February 19, 2026

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-009267 - ARELLANO, ARLET CASTRO vs JIMENEZ, JESSICA MARIE - a) Cross-Complainant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiffs’ Answers to Request for Production of Documents - GRANTED and unopposed; b) Cross-Complainant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiffs’ Answers to Form Interrogatories - GRANTED and unopposed; c) Cross-Complainant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiffs’ Answers to Special Interrogatories - GRANTED and unopposed.

a) Cross-Defendant Jimenez shall provide full and complete responses to the April 24, 2025, Requests for Production, Set One, without objection and within the next thirty (30) days.  In addition, the Court awards Defendant and Cross-Complainant Emily Grace Hanham monetary sanctions in the amount of $560. These sanctions are payable within the next thirty (30) days in care of Defendant and Cross-Complainant’s attorneys Smith, Koyama & Costello.

b) Cross-Defendant Jimenez shall provide full and complete responses to the April 24, 2025, Form Interrogatories, Set One, without objection and within the next thirty (30) days.  In addition, the Court awards Defendant and Cross-Complainant Emily Grace Hanham monetary sanctions in the amount of $560. These sanctions are payable within the next thirty (30) days in care of Defendant and Cross-Complainant’s attorneys Smith, Koyama & Costello.

c) Cross-Defendant Jimenez shall provide full and complete responses to the April 24, 2025, Special Interrogatories, Set One, without objection and within the next thirty (30) days.  In addition, the Court awards Defendant and Cross-Complainant Emily Grace Hanham monetary sanctions in the amount of $560. These sanctions are payable within the next thirty (30) days in care of Defendant and Cross-Complainant’s attorneys Smith, Koyama & Costello.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-21-005754 - GAVERT, JAMES vs CF MODESTO LLC - Defendant Andreh Saralou M.D’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint - OVERRULED.

As Plaintiffs note in their opposition, the demurrer is procedurally defective. It fails to comply with either Code of Civil Procedure § 430.60 or rule 3.1320 of the California Rules of Court. Consequently, the demurrer is OVERRULED.

Defendant to answer in 10 days.

The Court makes no findings regarding the merits of the demurrer, and this ruling is without prejudice to the filing of any motion for judgment on the pleadings.

CV-24-002391 - MUNOZ, JUAN HERNANDEZ vs GUTIERREZ, VELIA - Plaintiff’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions or in the Alternative Discovery and Evidence Sanctions - GRANTED, and unopposed.

The Court finds that Defendant Velia Gutierrez d/b/a Gutierrez Motor Plaza has willfully failed to comply with discovery orders compelling verified responses without objection and requiring payment of monetary sanctions, despite having been served with notice of those orders. Lesser sanctions have proven ineffective. The Court further notes that Defendant’s failure to pay required AAA arbitration fees after arbitration was compelled constitutes a material breach of the arbitration agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97, independently supporting terminating sanctions under section 1281.99.

As Plaintiff aptly notes in his supporting memorandum, “Defendant ignored discovery entirely, ignored two Court orders, ignored meet-and-confer efforts, ignored three separate motions to compel, and then ignored a court order expressly requiring compliance without objection. Such conduct supports an inference of willfulness as a matter of law.” (Mem., at p. 9.) The Court further observes that Defendant has not filed an opposition to this motion, despite the fact that a proof of service indicates timely service of the moving papers. At this point, it seems clear that Defendant is simply unwilling to participate in these proceedings.

Consequently, the Court GRANTS the unopposed motion. Defendant’s Answer is STRICKEN, and Defendant’s default shall be entered.

The Clerk is directed to enter default against Defendant on Plaintiff’s submission of appropriate paperwork. Plaintiff may then proceed with a default prove-up hearing in accordance with law.

Plaintiff to submit a proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

CV-24-003155 - WESTERN HILLS WATER DISTRICT vs WORLD INTERNATIONAL LLC - a) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - CONTINUED to February 26, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22; b) Defendant World International LLC’s Motion for Order Awarding Attorney's Fees - CONTINUED to February 26, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

a-b) These matters are CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to February 26, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22, pending the hearing on the ex parte now scheduled for February 20, 2026.

CV-25-005485 - WHEELS FINANCIAL GROUP LLC vs BARDWELL, DONALD CARLOS - Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Summary Adjudication - GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff has met its prima facie burden of showing there is no triable issue of material fact as to its entitlement to possession of the collateral vehicle, a 1984 Cadillac Eldorado (VIN 1G6AL6785EE639336), based on the security agreement, lien perfection, assignment, Defendant’s default, and Defendant’s failure to surrender the vehicle.

Because Defendant did not file an opposition, there is no contrary evidence raising a triable issue of material fact.

Consequently, the unopposed motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff for possession of the vehicle.

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as to the existence of the noticed court records.

The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the moving papers. Plaintiff is directed to submit a proposed judgment consistent with this ruling.

PR-24-000883 - IN THE MATTER OF KENNETH J OCKEY TRUST - a) Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Waiver of Discovery Objections - DENIED; b) Respondent's Motion to Compel Further Answers to Respondent Roxanne Ockey's Form Interrogatories, Set One and for Sanctions - GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

a) Motion for Relief from Waiver of Objections

Petitioner has failed to establish that her failure to timely respond to Respondent Roxanne Ockey’s Form Interrogatories resulted from mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a)(2). Petitioner acknowledges she was notified of the discovery in July 2025 but did not review the attached discovery requests for several months, and further delay occurred after counsel was advised that discovery was overdue and objections had been waived.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is DENIED.

b) Motion to Compel Further Answers to Form Interrogatories and Sanctions

Respondent Roxanne Ockey’s motion to compel further responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One Nos. 12.1, 14.1, and 17.1 is GRANTED. Petitioner Daryn A. Ockey shall serve verified further responses, without objections, to Form Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 12.1, 14.1, and 17.1, within 15 days after service of the signed order on the Petitioner. The further responses shall be complete and code-compliant.

Sanctions

Moving Party requests sanctions in the amount of $2,860. The request is DENIED. The requested amount is disproportionately high. Moreover, the Court finds that Petitioner was substantially justified in opposing the motion. The main sticking point was the question of the objections, and Petitioner had colorable grounds to ask for relief from the waiver of the objections. Ultimately, the Court has decided to deny Petitioner’s concurrently heard motion for relief from the waiver of objections, but the decision was not clearcut.

Order

Moving Party is directed to file a new proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Marie Silveria sitting on assignment in Department 23:

CV-23-004787 - HOSKINSON, ROY BERT, Jr vs LUMAUIG, BRANDON - Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment - CONTINUED to March 11, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 23, for supplemental briefing.

Background

Plaintiff Roy Bert Hoskinson, Jr. alleges he was shot and injured on June 20, 2021 by individual defendants who were employed by Ontel Security Services, Inc. Ontel moves for summary judgment on the ground that the action is barred by the two‑year statute of limitations for personal injury actions (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1).

The original complaint was electronically accepted and filed on August 23, 2023, more than two years after the alleged injury. Plaintiffs Roy Bert Hoskinson, Jr., and Sara Leffler do not dispute the August 23, 2023 file‑stamp date but contend the complaint should be deemed filed earlier due to filing attempts in June 2023 and alleged technical and clerical impediments.

Governing Standards for Summary Judgment

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.) A defendant meets their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that “a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)  

 

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed.” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.) 

Governing Statutory Authority for Tolling Due to Efiling Errors

Code of Civil Procedure § 1010.6(e)(4)(E), which neither side appears to cite, provides as follows: “If the clerk of the court does not file a complaint or cross complaint because the complaint or cross complaint does not comply with applicable filing requirements or the required filing fee has not been paid, any statute of limitations applicable to the causes of action alleged in the complaint or cross complaint shall be tolled for the period beginning on the date on which the court received the document and as shown on the confirmation of receipt described in subparagraph (A), through the later of either the date on which the clerk of the court sent the notice of rejection described in subparagraph (C) or the date on which the electronic filing service provider or electronic filing manager sent the notice of rejection as described in subparagraph (D), plus one additional day if the complaint or cross complaint is subsequently submitted in a form that corrects the errors which caused the document to be rejected. The party filing the complaint or cross complaint shall not make any change to the complaint or cross complaint other than those required to correct the errors which caused the document to be rejected.”

According to the legislative history of the statute, this subdivision was in effect in 2023, when the Plaintiffs made their efiling attempts. Pursuant to the statute, the limitations period would have been tolled for one day after notification of each efiling error.

Discussion

The evidence from both Defendant and Plaintiffs reflects that Plaintiffs made multiple attempts to electronically file the complaint before it was accepted. Tyler Technologies records as well as the declaration of Plaintiffs’ paralegal, Vanessa Freeman, indicate electronic filing attempts on June 7, 2023, June 20, 2023, June 30, 2023, and July 5, 2023. Each of these submissions was rejected and not accepted for filing. According to the information from Tyler Technologies, Plaintiffs were sent same-day efiling rejections. The complaint was ultimately electronically submitted and accepted for filing on August 23, 2023, which is the file‑stamped filing date reflected in the court record.

The gaps in submissions appear to be fatal to Plaintiffs’ case and take the complaint outside the tolling harbor provided by Code of Civil Procedure § 1010.6(e)(4)(E). Consequently, the Court is inclined to GRANT the motion for summary judgment. However, it recognizes that, in making this determination, it is relying on authority that was not raised in the papers. Therefore, it CONTINUES this matter to March 11, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 23, for supplemental briefing. Plaintiffs may file and serve no later than February 25, 2026, a supplemental brief, not to exceed five pages, addressing Code of Civil Procedure § 1010.6(e)(4)(E). Moving Defendants may then file and serve a responsive supplemental brief no later than March 11, 2026, not to exceed five pages.

CV-24-000494 - PAULINE PROVINCE WELLER LLC vs KHAN, NASIR - a) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses from Plaintiff to Form Interrogatories and for Monetary Sanctions Against Plaintiff for Misuse of the Discovery Process - GRANTED in part with modification to the sanctions amount, and DENIED in part; b) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses from Plaintiff to Special Interrogatories and for Monetary Sanctions Against Plaintiff for Misuse of the Discovery Process - GRANTED in part with modification to the sanctions amount, and DENIED in part; c) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses from Plaintiff to Requests for Production and for Monetary Sanctions Against Plaintiff for Misuse of the Discovery Process - GRANTED in part with modification to the sanctions amount, and DENIED in part; d) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses from Plaintiff to Special Interrogatories and for Monetary Sanctions Against Plaintiff - GRANTED in part with modification to the sanctions amount, and unopposed.

a) Form Interrogatories

By way of this motion, Defendant Nasir Khan seeks to compel Plaintiff Pauline Province Weller LLC’s responses to Form Interrogatories, Set No. One, Nos. 1.1, 3.1 through 3.7, 4.1, 4.2, 9.1, 9.2, 17.1, and 50.1 through 50.6; an order deeming all objections to the Form Interrogatories waived, and an order imposing monetary sanctions of $1,869.00 against Plaintiff. Defendant alternatively requests an order rendering judgment in his favor by default and dismissing the action.

Plaintiff has filed a notice of non-opposition stating that it is “actively gathering documents and preparing verified discovery responses, and intends to serve responsive materials in good faith and as expeditiously as possible.” (Not., at p. 2.) However, this notice was filed 15 days before the hearing date, and there is no indication that Plaintiff has yet complied with its discovery obligations.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.290(b). Plaintiff shall serve verified responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set No. One, without objection, within 15 days of service of the signed order. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(a)-(b).)

The alternative request for a default judgment and dismissal is DENIED.

Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.290(c) requires that the Court impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel responses to interrogatories “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” In a declaration filed concurrently with the non-opposition to the motion, Attorney Warda does not dispute that monetary sanctions are appropriate, but he contends that the amount of sanctions sought is too high.

 

Defendant has asked for $1,869, which represents 3.5 hours for drafting the moving papers, 1.5 anticipated hours for reviewing an opposition and drafting a reply, and 1 anticipated hour for attending the hearing on this matter, all billed at the rate of $300 per hour. In addition, Defendant seeks $60 for the filing fee, $4.50 for the e-filing cost of the moving papers, and $4.50 in anticipated e-filing fees for the reply.

This was a straightforward motion. There is no opposition per se, no reply was necessary, and a hearing on this matter is not anticipated. The Court deems two hours of attorney time ample for drafting the moving papers. Therefore, the Court awards sanctions against Plaintiff Pauline Province Weller LLC in the amount of $664.50, payable to Fores Macko Johnston & Chartrand, A Professional Law Corporation. Should Plaintiff request a hearing on this matter, the Court will revisit the sanctions amount.

The Court notes that Defendant’s current proposed order (which will need to be revised) includes a deadline for the payment of sanctions. This condition is unnecessary; “monetary sanction orders are enforceable through the execution of judgment laws.” (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995).)

 

Defendant to submit a new proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling.

b) Special Interrogatories

By way of this motion, Defendant Nasir Khan seeks to compel Plaintiff Pauline Province Weller LLC’s responses to Special Interrogatories, Set No. One, Nos. 1 through 35; an order deeming all objections to the Special Interrogatories waived, and an order imposing monetary sanctions of $1,509.00 against Plaintiff. Defendant alternatively requests an order rendering judgment in his favor by default and dismissing the action.

Plaintiff has filed a notice of non-opposition stating that “it is currently preparing verified, code-compliant responses to the Special Interrogatories and intends to serve those responses promptly.” (Not., at p. 2.) However, this notice was filed 15 days before the hearing date, and there is no indication that Plaintiff has yet complied with its discovery obligations.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.290(b). Plaintiff shall serve verified responses Plaintiff shall serve verified responses to Defendant’s Special Interrogatories, Set No. One, without objection, within 15 days of service of the signed order. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(a)-(b).)

The alternative request for a default judgment and dismissal is DENIED.

Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.290(c) requires that the Court impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel responses to interrogatories “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. In a declaration filed concurrently with the non-opposition to the motion, Attorney Warda does not dispute that monetary sanctions are appropriate, but he contends that the amount of sanctions sought is too high.

 

Defendant has asked for $1,509, which represents 2.3 hours for drafting the moving papers, 1.5 anticipated hours for reviewing an opposition and drafting a reply, and 1 anticipated hour for attending the hearing on this matter, all billed at the rate of $300 per hour. In addition, Defendant seeks $60 for the filing fee, $4.50 for the e-filing cost of the moving papers, and $4.50 in anticipated e-filing fees for the reply.

This was a straightforward motion. There is no opposition per se, no reply was necessary, and a hearing on this matter is not anticipated. The Court deems two hours of attorney time ample for drafting the moving papers. Therefore, the Court awards sanctions against Plaintiff Pauline Province Weller LLC in the amount of $664.50, payable to Fores Macko Johnston & Chartrand, A Professional Law Corporation. Should Plaintiff request a hearing on this matter, the Court will revisit the sanctions amount.

The Court notes that Defendant’s current proposed order (which will need to be revised) includes a deadline for the payment of sanctions. This condition is unnecessary; “monetary sanction orders are enforceable through the execution of judgment laws.” (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995).)

 

Defendant to submit a new proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling.

c) Requests for Production

By way of this motion, Defendant Nasir Khan seeks to compel Plaintiff Pauline Province Weller LLC’s responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set No. One, Nos. 1 through 17; and an order imposing monetary sanctions of $1,629.00 against Plaintiff. Defendant alternatively requests an order rendering judgment in his favor by default and dismissing the action.

Plaintiff has filed a notice of non-opposition stating that it is “actively gathering documents and preparing verified discovery responses, and intends to serve responsive materials in good faith and as expeditiously as possible.” (Not., at p. 2.) However, this notice was filed 15 days before the hearing date, and there is no indication that Plaintiff has yet complied with its discovery obligations.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.300(b). Plaintiff shall serve verified responses to Defendant’s Requests for Production, Set No. One, without objection, within 15 days of service of the signed order. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300(a)-(b).)

The alternative request for a default judgment and dismissal is DENIED.

Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.300(c) requires that the Court impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel responses to requests for production “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” In a declaration filed concurrently with the non-opposition to the motion, Attorney Warda does not dispute that monetary sanctions are appropriate, but he contends that the amount of sanctions sought is too high.

 

Defendant has asked for $1,629, which represents 2.7 hours for drafting the moving papers, 1.5 anticipated hours for reviewing an opposition and drafting a reply, and 1 anticipated hour for attending the hearing on this matter, all billed at the rate of $300 per hour. In addition, Defendant seeks $60 for the filing fee, $4.50 for the e-filing cost of the moving papers, and $4.50 in anticipated e-filing fees for the reply.

This was a straightforward motion. There is no opposition per se, no reply was necessary, and a hearing on this matter is not anticipated. The Court deems two hours of attorney time ample for drafting the moving papers. Therefore, the Court awards sanctions against Plaintiff Pauline Province Weller LLC in the amount of $664.50, payable to Fores Macko Johnston & Chartrand, A Professional Law Corporation. Should Plaintiff request a hearing on this matter, the Court will revisit the sanctions amount.

The Court notes that Defendant’s current proposed order (which will need to be revised) includes a deadline for the payment of sanctions. This condition is unnecessary; “monetary sanction orders are enforceable through the execution of judgment laws.” (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995).)

 

Defendant to submit a new proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling.

d) Requests for Admissions

By way of this motion, Defendant Nasir Khan seeks to deem the matters set forth in Defendant’s Requests for Admissions, Set No. One, served on Plaintiff on October 10, 2025, admitted; and an order imposing monetary sanctions of $1,389.00 against Plaintiff. Defendant alternatively requests an order rendering judgment in his favor by default and dismissing the action.

Plaintiff has filed a notice of non-opposition stating that “it is actively working on preparing and serving substantive, verified discovery responses, and is doing so in good faith with the intent to resolve the discovery issues without further unnecessary motion practice.” (Not., at p. 2.) However, this notice was filed 15 days before the hearing date, and there is no indication that Plaintiff has yet complied with its discovery obligations.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.280(b). The truth of any matters specified in Defendant’s Requests for Admissions, Set One, are deemed admitted, without objection. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(a)_‑‑(b).)

The alternative request for a default judgment and dismissal is DENIED.

Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.280(c) states in relevant part, “It is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion.” In a declaration filed concurrently with the non-opposition to the motion, Attorney Warda does not dispute that monetary sanctions are appropriate, but he contends that the amount of sanctions sought is too high.

 

Defendant has asked for $1,389, which represents 1.9 hours for drafting the moving papers, 1.5 anticipated hours for reviewing an opposition and drafting a reply, and 1 anticipated hour for attending the hearing on this matter, all billed at the rate of $300 per hour. In addition, Defendant seeks $60 for the filing fee, $4.50 for the e-filing cost of the moving papers, and $4.50 in anticipated e-filing fees for the reply.

This was a straightforward motion. There is no opposition per se, no reply was necessary, and a hearing on this matter is not anticipated. The Court deems 1.9 hours of attorney time reasonable for drafting the moving papers. Therefore, the Court awards sanctions against Plaintiff Pauline Province Weller LLC in the amount of $634.50, payable to Fores Macko Johnston & Chartrand, A Professional Law Corporation. Should Plaintiff request a hearing on this matter, the Court will revisit the sanctions amount.

The Court notes that Defendant’s current proposed order (which will need to be revised) includes a deadline for the payment of sanctions. This condition is unnecessary; “monetary sanction orders are enforceable through the execution of judgment laws.” (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995).)

 

Defendant to submit a new proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling.

CV-25-000429 - PACAHUALA, DONATO vs VIZCARRA, YOLANDA PORRAS - Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment - DENIED as MOOT.

Pursuant to the declaration of opposing counsel late-filed on February 11, 2026, the same day that Plaintiff filed this motion to set aside the default entered on November 26, 2025, the Court (Hon. J. Sandhu presiding) voided the default at issue. Consequently, the motion appears MOOT and is thus DENIED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-22-004296 - B, L vs DOE 1 - Defendant County of Kern’s Motion to Stay - GRANTED.

The Court has the power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice. (Civ. Proc. Code § 128(a)(3) and (8)).

The general rule is that trial courts have inherent power to stay trials awaiting final appellate resolution of related actions that might conclusively determine all or some of the issues in the stayed action. (Koch-Ash v. Superior Ct., (1986)180 Cal. App. 3d 689, 696, citing Houghton v. Superior Court (1922) 187 Cal. 661; Smith v. Jones (1900) 128 Cal. 14; Connor v. Bank of Bakersfield (1917) 174 Cal. 400).

Based on the applicable factors for granting a stay herein, the Court finds that absent a stay, should the California Supreme Court find in support of Defendant’s position, Defendant herein will be substantially prejudiced due to the potentially irrecoverable expense of taxpayer funds involved in defending this action. Should the stay be granted, Plaintiff will also be substantially prejudiced by the extension of evidentiary challenges already posed by her decades-old claims. Public interest also supports both a prudent use of public and judicial resources as well as the ability of victims of sexual abuse to obtain justice against their abusers. (Koch-Ash v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 696; Nken v Holder (2009) 556 U.S. 418; People ex rel. Harris v Rizzo, (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 921).

Nevertheless, overall, based on the identity of issues between this case and the case of K.C. v City of Merced accepted for review by the California Supreme Court and the strong likelihood of such Supreme Court decision having a dispositive or substantial effect on this case, the Court finds that the efficient use of judicial resources, the benefits of the simplification of legal issues herein, and the orderly progression of litigation, require a complete stay of the proceedings. (K.C. v. Cnty. of Merced, (2025)109 Cal. App. 5th 606, review granted Apr. 21, 2025, S290435).

The Court, therefore, in the exercise of its discretion stays all proceedings herein for an initial limited period of six (6) months from the date of this order pending the issuance of an opinion by the California Supreme Court as to the extent and scope of social of social worker immunity in the face of claims of failure to investigate or act in sexual abuse cases. (Civ. Proc. Code §128 (a)(8)).

Accordingly, the current trial date, all motions on calendar and all Mandatory Case Management and Settlement Conferences in this case are hereby stayed until further notice. Upon lifting the stay, all pretrial dates and deadlines, including regular and expert discovery and motion cut-offs, shall be recalculated to run from the new trial date as though that date were the original trial date for all purposes.

The parties shall provide a status update to the court no later than the close of business on August 28, 2026.

Defendant’s request for Judicial Notice is granted. (Evidence Code §§ 451, 452, and 453).  

CV-23-004868 - VILLANUEVA, ENRIQUE vs SOTO, LUIS - Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement - CONTINUED, on Plaintiffs’ motion.

At Plaintiff’s request and based on the implementation of the parties’ Settlement Agreement, this matter is continued to Tuesday, August 18^th, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

CV-24-003269 - KEYSTONE RANCH LLC vs CITY OF PATTERSON - Pre-Trial: Evidentiary Hearing - This matter comes before the Court on Respondents’ motions in limine and on various objections and requests to strike filed in advance of the Phase I writ proceedings. These matters are before the Court based on the parties’ request made at the last case management conference and in anticipation of the hearing on the writ scheduled for March 3, 2026. The Court issues the following tentative ruling to clarify the scope of materials properly before it, to resolve the motions in limine, and to ensure orderly adjudication consistent with the Court’s prior bifurcation and briefing orders.

I. RESPONDENTS’ JANUARY 22, 2026, FILINGS

The Court STRIKES all filings submitted by Respondents on January 22, 2026, EXCEPT for Respondents’ replies related to the pending motions in limine.

The replies in support of the motions in limine are deemed timely and will be considered.

All other January 22, 2026, filings are stricken and will not be considered for any purpose.

Petitioner’s request for sanctions in this regard is DENIED.

II. PETITIONER’S TRIAL BRIEF

On its own motion, the Court STRIKES Petitioner’s trial brief filed on January 5, 2026. The Court does not find any order allowing this document to be filed and thus the Court will not consider it in connection with the Phase I writ proceedings.

III. RESPONDENTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE

The Court addresses Respondents’ motions in limine in light of the governing principle that Phase I review is limited to the administrative record and to the claims presently before the Court.

A. Motion in Limine No. 1 (Facts, Evidence and Argument Related to Bad Faith, Pretext, and Retaliation)

Respondents’ Motion in Limine No. 1 seeks to exclude “facts, evidence, and argument” relating to alleged bad faith, pretext, and retaliation.

Consistent with the Court’s stated scope of review, the Court does not intend, in Phase I, to consider extra‑record evidence or material offered solely in support of bifurcated claims, including evidence or theories directed to alleged bad faith, pretext, or retaliation.

To the extent such matters are not part of the administrative record or do not bear on the First through Seventh Causes of Action, they are not properly before the Court at this stage.

The Court notes that this is not a jury trial, and the Court is capable of disregarding irrelevant argument or inadmissible material contained in the briefing without the need for a broad evidentiary exclusion. Relevance and admissibility will be assessed in context as the Court conducts its review of the record.

Accordingly, Motion in Limine No. 1 is GRANTED, to the extent it seeks to preclude the introduction or consideration of extra‑record evidence or material directed solely to bifurcated claims. This ruling reflects the Court’s application of the governing scope of review and does not preclude consideration of any properly admissible material within the administrative record.

B. Motion in Limine No. 2 (Material Not Cited to the Administrative Record)

Respondents’ Motion in Limine No. 2 seeks an order excluding facts, evidence, and argument not supported by citations to the administrative record.

The Court agrees that, in an administrative mandamus proceeding, the petitioner bears the burden of supporting factual assertions with citations to the administrative record or to properly noticed material. However, the Court is not persuaded that a preemptive order excluding unspecified material is necessary or appropriate.

As the trier of fact, the Court is capable of reviewing the administrative record, evaluating the parties’ citations, and assigning appropriate weight to the arguments presented. To the extent a factual assertion is unsupported by citation to the administrative record (or by a granted request for judicial notice), Petitioner bears the consequence of that deficiency in meeting its burden of proof.

Accordingly, Motion in Limine No. 2 is DENIED.

C. Motion in Limine No. 3 (Settlement Communications)

Respondents’ Motion in Limine No. 3 seeks to exclude evidence and argument regarding settlement communications.

Consistent with the Court’s stated limitation to the administrative record, the Court does not intend, in Phase I, to consider settlement communications that are not part of the administrative record or that do not bear on the claims presently before the Court. To the extent such material is offered to demonstrate bad faith or pretext, it relates primarily to bifurcated causes of action not at issue in this phase.

Accordingly, Motion in Limine No. 3 is GRANTED. This ruling does not preclude consideration of settlement agreements or related material that are part of the administrative record or properly subject to judicial notice as part of the public record, nor does it preclude consideration of settlement‑related evidence, if otherwise admissible, in connection with the bifurcated causes of action.

IV. SCOPE OF EVIDENCE AND REMAINING ISSUES

The Court reiterates that, in this Phase I writ proceeding, its review is confined to the administrative record and to matters properly subject to judicial notice. The Court does not intend to consider extra‑record evidence, nor material offered solely in support of the Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action, which have been bifurcated and are not before the Court at this stage. As the trier of fact and law, the Court is capable of disregarding irrelevant argument and inadmissible material and of confining its review accordingly.

V. HEARING AND FURTHER ARGUMENT

Based on the Court’s review of the papers and the foregoing rulings, it appears that the hearing scheduled for Thursday morning at 8:30 a.m. is not necessary. Therefore, unless a party contests this tentative ruling, the hearing will be VACATED.

If the tentative ruling is contested, the Court will consider argument regarding the order striking Petitioner’s trial brief and the rulings on the motions in limine. The Court does not believe that further information or argument is necessary as to the remaining issues addressed in this tentative ruling.

CV-25-005194 - BETSAKIS, SINTIYA vs BMW OF NORTH AMERICA LLC - a) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant's Further Responses to Requests for Production Nos. 1, 3, 9, 17, 37-63, 71, 72 and 73 - GRANTED; b) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant's Further Responses to Form Interrogatory Nos. 15.1 and 17.1 - GRANTED; c) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant's Further Verified Responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 14, 38-43 and 51 - GRANTED.

a) The Court notes as a preliminary matter that Defendant’s Supplementary Responses appear to be unverified and finds that unverified responses which do not comprise objections only but include factual responses render the factual responses tantamount to no responses at all. (Appleton v. Superior Ct., (1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 632). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production as said claims largely relate to Plaintiff’s specific vehicle and are relevant to Plaintiff’s civil penalty claims and to Defendant’s affirmative defense of good faith denial of Plaintiff’s request to repurchase his vehicle.  (Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2017.010 and 2031.310; Williams v. Sup.Ct. (Marshalls of CA, LLC) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 Emerson Elec. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Grayson) (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 1101; Obregon v. Sup.Ct. (Cimm's, Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.4th 424, 434).

Furthermore, information regarding other vehicles of the same make model and year as Plaintiff’s have been held to be discoverable. (MacQuiddy v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC, (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1036; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc., (2009)174 Cal.App.4th 967; Schreidel v. American Honda Motor Co., (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1242).

As to information possessed by Defendant’s dealers or authorized repair agents or facilities, this has been held to be available to Defendant. (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (a)(1)(A)); Krotin v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., (1995), 38 Cal. App. 4th 294, 303, as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 14, 1995).

Regarding Defendant’s claims of attorney client privilege and attorney work product, the Court finds that Defendant did not provide sufficient factual information to permit an evaluation of the merits of its claim or a privilege log. Defendant is therefore ordered to produce a privilege log in support of its claims. (Code of Civil Procedure CP § 2030.240; Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court (2015), 242 Cal.App.4th 1116).

Any trade secret claims must be supported by an affidavit based upon personal knowledge listing the affiant's qualifications to give an opinion concerning the trade secret at issue, identifying, without revealing, the alleged trade secret and articles which disclose the secret, and presenting evidence that the secret qualifies as a trade secret. (Stadish v. Superior Ct., (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 1130, 1144), applying Section 1061 of the Evid Code).
 

Subject to substantiation of claims of attorney client privilege, and attorney work product, and trade secret claims, Defendant shall provide further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents Nos 1,3, 9, 17, 37-63, 71,72 and 73 within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order.   

b) The Court notes as a preliminary matter that Defendant’s Supplementary Responses appear to be unverified and finds that unverified responses which do not comprise objections only but include factual responses render the factual responses tantamount to no responses at all. (Appleton v. Superior Ct., (1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 632). 

The Court also finds Defendant’s responses to said Form Interrogatories to be incomplete, not answered to the extent possible, and do not demonstrate a good faith attempt to obtain the requested information. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2030.220; Krotin v Prosche Cars N. Am., Inc., (1995), 38 Cal. App. 4th 294, 303, as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 14, 1995).

The Court further finds that the Interrogatories at issue do not require the compilation of an audit, summary or abstract. Furthermore, even if they did, Defendant did not refer to the relevant documents out of the 825 pages Defendant’s states it has produced with sufficient detail to enable Plaintiff to identify and locate said documents as easily as Defendant can. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2030.230).

Accordingly, subject to any claims of attorney client and work product privilege Defendant shall provide further Code complaint verified responses to the Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories Nos. 15.1 and 17.1 within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order.

c) The Court notes as a preliminary matter that Defendant’s Supplementary Responses appear to be unverified and finds that unverified responses which do not comprise objections only but include factual responses render the factual responses tantamount to no responses at all. (Appleton v. Superior Ct., (1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 632). 

The Court also finds Defendant’s responses to said Special Interrogatories to be incomplete, not answered to the extent possible, and do not demonstrate a good faith attempt to obtain the requested information. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2030.220; Krotin v Prosche Cars N. Am., Inc., (1995), 38 Cal. App. 4th 294, 303, as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 14, 1995).

The Court further finds that the Interrogatories at issue do not require the compilation of an audit, summary or abstract. Furthermore, even if they did, Defendant did not refer to the relevant documents out of the 825 pages Defendant’s states it has produced with sufficient detail to enable Plaintiff to identify and locate said documents as easily as Defendant can. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2030.230).

The court notes that Civ. Proc.  Code § 871.26 mandates the production of various documents and depositions on various matters covered by Plaintiff’s Interrogatory Requests. (Civ. Proc. Code § 871.26(h) (7) (15)(16) and (16) (i)(9) and (10)). While it is not clear whether Plaintiff made any prelitigation requests for restitution or replacement good cause exists to find the requested information discoverable. (Code of Civ. Proc. Section 2017.010; Goglin v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, (2016) 4 Cal. App. 5th 462, 466–67; Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094)

Accordingly, subject to any claims of attorney client and attorney work product privilege Defendant shall provide further, Code complaint, verified responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories Nos. 15.1 and 17.1 within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-25-001104 - DATA MORTGAGE INC vs HARRISON, RODNEY - Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication - HEARING REQUIRED.

UD-25-001239 - NEXT DOOR NEIGHBOR HOMES LLC vs QUINTERO, JOSE ANTONIO - a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories - HEARING REQUIRED; b) Plaintiff’s Motion Deeming Matters Admitted - HEARING REQUIRED; c) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Documents Set One - HEARING REQUIRED.