Civil Tentative Rulings

November 12, 2026

                           

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-009799 - GUTZLER, REBECCA vs DOE, JOHN - Defendant Lowe's Home Centers, Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, Summary Adjudication of Issues – DENIED.

 

Objections

 

Plaintiff objects to certain opinions of Defendant’s expert, Dr. Gomez. The Court SUSTAINS the following objections: Nos. 1; 3; 4; 5 as to the sentence “Plaintiff did not slip in water and this is not a slip and fall incident.”; and 7. The remaining objections to Dr. Gomez’s opinions are OVERRULED because they go to weight, not admissibility.

 

Plaintiff’s Objection No. 9 to the declaration of Randal Peterson is OVERRULED for the purposes of this motion.

 

Defendant’s objections to certain opinions of Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Teetz and Dr. Hashish, are OVERRULED because they go to weight and not admissibility.

 

Plaintiff submitted supplemental objections to the Declaration of Brandi Ontiberos. The objections are OVERRULED. Plaintiff’s objections are matters for cross-examination, not admissibility.

 

Legal Standards

 

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.) A defendant meets their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that “a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)

 

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party’s are liberally construed.” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

 

Discussion

 

The Complaint alleges two causes of action against Defendant: negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff alleges that water on the concrete floor in the outdoor lawn and garden area of Defendant’s store caused Plaintiff to slip and fall resulting in serious injuries. Defendant’s motion argues that Lowe’s did not breach any duty of care, that the wet floor did not cause Plaintiff’s injury, and that Plaintiff cannot show that Lowe’s was negligent in hiring, supervising, or retaining any employees. Plaintiff opposes and disputes Defendant’s characterizations.

 

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.) “[T]he negligence ‘elements of breach of that duty and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury’s determination.’ [Citation.]” (Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 11, 32.)

 

Triable issues of material fact preclude summary judgment or summary adjudication of any cause of action.

 

Breach

 

Defendant argues that it did not breach any duty of care.

 

“[T]hose who own or occupy propertyhave a duty to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition. [Citations.]” (Staats v. Vintner's Golf Club, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 826, 833.) “To comply with this duty, a person who controls property must [conduct reasonable inspections] and, if a dangerous condition exists that would have been discovery by the exercise of reasonable care, has a duty to give adequate warning of or remedy it. [Citations.]” (Id.)

 

Defendant argues that it satisfied its duty of care by “taking reasonable steps to remedy the situation,” (Memorandum at 8), because employees squeegeed the ground to clean up excess water approximately 30 minutes before Plaintiff fell. Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether the condition of excess water was remedied. Witnesses testified that there was water on the ground where Plaintiff fell; a photograph and a video show water on the ground; and deponents did not recall whether anyone had squeegeed the area where Plaintiff fell or when any such squeegeeing occurred. (See, e.g., UMF No. 28.) In addition, Defendant’s argument that it squeegeed the excess water is belied by its later contention that the wet ground was an obvious, highly visible condition that any customer would have seen. (See, e.g., Memorandum at 8–9.)

 

The Court has viewed the video and does note the visible cones which may constitute either a defense or a mitigation, but this does not appear sufficient to fully negate Plaintiff’s stage at the MSJ stage.

 

Next, Defendant argues that it satisfied its duty of care by giving adequate warning of the condition because it placed two highly visible warning cones in the area where Plaintiff fell. However, Plaintiff disputes the yellow cones were visible and disputes that she saw them. (See, e.g., UMF Nos. 4, 9, 27.)

 

Plaintiff’s expert also opines that the cones do not define any specific hazardous area to avoid as opposed to placing cones around the perimeter of the hazardous area to clearly demonstrate the location of the potential hazard. While a photograph and video show the existence of yellow cones, the question of whether such cones provided were “highly visible” or provided adequate warning of the excess water is for the jury. (Scott v. Alpha Beta Co. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 305, 308 [where Defendant had notice of water on floor, “it was an issue for the jury to determine whether the steps defendant took to remedy or warn about the danger were sufficient”].)

 

The Court has viewed the video and has carefully considered whether the video is sufficiently dispositive as to negate any claim of inadequacy of the warning. The Court need not accept Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony and has concerns. This is a close case, but in doing this analysis, the Court is required to make assumptions against the motion. 

 

Next, Defendant argues that it had no duty to warn Plaintiff of the presence of water on the ground because it was an obvious condition that anyone would have seen.

 

“ ‘Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.’ [Citation.]” (Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447.)

 

Defendant argues that the water on the ground was open and obvious, that Plaintiff saw the water on the ground, and that it was a highly visible condition that could be readily perceived by any customer. But Plaintiff disputes that she saw the water on the ground or was aware of any slip hazard. (See, e.g., UMF Nos. 10–13.) The case Defendant relies on is distinguishable as it addresses falling into an empty swimming pool, “[p]laintiff admitted during his deposition that he was fully aware of the danger[,]” and there was no evidence that plaintiff “was foreseeably required to expose himself to the danger of falling into the empty pool.” (Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447.) Here, the condition was not as obvious as an empty pool and Defendant reasonably expected customers to walk across the wet ground in its store.

 

Causation

 

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by Plaintiff slipping in water and would have occurred whether or not there was water on the ground. This conclusion comes well short of the requirement for summary judgment.

 

Plaintiff sufficiently raises a material dispute to Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s specific type of fracture is inconsistent with a slip and fall on a wet floor. (See, e.g., UMF No. 47 [Defendant argues that if Plaintiff slipped, her body would have fallen backwards and to the left while her foot slipped forward but Plaintiff argues slip-related fall directions vary]; see also, e.g., UMF Nos. 29, 31–44, 46, 49.) The parties’ respective experts offer conflicting testimony regarding the type of fracture and cause of the fracture. “It is within the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of experts and the weight to be given to their testimony.” (In re Schmidt's Estate (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 262, 272.) “The trial court’s gatekeeping role does not involve choosing between competing expert opinions.” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 772.)

 

Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention

 

It does not appear that Plaintiff can establish negligence against Defendant based on negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. However, because Plaintiff raises triable issues of material fact as to breach and causation as discussed above, Plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate negligent hiring, supervision, or retention does not dispose of any cause of action.

CV-26-005333 - ANAYA, STACY LYNN vs RESPIRATORY CARE BOARD OF CALIFORNIA - Petitioner's Verified Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate – HEARING REQUIRED.

 

The Court would like to discuss the schedule with the parties. The Court previously continued the matter to November 12, 2026, and set a briefing schedule yet no papers were subsequently filed.

CV-26-008845 - KUYKENDALL, RAYLON vs STANISLAUS REGIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY - Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate - CONTINUED to December 17, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21.

 

The Court assumes the attachment to the petition contains all of the relevant materials that need to be considered. If this is not accurate, the parties should request a hearing on this tentative ruling.

 

The matter is CONTINUED to December 17, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21. The Court sets the schedule below.

 

Brief due 11/23/2026.

Opposition due 12/4/2026.

Reply due 12/10/2026.

 

On September 16, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging

Respondent Stanislaus Regional Housing Authority’s termination of Petitioner’s housing choice

voucher pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. On November 2, 2026, Respondent filed an answer.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-20-000770 - VARGAS, AZUCENA vs DMB PACKING CORPORATION - Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval – HEARING REQUIRED.

CV-24-003049 - WESTERN HILLS WATER DISTRICT vs WORLD INTERNATIONAL LLC - Plaintiff's Motion to Lift Stay and to Reset Hearing Dates on Motions to Compel - GRANTED in part.

The stay of proceedings entered June 2025 pending appeal is lifted as to all causes of action except the fourth cause of action, which remains stayed in this action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. Sequencing of the arbitration of the fourth cause of action will be addressed at the case management conference set for April 5, 2027, at 1:30 p.m. in Department 22.

Defendants World International, LLC, Three60, LLC, Guillermo Marrero, Carmen Kearney, and Douglas Kearney shall file and serve their responses to the First Amended Complaint on or before December 14, 2026.

Plaintiff's request to reset its three motions to compel further responses to form interrogatories is GRANTED as modified. The motions are reset for January 28, 2027, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22. Counsel shall meet and confer in good faith, by telephone, videoconference, or in person, regarding the responses at issue on or before December 18, 2026, and defendants may serve verified supplemental responses by that date. No later than 10 calendar days before the hearing, the parties shall file a joint statement identifying the specific interrogatories that remain in dispute, if any.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-006869 - CARRILLO, FERNANDO, Jr vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – a) Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to November 25, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23; b) Defendant General Motors LLC's Motion to Tax Counsel's Memorandum of Costs - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to November 25, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

a-b) CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to November 25, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court previously continued these matters from September 1, 2026, and ordered the parties to meet and confer in person or by online video conference regarding the fee and cost disputes. The Court further ordered the parties to file a Joint Status Statement by October 20, 2026, describing their meet-and-confer efforts and any resolution or narrowing of the issues.

The Court has reviewed the file and does not find a Joint Status Statement complying with the Court's September 1, 2026 order. The Court is, therefore, unable to determine whether the parties have fully complied with the Court's directives or whether additional efforts have been made to narrow the issues presented by the motion.

Accordingly, on the Court's own motion, the hearing on Plaintiff's motion for attorneys’ fees is CONTINUED as above, and the parties are ordered to comply with the Court's prior meet-and-confer directive if they have not already done so. In addition, no later than November 19, 2026, the parties shall file a Joint Status Statement describing:

        1. The date(s) and manner of the meet-and-confer efforts;

        2. Any issues that have been resolved or narrowed; and

        3. The specific issues that remain disputed, if any, and the parties' respective positions regarding the same.

Failure to comply with this order may result in the matter being continued again or taken off calendar. Further, should counsel for the parties be unable to reach a reasonable compromise of any of the issues presented by the instant motion, counsel should expect to be required to appear in person at the time of the continued hearing to further address the issues herein.

As before, the Court strongly encourages counsel to make further good-faith efforts to resolve or narrow the attorney-fee dispute without further expenditure of judicial resources and with due civility to one another.

CV-24-008657 - WALLACE, KEVIN ALAN vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO INC - Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees - IN-PERSON APPEARANCES REQUIRED.

Pursuant to the Court’s 10-2-26 order, counsel shall appear at the hearing in person and shall be prepared to engage in further efforts to reach a reasonable compromise of the issues herein.

CV-25-007643 - PITRE, TERENCE vs TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY – a) Defendants Board of Trustees of California State University, Alfred Petrosky and Jarrett Kotrozo's Motion for Protective Order - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 4, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23; b) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 4, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23; c) Defendant's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University's Form Interrogatories - Employment; Request for Sanctions – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 4, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

a-c) CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 4, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court previously continued these matters from September 11, 2026 (Motions A and B) and September 29, 2026 (Motion C) based on the parties’ representation that meet and confer efforts were continuing, and ordered the parties to file a Joint Status Statement by November 2, 2026, describing their meet-and-confer efforts and any resolution or narrowing of the issues presented by these motions.

The Court has reviewed the file and does not find a Joint Status Statement complying with the Court's previous orders. The Court is, therefore, unable to determine whether the parties have fully complied with the Court's directives or whether additional efforts have been made to narrow the issues presented by the motion.

Accordingly, on the Court's own motion, the hearings are CONTINUED, as above, and the parties are ordered to comply with the Court's prior meet-and-confer directive if they have not already done so. In addition, no later than November 25, 2026, the parties shall file a Joint Status Statement describing:

        1. The date(s) and manner of the meet-and-confer efforts;

        2. Any issues that have been resolved or narrowed; and

        3. The specific issues that remain disputed, if any, and the parties' respective positions regarding the same.

Failure to comply with this order may result in the matter being continued again or taken off calendar.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-23-003515 - SANTIAGO, CHRISTINA EVA vs CENTER FOR HUMAN SERVICES - Compliance Hearing - CONTNUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The Court notes that the required Class Administrator’s declaration has not been filed.

Accordingly, this matter is continued to 11th December 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

The Class Administrator’s declaration shall be filed no later than December 4, 2026.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***