Civil Tentative Rulings

June 5, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-006360 – LAINEZ, JUANA CASTILLO DE vs CITY OF CERES – Defendant County of Stanislaus’ Motion for Order Compelling Plaintiff to Submit to an Examination -  DENIED.

Code of Civil Procedure § 2032.220(a) states, “In any case in which a plaintiff is seeking recovery for personal injuries, any defendant may demand one physical examination of the plaintiff, if both of the following conditions are satisfied: [¶] (1) The examination does not include any diagnostic test or procedure that is painful, protracted, or intrusive. [¶] (2) The examination is conducted at a location within 75 miles of the residence of the examinee.” A party seeking to deviate from these parameters must first seek leave from the Court (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.310(a)) and must show good cause (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.320(a)). In addition, where the examination is noticed for a location more than 75 miles from the examinee’s residence, the Court may make the order only if “(1) [t]he court determines that there is good cause for the travel involved,” and “(2) [t]he order is conditioned on the advancement by the moving party of the reasonable expenses and costs to the examinee for travel to the place of examination.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.320(e).)

As Defendant notes, “ “ ‘Good cause’ in the context of this motion is a demonstration of ‘relevance and specific facts showing the need for the information and the lack of means for obtaining it elsewhere.’ (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 833, 840.)” (Mem., at p. 4 [emphasis added].) None of the reasons set forth in the motion meet this standard.

Defendant asserts, inter alia, that “Defendant cannot be sure of retaining a North Carolina physician with the same attributes as Dr. Purnell and would have no reasonable way of vetting out-of-state doctors to find one with the appropriate professional qualifications and the ability to testify in a reasonable manner and to not have some unknown, disqualifying history.” (Mem., at p. 5.) However, as Plaintiff has noted in her opposition, Durham, North Carolina probably has competent physicians for this task. The Court is not convinced that Defendant’s efforts have been sufficient to overcome the code’s requirements.

Defendant’s other stated reasons— that Defendant would like to use the Modesto doctor it already knows and would prefer in-person testimony from its expert—also do not rise to the level of showing a lack of means.

On reply, Defendant further contends, “Plaintiff has not presented any evidence she is currently unable to travel.” (Reply, at p. 1.) This contention, however, reverses the burden of proof. The burden is not on Plaintiff to demonstrate that she cannot currently travel; rather, the burden is on Defendant to show why Plaintiff’s travel is necessary.  

CV-24-009613 – RUIZ, ANA vs G3 ENTERPRISES INC – Final Approval Hearing – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court would like additional information regarding the costs incurred by the Koul Law Firm. Provided that Class Counsel can explain the costs to the Court’s satisfaction, and further providing that there are no unexpected issues, the Court is inclined to GRANT the motion.

It appears that proper notice to the settlement class has been given in compliance with the law and as required by the Court’s order granting preliminary approval. Having considered the unopposed motion herein and the supporting declarations and evidence, the Court finds that the settlement was entered into good faith, is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and satisfies the standards for final approval under California law. (Civil Code § 1781; Code Civ. Proc. § 382; Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.769.) Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the proposed settlement and the associated fees and costs are approved as set forth in the motions and supporting papers, as follows:

        Fees and costs of Settlement Administrator: $12,000;

        Payment to Class Representative: $7,500;

        PAGA allocation to LWDA (65%) and class members (35%): $30,000;

        Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees: $98,323.50; and

        Class Counsel’s costs: $20,307.27.

In accordance with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 384 and pursuant to the suggestion in the proposed order, the Court SETS a compliance hearing for February 5, 2027, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 21, to confirm full administration of the settlement. The Settlement Administrator shall submit a compliance report no later than nine days before the date of the hearing, which shall include the total amount that was actually paid to the class members pursuant to the subject settlement and the remaining amount of unclaimed funds.

The Court orders that Notice of the Court’s Order Granting Final Approval and Judgment be posted on the Settlement Administrator’s website for a period of at least 90 days. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.771(b).)

If this motion is granted as prayed, the Court will sign the proposed order.

CV-26-001562 – AMAYA, SALVINO vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO – Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Arbitration Pending Litigation - GRANTED

The Court has questions about the legal effect of the initiation of arbitration

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff’s unopposed request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

Objections

Plaintiff has objected to paragraphs 2-27 of the Declaration of Michele Bava, the Group Chief Human Resources Officer for Tenet – Northern California and the exhibits attached to the declaration. Although the Court does not consider the information provided by the declaration material to the current dispute, the objections are OVERRULED in their entirety.

Merits

Plaintiff moves to stay an American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) proceeding that was initiated by Defendant after this civil action was filed. The arbitration demand names Plaintiff as the “Claimant,” notwithstanding that Plaintiff did not know about the commencement of the proceeding, let alone authorize the initiation.

California law strongly favors arbitration (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125), and arbitration agreements may, in some circumstances, be “self-executing” (see infra). Nonetheless, where a civil action has already been filed, the statutory scheme contemplates that a party seeking to arbitrate will pursue a court order enforcing the arbitration agreement. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.2, 1292.4.)

Here, Plaintiff filed the civil complaint, and Defendant did not seek a court order compelling arbitration. Instead, it initiated arbitration proceedings on Plaintiff’s behalf after this case was filed and without Plaintiff’s consent. That renders this case distinguishable from the authorities relied on by Defendant in pages 7 and 8 of its opposition. Specifically, in Tutti Mangia Italian Grill, Inc. v. American Textile Maintenance Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 733, 736, fn. 1, “The arbitration award against TMIG had been rendered the day before appellants filed their declaratory relief action.” Similarly, in National Marble Co. v. Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1063, the court case was initiated by a petition seeking to vacate the arbitration award. Able Building Maintenance Co. v. Board of Trustees of General Employees Trust Fund (9th Cir. 2006) 175 Fed.Appx. 118, 119, also arose from a petition seeking to vacate the arbitration award. King v. Larsen Realty, Inc. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 349, 352, was initiated by a petition to confirm an arbitration award. In Kustom Kraft Homes v. Leivenstein (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 805, 807‑808, Plaintiffs filed their complaint first. Defendants demurred, and the trial court “treated defendant’s misplaced demurrer as a request for arbitration and the court's ruling thereon, in effect, as an order therefor.” (Id. at p. 811.)

Thus, none of the above cases stands for the proposition that it is appropriate for a civil defendant to unilaterally begin an arbitration without court authorization once a litigation has commenced. The instant sequence raises issues distinct from the ultimate question of arbitrability, including the procedural propriety of the arbitration’s initiation and the management of parallel proceedings.

The Court is not, at this time, determining whether Plaintiff’s claims are subject to arbitration or whether any delegation provision applies those questions to the arbitrator. Rather, the Court concludes it retains authority to address the manner in which parallel proceedings are initiated and to determine whether interim relief is appropriate to preserve the orderly administration of justice pending resolution of arbitrability. And indeed, the Court notes that the AAA seems to agree, as it has already suspended the arbitration in deference to this Court’s determination.

It appears to the Court that, under the circumstances presented, Defendant should have sought a court order compelling arbitration in the first instance before initiating proceedings that purport to assert Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses. The Court further concludes that it has authority to regulate the relationship between this action and the AAA proceeding, notwithstanding Defendant’s arguments to the contrary.

The Court vacates the June 9, 2026 hearing. 

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-26-000101 – JACKSON, NICHOLAS vs CITY OF MODESTO – Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Mandate - DENIED.

For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the petition. Respondents to submit a proposed order consistent with this ruling within 5 court days.

Background

On January 7, 2026, Petitioner Nicholas Jackson filed a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to the California Public Records Act, Government Code sections 7920.000 et seq., and Code of Civil Procedure § 1085 (the “Petition”). The Petition asks the Court to order Respondents City of Modesto (“City”) and the Modesto Police Department (the “Police Department”; collectively, “Respondents”) to release body worn camera footage and related audiovisual records arising from a completed traffic stop involving Petitioner Jackson.

The parties submitted briefing and the Court held a hearing on May 8, 2026. Both parties presented oral argument at the hearing and Respondents indicated they would submit additional materials in camera. Subsequently, Respondents submitted additional documents, including an in camera submission.

Petitioner’s Unopposed Request for Judicial Notice

On April 23, 2026, Petitioner submitted a Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Petition requesting that the Court take judicial notice of three documents pursuant to Evidence Code Sections 452 and 453:

        1) Petitioner’s California Public Records Act request dated December 4, 2025 (Exhibit A); 

        2) Respondent’s written response dated December 22, 2025 (Exhibit B); and

        3) Redacted CAD report produced by Respondent (Exhibit C).

Respondents have no opposition or objections. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s unopposed request for judicial notice.

The California Public Records Act (“CPRA”)

“Each agency, upon a request for a copy of records, shall, within 10 days from receipt of the request, determine whether the request, in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records in the possession of the agency and shall promptly notify the person making the request of the determination and the reasons therefor.” (Gov. Code, § 7922.535.)

“A response to a written request for inspection or copies of public records that includes a determination that the request is denied, in whole or in part, shall be in writing.” (Gov. Code, § 7922.540.) “The notification of denial shall set forth the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial.” (Ibid.) “An agency shall justify withholding any record by complying with Section 7922.000.” (Ibid.)

Under the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”), any person may institute a proceeding for a writ of mandate to enforce the right to inspect or receive a copy of a public record. (Gov. Code, § 7923.000.) “[T]he court shall set the times for hearings and responsive pleadings with the object of securing a decision as to the matters at issue at the earliest possible time.” (Gov. Code, § 7923.005.) “When it is alleged that public records have been improperly withheld, section 6259, subdivision (a) [i.e., the predecessor statute to Government Code section 7923.100] directs that ‘the court shall order the officer or person charged with withholding the records’ to disclose the records or show cause why they should not be produced.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Ct. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 622; Gov. Code, § 7923.100.) “The court shall decide the case after . . . examin[ing] the record in camera[,] examin[ing] any papers filed by the parties[,] and consider[ing] any oral argument and additional evidence as the court may allow.” (Gov. Code, § 7923.105.)

“If the court finds that the public official's decision to refuse disclosure is not justified under Section 7922.000 or any provision listed in Section 7920.505, the court shall order the public official to make the record public.” (Gov. Code, § 7923.110.) “If the court finds that the public official was justified in refusing to make the record public, the court shall return the record to the public official without disclosing its content, together with an order supporting the decision refusing disclosure.” (Ibid.)

Whether Respondents violated the CPRA

Exhibit A to Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice is identified as a copy of Petitioner’s CPRA Request (the “CPRA Request”). It is signed received by “B. Diaz de Leon” on the date of “12-4-25.” The CPRA Request is also stamped “DEC 4’25am9:39.”

Exhibit B to Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice is identified as an email notification of Respondents’ written response to Petitioner’s CPRA Request. The email was received by Petitioner on Monday, December 22, 2025 at 1:31 pm. The written response states that “[r]ecords . . . have been withheld pursuant to California Government Code section 7923.600-7923.625,” that “City has redacted certain information . . . pursuant to Government Code section 7927.700,” and that “[d]ocuments have been withheld pursuant to California Government Code 7927.705, Penal Code section 1054.5.”

Exhibit C to Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice is identified as the redacted CAD report produced by Respondents. The second page of the exhibit contains a letter on Modesto Police Department letterhead from Beatrice Diaz Deleon to Petitioner Jackson that is dated December 11, 2025. The letter states the following: “Any body camera footage, dash camera footage in relation to the incident is considered evidence and is releasable only through subpoena.”

Here, Petitioner’s CPRA Request was dated December 4, 2025 and was received by Respondents on December 4, 2025. (Ex. A.) Ten days after December 4, 2025 puts the deadline to respond on December 15, 2026. Respondents responded to the CPRA Request approximately five business days later on December 22, 2025. (Exs. B, C.) Respondents also contend that they received another, separate CPRA request from Petitioner via mail on December 11, 2025, to which they timely responded within 10 days on December 22, 2025. (Amended Declaration of Heidi Jenkins.)

Respondents failed to respond within the statutory 10 days proscribed by Government Code, section 7922.535, but “[t]he Act provides no remedy for failure to timely comply with a request for records.” Rogers v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 469, 483, as modified (Oct. 13, 1993). The California Supreme Court has explained “that requiring disclosure of otherwise exempt records as a penalty for delay in complying with the Act's timing requirements is unduly harsh.” Michaelis, Montanari & Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1065, 1072. The Court finds that Respondents’ written response to the CPRA Request otherwise sufficiently complies with Government Code, section 7922.540.

Respondents contend that, aside from the redacted CAD report they provided, the requested records are exempt as an investigation file. The Court has reviewed Respondents’ May 14, 2026 sworn declaration submitted to the Court in camera. The Court finds that Respondents have sufficiently established the existence of an investigation undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of the Vehicle Code may have or did occur. Thus, the investigation exemption applies here. Not “everything law enforcement officers do [is shielded] from disclosure.” (Haynie v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1061). “The records of investigation exempted under [Section 7923.600] encompass only those investigations undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of law may occur or has occurred.” (Ibid.)

Accordingly, pursuant to Government Code, section 7923.110, the Court will not order Respondents to make the requested records public.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-25-002490 – ROMERO, ROGER vs SCROGGINS, JAMES EDWARD JR – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication by Defendants Flowtek Plumbing, Inc. and James Edward Scroggins Jr – GRANTED.

The Court finds that Defendants, as the moving parties, have met the initial burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment on Plaintiff’s claim herein, on the grounds that Plaintiff is limited to the worker’s compensation system to address his alleged injuries in this instance. The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to submit admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a material factual dispute preventing judgment for Defendant as a matter of law.  Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden in that he has failed to submit admissible evidence creating a material factual dispute on the issue of whether Plaintiff was injured while in the course and scope of his employment, thus limiting his opportunities for redress to the worker’s compensation system. Therefore, the Court finds that the undisputed facts dictate a conclusion that the subject accident occurred within the parameters of the incidental benefit exception. (See, e.g. Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150; Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. Department of Transportation (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 87; Lazar v. Thermal Equipment Corp. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 458.)

Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s evidence are SUSTAINED on the grounds stated. In addition, Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED.

CV-25-007838 – ALVARAZ, CRISTAL vs DIAMOND TRUCK SALES – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Deeming Requests for Admission to Diamond Truck Sales Admitted and for Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The Court finds that Defendant has failed to respond to the subject discovery entirely and objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(a).)  Accordingly, the Court has no discretion but to grant Plaintiff’s request.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c); St. Mary’s v. Superior Court (Schellenberg) (2014) 223 Cal.App.4^th 762, 777-778.). The matters contained in Request for Admissions, Set One, are deemed admitted. 

The Court further finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with this motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2033.280(c), 2023.010, 2030.030 et seq.) Therefore, monetary sanctions in the amount of $410 are awarded against Defendant Diamond Truck Sales and its counsel, Gulomjon Azimov, payable to Plaintiff’s counsel.

CV-24-003550 – MARCHIANDO, LORI vs RULER, REONA VAN – Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint - GRANTED.

Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated grounds for the proposed amendment. The Court has broad discretion in this area and there is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 473(a)(1), 576.)

Plaintiff shall submit the Second Amended Complaint for filing within 10 days. Plaintiff shall submit a revised form of order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-24-006691 – PROTO PARTNERSHIP vs AVALOS, ARNOLDO – Defendant’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – GRANTED

The Court finds Defendants’ counsel, Jakrun S. Sodhi’s motion to be relieved as counsel of record complies with the procedural requirements of rule 3.1362, including use of the required Judicial Council forms and submission of a supporting declaration. 

The Court further finds that proof of service and notice to the clients were sufficient under the circumstances. Counsel has demonstrated reasonable diligence in attempting to notify Defendants, including service at last known addresses and multiple additional efforts to contact them when direct communication failed.

The Court also finds good cause for withdrawal. Counsel has shown a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, including Defendants’ failure to respond to repeated communications and failure to cooperate in preparing the case for trial.  These circumstances make continued representation unreasonably difficult.

The Court is concerned about the timing of the motion. Trial is set for June 23, 2026, and a settlement conference is scheduled for June 8, 2026.  Granting withdrawal at this late stage creates potential disruption to the proceedings. However, given the total lack of communication and cooperation from Defendants, the Court concludes that counsel cannot reasonably be required to continue representation, and withdrawal is appropriate notwithstanding the proximity to trial.

Accordingly, the motion is granted.

The order is effective upon service of the signed order on Defendants. Upon the effective date, Defendants Rancho Fresco Modesto, Inc., Ismael Covarrubias, and Arnoldo Avalos will be unrepresented unless and until new counsel appears. Defendant Rancho Fresco Modesto, Inc., as a corporation, is advised that it must appear through licensed counsel.

Withdrawing counsel shall promptly serve the signed order on all Defendants at their last known addresses and file proof of service.

All currently scheduled dates, including the settlement conference and trial, remain set.

Any request to continue must be made by appropriate application.

Failure to appear, retain counsel where required, or comply with court orders may result in sanctions, including striking pleadings or entry of default.

CV-24-008466 – MILLER, CEDRICK vs HOME OXYGEN COMPANY LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement – GRANTED.

Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court the Court finds as follows:

The Settlement class is certified for settlement purposes only in accordance with Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.769(c).

The proposed settlement is within the range of reasonableness and deemed to be presumptively valid, subject to any objections that may be heard at the final fairness hearing and subject to final approval by this Court. 

The class counsel, class representative and claims administrator are hereby preliminarily approved and appointed as set forth in the motion. The Court sets the following deadlines relative to this matter:

June 18, 2026	Defendant shall provide Class Data to Class Administrator
June 30, 2026	Class Administrator shall mail Class Notice to Members
September 30, 2026	Class Deadline for Submission of Opt-outs / Objections / Workweek Disputes
October 9, 2026	Deadline for Submission of Administrator due diligence declaration
October 16, 2016	Deadline for Class Counsel to File Motion for Final Approval
[Set by Court]	Final Fairness Hearing (Dept. 24, 8:30 a.m.)

A final fairness hearing in this matter shall be set for November 13, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 24 of this Court. 

The Class Notice shall be revised to reflect the date of the final fairness hearing and the corresponding deadlines.

Plaintiff shall submit a Proposed Order within five court days that conforms to this ruling.

CV-24-009962 – THE AGRI GROUP INC vs LEAVITT, BURNS D – Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default - CONTINUED, at Defendant’s request.

At Defendant’s request, this matter is continued to June 16, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

The Court’s Motion to Dismiss set for June 5, 2026, is also vacated and set for June 16, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***