November 14, 2025

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-21-004762 – TORRES, MAYRA vs MANUEL VILLA ENTERPRISES LLC – Compliance Hearing – CONTINUED for a further compliance hearing on May 28, 2026, at 8:30 AM in Department 21 to confirm full administration of the settlement. Class Counsel shall submit a compliance report no later than five (5) court days before the date of the hearing, which shall include the total amount that was actually paid to the class members pursuant to the settlement. At the time of the continued compliance hearing, the Court shall amend the judgment to direct that the sum of the unpaid funds, plus interest as required by the statute, be distributed as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

CV-24-008274 – DOUGLAS, SHAWNA MARIE vs KAISER FOUNDATION HOPSITALS – Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Defendant’s Subpoena to the Camp Transformation Center – DENIED.

Defendant asserts that they have some indication that Plaintiff clocked in while at or traveling from the gym. Plaintiff argues that the privacy rights will be violated and that the stated reason for termination was logging in with a cell phone.

But it is clearly relevant evidence whether Plaintiff logged in from the workplace or from outside the workplace. Plaintiff’s assertion that she was terminated solely for using the cell phone does not appear accurate; the issue here was also alleged “timecard falsification.”

The Court appreciates Plaintiff’s point as to where this goes from here – will there be subpoenas for other records indicating where Plaintiff shops? The answer to that is very likely no; Defendant asserts with some basis that Plaintiff traveled directly and regularly from the gym to workplace. Defendant expresses optimism that this is relevant and admissible evidence; if such optimism is misplaced the Court is less likely to accept a request for a similar subpoena type in the future.

CV-25-003281 – MEDINA, BERTOLDO SALOMON vs CERPAS, JOSE LUIS – Defendant’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint Code of Civil Procedure Sections 430.10(e)(f) and (g) - SUSTAINED, with leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e). The First Amended Complaint continues to lack the necessary factual allegations to support the elements of a fraud claim, which must be pled with specificity. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73.)  Plaintiff’s other “causes of action” for “Breach of Duty (Oral Contract)”, “Defamation” and “Mental Anguish (Intentional (sic) Causing Emotional Distress)” are equally insufficient.

Moreover, Plaintiff has included private information in the exhibits attached to the First Amended Complaint.  This information should have been redacted pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 1.201. Plaintiff shall file a Second Amended Complaint in which any personal identifying information is redacted.

The Court seriously considered sustaining without leave to amend but grants one additional attempt.  If these issues are not resolved in the next pleading, the Court is unlikely to grant leave to amend a third time. For clarity, the allegations in the complaint – not the evidence – must clearly and concisely articulate a legal cause of action, and for fraud, must be pled with specificity.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-010066 – WELLS FARGO BANK NA vs GREENHAW, DEENA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court needs clarification regarding the notice of motion that was served on the Defendant. Per the notice of motion, notice was given that the hearing would be held “on the date, time and department set forth above.” It appears that the “date, time and department” was stamped onto the document by the clerk’s office when the notice was filed on October 7, 2025. But the moving papers had already been served by that point. Specifically, they were served by overnight mail on August 21, 2025. So, was the notice section just blank on the copy that the Defendant received?

If the section was indeed left blank (or if Plaintiff fails to appear or satisfactorily answer the Court’s question), then the Court intends to DENY the motion for lack of proper notice.

If, on the other hand, the Defendant received proper notice of the hearing date, place, and time, then the Court will GRANT the unopposed motion. Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of all the required elements for breach of contract. (See SUF Nos. 1-12.) And because the motion is unopposed, Plaintiff’s assertions are uncontroverted.

Plaintiff has asked the Court to take judicial notice of the summons, complaint, and the proof of service for the summons and complaint. The unopposed request for judicial notice is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 452 and 453.

If the Court grants the unopposed motion, the trial date of February 20, 2026, shall be VACATED.

CV-25-003859 – NAVARRO, MARIA vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Form Interrogatories, and Request for Sanctions– DENIED as MOOT. b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Special Interrogatories, and Request for Sanctions- CONTINUED to December 11, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22 c) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Request for Admission, and Request for Sanctions – CONTINUED to December 11, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

a) Form Interrogatories

By way of this motion, Plaintiff seeks further responses to Form Interrogatory Nos. 15.1 and 17.1. However, the reply concedes that Defendant Volkswagen Group of America Inc. (“Defendant”) has now provided code-compliant responses. (See Omnibus Reply, at p. 1.) Consequently, this motion is DENIED as moot.

b) Special Interrogatories

By way of this motion, Plaintiff seeks further responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 30, 42, and 43.

Both parties seem to acknowledge that the meet-and-confer process was not yet complete at the time these motions were filed. “[I]t is a ‘central precept’ of the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 that discovery ‘be essentially self-executing.’ [Citation.]” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 434.) “A self-executing discovery system is ‘one that operates without judicial involvement.’ [Citation.]” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1291.) The meet-and-confer process is a central component of that self-executing system.

While, on the one hand, Plaintiff’s counsel could have made a more concerted effort to engage Defendant’s counsel in discussion before the extended filing deadline, on the other hand, it was Defendant’s counsel who failed to respond to Plaintiff’s counsel’s last email sent on October 7, 2025.

Consequently, the Court CONTINUES this matter to December 11, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22. The parties are ordered to meet and confer in person or by online video conference no later than November 26, 2025. The parties are further ordered to then file a joint statement by December 4, 2025, describing the efforts to meet-and-confer and any narrowing of the issues.

c) Requests for Admissions

By way of this motion, Plaintiff seeks further responses to Requests for Admissions Nos. 12 and 13.

Both parties seem to acknowledge that the meet-and-confer process was not yet complete at the time these motions were filed. “[I]t is a ‘central precept’ of the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 that discovery ‘be essentially self-executing.’ [Citation.]” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 434.) “A self-executing discovery system is ‘one that operates without judicial involvement.’ [Citation.]” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1291.) The meet-and-confer process is a central component of that self-executing system.

While, on the one hand, Plaintiff’s counsel could have made a more concerted effort to engage Defendant’s counsel in discussion before the extended filing deadline, on the other hand, it was Defendant’s counsel who failed to respond to Plaintiff’s counsel’s last email sent on October 7, 2025.

Consequently, the Court CONTINUES this matter to December 11, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22. The parties are ordered to meet and confer in person or by online video conference no later than November 26, 2025. The parties are further ordered to then file a joint statement by December 4, 2025, describing the efforts to meet-and-confer and any narrowing of the issues.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John D. Freeland in Department 23:

CV-25-005279 – GONZALEZ, MARGARITA vs EVERBRIGHT LLC – a) Defendant Everbright, LLC’s Motion for Order Compelling Joinder of Indispensable Party – GRANTED. b) Defendant Everbright, LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration – CONTINUED to January 15, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23, given the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s concurrent Motion to Join Indispensable Party. 

a)  Under CCP § 389(a), Melissa Gonzalez is a necessary party to this action because Plaintiff seeks rescission and other relief arising from a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) alleged to have been signed by both Plaintiff and Melissa Gonzalez, with Melissa identified as the primary signatory.  Adjudication of the parties’ rights and obligations under the PPA in Melissa’s absence risks impairing her interests and may subject existing parties to inconsistent obligations. The motion is procedurally proper and was duly noticed and briefed.

Plaintiff shall file and serve an amended complaint naming Melissa Gonzalez within twenty (20) days. Service on Melissa Gonzalez shall be completed pursuant to applicable rules. If joinder is shown to be infeasible EverBright may seek appropriate relief under CCP § 389(b).

Plaintiff’s objections to the Declarations of Brianna Howard and Zachary Tannenbaum filed in support of the motion to join an indispensable party are OVERRULED.

b) One of the key issues in Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is whether Plaintiff (who cannot read or write English) understood that the agreement between the parties contained an arbitration provision.  Plaintiff, in her opposition to the motion to compel arbitration, admits that she and her daughter signed the agreement “together”.  Plaintiff’s daughter’s appearance on that issue is crucial given that the contractual provisions regarding arbitration are clear and conspicuous.  The Court believes it cannot make a final determination of the motion to compel arbitration without an appearance from the primary signatory on the agreement.

CV-25-006991 – VELEZ, PEDRO vs SILVA INJURY LAW – Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment – DENIED, without prejudice.

The motion was filed prematurely, less than 60 days after Defendants’ first appearance, in violation of Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a)(1). In addition, proof of service demonstrates insufficient notice in violation of Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a)(2).

CV-24-008326 – PAYNE, KELLIE vs MOCSE CREDIT UNION – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration – DENIED.

The Court finds that Defendant has failed to demonstrate the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Even though the law favors contracts for arbitration of disputes between parties, there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate. (Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 19-20.) 

The situation herein appears to be governed by the holding of Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, which rejects the unilateral addition of arbitration provisions to an agreement governing the relationship between the parties.  The Court is not convinced by the defense’s characterization of the transaction herein as an entirely “new” offer and acceptance, given its reliance on the membership agreement’s provisions regarding amendments, as well as the context of the parties’ longstanding pre-existing relationship.

Moreover, even taking the defense’s characterization of the transaction at face value, the Court finds the evidence insufficient to demonstrate that the purported “offer” to arbitrate was mailed to Plaintiff as indicated by the declaration of Ms. Ramar. Specifically, Ms. Ramar does not attest to personal knowledge of Defendant’s mailing procedures and does not submit any account documents which specifically demonstrate that such mailing occurred.

Moreover, silence or inaction by the offeree does not ordinarily constitute acceptance unless the offeree's conduct reasonably leads the offeror to believe that silence would suffice to create a contract. (Badie v. Bank of America, supra, at 804; see also Gentry v Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, abrogated on other grounds by AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion 563 U.S. 333 (2011).) Under the circumstances presented herein, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s silence was intended to signal her assent to the arbitration provisions herein.

UD-25-000784 – STATE BANK OF TEXAS vs DHILLON, VIJAYPAL SINGH – Plaintiff’s Motion to Lift Stay – DENIED.

The Court is not convinced that its order expunging the lis pendens in the related civil matter necessarily requires that the stay of the instant case be lifted.  Rather, the issues presented herein remain inexorably intertwined with the more complex claims set forth in the related action, which are not amenable to the summary procedures designed for application in straightforward unlawful detainer proceedings. Under the circumstances, the law recognizes the Court’s discretion to stay the unlawful detainer proceeding pending resolution of the more complex issues. (See, e.g., Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367.)

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-24-006981 – G, R vs THERAPUTIC PATHWAYS INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Depose Prisoner Sean Dalton – GRANTED, unopposed.

The Court finds that good cause exists to grant the requested motion. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2017.010,1995 and 1996).

The Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Detention Center located at 200 E. Hackett Road, Modesto, California 95358 shall produce inmate Sean Dalton for deposition at their premises at a date and time to be agreed upon with Counsel for Plaintiffs herein.

CV-24-007219 – CABRERA, LEONORILDA NARANJO vs SCHWARZ, KEVIN – Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – DENIED, without prejudice.

Counsel Lilian Sedaghat’s application for leave to withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiff Leonorilda Naranjo Cabrera is denied without prejudice for failure to demonstrate proof of service of same on Plaintiff and for failing to confirm Plaintiff’s current address. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1362).

CV-24-007633 – HEITZER, MURRAY vs LIU, ANNA YAN – a) Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Against Plaintiff Murray Heitzer and his Attorney of Record, Jointly and Severally- HEARING REQUIRED. b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Zen to Produce Documents and Request for Sanctions Against Zen and its Attorney of Record, Jointly and Severally, Under CCP 177.5 and CCP 2023.030 – HEARING REQUIRED.

a-b) HEARING REQUIRED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***