Civil Tentative Rulings

July 16, 2026

The following are the tentative ruling for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 21***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-25-012548 – PRIETO, MARIA DE vs FCA US LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 871.26 and Request for Monetary Sanctions – DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

On June 15, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel initial disclosures pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26 and request for monetary sanctions in the amount of $2500.00 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26(j)(1). On July 2, 2026, Defendant filed an opposition. There is no reply in the court file. The motion to compel is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Moving party to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms with this ruling.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not provided written responses accompanied by verifications pursuant to the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.090. Nothing in section 821.26 requires signed verifications nor does Plaintiff provide any authority linking the verifications of section 2016.090 to section 821.26. Nonetheless, Defendant serviced a verified Initial Disclosures pleading on June 10, 2026. Likewise, Plaintiff has provided no authority to support its argument that Defendant must produce all documents in its DealerCONNECT database for the subject vehicle.

Plaintiff argues that the following items must be produced pursuant to section 871.26(h): Trouble Not Found (“TNF”) visits; AutoPay flash/reprogram claims; all warranty claims paid under both the 85-41-XX-XX prefix and the 08-19-XX-40 series for the Subject VIN; Technical Service Bulletins (“TSBs”); Informational Service Bulletins (“ISBs”); recall records; and all service manuals for the Subject vehicle. Defendant does not dispute that the requested documents are required by the statute but rather argues that it is not required to turnover all documents in its databases. The Court finds that the requested documents fall within the scope of section 871.26(h). It appears that Defendant possesses such records and can easily identify them within its internal systems by searching the Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”) of the subject vehicle.

The motion to compel is DENIED in part as to the request for verification and the request for production of the entirety of the DealerCONNECT database for the subject vehicle. Upon reviewing the relevant facts in this matter, the Court declines to issue sanctions.

The motion to compel is GRANTED in part as to the remaining requests for relief. Within 30 days of this ruling, Defendant shall conduct a VIN-based search of all internal systems identified in the instant motion and provide a verified certification that the search was completed; Defendant shall produce all warranty transaction history, unverified complaint claims, AutoPay claims, LOP 85-41-XX-XX diagnostic claims, and LOP 08-19-XX-40 module reset claims for the subject vehicle; Defendant shall produce all Technical Service Bulletins (TSBs), Informational Service Bulletins (ISBs), safety recalls, emissions recalls, Customer Satisfaction Notifications (CSNs), and Rapid Service Updates (RSUs) applicable to the Subject Vehicle; and Defendant shall produce all service manuals reasonably related to the nonconformities pertaining to the subject vehicle, including manuals for every system or component that was diagnosed, attempted to be diagnosed, or repaired.

PR-25-000262 – Estate of LOCKARD, DENNIS J – Petitioner Kelsey Wood's Motion to Strike Slapp Suit by Respondents and for Attorney Fees – DENIED.

Respondents move to strike the Second Cause of Action for Double Damages under Probate Code § 859, the Fifth Cause of Action for Financial Elder Abuse, and portions of the prayer for relief.

An anti‑SLAPP motion is evaluated under a two‑step process. First, the moving party must establish that the challenged claims arise from protected activity—i.e., acts in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition or free speech, including statements or writings made in judicial proceedings or in connection with issues under review by a court. If that burden is met, the analysis proceeds to step two, where the burden shifts to the plaintiff or petitioner to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits by presenting legally sufficient claims supported by admissible evidence. (See Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)

Courts construe protected activity broadly at step one. (See Brodeur v. Atlas Entertainment, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 [“[I}t is … beyond dispute that the anti-SLAPP statute, including the scope of the term “public interest,” is to be construed broadly.”].)

But in determining the first prong, courts focus on the acts supplying the elements of liability, not merely evidence that may support liability. (See Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 [“[I]n ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.”]; see also Gaynor v. Bulen (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 864, 869 [“To trigger anti-SLAPP protection, the moving party has the initial burden to show the plaintiff alleges constitutionally-protected activity and the claim arises from this activity.”] [emphasis in original].)

Respondents have failed to satisfy the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The challenged causes of action do not arise primarily from Respondents' protected legal activity. Although the Petition references rejection of a creditor's claim and denial of liability, the purported liability-producing conduct consists largely of the alleged taking, retention, concealment, disposal, and control of estate property. The gravamen of the challenged claims comprises noncommunicative conduct involving estate assets, not protected legal activity.

Because Respondents fail to satisfy the first prong, the Court need not reach the second prong. Nonetheless, the Court notes that Petitioner has submitted sufficient allegations and evidentiary material to demonstrate at least minimal merit for purposes of an anti-SLAPP analysis.

For the foregoing reasons, the request to strike the Second Cause of Action, Fifth Cause of Action, and related prayer allegations is DENIED.

Respondents' request for attorney fees is correspondingly DENIED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-22-002266 – MOMENI, SASAN vs MALAK, PIERRE – Plaintiff’s Motion for Good Faith Settlement – HEARING REQUIRED.

Counsel shall appear to address the issue of Mr. Abpikar’s claim of ownership in the subject real property.

CV-25-011292 – HILL, TALIA ALEXANDRA vs CASTANEDA, HANNAH ELAINE – Plaintiff’s Talia Alexandra Hill’s Motion to Compel Hannah Elaine Castaneda’s Further Discovery Responses to Request for Admissions, Set One; Request for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $2,816.75 Against Defendant and/or Defendant’s Attorney of Record – DENIED.

The Code finds that the subject responses are sufficient pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220 and contain appropriate explanatory information as to why Defendant is unable to admit or deny the subject requests.

The Court further finds that Defendant is entitled to monetary sanctions for Plaintiff’s unsuccessful motion pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.290(d). There, the Court awards $750 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel, payable to defense counsel.

CV-26-001860 – SELFHELP ENTERPRISES vs NORTHEAST TERRITORIES PATTERSON LLC – Defendant 50 Fathom Curve LLC’s Demurrer to Amended Complaint – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to August 28, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The matter is continued to be heard concurrently with the co-defendant’s demurrer scheduled for hearing on 8-28-26.  In the meantime, the parties are instructed to continue meet-and-confer efforts in an attempt to resolve or narrow the issues presented herein. Defense counsel shall submit a supplemental declaration detailing those efforts and the results thereof no later than August 20, 2026.

In addition, the Court notes an additional demurrer, submitted by Defendant Hartley Patterson, LLP, which is set for hearing on August 4, 2026.  The Court intends to likewise CONTINUED that hearing, as above. Counsel for Harley Patterson, LLP is likewise expected to continue meet-and-confer efforts in good faith in advance of the continued hearing date and to submit a supplemental declaration before the continued hearing.

CV-26-003769 – GENESIS FAMILY ENTERPRISES INC vs GERRARD, FRANK WALTER – Petitioner’s Petition for Judicial Declaration of Abandonment – HEARING REQUIRED.

Despite the Court’s grant of a continuance at Petitioner’s request at the time of the last hearing,  Petitioner has apparently failed to cure the procedural deficiencies with regard to service of the petition herein. Specifically, proof of service of the petition fails to demonstrate compliance with the service requirements of Civ. Code § 798.61(c).  In addition, the address contained on the proof of service for the petition as to Respondents Gerrard and Wilhelm appears to be incomplete, as no space number is indicated.

Petitioner’s counsel shall appear to address the status of the petition in view of these deficiencies.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David Hood in Department 24:

CV-25-002051 – RODRIGUEZ, JAVANNA vs LA PARRILLA INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement; (2) Approval to Notice to Class Members; (3) Approval of Settlement Administrator; and (4) Setting Hearing for Final Approval of Settlement – GRANTED.  

Based on a review of the moving papers, Court finds good cause to order as follows:

The Settlement class is certified for settlement purposes only in accordance with Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.769(c).

The proposed settlement is within the range of reasonableness and deemed to be presumptively valid, subject to any objections that may be heard at the final fairness hearing and subject to final approval by this Court. 

The class counsel, class representative and claims administrator are hereby preliminarily approved and appointed as set forth in the motion. The Court sets the following deadlines relative to this matter:

8-19-26	Defendant shall provide Class Information to Administrator.
9-11-26	Administrator shall mail Class Notice to Class Members.
11-13-26	Class Deadline for Submission of Opt-Out Notices, Objections or Workweek Disputes.
11-20-26	Deadline for Class Counsel to file Motion for Final Approval and submit due diligence declaration from Administrator.

A final fairness hearing in this matter shall be set for December 18, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 24 of this Court.  The Class Notice shall be revised to reflect the date of the final fairness hearing and the corresponding deadlines.

CV-25-002580 – RUIZ, JOSE RUIZ vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – Plaintiff Jose Ruiz’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Demand for Inspection and Production of Documents, Set One, Request for Sanctions – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

In view of the parties’ failure to comply with the Court’s prior order requiring the parties to engage in further meet and confer, and to submit a Joint Status Statement to the Court, this matter is further continued to August 18, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24. 

The Court also sets an OSC re Sanctions for August 18, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 as to both counsel, due to the failure of both counsel to obey the Court’s prior order.  

CV-25-012491 – FRELIX, ANTONIO vs OAKLAND MOTOR CARS INC – Defendant’s Petition to Compel Arbitration, Dismiss Putative Class Claims, and Stay Proceedings – GRANTED.

The Court finds that Defendant has discharged its burden of demonstrating evidence of a written agreement between the parties regarding the present dispute according to the terms of the arbitration between Plaintiff and Oakland Motor Cars Co, executed by Plaintiff on December 30, 2024.  Brockman v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. (2025) 114 Cal. App. 5th 569, reh'g denied Oct. 16, 2025; Gamboa, v NorthEast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 158; Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transp. (2022) 75 Cal. App. 5th 748.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of an executed arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Oakland Motor Cars Co. covering the present dispute. 

A procedural unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion. Swain v. LaserAway Med. Grp., Inc. (2020), 57 Cal. App. 5th 59, as modified (Nov. 3, 2020). However, procedural unconscionability alone does not invalidate a contract but requires courts to closely scrutinize the substantive terms to ensure they are not manifestly unfair or one-sided. OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal. 5th 111, 447; Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC (2026) 120 Cal. App. 5th 91.

Furthermore, when there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, the degree of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low, and the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of substantive unconscionability is high. Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 771. Notably, the degree of unfairness required for unconscionability of an arbitration agreement must be as rigorous and demanding for arbitration clauses as for any other contract clause. OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra.

The court finds, to the extent that the arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion, that it exhibits a baseline, low degree of procedural unconscionability. Swain v. LaserAway Med. Grp., Inc. (2020) 57 Cal. App. 5th 59, as modified (Nov. 3, 2020).

Evidence of lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, and/or surprise, where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form would support a finding of procedural unconscionability. Swain v. LaserAway Med. Grp., Inc. (2020) 57 Cal. App. 5th 59, as modified (Nov. 3, 2020).

Among the court’s considerations in determining whether a contract was procedurally unconscionable, in addition to the issue of adhesion, is the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision. The court finds here that the arbitration agreement is included on the 6^th page of an 8-page Vehicle Salesperson Compensation Program, has its own subheading in bold capitals and is quite lengthy, comprising a single paragraph of about 63 lines, covering about a page and a half of writing overall, with regular sized font containing legal jargon. However, apart from the provision that lists the types of disputes subject to arbitration, the remaining sentences of the arbitration agreement are not unduly long and are written in easy-to-understand sentences. Additionally, Plaintiff’s execution of three arbitration agreements with Defendant prior to the one at issue does not support a finding of surprise. Overall, the court finds that the arbitration agreement at issue supports a low to moderate degree of procedural unconscionability.

The ultimate issue in every case of substantive unconscionability is whether the terms of the contract are sufficiently unfair, in view of all relevant circumstances, that a court should withhold enforcement. Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal. 5th 478. As to substantive unconscionability, the court finds a lack of substantive unconscionability herein.

Specifically, the agreement provides for adequate discovery and does not impose unreasonable costs as a condition of access to the arbitration forum. Haydon v. Elegance at Dublin (2023) 97 Cal. App. 5th 1280. Additionally, due to the express application of said Code of Civil Procedure § 1284.2 and Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate an inability to pay any potentially applicable arbitration fees or costs, the court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that said fee provision of the California Arbitration Act is substantively unconscionable.  Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc. (2003), 114 Cal. App. 4th 77, modified on denial of rehearing; Haydon v. Elegance at Dublin, (2023) 97 Cal. App. 5th 1280.

According to the parties’ arbitration agreement, only individual claims may be arbitrated. Moreover, in light of the Viking River Cruises followed by the California Supreme Court decision in Adolph v. Uber Techs., Inc., it seems clear that Plaintiff’s individual Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) claims may be compelled to arbitration under the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement and in line with California’s policy of permitting individual PAGA claims to be severed and compelled to arbitration. Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S. Ct. 1906, reh'g denied, 143 S. Ct. 6; Adolph v. Uber Techs., Inc. (2023) 14 Cal. 5th 1104. Furthermore, as held by Adolph v Uber Technologies, an aggrieved employee retains standing to pursue a representative PAGA action even after arbitrating his individual claims. Adolph v Uber Techs Inc. (2023) 14 Cal. 5^th 1104. 

Plaintiff’s contentions as to the existence of a confidentiality provision herein are without merit. Civil Code § 47 (b) is also known as the official proceeding privilege and it applies to any communication: (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action. Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal. App. 4th 256. This is distinguishable from Plaintiff’s contentions as to confidentiality which are inapplicable here.

Plaintiff’s claims as to substantive unconscionability based on the arbitration of harassment claims  which would include sexual harassment claims covered by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA 9 USC section 401 and 402), which contains a prohibition on pre-dispute arbitration agreements for sexual harassment claims, are without merit as the statute gives the party alleging sexual harassment the option to elect to proceed with their claims per the pre-dispute agreement in arbitration or not. 9 U.S.C.A. § 402

The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s Unfair Competition Law claims, causes of action 10 and 11 in the First Amended Complaint, do not seek injunctive relief but only declarative relief. Injunctive relief is sought as to the PAGA claim which, as above noted, is not prohibited from being pursued in a representative action in court. The claimed injunctive relief would therefore still be available to Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s’ argument in this regard is therefore without merit.

An entity seeking to compel arbitration must generally establish it was a party to an arbitration agreement. Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Grp., (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 539. Because arbitration is a matter of contract, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement generally cannot invoke it. Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co. (2025) 109 Cal. App. 5th 1196, review dismissed, cause remanded.

The arbitration agreement here was executed by Plaintiff and Defendant Oakland Motor Cars Inc.’s General Manager and President. None of the other Defendants were a party to or executed the arbitration agreement.

However, the agency exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it provides that a defendant may enforce the arbitration agreement, when a plaintiff alleges a defendant acted as an agent of a party to an arbitration agreement. Najarro v. Superior Ct. (2021) 70 Cal. App. 5th 871, as modified (Oct. 22, 2021).

The First Amended Complaint alleges that all the Defendants are agents, alter egos or employees of each other. To that extent, the agency exception would be applicable here and permits the non-signatory Defendants to enforce the arbitration agreement against Plaintiff herein.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel seeks to hold a non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration's applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory. Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 486, disapproved of by Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2025)17 Cal. 5th 1122; Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co. (2025) 109 Cal. App. 5th 1196, review dismissed, cause remanded. However, the application of this doctrine requires that the causes of action against the non-signatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations. The court finds that the causes of action against the non-signatory Defendants arise from the same facts (Defendants’ alleged Labor Code violations) and are inherently inseparable from the arbitrable claims against the signatory defendant. Equitable Estoppel is therefore applicable hereto to make Plaintiff’s claims against the non-signatory Defendants subject to arbitration.

In the absence of any substantively unconscionable provisions here, the Court finds that the arbitration agreement is enforceable and no severance is required. Civil Code § 1670.5; Ramirez v Charter Communications, supra; 9 U.S.C.A. § 2; Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.2

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is hereby granted.

Plaintiff’s individual claims are hereby compelled to arbitration, Plaintiff’s putative class claims are dismissed, and  this matter is stayed pending the conclusion of said arbitration. 9 U.S.C.A. § 3; Civ Proc. Code § 1281.4; Adolph v Uber Techs Inc. (2023) 14 Cal. 5^th 1104. 

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order by July 24, 2026, conforming to this ruling.

CV-25-008440 – VELOCITY INVESTMENTS LLC vs MORALES, SYLVIA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings – GRANTED, unopposed.

The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ. Proc. Code § 438(c)(1)(A); Apple Annie, LLC v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co. (2022) 82 Cal. App. 5th 919; Tung v. Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 Cal. 5th 734, 758-759.

Based on the pleadings filed herein, Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant’s Answer, the Moving Papers with supporting declaration, and Defendant’s failure to oppose this motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. Civil Procedure Code § 438 (c)(1)(A).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the pleadings is hereby granted for the sum of $2, 997.60.

The referenced Civil Code §§ 2983.4 and 1717 do not support the requested costs.  Claimed costs of $397.60 are therefore denied. 

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order no later than July 23, 2026, that conforms to the Court’s ruling.

CV-26-001460 – SNYDER, GLORIA vs RAMOS, COREY – Defendant’s Demurrer – MOOT.

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was not filed and served on or before the date Plaintiff’s Opposition to the demurrer was due: i.e. July 2, 2026.  Plaintiff’s Counsel’s declaration attests to service of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on Defendant’s Counsel prior to the date said First Amended Complaint was due and to a failure to file said Frist Amended Complaint with the Court prior to said deadline. Civ. Proc. Code § 472 (a).

To the extent that Plaintiff timely served Defendant’s Counsel with said First Amended Complaint but mistakenly failed to timely serve same with the court, and that Defendant does not oppose the untimely filing with the Court, the Court considers Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint properly filed and finds Defendant’s demurrer moot.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***