Civil Tentative Rulings

Amended November 10, 2026

                           

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-006262 - PACIFIC CLAIMS MANAGEMENT vs DUARTE NURSERY INC – a) Defendants Green Valley Labor, INC. and Samuel Valero's for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication to Complaint in Intervention CONTINUED TO NOVEMBER 13, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21. b) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication Against the Complaint and Causes of Action Therein of Plaintiff Gilberto Magana Mora - CONTINUED IN PART TO NOVEMBER 13, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 21. DENIED as MOOT as to ISSUES TWO AND THREE. c) Defendants Green Valley Labor, INC. and Samuel Valero's for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication to Complaint in Intervention – DENIED as MOOT.

a) The Court continues the matter to November 13, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21 and apologizes for the delay.

b) As to Issues Two and Three addressing the Second and Third Causes of Action, it appears those were ordered dismissed with prejudice in 2024. Only issue one remains. The Court continues the matter to November 13, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21 and apologizes for the delay.

c) DROPPED as MOOT. The parties have resolved this portion of the case. 

CV-23-006601 - BETBABANTA, JAYDEN vs TURLOCK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT – a) Defendant Turlock Unified School District's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Perform a Demonstration at a Resumed Videotaped Deposition - GRANTED with sanctions issued b) Defendant Turlock Unified School District's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Appear for Completion of Deposition on a Date Certain – GRANTED, with reduced sanctions.

a) For the reasons below, Defendant’s motion to compel Plaintiff to perform a demonstration at a videotaped deposition is GRANTED. The continued deposition shall occur on or before November 24, 2026. The Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,624.50 against Plaintiff and his attorney of record, jointly and severally. The Court will modify and sign the proposed order.

On October 1, 2026, Defendant Turlock Unified School District (the “District”) filed a motion to compel plaintiff to perform a demonstration at a resumed videotaped deposition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480 on the grounds that Plaintiff, on his counsel’s advice, declined to answer a proper deposition question. Plaintiff timely opposed and Defendant timely replied.

The issue is whether Plaintiff should be compelled to tie a knot at a deposition. Plaintiff brought the instant case against the District and others alleging that District personnel falsely accused him of committing a hate crime and later expelled him. Plaintiff does not dispute that on November 2, 2022, he tied a knot in a bungee cord and tossed it at the door of a teacher of African American heritage. However, Plaintiff contends that the bungee cord fell to the ground, after which a different student picked it up and hung it on the teacher’s door, where it resembled a noose. A central issue of the case is whether Plaintiff tied a basic version of a universal fishing knot, or what appeared to be a noose.

The District deposed Plaintiff on July 22, 2026. At the deposition, Defendant asked Plaintiff to tie a universal fishing knot onto a bungee cord like the one he tied on November 2, 2022. Plaintiff responded that he did not know if he was comfortable doing that. Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Warda, stated on the record that “if he finds it humiliating or overly oppressive, he’s permitted to deny doing it” and “there are limits, if it’s too upsetting for you and you can’t do it, don’t want to do it because it is too upsetting, you don’t have to do it.” (July 22, 2026 Deposition Transcript at pp. 80-81.) Plaintiff then declined to tie the knot because he didn’t want to do it again.

“If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480.)

The Supreme Court of California has held that a deponent’s obligation to answer questions “include[s] nonverbal as well as verbal responses at a videotaped deposition—which may require a deponent to perform a demonstration or reenactment at the request of a party.” (Emerson Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1111–1112.)

Here, the parties agree that Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480 generally requires a deponent to perform a demonstration or reenactment if asked to do so during a deposition. Plaintiff’s refusal to tie the knot because he just did not want to do it, was improper. Plaintiff testified at the deposition that he could try to tie the knot, that he tied a fishing knot often, that he tied the fishing knot “[t]he same way I tied a fishing knot as always,” and also described how to tie the knot. (July 22, 2026 Deposition Transcript at pp. 47-49.) Yet when asked to tie the knot, he refused. At the deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel did not assert that tying the knot was covered by privilege, work product, or similar protected interest. Nor did Plaintiff move for a protective order that the question constituted “unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420.)

In its opposition, Plaintiff does not identify any privilege, work product, or similar protected interest to justify his refusal to tie the knot at the deposition. Instead, the opposition states that Plaintiff expressed discomfort and pain associated with the knot. Plaintiff also states that there is already a color photograph of the bungee cord hanging from the teacher’s door. But Plaintiff cites no authority that a deponent can refuse to answer a question simply because the questioning relates to something depicted in a photograph. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that the color photograph depicts the bungee cord after another student handled the bungee cord by picking it up and hanging it on the teacher’s door. The demonstration is not unreasonably duplicative or cumulative under Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.030(a)(1). Nor is there any undue burden, expense, or intrusiveness in Plaintiff tying a knot he testified that he tied often and described in detail. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020.)

Sanctions

Defendant seeks sanctions for 8.9 hours of attorney time at the rate of $295.00 per hour for a total amount of $2,624.50.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480.)

“[D]eponents [should] not be prevented by counsel from answering a question unless it pertains to privileged matters or deposing counsel’s conduct has reached a stage where suspension is warranted.” (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015 disapproved of on other grounds by Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group, Inc. (2026) 20 Cal.5th 91).

Plaintiff’s counsel directed Plaintiff not to answer the question without asserting any applicable privilege or valid objection and did not move for a protective order. Further, the knot-tying demonstration was a clear effort to gain relevant information via legally appropriate means.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.480, the Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,624.50 against Plaintiff and his attorney of record, jointly and severally. Plaintiff and his attorney are to pay the sanctions to Leone Alberts & Duus within 20 days of service of the signed order.

b)

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel Plaintiff to appear for completion of deposition on a date certain. The continued deposition shall occur on or before November 24, 2026. The Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,220.00 against Plaintiff and its attorney of record, jointly and severally. The Court will modify and sign the proposed order.

Plaintiff cancelled several noticed deposition dates, failed to appear for a noticed deposition on October 21, 2026, agreed to a date of October 29, 2026, and then refused to appear on the basis that there was a pending motion to compel, and refused to appear on any later date. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s invitation to consider the matter as a whole; the delay to determine the knot-tying order had some justification, but the other failures did not.

Sanctions

Defendant requests sanctions for 10.8 hours of attorney time at the rate of $295.00 per hour for a total amount of $3,186.00 in bringing the instant motion. Defendant also requests the reporter and videographer costs for the October 21,2026 nonappearance of $1,745.00.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480.)

The Court reduces the requested fees to five hours of attorney time. At the rate of $295.00 per hour, the amount is $1,475.00 plus the costs for the nonappearance in the amount of $1,745.00.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.480, the Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,220.00 against Plaintiff and his attorney of record, jointly and severally. Plaintiff and his attorney are to pay the sanctions to Leone Alberts & Duus within 20 days of service of the signed order.

The district raises in their reply brief the issue of due dates for any summary judgment motion. That matter is not properly before the Court.

CV-26-004282 - ABBOTT, MICHAEL KELLY vs BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS STATE OF CALIFORNIA - Petitioner's Motion to Compel Filing of Administrative Record – DENIED.

On September 29, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion to compel filing of complete record and compliance with redaction order. On October 13, 2026, Respondent opposed.

Petitioner argues that portions of the administrative record—specifically, certain portions in exhibits 9, 10, and 11—have been removed and that the record is incomplete. The allegations of incompleteness are not entirely clear, but the Court reviewed the video evidence and was unable to locate the alleged 119 single second redactions. But even if it were to do so, Respondent is correct that the burden to produce the administrative record is on Petitioner, and the apparent request for Respondent to locate the missing seconds and provide them has no legal basis.

If there is nothing missing from what was used at the administrative hearing, then there is nothing missing from the administrative record.

Petitioner argues that not all of Patient A’s information has been redacted and/or sealed. This Court previously directed counsel to submit a sealing order to the Court regarding Patient A on May 19, 2026. Petitioner lodged the exhibits on or about August 14, 2026, but did not submit an order to seal. Based on the filings, it appears that at least Exhibits 9b, 10b, 10c, and 10d should be sealed. Petitioner is directed to submit a proposed order to seal any documents with Patient A’s personally identifying information, specifically identifying those documents and locations on those documents which should be sealed.

CV-26-005566 - MILLER, LETOMA R vs OLLIVIERRE, LISA LYNN LEWIS - Petitioner Letoma R. Miller's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs Against Respondent Lisa Lynn Lewis Ollivierre - CONTINUED on the Court’s motion to November 18, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 23.

Because Judge Tong presided over the hearing in this matter, and the awarding of attorney fees is entirely discretionary, the proper department to hear this is Department 23.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-23-004628 - COUGHLIN, SAMANTHA vs FRESHPOINT CENTRAL CALIFORNIA INC - Compliance Hearing - DROPPED.

 

On October 27, 2026, the Settlement Administrator submitted a supplemental declaration stating that unclaimed funds in the amount of $6,717.60 remain uncashed after the deadline. The uncashed funds in the amount of $6,717.60 were sent to the State Controller’s Office – Unclaimed Property Fund on October 24, 2026.

 

As it appears that all payment obligations regarding the settlement agreement have now been fulfilled, the compliance hearing is DROPPED.

CV-25-010960 - TADEO, SILVERIO vs PEAHI BAY LLC – a) Defendant's Demurrer to First Amended Complaint – SUSTAINED in part, and OVERRULED in part; b) Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint – GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part

a-b) For the reasons below, the demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend; and the demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED. Any amended complaint to be filed within 15 days of service of notice of the signed order. The Court was unable to locate a proposed order in the Court file. Moving party is directed to submit a proposed order within five court days that comports with this ruling. Defendant to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

Because the demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained, the motion to strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court STRIKES from the First Amended Complaint all damages, attorney fees, and costs sought in connection with the first cause of action only. The Court was unable to locate a proposed order in the Court file. Moving party is directed to submit a proposed order within five court days that comports with this ruling. Defendant to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

On September 24, 2026, Defendant filed the instant demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). On October 23, 2026, Plaintiff timely opposed and Defendant timely replied.

First cause of action for Elder Abuse

Defendant argues that the FAC fails to allege any specific act or any specific omission to act that was carried out with recklessness, malice, oppression, or fraud. Defendant also argues there are no allegations describing failures in care or training of staff to meet Plaintiff’s basic needs and that the FAC fails to plead employer liability as required by Civil Code section 3294.

To state a claim for neglect within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act, a “plaintiff must allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) facts establishing that the defendant: (1) had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care [Citations]; (2) knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs [Citations]; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult’s basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness) [Citations]. The plaintiff must also allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) that the neglect caused the elder or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain or mental suffering. [Citations.]. Finally, the facts constituting the neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury ‘must be pleaded with particularity,’ in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory claims. [Citations.]” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406–407, as modified (Aug. 24, 2011).)

“An employer shall not be liable for damages . . . based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294.)

Here, the FAC fails to plead sufficient facts to state an elder abuse claim against Defendant River View itself. Allegations that a Defendant “was chronically understaffed, and did not adequately train the staff it did have . . . are not sufficient to render [the Defendant’s] conduct in failing to provide adequate staffing anything more than professional negligence.” (Worsham v. O'Connor Hospital (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 331, 338.) Instead, the FAC pleads conduct by certain unnamed staff members. Specifically, the FAC alleges that staff failed to provide aid in the consumption of food and fluids, failed to provide aid with toileting and hygiene, failed to supervise Plaintiff’s skin, and failed to provide aid in ambulation, bed mobility, repositioning, and pressure relief. “To recover against an employer, the plaintiff must meet the standards in Civil Code section 3294 for the imposition of punitive damages on an employer based on the acts of an employee.” (Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 81, 88.)

The FAC does not contain facts sufficient to plead employer liability. The FAC fails to identify any managing agent or conduct by a managing agent that would satisfy Civil Code section 3294. Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to strike argues that Defendant had notice of “severe and chronic deficiencies in staffing, training, and supervision” yet chose “not to supplement its staffing or train or supervise them.” (Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Strike, pp. 6-7.) But the opposition does not contain citations to paragraphs in the FAC alleging such notice and the Court was unable to find any. Further, Plaintiff cites no authority that notice of mere staffing and training deficiencies are sufficient to satisfy Civil Code section 3294. The instant matter is distinguishable from Delaney, where “[t]he neglect occurred despite plaintiff’s persistent complaints to nursing staff, administration, and finally, to a nursing home ombudsman” and the “facility had been [previously] cited for neglect by the Department of Health Services.” (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 27.)

Accordingly, Defendant River View’s demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED. It is not clear that leave to amend is futile, and thus leave to amend is GRANTED. Any amended complaint shall be filed within 15 days of notice.

Third cause of action for Violation of Patients’ Bill of Rights

Defendant argues that the FAC fails to plead facts supporting the allegations that Defendant violated any of Plaintiff’s statutory rights.

“Section 1430, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part, ‘A current or former resident or patient of a skilled nursing facility ... may bring a civil action against the licensee of a facility who violates any rights of the resident or patient as set forth in the Patients Bill of Rights in Section 72527 of Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations, or any other right provided for by federal or state law or regulation.’ (Italics added.)” (Lemaire v. Covenant Care California, LLC (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 860, 864.).

The FAC contains sufficient facts supporting the allegation that Defendant violated at least rights specified in Health and Safety Code, section 1599.1.

Accordingly, Defendant River View’s demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

CV-26-007399 - LOUREIRO, DAVID J vs KEENSTAR AMERICA INVENSTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION - Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction - DENIED without prejudice. 

On October 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Amended Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction. There is no opposition on file.

The motion is procedurally improper. The record does not reflect that Defendants have appeared in the instant action. Accordingly, Plaintiff is required to obtain and serve an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) rather than proceed by noticed motion. “An OSC must be used . . . if the party against whom the preliminary injunction is sought has not appeared in the action. If the responding party has not appeared, the OSC must be served in the same manner as a summons and complaint.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1150.)

In addition, it is not clear that the correct papers have been served on Defendant. The proofs of service filed on October 21, 2026, indicate that Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion papers were personally served on Defendants on October 16, 2026. But Plaintiff withdrew its September 15, 2025 Notice and Motion and filed an Amended Notice of Motion and Motion on October 12, 2026. The proofs of service do not indicate that the “amended” papers were served.

Accordingly, the Court does not reach the merits in this ruling. However, the Court notes that it does not appear Plaintiff has submitted the recorded easement. Instead, Plaintiff appears to have attached a title report stating the existence of a recorded easement.

PR-24-000475 - Estate of ZAMORA, RAUL ARRIAGA - Petitioner's Motion to Grant Full Authority - GRANTED, and unopposed.

The unopposed motion of Administrator with Will Annexed Raul Zamora Jr. to be given full authority under the Independent Administration of Estates Act is GRANTED.

Petitioner has submitted bond waivers signed by all interested parties but has also requested that the current bond in the amount of $20,000 remain in place.

The clerk’s office is instructed to reject the current proposed order. Petitioner is directed to submit a new proposed order that includes the following corrections: (1) the order is to be marked “FIRST AMENDED”; (2) item 2c(2) needs to indicate that the will dated 3/31/17 was admitted to probate per minute order dated 9/11/24.

At the accounting status report review hearing scheduled for November 10, 2026, the Court will also set a review hearing for the filing of a Judicial Council form MC-355 that reflects the actual amount to be deposited into the blocked account at Bank of Stockton in Modesto, California, and for the filing of Judicial Council MC-356 form signed by the bank.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-001200 - BELL, WILLIAM vs BENHAM, CHRISTOPHER - Plaintiff's Motion to Lift Stay and Restore Case to the Active Civil Calendar – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on the documentation submitted in support of Plaintiff’s request herein, the Court finds that the stay due to bankruptcy proceedings has been terminated by the dismissal of the bankruptcy petition. (11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B).) The instant case is returned to the active civil calendar and is set for a hearing on the Court’s Motion to Dismiss on March 12, 2027 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

Plaintiff shall serve and submit a proposed order reflecting the Court’s ruling herein. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1312.)

CV-25-000047 GERVERGIS, DAVID vs PERFORMANCE COMPANIES LLC - Defendants' Motion for Protective Excusing Defendants from Responding to the Six Additional Sets of Discovery and 526 Additional Discovery Requests Served on by Plaintiffs on 7/14/26; Imposition of Monetary Sanctions of $4,780 as Against Plaintiff and his Attorney Ben Robert – DENIED, as untimely.

A motion for a protective order should be made promptly (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.090(a)), i.e., within the 30-day period for answering interrogatories. (See, e.g. Willis v. Superior Court (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 277, 289 n.5.) 

The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendants’ Responses to this discovery, finding that Defendants failed to timely respond to the same and all objections have been waived.

CV-25-011530 - DIAZ, KIMBERLY vs BLYTHE, HOLLY YVETTE - Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Non-Party In-N-Out Burgers to Comply to Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records Request for Monetary Sanctions – DENIED.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the subpoena placed at issue by Plaintiff’s motion appears to designate a different production date than that purportedly served on the non-party deponent on 4-13-26.  While Plaintiff’s additional reply brief now concedes counsel’s error in that regard, the Court has concerns arising from this discrepancy and whether a clear and accurate description of the underlying facts has been presented herein. All counsel are reminded that, as officers of the court, they owe a duty of candor with regard to their handling of proceedings before it. (See, e.g. Levine v. Berschneider (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 916, 921.)

In any case, the Court finds that the production date reflected in either version of the subpoena at issue failed to reflect compliance with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 2020.410(c) herein, making the subpoena ineffective to require production on the designated date(s). Plaintiff’s motion is, therefore, denied on this ground.

Under the circumstances, the Court has not reached the merits of the parties’ substantive arguments as to the scope and nature of the information sought by Plaintiff herein.  However, the Court notes that both sides indicate willingness to work toward a compromise on these issues, such that it appears that an informal resolution may be possible in connection with a properly issued subpoena. The Court urges the parties to work together in good faith toward that end and to demonstrate genuine efforts in that regard should future law and motion proceedings become necessary.

CV-26-001187 - LIMA, JOCELYN vs EAST BAY HC RESOURCE - Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff's Individual PAGA Claim and to Stay Plaintiff's Representative Paga Claim - HEARING REQUIRED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-23-003668 - RHINEY, TIMOTHY LAMONTE, Jr vs RAMIREZ, JOSE MIGUEL - Defendant Jose Miguel Ramirez' Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Propounded on Plaintiff Admitted; Request for Sanctions - GRANTED.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.250 (a):"[w]ithin 30 days after service of requests for admissions, the party to whom the requests are directed shall serve the original of the response to them on the requesting party..."

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 provides that if a party to whom requests for admission have been directed fails to timely respond, that party waives any objections to the requests and the matters specified in the requests may be deemed admitted.

The statute has no meet and confer requirement where no responses have been served. (See St. Mary v. Superior Court, (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762).  Furthermore, there is no deadline to file a motion to deem requests for admissions admitted.

The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to timely respond to Defendant/Cross Complainant’s Request to Deem Admissions Admitted, Set One, propounded on May 26, 2026, in spite of an extension granted by Defendant/Cross Complainant’s Counsel, without substantial justification.  Therefore, Defendant/Cross Complainant’s motion is granted.

Accordingly, all objections to said Requests for Admissions by Plaintiff are hereby waived. Code of Civil Procedure §2033.280(a). Furthermore, Defendant/Cross Complainant’s said Request for Admissions, Set One, are hereby deemed admitted for all purposes including trial.    Civ Proc. Code §§.2033.010, 2033.020, 2033.250, 2033.280; St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762).

Monetary sanctions of $215.00 are hereby imposed against Plaintiff for Defendant/Cross Complainant’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting this motion. Code of Civ. Proc., § 2033.280 (b) and (c).

CV-24-009165 - PADILLA, LAZARO HERNANDEZ vs ALL I DO IS WING INC - Plaintiff's Motion for PAGA Approval of Representative Action Settlement – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court is inclined to find that good cause exists for the Court to find the settlement agreement between the parties is reasonably fair and adequate and accomplishes the objectives of the Private Attorney General Act.  (Lab. Code, § 2699 (e)(2) and (l)).

However, the Court requires input from counsel as to why the LWDA/Aggrieved Employees penalty percentage distribution is calculated at 75%-25%, and not 65%-35%. 

The Settlement Agreement provides that “LWDA PAGA Payment” means the 75% of the PAGA Penalties paid to the LWDA under Labor Code section 2699(i), and that the “PAGA Penalties” means the total amount of PAGA civil penalties to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount, allocated 25% to the Aggrieved Employees and 75% to LWDA in settlement of PAGA claims.  Declaration of Alexa R. Guzman in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of Representative Action Settlement, Exhibit 1, the Joint Stipulation Settlement Agreement, page 3, section 1.15, lines 26 – 27; and page 4, section 1.23, lines 19 – 21.

In the Notice of Motion and Motion for Approval of Representative Action Settlement, it is stated that “…the estimated PAGA Penalties total $190,606.57, of which seventy-five percent, or $142,954.93, shall be paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), and twenty-five percent, or $47,651.64, shall be paid to the Aggrieved Employees.” See Notice of Motion and Motion for Approval of Representative Action Settlement, page 3, line 19, through page 4, line 2.

The Court believes that the correct split should be 65%-35%.

Labor Code section § 2699 (m) provides:

“Except as provided in subdivision (n), civil penalties recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 65 percent to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency for enforcement of labor laws, including the administration of this part, and for education of employers and employees about their rights and responsibilities under this code, to be continuously appropriated to supplement and not supplant the funding to the agency for those purposes; and 35 percent to the aggrieved employees.”

Labor Code section § 2699(v)(1) provides that except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendments made to this section by the act adding this subdivision shall apply to a civil action brought on or after June 19, 2204.

Labor Code section §2699(v(2) provides:

“The amendments made to this section by the act adding this subdivision shall not apply to a civil action with respect to which the notice required by subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), paragraph (1) of subdivision (b), or subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 2699.3 was filed before June 19, 2024.

A review of the moving papers shows that the Notice was submitted to the LWDA and served on the defendants on June 20, 2024, which is a day after the above stated deadline. See Notice of Motion and Motion for Approval of Representative Action Settlement, page 4, lines 16 – 18.

Thus, it appears that the correct LWDA /Aggrieved Employee distribution is 65%-35%, not 75%-25%, and that therefore the estimated PAGA penalties of $190,606.57 should be split as follows: $123,894.27 (65%) to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), and $66,712.30 (35%) to the Aggrieved Employees.

CV-24-007462 - HERRERA, YOSSILYN O vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO INC - Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant's Person(s) Most Qualified and Production of Documents – GRANTED.

Plaintiff has established that the requested testimony and documents concerning the Subject Vehicle, its warranties and repairs, Defendant’s handling of Plaintiff’s repurchase request, Defendant’s applicable warranty and repurchase policies, and substantially similar defects and complaints are relevant and discoverable. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2017.010, 2025.230, 2025.450; Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051; Krotin v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 294, 303; Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334; Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967; Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191, 1198.)

A party objecting to discovery on grounds of burdensomeness and oppression bears the affirmative burden of supplying specific, factual evidence to support those objections quantum of work required — conclusory assertions are insufficient to sustain either ground. West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County, (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407. Defendant’s opposition does not offer declarations from records custodians, technical personnel, or discovery vendors identifying the basis of the claimed burden and oppression.

Therefore, Defendant’s objections to said deposition and document production based on relevance, overbreadth, burden, and oppression are without merit.  Accordingly, Defendant shall produce a properly prepared PMQ and responsive nonprivileged documents for all matters of examination requested in Plaintiff’s deposition notice.

Discovery concerning other vehicles or consumers is limited to the same or substantially similar defects, symptoms, components, and vehicle platforms implicated by Plaintiff’s claims. Any claim of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection must be supported by sufficient factual information and, where necessary, a privilege log. Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (c); Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181; Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1116.

The parties shall meet and confer to agree on complete document production and the PMQ deposition sufficiently ahead of January 14, 2027, to permit Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to use the discovery in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication.

The Court notes Defendant’s claims of an administrative error regarding the scheduling of the PMQ deposition. However, Plaintiff’s based on Defendant’s largely unsubstantiated objections to the deposition at issue, monetary sanctions of $750 are imposed on Defendant for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees and cost incurred in bringing this motion. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2023.010; 2023.030(a) and 2031.310(h).

Plaintiff shall submit a proposed order conforming to this ruling no later than November 18, 2026.

CV-25-004133 - MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT INC vs FIGUEROA, MONICA - Defendant's Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - DENIED, without prejudice.

Alexander Penley of Cordoba Legal Group, attorney for Defendant Monica Figueroa in this debt collection matter seeks leave of the Court to withdraw as Counsel for his client herein. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 284 permits an attorney to be changed in a matter “at any time before or after judgment or final determination……upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.” 

Counsel’s supporting declaration attests to service of the motion papers at the client’s last known address by mail.  However, Counsel attests to being unable to confirm that the client’s address is current or to locate a more current address after mailing the motion papers to the client’s las know address return receipt requested.  Counsel’s declaration does not state what the exact outcome of the return receipt mailing attempt was. While Counsel attests to his inability to confirm the client’s address, it does not appear that Counsel has taken other steps to confirm the client’s current address such as the use of a people search engine/ tracing service.  Counsel also did not make any attempt to call the client or contact others familiar with the client.  These are all options indicated on Form MC-052.

Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1362 makes clear that the attorney must affirmatively attest to facts showing the address is current — confirmed within 30 days — and that the absence of a returned mailing is insufficient standing alone. Where counsel cannot confirm the current address, the rule provides an alternative: counsel must attest that the address is the last known address and that reasonable efforts to locate a more current address were made within the 30-day period.  Counsel has not demonstrated the required diligence in confirming the client’s address, which, as previously noted by the Court, is an affirmative investigation obligation that must be satisfied prior to filing the motion.

Therefore, the motion is denied, without prejudice.  

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***