Civil Tentative Rulings

November 05, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-005997 – SANCHEZ, OSCAR vs TDSG LLC – Compliance Hearing – DROPPED.

As it appears that all payment obligations have been fulfilled, the compliance hearing is DROPPED. The Court will modify and sign the proposed order. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 384.5, the court directs the clerk to transmit a copy of the amended judgment along with the original judgment to the Judicial Council for completion of the report required by Section 68520 of the Government Code.

On October 29, 2026, the settlement administrator submitted a declaration stating that a total of $1,827.98 remains uncashed following the check cashing deadline. The settlement administrator shall hold the uncashed funds for one year from the date of notification, at which point it will then be able to transmit the unclaimed amounts in the Class Member’s name. All unclaimed property shall be distributed to the State by June 2027.

CV-25-006863 – C, M vs DOE 1 – Defendant Sylvan Union School District’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint – OVERRULED.

Defendant shall file and serve an answer within 10 days after service of notice. Plaintiff to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

On September 24, 2026, Defendant filed the instant demurrer. On October 23, 2026, Plaintiff timely opposed and Defendant timely replied.

“An action described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s 40^th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.11(c).)

The parties agree that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.11(c) applies to the first through fifth causes of action. Because the action was filed after Plaintiff’s 40^th birthday, the issue is whether Defendant “knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or [Defendant] failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.11(c).)

The Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges ultimate facts supporting a reasonable inference that Defendant knew, had reason to know, and/or was notified of misconduct creating a risk of childhood sexual assault prior to the alleged assault of Plaintiff. In particular, the SAC alleges that another student’s mother reported to a District Principal and District Vice Principal that Mr. Olson was sexually assaulting her child. (SAC, ¶ 31.) The SAC alleges that another student was sexually abused in 1975-1976, and that prior to and contemporaneous with that abuse, reports of Mr. Olson’s conduct were made known to Defendant. (SAC, ¶ 32.) The SAC further alleges that formal allegations were brought against Mr. Olson in or around 1978, and such allegations were made known to Defendant. (SAC, ¶ 36.)

Defendant argues that the allegations in the SAC are insufficient because the SAC does not identify the names of who made reports to the District, the names of to whom the reports were made, the exact dates the reports were made, or in what form the reports were made. The identities of the reporting persons and/or the persons to whom the reports were made, the exact dates of the reports, and the form of the reports are evidentiary details not required at the pleading stage. A “complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) Defendant relies heavily on Doe, but Doe does not support Defendant’s position. Instead, Doe found allegations that others knew of an alleged perpetrator’s tendencies, inter alia, was sufficient to support that “defendant had knowledge or notice of misconduct by [the alleged perpetrator] that created a risk of sexual exploitation.” (Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 551–52.) Here too, the allegations in the SAC are sufficient to support that defendant knew, had reason to know, or was notified of misconduct creating a risk of sexual assault.

In addition, the doctrine of less particularity is appropriate here because Defendant might be in possession of the evidentiary facts it argues are missing from the SAC. (Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 550–51.)

CV-26-000789 – AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK vs PHILLIPS, ALEXANDER – Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication - GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff is entitled to costs in the amount of $1,015.22. The Court will sign the proposed order and proposed judgment. Plaintiff to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

Governing Law

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish each element of the cause(s) of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849–850.) Once that burden is met, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Id.) Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, the moving party’s evidence is strictly construed and the opposing party’s evidence is liberally construed, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the opposing party. (Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 575.) However, when a motion is unopposed, and the movant’s evidence establishes each required element, summary judgment is appropriate. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

In addition to moving for summary judgment, “[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(2).)

Requests for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of 15 USC Section 1666 and 12 CFR Section 202.12. The federal statutes and regulations do not appear necessary to determination of the motion. Thus, judicial notice is unnecessary.

Merits

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. The complaint pleads a single cause of action for breach of contract. There is no opposition in the Court file.

“Establishing [a breach of contract] claim requires a showing of ‘(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.’ [Citations.]” (D'Arrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 790, 800.)

Plaintiff has met its prima facie burden of showing that there is no triable issue of fact as to breach of contract based on the cardmember agreement at issue, Plaintiff’s payments to all vendors for all charges on the account, Defendant’s failure to pay the balance due, and resulting damages to Plaintiff in the amount of $20,536.22. Because Defendant did not file an opposition, there is no contrary evidence raising a triable issue of material fact.

Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $20,536.22.

Costs

The same day it filed its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs on August 3, 2026.

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032.)

“Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1013.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1).)

Plaintiff seeks $870.00 in filing fees and $145.22 in service of process fees for a total amount of $1,015.22. Defendant had 20 days after service of the cost memorandum to file a motion to strike or tax costs. No such motion was filed.

Plaintiff is entitled to costs in the amount of $1,015.22.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-20-001720 – CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING PROTECTION ALLIANCE vs EASTERN SAN JOAQUIN GROUNDWATER AUTHORITY – GSA Defendants Demurrer to Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Reverse Validation and Petition for Writ of Mandate – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 1, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22.

CV-25-001000 – PUENTES, JARED vs CROSKREY, PAUL – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories Set 2 – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 3, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production Set 3 – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 3, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

a-b) These matters are CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 3, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court views the nature of this dispute as presenting significant potential for informal resolution with genuine meet and confer attempts made in good faith, particularly in view of Defendant’s recent service of supplemental interrogatory responses.  The hearings are continued for this purpose, and the parties are ordered to meet and confer in person or by online video conference to discuss the issues herein.

The parties shall submit a Joint Status Statement by November 25, 2026, describing their further efforts to resolve the issues, specifically identifying the issues remaining in dispute, if any, and briefly setting forth the parties’ respective positions as to the same.

Lastly, the Court reminds counsel that discovery is intended to be self-executing, and good faith communication should involve serious efforts at informal negotiation and resolution, not mere bickering between counsel. (See, e.g., Townsend v. Superior Court (EMC Mortgage Co.) (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431; Obregon v. Superior Court (Cimm’s, Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424.) As noted above, the Court believes that many, if not all, of the disputes herein are amenable to informal resolution, and the parties are expected to demonstrate their best efforts in this regard.

CV-25-006934 – SANCHEZ, ESCOBAR LEOBARDO vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to January 7, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22.

The Court notes that counsel herein has substantial experience with these types of matters and is presumably well-acquainted with the law governing the determination of reasonable fees and expenses pursuant to the statute.  Nevertheless, these types of fee disputes are commonplace and appear to reflect a default pattern of refusing to compromise in favor of “trying their luck” before the court, thus wasting judicial resources in the hopes of obtaining a ruling favoring their side.

The Court believes that the potential exists for the parties to informally resolve the issues presented herein if genuine efforts to meet and confer as to such issues are undertaken in good faith. Therefore, the hearing is continued, as above, for that purpose, and the parties are ordered to meet and confer in person or by online video conference to discuss the issues herein. The parties are further ordered to submit a Joint Status Statement by December 28, 2026, describing their efforts to meet-and-confer and any resolution or narrowing of the issues they were able to achieve.

The Court strongly encourages the parties to make genuine efforts to informally resolve their differences with due civility to one another. Should counsel for the parties be unable to reach a reasonable compromise of any of the issues presented by the instant motion, the Court may require personal appearances at the time of the continued hearing to further address the issues herein.

PR-25-000754 – IN THE MATTER OF THE GEORGE GARY VENIOT LIVING TRUST – Dana Garth and Richard Pomares’ Motion to Set Aside the Court’s Revised Ruling Granting Motion Appointing Receiver Laurie Jamison or in the Alternative a Request for Termination of Receivership Based Upon Change in Circumstances CCP Section 473 - DENIED for lack of jurisdiction. Moving parties filed a notice of appeal from the court’s order appointing Laurie Jamison on September 8, 2026, before this motion was filed. While the appeal is pending, the court may not vacate or modify the order appealed from. (Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a); Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 - 190.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 917.5 permits enforcement of a receivership order during an appeal but does not authorize the court to vacate it.

This ruling is without prejudice to renewal of the motion after issuance of the remittitur or other termination of the appeal. The court does not reach the merits.

The remaining requests in the moving papers, are not within the notice of motion and are not properly before the court; the court declines to rule on them.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-25-000947 – VERA, FRANCINE vs STANISLAUS SURGICAL HOSPITAL LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories and Request for Sanctions – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 23, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The motion fails to demonstrate sufficient efforts to meet and confer in good faith before filing the instant motion. In addition, the Court views the nature of this dispute as presenting significant potential for informal resolution with genuine meet and confer attempts made in good faith.  The hearing is continued for this purpose, and the parties are ordered to meet and confer in person or by online video conference to discuss the issues herein.

The parties shall submit a Joint Status Statement by December 15, 2026, describing their further efforts to resolve the issues, specifically identifying the issues remaining in dispute, if any, and briefly setting forth the parties’ respective positions as to the same.

Lastly, the Court reminds counsel that discovery is intended to be self-executing, and good faith communication should involve serious efforts at informal negotiation and resolution, not mere bickering between counsel. (See, e.g., Townsend v. Superior Court (EMC Mortgage Co.) (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431; Obregon v. Superior Court (Cimm’s, Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424.) As noted above, the Court believes that many, if not all, of the disputes herein are amenable to informal resolution, and the parties are expected to demonstrate their best efforts in this regard.

CV-25-002053 – MILLER, JOSHUA vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees for Time Actually Extended and Reasonably Incurred – DROPPED, at the request of the moving party.

CV-26-004480 – ESHRAGHI, RAMIN vs TESLA INSURANCE SERVICES INC – Defendant Tesla Insurance Services, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration and Complaint for Damages - OVERRULED.

The Court finds that the central issue presented by Plaintiff’s amended petition to compel arbitration concerns the determination of whether Plaintiff, as the insured, is legally entitled to recover damages and is arbitrable pursuant to Ins. Code § 11580.2(f) and Bouton v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company (2008) 43 Cal.4^th 1190.  Therefore, the Court finds that the subject dispute shall be submitted to arbitration in that regard, as provided in the policy and required by Ins. Code § 11580.2(f).

With regard to Plaintiff’s separate cause of action asserting breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing attendant with Defendant’s obligations under the policy, the Court finds that the amended pleading sufficiently states this non-arbitrable claim to overcome demurrer herein. Specifically, the law recognizes that litigation of a non-arbitrable bad faith claim may proceed concurrently with an arbitration proceeding under Ins. Code § 11580.2(f). (See, e.g. Tornai v. CSAA Insurance Exchange (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 974.)

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-26-001921 – JOHNSON, GUY PATRICK vs COUNTY OF STANISLAUS – a) Defendant California Forensic Medical Group Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint – SUSTAINED, in part, OVERRULED, in part; b) Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint – GRANTED, in part.

a) SUSTAINED, in part, OVERRULED, in part.

As a preliminary matter, the Court states its displeasure with the parties’ failure to file the required Joint Status Statement regarding this demurrer, contrary to the Court’s order of September 24, 2026, and expects that this conduct will not be repeated.

The Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of California Civil Code Section 52.1 (the Bane Act)

Civil Code section 52.1 requires interference or attempted interference with a constitutional or statutory right by threat, intimidation, or coercion. The Bane Act requires the defendant to have the specific intent to violate the right at issue. Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 801-803. Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 958-961, further distinguishes the conduct actionable under section 52.1 from ordinary negligence, while Cornell cautions against extending Shoyoye’s independent-coercion analysis beyond its factual context.

Here, Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that Decedent was subjected to physical restraints, medication to which he could not or did not consent, and punitive confinement, and characterize such conduct as volitional and undertaken with the specific intent to interfere with his protected rights. However, the FAC does not sufficiently allege ultimate facts identifying conduct by CFMG or its agents that constituted the requisite intentional interference, as distinguished from allegedly negligent medical care or conduct attributable to other defendants. Accordingly, the demurrer to the Bane Act Fourt Cause of Action is SUSTAINED. California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10.

Because there is a reasonable possibility Plaintiffs can cure this deficiency by amendment, leave to amend is granted. Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349. Therefore, Defendant California Forensic Medical Group, Inc.’s demurrer to the First Amended Complaint as to the Fourth Cause of Action for violation of the Bane Act is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10.

The Fifth Cause of Action for Professional Negligence

As to Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Professional Negligence, the elements of professional negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages. Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606. At the pleading stage, a plaintiff is required to allege ultimate facts, not the evidentiary facts by which the claim ultimately will be proved. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872; Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.

The FAC alleges that CFMG and its medical personnel provided medical and mental-health services to Decedent and owed him the applicable professional standard of care. Plaintiffs further allege inadequate psychiatric stabilization, medication oversight, physiological monitoring, observation, and response to Decedent’s medical and psychiatric deterioration, and allege that those failures were a substantial factor in his death.

CFMG principally argues that Plaintiffs fail to identify which CFMG employee committed particular acts or omissions and fail to allege sufficient treatment-specific facts. California pleading law does not require that degree of evidentiary specificity. In C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 872, the Supreme Court specifically held that the plaintiff was not required at the pleading stage to identify which of the defendant’s employees committed the allegedly negligent acts or omissions. Likewise, Rannard, supra, 26 Cal.2d at pages 156-157, recognizes that negligence and proximate cause may be pleaded without alleging the evidentiary details by which they eventually will be proved.

CFMG’s contention that Plaintiffs cannot establish a causal relationship between the alleged deficiencies in Decedent’s medical treatment and his cardiac death raises an issue of proof not appropriately resolved on demurrer. Construed liberally and as a whole, the FAC sufficiently alleges duty, breach, causation, and resulting injury. Therefore, the demurrer to the and as to the Fifth Cause of Action for Professional Negligence is OVERRULED.  California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10.

The Sixth Cause of Action for Wrongful Death – Negligence

A wrongful-death claim is predicated upon a wrongful act or neglect causing the decedent’s death. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 390.) CFMG’s challenge to this cause of action is principally derivative of its challenge to the underlying professional-negligence claim.

Because Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged professional negligence against CFMG, they have alleged an underlying wrongful act capable of supporting the wrongful-death cause of action. Whether Plaintiffs ultimately can establish that the alleged negligence was a substantial factor in causing Decedent’s death presents an evidentiary issue not appropriately determined on demurrer. Therefore, the demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action for Wrongful Death is OVERRULED. California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10.

Plaintiffs shall file their Second Amended Complaint, should they decide to do so, within ten (10) days of the date of service of this order.

Defendants shall submit a Proposed Ruling that conforms to this ruling no later than November 13, 2026.

b) GRANTED, in part.

Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Item No. 1 (Page  24, Line 10, Prayer for Relief A, which states, “… exemplary damages…”), as identified in the Notice of Motion, is hereby ordered stricken as to Defendants DMC and Tenet, only.

Defendants’ requests to strike Item Numbers 2 through 7 in the Notice of Motion to Strike are withdrawn.                       

CV-26-002729 – LEITING, CASSANDRA vs LES SCHWAB TIRE CENTERS OF CALIFORNIA LLC – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay – GRANTED. 

The Court finds that Defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff electronically assented to the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes. Defendant’s Workday evidence connects the acknowledgment to Plaintiff’s unique username and encrypted password, employee identification number, authenticated login session, IP address, and the time-stamped electronic-signature process. The showing is sufficient under Civil Code section 1633.9 and Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047. The Court further finds that Defendant is an affiliate within the agreement’s definition of “Company” and may enforce the agreement. 

Whether an agreement to arbitrate exists is a threshold issue of contract formation and state contract law. Further, even though the law favors contracts for arbitration of disputes between parties, there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate. In re Uber Techs. Wage & Hour Cases, (2023), 95 Cal. App. 5th 1297, review denied (Jan. 17, 2024), cert. denied sub nom Uber Techs., Inc. v. California, 145 S. Ct. 142 (2024), and cert. denied sub nom. Lyft, Inc. v. California, 145 S. Ct. 143 (2024).

The Court, rather than the arbitrator, determines whether an arbitration agreement was formed. Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272) The Court finds formation of an arbitration agreement here based on (1) Parties capable of contracting; (2) their consent; (3) a lawful object; and (4) a sufficient cause or consideration. Civ. Code § 1550.

Having found formation, the Court considers the delegation provision. Section 4 provides that, unless applicable law requires otherwise, “the arbitrator will have the authority to determine the enforceability of this Agreement as well as whether a claim is arbitrable.” This language clearly and unmistakably delegates enforceability and claim-arbitrability issues to the arbitrator. Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880; Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231. The qualifying phrase preserves threshold questions governing law requires the Court to decide, including formation; it does not negate the express assignment of remaining gateway issues to the arbitrator. 

Plaintiff specifically challenges delegation on the ground that the fee-splitting language would require her to pay arbitration costs merely to determine whether she is bound. The Court finds a modest degree of procedural unconscionability arising from the onboarding context and the absence of separate emphasis on delegation. The Court finds no substantive unconscionability. The delegation provision applies equally to both parties. Section 5 also qualifies equal fee splitting with “except to the extent otherwise required by applicable law,” and Defendant agrees to pay costs unique to arbitration as required by applicable law. Armendariz v Foundation Health Psychare Services Inc.  (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83). Plaintiff shall not be required to pay costs unique to arbitration, including costs incurred to adjudicate delegated gateway issues. Because both procedural and substantive unconscionability are required, Plaintiff’s challenge to the delegation provision fails. 

The arbitrator shall determine Plaintiff’s remaining challenges to enforceability, including those concerning Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, attorney fees, venue, the jury-waiver language, and severability. The Court does not reach the merits of those delegated issues. 

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections Nos. 1–5 and 7–11 are OVERRULED. Objection No. 6 is SUSTAINED only as to the phrase “and other onboarding documents” in paragraph 14 of the Glender declaration and otherwise OVERRULED. 

Defendant’s evidentiary objections are ruled upon as follows: No. 1 is SUSTAINED as to the statement that “no one at Les Schwab knew me as Cassie Leiting” and otherwise OVERRULED. No. 2 is SUSTAINED as to Plaintiff’s legal conclusion that she did not agree to relinquish a judicial forum and otherwise OVERRULED. No. 3 is SUSTAINED as to the generalized assertion that “everyone” had access to or shared accounts and otherwise OVERRULED. No. 4 is SUSTAINED as to unsupported testimony concerning Plaintiff’s husband’s income and the phrase “undue financial hardship” as a legal conclusion and otherwise OVERRULED. No. 5 is SUSTAINED as to “prejudicial” and “undue hardship” as legal conclusions and otherwise OVERRULED. No. 6 is SUSTAINED. 

The action is STAYED pending completion of arbitration. (9 U.S.C.A. § 3; Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4).

The Court sets a Status Review Hearing for Friday, May 21, 2027, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 24.  Defendant is ordered to file and serve a Status Report no later than Monday, May 10, 2027.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000807 – FISHER, HEATHER vs HICKS, JANICE – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel as to Janice Hicks – HEARING REQUIRED; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel as to Bill Hicks – HEARING REQUIRED; c) Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Matters Admitted as to Janice Hicks – HEARING REQUIRED; d) Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Matters Admitted as to Bill Hicks – HEARING REQUIRED.

a-d) HEARING REQUIRED.