Civil Tentative Rulings

August 21, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 21***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-010714 - CERVANTEZ, YENI ALEJANDRA CORTEZ vs CITY OF TURLOCK - Defendant City of Turlock's Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Further Discovery Responses and Request for Issue and Evidence Sanctions in the Alternative - CONTINUED to September 4, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

Defendant seeks to withdraw the motion to compel because the discovery dispute has been resolved.

The matter is CONTINUED to September 4, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22. Moving party to submit a notice of withdrawal at least five court days before the hearing.

CV-25-012731 - ORTEGA, OFELIA vs VASQUEZ, RUBEN - Defendant's Motion for Protective Order - DENIED.

On July 28, 2026, Defendant filed a motion for protective order seeking to prohibit Plaintiff from propounding further discovery and to relieve Defendant from responding to Plaintiff’s requests pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2017.020, 2030.090, 2031.060, and 2033.080. On July 30, 2026, Defendant filed a declaration related to his motion for protective order. On August 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed an opposition. No reply was filed.

“The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(a).) “The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(b).)

The motion is procedurally defective. It fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2017.020, 2030.090, 2031.060, and 2033.080, which requires “a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) Here, Defendant states in his declaration that he did not attempt to meet and confer before filing the motion for protective order. Defendant also states that he is in the process of seeking legal counsel.

Accordingly, the motion for protective order is DENIED. The Court declines to issue sanctions against Defendant in this instance

CV-26-001469 - AARZA GROUP INC vs MARTIN, ROBERT - Defendants’ CCTMO LLC and T-Mobile West Tower LLC’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Aarza Group Inc. - CONTINUED to September 22, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

The demurrer is procedurally defective. It fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, which requires that the parties meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video conference.”

Here, the effort to meet and confer was insufficient. The only attempt to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 was the delivery of a written email communication sent on July 14, 2026, to which Plaintiff did not respond. (Declaration of Sandra Vucinic, ¶¶ 4–5.)

A communication sent by email is insufficient. The Legislature’s specification of the authorized methods for meeting and conferring reflects its belief that more personal forms of communication—beyond written exchanges—are better suited to resolving disputes informally, thereby reducing the burden on both the courts and the parties.

Accordingly, the Court CONTINUES the hearing on the demurrer to September 22, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22. The parties are ordered to meet and confer by one of the methods set forth in Code of Civil Procedure § 430.41(a) by no later than six court days before the hearing. Moving Party to file and serve a declaration no later than five court days before the hearing describing the efforts to meet and confer and any narrowing of the issues.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-23-007325 - MARTINEZ, JORDAN P vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO - Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission, Set One, and Form Interrogatory No. 17.1; Request for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto and its Counsel of Record - GRANTED.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that while submitted as a single motion, the papers herein seek orders concerning 2 separate discovery devices: Requests for Admissions, Set One, and Form Interrogatory No. 17.1. Such combined motions are disfavored. In this instance, the Court finds that the issues presented with regard to the 2 sets of discovery requests are sufficiently interrelated as to justify hearing concurrently in the interest of judicial economy, and for that reason the Court will consider those issues together herein. 

With regard to the issues presented herein, the Court finds that the subject responses do not comply with the requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2033.220 and 2030.220, and Plaintiff is entitled to further verified responses.  Such responses shall be provided within 14 days.
 

The Court further finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with the instant motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2033.290(c), 2030.300(c), 2023.010, 2023.030 et seq.) Therefore, sanctions in the amount of $1,350 are awarded against Defendant and its counsel, jointly and severally, payable to Plaintiff’s counsel.

CV-24-005270 - DAVIS, MICKEY ERNEST vs COUNTY OF STANISLAUS - Plaintiff's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel - HEARING REQUIRED.

Due to the proximity of the trial and dispositive motion dates, the Court wishes to inquire of counsel in camera as to the factual details supporting the instant request.

CV-25-011109 - DOE 1 , JANE vs ALTMAN, ROBERT J, MD - a) Defendant Sutter Gould Medical Foundation's Demurrer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint - SUSTAINED, in part, with leave to amend; SUSTAINED, in part, without leave to amend; OVERRULED, in part; b) Defendant Sutter Gould Medical Foundation's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint - DENIED, as MOOT.

a) With regard to Defendant’s demurrer to the entire pleading based on uncertainty and misjoinder, the Court notes that the law recognizes the proper joinder of multiple claims against an institutional defendant where the alleged institutional conduct is common to all plaintiffs and common questions regarding that conduct are present. . (See, e.g. Moe v. Anderson (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 826, 832–836; Smith v. Superior Court (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 607, 621–622.)  Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations against the moving defendant are properly pursued jointly herein and are sufficiently certain at this stage to inform the defendant of the allegations against it requiring response. Therefore, Defendant’s demurrer to the entire pleading on these grounds is OVERRULED.

With regard to the Second Cause of Action (Bane Act violation), the Court finds that the pleading fails to sufficiently allege the stated claim. Specifically, the pleading fails to allege the moving defendant’s use of threats, intimidation, or coercion to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights. Therefore, the demurrer to this claim is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

With regard to the Fourth Cause of Action for Sexual Harassment pursuant to Civ. Code § 51.9, the Court finds that the pleading is deficient with regard to the factual basis underlying Jane Doe #5’s claim pursuant to Civ. Code § 51.9. Specifically, the pleading fails to provide sufficient information from which to ascertain (1) the applicable statutory elements relative to her claim, and (2) whether such elements are sufficiently alleged. Therefore, the demurrer to this claim is SUSTAINED with leave to amend in this regard.

With regard to the Eleventh Cause of Action for Gross Negligence, the Court finds that California law does not support an independent cause of action for gross negligence, which differs from ordinary negligence in degree, not in kind. (Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 44, 55-56.) As the pleading already asserts a cause of action for negligence, this claim is duplicative and unnecessary; therefore, the demurrer to the Eleventh Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

With regard to the Sixteenth Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting, the Court finds that the factual allegations do not state facts supporting a conscious decision by the moving defendant to participate in and render substantial assistance to Dr. Altman’s alleged tortious activity. (See, e.g., George v. eBay, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 620, 641-642; Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 879.) Therefore, the demurrer to this claim is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

The Court finds that the remaining challenged claims are sufficiently alleged at this stage of the case. Therefore, the demurrer to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Causes of Action is OVERRULED.

Plaintiffs shall submit their Second Amended Complaint within 20 days.

b) The motion to strike is MOOT in view of the Court’s ruling on the demurrer, above.

CV-26-002449 - BLACK, DAWN vs ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF PHOENIX LLC - Defendant Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of San Francisco, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint - OVERRULED.

The Court finds that the pleading sufficiently states the subject causes of action at this stage of the litigation. Moreover, it appears that the demurrer rests, in part, on the existence of extrinsic facts, which are inappropriate for consideration on demurrer.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David Hood in Department 24:

CV-21-001167 - ELIZONDO, AARON vs KCB VENTURES INC - Defendant, Tejinderpaul Chahal's, Motion for an Order That Requests for Admissions, Set One, to Defendant, ADCOMM, Inc., Be Deemed Admitted - DENIED.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant Tejinderpaul Chahal's Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

The Court takes judicial notice of the court records identified in the request, including Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Chahal's prior Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission, Set One, the Court's order granting that motion, and the Notice of Ruling. Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d).

Merits

Defendant Tejinderpaul Chahal's Motion for an Order Deeming Requests for Admission, Set One, to Defendant Adcomm, Inc. Admitted is DENIED.

The motion is procedurally defective. Chahal's own moving papers establish that Adcomm served responses to the requests for admission on October 29, 2025. Although those responses allegedly consisted solely of objections and no substantive responses, Chahal acknowledged the existence of those responses by filing a motion to compel further responses, which the Court granted on April 7, 2026.

Because responses were served, this is not a circumstance in which the responding party wholly failed to respond to requests for admission. Nonetheless, the present motion improperly proceeds as if no responses were ever received.

As the premise for the motion is procedurally infirm, the Court declines to deem Requests for Admission Nos. 1 through 51 admitted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280.

The denial is without prejudice to any relief that may otherwise be available under the Discovery Act based upon an alleged failure to comply with the Court's prior order compelling further responses. The Court expresses no opinion regarding the merits of any such request.

CV-24-000417 - CEJA, REGINA vs STANISLAUS COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION - Final Fairness Hearing - GRANTED, and unopposed.

The Court finds the settlement was reached after informed, arm's-length negotiations following contested litigation, is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and warrants final approval. Defendant Stanislaus County Office of Education shall pay a total of $220,000.00 to resolve this litigation, and the Individual Settlement Payments to Settlement Class Members are approved to be paid in accordance with the Settlement.

For settlement purposes only, the Court confirms certification of the Settlement Class defined as all current and former non-union classified employees who (1) were hired and began work on or before June 30, 2023; (2) prior to July 1, 2023 were paid according to a Certificated Management Salary Schedule; and (3) on and after July 1, 2023 were moved from a Certificated to a Classified Management Salary Schedule. The Court finds ascertainability, numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority are satisfied and confirms appointment of Susan Lyneis and Regina Ceja as Class Representatives and class counsel as previously appointed in the Court's preliminary approval order.

The Court finds the notice program, consisting of bilingual mailed notice to each Settlement Class Member following address verification procedures, was the best notice practicable, satisfied due process and California Rules of Court, rule 3.769, and provided adequate protection to class members. Notice was successfully delivered to all 40 Settlement Class Members. No class member objected to the Settlement, requested exclusion from the Settlement, or disputed his or her workweek calculation.

The non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount is $220,000.00, from which are approved: attorneys' fees of $73,333.33; litigation costs of $1,357.95; Class Representative Enhancement Payments of $5,000.00 each to Susan Lyneis and Regina Ceja ($10,000.00 total); and Settlement Administration Expenses to Apex Class Action, LLC of $3,990.00.

After approved deductions, the estimated Net Settlement Amount of approximately $130,676.67 shall be distributed to 40 Settlement Class Members on a pro rata basis according to qualifying workweeks during the Class Period. The average estimated settlement payment is approximately $3,266.92, with payments ranging from approximately $673.74 to $4,130.33.

Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees of $73,333.33 and litigation costs of $1,357.95, consistent with the Settlement and supported by counsel's lodestar showing work in excess of 225 hours and a reported lodestar of $239,790.75, resulting in a substantial negative multiplier. The Court awards Enhancement Payments of $5,000.00 each to Susan Lyneis and Regina Ceja for their service to the Class. The Court approves Apex Class Action, LLC's fees and expenses of $3,990.00.

The Court enters final judgment consistent with the Settlement Agreement and prior preliminary approval orders. Without affecting finality, the Court retains continuing jurisdiction over implementation, interpretation, administration, effectuation, and enforcement of the Settlement and this Order.

The Court notes that the proposed order submitted for signature inadvertently contains references to a PAGA claim and PAGA-related relief. No PAGA claim is alleged in the operative complaint, no PAGA penalties are being recovered, and the Settlement contains no PAGA release. The Court has therefore stricken the PAGA-related language from the proposed order. As modified, the proposed order accurately reflects the terms of the Settlement and may be signed.

In accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384, the Court SETS a compliance hearing for May 7, 2027, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 24, to confirm completion of settlement administration. The Settlement Administrator shall submit a compliance report no later than five court days before the hearing identifying the amount paid to Settlement Class Members, the number and value of negotiated checks, any residual funds remaining after expiration of the 180-day check-cashing period, and any cy pres distribution. Under the Settlement, any residual funds remaining after the check-cashing period shall be distributed to Court Appointed Special Advocates of Stanislaus County (CASA). If settlement administration is complete as certified by the administrator, no appearance will be necessary.

Additionally, the Court orders that Notice of the Court's Final Approval Order and Judgment be posted on the Settlement Administrator's website for a period of at least 90 days.

CV-24-010716 - NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC vs HALVORSON, NICOLE M - Defendant's Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction - DENIED.

Defendant specially appears and moves to quash service pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10(a)(1), contending that Plaintiff failed to establish reasonable diligence before obtaining service by publication and further failed to comply with the publication orders entered by the Court. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

The record reflects that Plaintiff filed applications for service by publication supported by declarations signed under penalty of perjury and numerous exhibits documenting efforts to locate and serve Defendant. Those efforts included multiple Accurint searches, repeated personal service attempts at the Beck Creek Lane property, telephone calls to two separate numbers associated with Defendant, text-message communications, review of Defendant's filings in a separate Stanislaus County civil action, email transmission of the summons and complaint with a Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt, and five additional service attempts by the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office. Based on that showing, the Court entered publication orders on February 9, 2026 and April 30, 2026.

Defendant first argues that the publication orders are void because Plaintiff relied on declarations rather than affidavits. The Court disagrees. Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5 generally permits a declaration executed under penalty of perjury to be used in lieu of an affidavit. Defendant identifies no provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50 requiring a notarized affidavit or exempting publication applications from section 2015.5. Both publication applications were supported by declarations executed under penalty of perjury, and both orders expressly recite that the Court considered declarations submitted pursuant to section 415.50. Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate that the publication orders were void or improperly issued on this basis.

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence before seeking publication. The record does not support that contention. Plaintiff documented extensive efforts spanning several months to identify Defendant's location and complete service through conventional means. As noted above, those efforts included repeated attempts at personal service at the property identified through Accurint searches, investigation of phone numbers and email addresses associated with Defendant, direct communications attempting to obtain acknowledgment of service, review of Defendant's own court filings showing the Beck Creek Lane address and contact information, and assistance from the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office. Several process-server declarations further reported vehicles at the property, dogs barking, movement within the residence, and observations suggesting occupancy but nonresponse. The Court finds that the evidence presented in support of the publication applications constituted a substantial showing of reasonable diligence under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50.

Defendant also challenges Exhibit 10 to the publication application, contending that the Sheriff's declaration was unsigned. The record does not support that characterization. Exhibit 10 contains an Affidavit of Unsuccessful Service executed through the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office and an attached declaration of diligence incorporating the service-attempt history. While the underlying service-attempt log does not contain separate signatures from each individual deputy identified therein, Defendant has cited no authority establishing that the Sheriff's affidavit is invalid for that reason or that the Court was prohibited from considering it as part of the overall diligence showing. In any event, even excluding Exhibit 10 entirely, the publication applications contain numerous independently executed declarations from private process servers and other evidence of substantial, unsuccessful efforts to locate and personally serve Defendant.

Defendant further argues that Plaintiff failed to comply with various provisions of the Court's April 30, 2026 order authorizing service by publication. The Court agrees that the record does not reflect strict compliance with every aspect of that order. In particular, the record does not appear to contain a declaration establishing that copies of the summons and complaint were mailed to Defendant, nor does it contain a declaration stating that Defendant's address could not be ascertained before expiration of the publication period. The record likewise reflects that posting of the summons and complaint occurred after the ten-day period specified in the order.

These irregularities do not warrant quashing service under the circumstances presented here. Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50(c) provides that service by publication is complete as prescribed by Government Code section 6064. The record reflects that Plaintiff published the summons in the Patterson Irrigator on June 4, June 11, June 18, and June 25, 2026, thereby satisfying the statutory requirements for service by publication. Once those requirements were met, service by publication became complete by operation of statute.

Moreover, the Court's April 30, 2026 order authorized two distinct methods of notice: (1) publication of the summons in the designated newspaper and (2) posting of the summons and complaint at the subject property. Defendant's arguments largely conflate the two. Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff's late posting rendered the posting aspect of the order defective, such a defect would not invalidate the separate service by publication, which the Court finds was properly authorized and properly completed. Defendant's arguments that service by publication should never have been granted in the first instance have been rejected for the reasons discussed above. The Court finds both that Plaintiff established reasonable diligence under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50 and that the publication orders were validly issued.

The Court further finds an absence of prejudice. Defendant acknowledges that she ultimately discovered the posted documents and obtained actual notice of the action. She thereafter timely prepared and filed the present motion to quash before any default was entered and before expiration of the time to challenge jurisdiction. Defendant identifies no missed deadline, lost evidence, unavailable witness, impaired defense, or other prejudice resulting from the delayed posting or the absence of a follow-up declaration. To the contrary, the substance of the present motion demonstrates familiarity with the publication applications, supporting declarations, and service history.

By way of the completed publication, Defendant received constructive notice of the action. In addition, Defendant acknowledges receiving actual notice when she discovered the documents posted at the property. While Plaintiff may not have strictly complied with every procedural aspect of the Court's order, the Court finds substantial compliance, no resulting prejudice to Defendant, valid completion of service by publication, and actual notice sufficient to satisfy due process. Accordingly, Defendant has not established grounds to quash service.

Defendant shall file and serve a responsive pleading within 15 days after Plaintiff serves a notice of this ruling. Plaintiff shall serve the notice of ruling by mail and file the notice of ruling and a proof of service within five court days of the hearing on this matter.

To the extent Defendant requests sanctions, disciplinary referrals, orders to show cause, or other affirmative relief in her supporting memorandum, those requests have not been properly presented to the Court and are also DENIED.

CV-25-002126 - CNH INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL AMERICA LLC vs MCDONALD, JAMES ROY - Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause re: Contempt - GRANTED, and unopposed.

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED. The Court takes judicial notice of the June 30, 2025 default judgment and the proof of service showing service of that judgment pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d).

Merits

The unopposed motion is GRANTED.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that:

        1. A valid default judgment was entered on June 30, 2025 containing a turnover provision specifically directed to James Roy McDonald a/k/a James R. McDonald a/k/a James McDonald a/k/a Jim McDonald requiring him to deliver possession of the New Holland Model U80C Loader, serial number JJGNU80CAM767600, or its proceeds, to Plaintiff.

        2. McDonald received notice of that judgment through personal service.

        3. Plaintiff has submitted evidence supporting a prima facie showing that McDonald had the ability to comply with the turnover provision.

        4. Plaintiff has submitted evidence supporting a prima facie showing that McDonald failed to comply with the turnover provision despite notice of the Court's order.

Accordingly, the Court finds sufficient grounds to institute contempt proceedings and SETS for September 30, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 24 an Order to Show Cause directing James Roy McDonald a/k/a James R. McDonald a/k/a James McDonald a/k/a Jim McDonald to appear and show cause, if any exists, why he should not be adjudged in contempt for violation of the turnover provision contained in the June 30, 2025 judgment.

The Court expresses no opinion regarding whether contempt ultimately will be established. The ruling is limited to whether Plaintiff has shown sufficient grounds for issuance of an OSC.

Plaintiff must file a proof of service at least five court days before the OSC date showing personal service of the signed order on the alleged contemnor no later than 16 court days before the hearing date.

The Judgment Debtor may file and serve a written opposition to the Order to Show Cause no later than nine court days before the OSC date.

If an opposition is filed, the Judgment Creditor may file and serve a reply brief no later than five court days before the OSC date.

Plaintiff is directed to submit a new proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

CV-26-004164 - CHAUHAN, HARPINDER SINGH vs GILL, HARBANS SINGH - Plaintiff Harpinder Singh Chauhan's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction - DENIED.

Plaintiff Harpinder Singh Chauhan’s motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED for the reasons set forth below.

A preliminary injunction requires consideration of two interrelated factors: the likelihood the moving party will prevail on the merits and the comparative interim harm likely to result from granting or denying relief. (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554; Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677–678.) Plaintiff has not shown a sufficiently strong probability of prevailing on the causes of action alleged in the complaint.

All of Plaintiff’s claims depend on his contention that the July 2021 conveyance was temporary or that Defendants were obligated to restore his one-half ownership interest. The present record includes an October 2020 resolution reflecting a sale, a July 2021 Assignment Agreement providing for transfer of Plaintiff’s interest for $500,000, a recorded Grant Deed transferring the Property to H & H Entities LLC, and an escrow settlement statement identifying the $400,000 closing disbursement as a buyout. Defendants also submit evidence that Plaintiff stated shortly after closing that he had sold his interest. Plaintiff’s evidence of continued onsite management, payment of a utility bill, identification on a business card, monthly payments, and third-party perceptions of ownership supports a competing inference but does not establish a strong probability of overcoming the written and recorded evidence.

Plaintiff also has not shown that the balance of interim harms warrants the broad restraint requested. Although the Property was refinanced in July 2026, the evidence does not identify a pending sale, transfer, lease, or additional encumbrance. Plaintiff’s claimed interest is also the subject of pleaded remedies for quiet title, partition, accounting, and damages, and a lis pendens provides notice of the title dispute. The proposed injunction would impose a new restriction on H & H’s recorded ownership and management of an operating commercial property rather than preserve an undisputed precontroversy condition.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice and Defendants’ request for judicial notice are GRANTED as to the existence, filing, recording, and legal effect of the identified court records and recorded instruments. The Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of reasonably disputable factual assertions or hearsay contained in those documents.

The denial is without prejudice to a later application based on materially changed circumstances or competent evidence of an actual threatened transfer, sale, or further encumbrance.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Richard D. Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

 

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***