Civil Tentative Rulings

August 4, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-002213 –LEGGETT, JANAE vs KEMP, HIRAM – Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Motion to Tax Costs – DENIED.

The motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Plaintiff’s memorandum reiterates arguments that were previously before the Court, such as arguing that deposition costs were not reasonably necessary and that Plaintiff is experiencing financial hardship. Plaintiff does not present “new or different facts, circumstances, or law” warranting modification of the May 12, 2026 Order on Motion to Tax Costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008.)

Further filings attempting to relitigate the same issues are likely to result in a vexatious litigant finding.

CV-26-000861 – CASTRO, VINCENT vs ADVANTAGE SALES & MARKETING LLC - Defendant Advantage Sales & Marketing LLC's Motion to Compel Arbitration of Individual and Individual Paga Claims, Strike Putative Class Claims, and Stay Non-Individual Paga Claims Pending Arbitration – HEARING REQUIRED.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice of the state cases is denied as the Court cannot consider them for any purpose. (See TBG Ins. Service Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4^th 443, 447 fn. 2; California Rule of Court 8.1115.)  Fisher & Phillips LLP is now on actual notice of this rule.

The Request for Judicial Notice in the Reply is likely to be granted, and the use of federal cases at every level is permissible as persuasive authority.

Nonetheless, before considering these rulings, Plaintiff has a right to differentiate the cases and to cite to any other citable (federal or published state) cases to assist the Court. (See Evidence Code § 452.)

CV-26-002154 – WRIGHT, SHANNA vs SODHI, JAKRUN S – a) Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint-– SUSTAINED with leave to amend in part, OVERRULED in part; b) Defendant’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages and Emotional Distress and Case of Action for Fraud - GRANTED with leave to amend.

a-b) The Court notes that the current pleadings do not appear to articulate recoverable damages in any case other than in the civil case CV-24-699.

Requests for Judicial Notice

Defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of the complaint in the instant action is DENIED as moot; it is unnecessary for the Court to take judicial notice of filings in the instant case.

Defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the Fee Arbitration Findings and Award filed on January 28, 2026, in Case No. 25-A-132 before the State Bar of California, Mandatory Fee Arbitration Program is GRANTED solely for the fact of the ruling and not for the factual findings. .

Plaintiff’s unopposed request for judicial notice of three records from Case No. CV-24-

000699 in Stanislaus County Superior Court, entitled Shanna Wright v. Debbra Schlicht, is GRANTED.

First cause of action for legal malpractice

“To state a cause of action for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must plead ‘(1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorney's negligence.’ ” (Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 179.) “To show damages proximately caused by the breach, the plaintiff must allege facts establishing that, ‘but for the alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not the plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result.’ ” (Ibid.)

Here, the First Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action for legal malpractice and is not uncertain. The First Amended Complaint pleads a duty owed by Defendants as legal counsel; that Defendants breach their duty by missing court deadlines; that Defendants’ actions caused her to suffer damages; and that Plaintiff suffered damages, including adverse rulings and sanctions in the form of an attorney’s fee award.

At this stage, Plaintiff is required only to plead facts showing that it is more likely than not Plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result. (Charnay, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at 180.) The First Amended Complaint does so by pleading Plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result with respect to the sanctions if deadlines were not missed. At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action.

At the pleading stage, Plaintiff need not relitigate the entire case. Either the failure to oppose the anti-SLAPP motion or the bringing of a case in which no credible opposition to an anti-SLAPP motion could be made is actionable.

“Settle and sue,” cases are, at trial, determined by a preponderance of the evidence standard. (Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F. Jensen (2020) 50 Cal.App.5^th 1077.)

The demurrer to the first cause of cation for legal malpractice is OVERRULED.

Second cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty

“To establish a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary relationship, breach of that duty and damages.” (Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 182.)

The First Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and is not uncertain. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants concealed procedural failures which resulted in damages. The allegations are sufficient at this early stage of the case.

The demurrer to the second cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is OVERRULED.

Third cause of action for breach of contract

In the third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that the existence of a contract, that Plaintiff performed by paying, that Defendants breached their contract by failing to perform legal services competently, and that Plaintiff suffered damages due to the breach.  The allegations are not uncertain. Defendant argues that the breach of contract cause of action is barred by res judicata because there was a prior arbitration between the parties. As to fees, the matter has been determined by the arbitrator. As to other damages, the matter has not been determined.

The demurrer to the third cause of action for breach of contract is OVERRULED.

Fourth cause of action for fraud and punitive damages

The First Amended Complaint adequately pleads the elements of a fraud cause of action. As to specificity, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sodhi knowingly made misrepresentations to Plaintiff regarding the status of her case, including for example, concerning Defendants’ failure to timely respond to a dispositive motion. Plaintiff’s allegations meet the requirement of specificity to plead fraud. But they are unsupported or insufficiently supported by the judicially noticeable case CV-24-699 in which Plaintiff did in fact have the ruling reversed on the anti-SLAPP issue. Representations that no irreparable harm had occurred appear to be true.

Allegations for fraud must be pled with specificity. Allegations that some discovery was not conducted that was desired by Plaintiff is insufficient. The inclusion of the statement that “no irreparable harm had occurred,” indicates there was likely some discussion about the missed deadline in which missing the deadline was acknowledged.

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action for fraud is SUSTAINED and the motion to strike is MOOT. The punitive damages request is STRICKEN.

Emotional distress damages

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s emotional distress damages should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s injuries are purely economic losses. Under these circumstances Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4^th 1 controls and everything outside of negligence is insufficiently pled.

Leave to Amend

Plaintiff is self-represented and may be able to repair the defects in the pleadings. Plaintiff is given 20 days to file an amended complaint.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-001460 – CITIBANK NA vs FIGUEROA, MONICA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order that Matters in Request for Admission of Truth of Facts be Deem Admitted – GRANTED, and unopposed.

On June 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for order that matters in request for admission of truth of facts be deemed admitted. There is no opposition on file.

“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response . . . [t]he requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) “The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(c).)

Plaintiff’s declaration states that Plaintiff served by mail its first set of requests for admissions on defendant on October 20, 2025, and received no response. Plaintiff requests that the truth of all specified facts in the requests for admission be deemed admitted.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280, Plaintiff’s unopposed motion is GRANTED. The Court intends to sign the proposed order Plaintiff submitted in connection with its motion.

CV-25-012482 - KOURY, ANITA vs FORD MOTOR COMPANY – a) Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint- DENIED; b) Defendant's Motion to Compel Depositions of Plaintiffs, Request for Sanctions of $750.00 – GRANTED in part, DENIED in part.

a) For the reasons set forth below, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.

On May 20, 2026, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ third and fourth causes of action of the First Amended Complaint fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiffs opposed and Defendant replied.

Third Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment

“The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact was known; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact.” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40.) “The requirement of specificity in a fraud action against a corporation requires the plaintiff to allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)

Pleading fraud with specificity

Defendant argues that the fraudulent concealment cause of action does not satisfy the requisite specificity required to plead fraud. “There are certain exceptions to the particularity requirement.” (Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1, 20 disapproved on another ground by Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310.) “ ‘Less specificity is required when ‘it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.’ ’ ” (Ibid.)
 

Here, the FAC satisfies the requirement of specificity to state a fraudulent concealment action. Courts have explained that the requirement of specificity in fraud actions “is intended to apply to affirmative misrepresentations” rather than concealment or nondisclosure. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384, as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 18, 2009).) The FAC alleges that Ford—through at least its marketing materials, salespersons, and repair representatives—concealed and/or failed to disclose material information regarding known defects with the ten-speed transmission model that was installed in the 2024 Lincoln Navigator that Plaintiffs’ leased. The Court finds the allegations in the FAC sufficiently satisfy the specificity requirement in this instance.

Duty to disclose

Defendant next argues that the FAC fails to demonstrate that it had a duty to disclose alleged defects with the ten-speed transmission.

“A duty to disclose a material fact can arise if (1) it is imposed by statute; (2) the defendant is acting as plaintiff's fiduciary or is in some other confidential relationship with plaintiff that imposes a disclosure duty under the circumstances; (3) the material facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows those facts are not known or reasonably discoverable by plaintiff (i.e., exclusive knowledge); (4) the defendant makes representations but fails to disclose other facts that materially qualify the facts disclosed or render the disclosure misleading (i.e., partial concealment); or (5) defendant actively conceals discovery of material fact from plaintiff (i.e., active concealment). [Citations.]” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40.) “Circumstances (3), (4), and (5) presuppose a preexisting relationship between the parties, such as ‘between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.’ ” (Ibid.)
 

Here, the FAC adequately alleges there is a buyer-seller relationship between Defendant and Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs leased a 2024 Lincoln Navigator from Big Valley Ford in Stockon, California. The FAC alleges that Big Valley Ford is an authorized dealer and agent of Defendant, and that Defendant backed the leased vehicle with warranties. Therefore, the FAC alleges a seller and buyer relationship forming the basis of a duty to disclose. (See, e.g., Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844 [“Nissan argues plaintiffs did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because plaintiffs bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself) . . . we decline to hold plaintiffs’ claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.”].) The CLRA cases Defendant relies on are distinguishable, because those cases did not contain allegations that the defect could cause physical injury or safety concerns. (E.g., Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 836, as modified (Nov. 8, 2006) [“The complaint is devoid of factual allegations showing any instance of physical injury or any safety concerns posed by the defect.”].)

The FAC also pleads exclusive knowledge and active concealment. For example, the FAC pleads that Defendant possessed exclusive knowledge of the alleged defective transmission through internal channels and that Defendant concealed the information by intentionally omitting it from marketing materials and failing to disclose such information to customers. Accordingly, the Court finds that the FAC adequately pleads a duty to disclose. (See, e.g., Dhital, supra 84 Cal.App.5th at 844–45 [“revers[ing] the trial court's order sustaining Nissan's demurrer to the SAC's fourth cause of action (the claim for fraudulent inducement by concealment)” where plaintiffs pleaded, inter alia, that certain transmission models installed in Nissan vehicles were defective and that “Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information”].)

Fraud damages

The FAC alleges that if Plaintiffs would not have leased the vehicle or would have paid substantially less for it but for Defendant’s concealment regarding alleged defects with the ten-speed transmission. The allegations are sufficient to state causation at this stage. Defendant’s arguments regarding the economic loss rule were presented for the first time in Defendant’s reply, thus the Court does not consider them.

Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code Section 1750 et seq. (Consumer Legal Remedies Act)

Defendant argues that the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) claim fails for the same reasons as the fraud claim. For the same reasons discussed above, the Court finds the CLRA claim is adequately stated.

b) On June 5, 2026, Defendant filed a motion to compel depositions of Plaintiffs Anita Koury and John Koury and request for sanctions. On July 22, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On July 24, 2026, Defendant filed a reply.

Defendant served the notices of deposition on February 19, 2026, but had to reschedule the noticed date due to a trial conflict. Despite numerous follow-ups from Defendant, Plaintiffs failed to provide alternate dates for the deposition. Defendant filed the instant motion, asking the Court to order Plaintiffs to appear for their depositions and produce documents on a date falling within 15 days of the Court’s order. Subsequently, Plaintiffs contacted Defendant and the depositions were scheduled for July 31, 2026. Defendant requests that the instant motion remain on calendar and requests that the Court grant the motion in the event the depositions do not occur on July 31, 2026, as scheduled.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.450, the motion to compel is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall appear for deposition within 15 days of service of the signed order. The Court finds the circumstances here make the imposition of sanctions unjust and declines to issue them. The request for sanctions is DENIED. Moving party to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms with this ruling.

CV-26-003882 - PADILLA, JOHN PAUL vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction – GRANTED.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED. Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. is enjoined from participating in the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) arbitration between the parties (i.e., AAA Case No. 012600037344). Defendant shall notify AAA within one court day that, pursuant to this Court’s order, Defendant seeks a stay of the arbitration. Plaintiff shall post an undertaking in the amount of $500 and submit a proposed order within one day that conforms with this ruling. (CRC 3.1150(f).)

On July 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Defendant from participating in the AAA arbitration that Defendant initiated on June 9, 2026. On July 24, 2026, Defendant opposed. The Court does not consider Plaintiff’s reply, as it is unauthorized.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 526 allows a preliminary injunction to issue in the following cases:

“(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.

(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.

(3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

(4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief.

(5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief.

(6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.

(7) Where the obligation arises from a trust.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 526.) Trial courts consider two factors when determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction. The first factor “is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits[.]” (Salazar v. Majestic Realty Co. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 813, 825, reh'g denied (Dec. 23, 2025), review denied (Feb. 25, 2026)). The second factor “is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.” (Ibid.) The greater the plaintiff’s showing on one factor, the less must be shown on the other factor. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) “A preliminary injunction is an interim remedy designed to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits.” (MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623.)

First, plaintiff has shown a possibility that it will prevail on the merits of the motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is both procedurally and substantially unconscionable because it was essentially a contract of adhesion, because it requires the arbitration to be confidential, and because it requires employees to waive their right to bring a representative PAGA action. After considering Defendant’s arguments in opposition, the Court finds “there is some possibility that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim.” (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at 678.)

Second, the balance of harms favors Plaintiff. It does not appear that Defendant initiated the arbitration in good faith. Defendant managed to initiate an arbitration as the Respondent by submitting an arbitration demand on behalf of Plaintiff as the Claimant. Typically, Respondents do not initiate arbitration, they respond to them. Defendant states that AAA Rule 4 allows either party to initiate arbitration “in the absence of a joint request for arbitration.” (Opposition at 18.) The Court was unable to locate such language in the AAA rules. Rather Rule 4 states that arbitration is initiated “by the initiating party” who is “referred to as the ‘claimant[.]’ ” (July 22, 2026 Amended Decl. of Jaclyn Joyce, Ex. 2 at p. 8.) In addition, the arbitration agreement at issue states that “an employee may initiate the arbitration process[.]” (Id., Ex. 1 at p. 2.) Neither document states that a Respondent may initiate an arbitration against itself on behalf of another party. Defendant’s argument that the arbitration agreement may be unilaterally commenced by either party without the need for a court order likewise appears misplaced. None of the cases which Defendant cites stand for the proposition that a respondent may initiate an arbitration against itself on behalf of the claimant. Rather, those cases merely demonstrate that a claimant may submit an arbitration demand a=without a court order.

Forcing Plaintiff to participate in arbitration proceedings that were improperly initiated harms Plaintiff and produces waste by forcing Plaintiff to devote resources on two fronts unnecessarily. Meanwhile, Defendant will suffer no harm in waiting for the Court’s order on its own motion to compel arbitration. That Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration in the instant case indicates that Defendant is aware of the proper procedure yet chose to circumvent established rules and procedures in an attempt to gain the upper hand. The Court notes that in the context of duplicative cases pending in other jurisdictions, California courts have the power to issue orders that prohibit a party from taking action in other actions that interfere with the trial court’s proceedings. (Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 697, 713, as modified (Mar. 5, 2003) [“Courts . . . consider vexatiousness or oppressiveness in a race to judgment in the foreign forum as sufficient grounds to issue an antisuit injunction.”].) Although an arbitration is not a judicial proceeding, the logic is applicable to matter at hand. Defendant’s acts of improperly initiating arbitration interfere with the trial court’s proceedings.

PR-25-001101 – IN THE MATTER OF EOFF, MATHEW – Petitioner's Motion for Sanctions Against Respondent's Counsel Cyril L. Lawrence and Cyril Lawrence, Inc. – DENIED.

The Court does not condone the submission of inaccurate legal authority. Attorneys have an obligation to independently verify citations before submitting a filing. However, former counsel Cyril L. Lawrence filed a Notice of Error acknowledging that the quotation attributed to Estate of Lingenfelter cited in a prior filing did not appear in the opinion. He admitted that the misattribution was the result of an AI research tool, and he corrected the error shortly after it was brought to his attention. The Court finds that this isolated corrected citation error does not warrant sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.

As to Petitioner's remaining allegations, the Court finds that Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that the challenged filings were presented for an improper purpose, that the legal contentions were objectively frivolous, or that the factual contentions lacked evidentiary support within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.

The motion is therefore DENIED in its entirety.

No sanctions are awarded.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-23-004787 - HOSKINSON, ROY BERT, Jr vs LUMAUIG, BRANDON - Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(B) – DENIED.

The Court notes that the judgment which is the subject of the instant motion is also currently the subject of a pending appeal. Under the circumstances, the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the motion herein. (Code Civ. Proc. § 916(a).) Therefore, the Court must deny the motion on that ground.

Additionally, even if the instant motion were properly before the Court at this time, the Court would have serious doubts as to the viability of the same, in view of the fact that the judgment resulted from the Court’s substantive determination regarding the statute of limitations defense to the action.

CV-25-006952 - A&A TRUCK TRAILER REPAIR INC vs SINGH, YADWINDER - Defendant Yadwinder Singh's Motion to Set Aside Judgment After Trial – DENIED.

This matter appears to be erroneously titled, as Defendant actually seeks relief from the entry of default on 10-17-25 under the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b). The motion is untimely, as it was brought more than 6 months from the entry of default.

CV-25-011230 - MELLO, CINDY vs MOCSE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION - Defendant's Verified Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Scott R. Sinson – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The application complies with the requirements of Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 9.40.  The Court will sign the proposed order.

CV-26-001860 - SELFHELP ENTERPRISES vs NORTHEAST TERRITORIES PATTERSON LLC - Defendant Hartley Patterson, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff's First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to August 28, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The matter is continued to be heard concurrently with the co-defendants’ demurrers scheduled for hearing on 8-28-26.  In the meantime, the parties are instructed to continue meet-and-confer efforts in an attempt to resolve or narrow the issues presented herein. Defense counsel shall submit a supplemental declaration detailing those efforts and the results thereof no later than August 20, 2026.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David Hood in Department 24:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 24***

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-18-001015 - GREENBRIAR VILLAS LLC vs GADDIS, TAMARA -Defendant’s Motion to Seal – HEARING REQUIRED.