Civil Tentative Rulings

May 15, 2026

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-25-003684 – KUMAR, PARMILA vs AGUILAR BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION INC – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Enrique Aguilar’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories General, Set One; and for Order Granting Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED and unopposed; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Aguilar Brothers Construction Inc.’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories Construction, Set One; and for Order Granting Monetary Sanctions - GRANTED and unopposed.

a) GRANTED, and unopposed.

Defendant Enrique Aguilar failed to serve any responses to properly propounded interrogatories. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(b).) Because no timely responses were served, Defendant has waived all objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(a).)

Defendant shall serve verified responses to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories, Set One, without objections, within 20 days of service of this order.

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded sanctions in the amount of $435 against Defendant Enrique Aguilar, payable within 20 days. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(c).)

b) GRANTED, and unopposed.

Defendant Aguilar Brothers Construction, Inc. failed to serve any responses to properly propounded interrogatories. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(b).) Because no timely responses were served, Defendant has waived all objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(a).)

Defendant shall serve verified responses to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories—Construction, Set One, without objections, within 20 days of service of this order.

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded sanctions in the amount of $435 against Defendant Aguilar Brothers Construction, Inc., payable within 20 days. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(c).)

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-25-011473 – PENALOZA, ROBERTO JR vs MERCER FOODS LLC – Defendant Mercer Foods LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, Dismiss Class Claims, and Stay Action - GRANTED.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, dismiss Plaintiff’s class claims, and stay of the instant action pending the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.

Defendant Mercer Foods LLC dba Thrive Foods (“Thrive Foods”) moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (the “FAA”), and California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4, and also to dismiss Plaintiff’s class claims, and to stay this action pending the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.

Plaintiff Robert Penaloza responds that the FAA does not apply and instead California law applies, that California law bars compelled arbitration of labor code wage claims, and that the arbitration agreement proffered by Defendant (the “Arbitration Agreement”) is not valid and therefore cannot be enforced.

Whether the FAA applies to requires arbitration

“The FAA applies to any ‘contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ that contains an arbitration provision.” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238 [quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2].) “The party asserting FAA preemption bears the burden to present evidence establishing a contract with the arbitration provision affects [interstate commerce], and failure to do so renders the FAA inapplicable.” (Ibid.) “[T]he Supreme Court held that a contract involves commerce under section 2 of the FAA simply if the transaction, in fact, involves interstate commerce.” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286.)

Defendant attests, through the Declaration of Kristi Imfeld, that it receives materials from outside of California, creates goods, and then sells and ships to customers outside of California and other parts of the world. (Imfeld Declaration, ¶ 2.) Defendant also attests that Plaintiff Penaloza’s duties included performing tasks that allow Defendant to use the materials received from out-of-state suppliers to produce freeze dried goods that are sold and shipped by Defendant to out-of-state customers. (Ibid., ¶ 3.)

Based on the foregoing, the Arbitration Agreement is subject to the FAA. (Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 246 [holding that “plaintiff’s employment with defendant bears on interstate commerce such that it falls within the scope of the FAA” where “[declarant] attested that defendant designs and manufactures surgical products, which it sells and distributes worldwide, and that plaintiff worked on the production line for those products”]).

Defendant submitted an Arbitration Agreement signed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not dispute that the Arbitration Agreement encompasses Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff argues that he does not remember signing the Arbitration Agreement, but does not dispute that he did in fact sign it.

Because Defendant has made a showing of a valid agreement to arbitrate and also that the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue, the FAA requires arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims. (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 218 [“By its terms, the Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.”]; Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual claims.

Whether the class action waiver in the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable

The Arbitration Agreement contains a class action waiver. Plaintiff does not dispute that such a waiver is enforceable under the FAA.

The FAA requires courts to enforce the terms of the arbitration agreements. (Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. 497, 510 [“the [FAA] . . . require[es] us to enforce, not override, the terms of the arbitration agreements before us”].) Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s class claims.

Whether the case should be stayed pending arbitration

The Federal Arbitration Act requires that “the court . . ., upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had[.]” (9 U.S.C. § 3.)

Because Plaintiff’s claims are subject to arbitration, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to stay the instant action pending the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 23***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-18-003129 – OVRAHIM, NARMELIN vs UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY – Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration on Order Granting Summary Judgment – GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part.

The Court finds that the majority of Plaintiffs’ arguments improperly seek to re-litigate issues previously raised and considered in connection with Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to revisit prior arguments or to correct perceived judicial error. Instead, the court may grant reconsideration only if presented with “ ‘new or different facts, circumstances, or law.’ (Crotty v. Trader (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 765, 770–771.)

A motion for reconsideration, which requires the moving party to offer new or different facts, circumstances, or law that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been previously discovered, will be denied absent a strong showing of diligence.  (Forrest v. Department of Corporations (2007), 150 Cal.App.4th 183).  A party seeking reconsideration must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time.  (Dickson v. Mann (2024) 103 Cal. App. 5th 935, review denied (Oct. 23, 2024).

The Court is confident that Plaintiff’s Counsel is no doubt aware of these statements of the law and therefore does not appreciate Plaintiff’s Counsel’s contribution to judicial inefficiency by rehashing arguments already made in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this motion.

The court therefore declines to revisit in this motion any claims of judicial error and or misinterpretation or misapplication of the law.

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the deposition testimony of Ms. Ygbuhay or Mr. Wenko constitutes “new or different facts” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure §1008. The substance of such testimony is cumulative of evidence already before the Court regarding the RMCC database and Defendant’s consideration of safety measures. Nor have Plaintiffs shown reasonable diligence in obtaining or presenting such evidence earlier.

Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding alleged discovery misconduct and evidentiary authentication similarly fail to satisfy the requirements of §1008, and do not warrant reconsideration.

However, the Court finds that Defendant’s amended responses to Requests for Admission concerning the timing of fencing installation—indicating that such fencing was installed between August and November 2018—constitute a new fact not previously before the Court in verified form. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that this information was not available to them at the time of the summary judgment proceedings.

A verified admission of a fact is not equivalent to circumstantial evidence that may support a conclusion as to the existence of said fact. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2033.410). Plaintiffs were therefore not in possession of said fact when Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment MSJ was heard.  (Film Packages, Inc. v. Brandywine Film Productions, Ltd. (1987), 193 Cal.App.3d 824)

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED solely as to this newly presented fact. The Court will reconsider its prior ruling only to the limited extent necessary to evaluate the impact of this fact. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.

Because the Court grants reconsideration solely as to Defendant’s amended response to Requests for Admission regarding the timing of fencing installation, and its impact, if any, on any applicable duties of Defendant. The Court will conduct further proceedings limited to the impact of that fact on the prior summary judgment ruling.

The Court sets the matter for further hearing on June 17, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 24.

The parties are ordered to submit simultaneous supplemental briefs addressing only the effect of this newly presented fact on the Court’s prior ruling. Supplemental briefs shall be filed and served no later than June 1, 2026. Briefs shall not exceed 15 pages. No reply briefs shall be permitted absent further order of the Court.

The Court will not consider argument or evidence beyond the limited scope identified herein without prior leave.

CV-23-006729 – LUSBY, KARI vs YOUNG, CARTER – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Five, to Kari Lusby – GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part, without prejudice; b) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set Five, to Kari Lusby - GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part, without prejudice.

a) GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part, without prejudice.

 “..any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Civ. Proc. Code § 2017.010).

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s responses to the Special Interrogatories at issue are non-responsive, incomplete and or evasive. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2030.220. and 2030.300).

The Court finds, to the extent that Plaintiffs have put their family assets and income at issue based on their claims of financial hardship, the discovery sought by Defendant herein is relevant to this action.

As to Plaintiff’s assertions of financial privilege, the right to financial privacy is not absolute. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff has put the family income at issue, Plaintiff is deemed to have waived any such privilege to the extent necessary for fair resolution of the action (GT, Inc. v. Superior Court, (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 748). The Court notes that Defendant does not seek tax returns or the information therein contained. Therefore, Plaintiff’s reliance on Sav-On, and Webb are unavailing. (Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Ct., (1975)15 Cal. 3d 1; Webb v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., (1957) 49 Cal. 2d 509).

Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby ordered to produce further verified, complete, code-compliant responses to said Special Interrogatories Numbers 300–304 and 306–321within 14 days of the date of service of this order. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2030.220. and 2030.300).)

The Court declines to impose evidentiary sanctions at this time. 

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order that conforms to this ruling within five court days.

b) GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part, without prejudice.

“..any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Civ. Proc. Code § 2017.010).

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s responses to the Requests for Production at issue are non-responsive, incomplete and or non-compliant. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.230. and 2031.310). To the extent that Plaintiff executed incorporation documents for Lusby Mining, the court finds that Plaintiff has custody or control of responsive documents, such that the Court may compel the production of same.  (Padron v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1246).

The Court finds, to the extent that Plaintiff has put the income generated from Lusby Mining LLC at issue in this action, that the documents requested by Defendants are relevant to this action.

As to Plaintiff’s assertions of financial privilege, the right to financial privacy is not absolute. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff has put the family income at issue, Plaintiff is deemed to have waived any such privilege to the extent necessary for fair resolution of the action (GT, Inc. v. Superior Court, (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 748). The Court notes that Defendant does not seek tax returns or the information therein contained. Therefore, Plaintiff’s reliance on Sav-On, and Webb are unavailing. (Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Ct., (1975)15 Cal. 3d 1; Webb v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., (1957) 49 Cal. 2d 509).

Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby ordered to produce further verified, code-compliant responses to said Requests for Production Numbers 128-132 within 14 days of the date of service of this order. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2031.010, 2031.310)

The Court declines to impose evidentiary sanctions at this time. 

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order that conforms to this ruling within five court days.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***