Civil Tentative Rulings

June 18, 2026

The following are the tentative ruling for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-22-004582 – E, L vs DOE 1 – a) Defendant's Motion to Compel Responses to Defendant's Special Interrogatories; Request for Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. b) Defendant's Motion to Compel Responses to Defendant's Requests for Production of Documents; Request for Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. c) Defendant's Motion to Compel Responses to Defendant's Request for Admissions; Request for Monetary Sanctions -- GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. d) Defendant's Motion to Compel Responses to Defendant's Form Interrogatories, Set Two; Request for Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

a) Special Interrogatories

Given that Plaintiff has served substantially compliant responses to Defendant’s Special Interrogatories propounded on Plaintiff on May 1, 2025, the motion is DENIED as moot.

However, the Court GRANTS Defendant $960 as monetary sanctions jointly and severally against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s firm for Defendant’s fees and costs incurred in bringing this motion occasioned by Plaintiff’s failure to file timely response thereto, payable within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(c).)

Defendant’s request for a much larger amount of sanctions is facially unreasonable.

Defendant to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms to the Court’s ruling.

b) Requests for Production of Documents

Given that Plaintiff has served substantially compliant responses to Defendant’s Production of Documents propounded on Plaintiff on May 1, 2025, and demonstrated mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect by Plaintiff’s Counsel for the untimely responses, the motion is DENIED as moot.

However, the Court GRANTS Defendant $510 as monetary sanctions jointly and severally against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s firm for Defendant’s fees and costs incurred in bringing this motion occasioned by Plaintiff’s failure to file timely response thereto, payable within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(c).)

Defendant’s request for a much larger amount of sanctions is facially unreasonable.

Defendant to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms to the Court’s ruling.

c) Requests for Admissions

Given that Plaintiff has served substantially compliant responses to Defendant’s Requests for Admissions propounded on Plaintiff on May 1, 2025, and demonstrated mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect by Plaintiff’s Counsel for the untimely responses, the motion is DENIED as moot.

However, the Court GRANTS Defendant $510 as monetary sanctions jointly and severally against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s firm for Defendant’s fees and costs incurred in bringing this motion occasioned by Plaintiff’s failure to file timely response thereto, payable within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(c).)

Defendant’s request for a much larger amount of sanctions is facially unreasonable.

Defendant to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms to the Court’s ruling.

d) Form Interrogatories, Set Two

Given that Plaintiff has served substantially compliant responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set Two, propounded on Plaintiff on May 1, 2025, and demonstrated mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect by Plaintiff’s Counsel for the untimely responses, the motion is DENIED as moot.

However, the Court GRANTS Defendant $510 as monetary sanctions jointly and severally against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s firm for Defendant’s fees and costs incurred in bringing this motion occasioned by Plaintiff’s failure to file timely response thereto, payable within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(c).)

Defendant’s request for a much larger amount of sanctions is facially unreasonable.

Defendant to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms to the Court’s ruling.

CV-24-001542 – ADAMS, JANICE vs NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY – Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Order Confirming Appraisal Award – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court would like to discuss this matter with the parties. The Court has no record of the opposition that Petitioner indicates in her reply was served on June 10, 2026. The Court does have a sparse motion filed by Respondent which is currently set for July 7, 2026.

The Court has further questions regarding the timeliness of Respondent’s filings.

CV-24-009853 – JONES, LATISHA MONIQUE vs KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – CONTINUED to June 25, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21.

The Court needs additional time to rule and apologizes for the delay.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-21-001363 – NARANJO, JOSHUA vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO INC – a) Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification of Declaratory Judgment and Breach of Contract Causes of Action – HEARING REQUIRED; b) Defendant, Doctors Medical Center of Modesto Inc's Motion to Seal Records Filed in Connection with Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification – GRANTED, and unopposed; c) Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto Inc's Motion to Seal Records Filed in Connection with Its Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification – GRANTED, and unopposed.

a) The parties have submitted voluminous briefing, declarations, and exhibits in connection with Plaintiff’s motion for class certification with respect to causes of action for breach of contract and declaratory judgment, or in the alternative, with respect to one or more of three proposed particular issues. The Court will hold a hearing on the motion.

Background

This matter arises from a dispute over fees charged by Defendant when a patient visits the emergency room. Plaintiff contends that Defendant breaches its own common form Consent for Treatment and Conditions for Admission contract (“COA”) used in Defendant’s emergency room. Plaintiff alleges that the COA allows Defendant to charge only for services actually rendered by Defendant and does not include an agreement to pay a separate Emergency Room Visitation Fee (also referred to as an “evaluation and management services fee”), which Plaintiff contends is a fee designed to cover overhead costs of running an emergency department.

Plaintiff filed this putative class action in 2021. After the trial court sustained Defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend, Plaintiff appealed.

The Fifth District reversed the trial court. The California Supreme Court granted review, and after issuing its decision in Capito v. San Jose Healthcare System, LP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 273 (Capito), transferred this case back to the Fifth District with directions to vacate its prior opinion and reconsider the matter in light of Capito.

On remand, the Fifth District held that Plaintiff’s claims are barred to the extent they are premised on a pre-treatment duty to disclose EMS fees. The Fifth District also concluded that Plaintiff otherwise stated a valid, contract-based declaratory relief claim and should be permitted leave to amend to plead breach of contract and post-treatment UCL/CLRA theories within the parameters stated. The remittitur issued on July 23, 2025.

Following remittitur, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on August 15, 2025. Defendant then demurred to the breach of contract, UCL, and CLRA causes of action. After oral argument, the Court took the demurrer under submission. The Court ultimately overruled the demurrer.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice

In connection with its opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for class certification, Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. dba Emanuel Medical Center (“EMC”) submitted a request for judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452 and 453 of the following document: Appellant’s Supplemental Opening Brief filed on March 14, 2025, in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, case number F083197, Naranjo v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc., (“Appellant’s Supplemental Opening Brief”).

Judicial notice “may be taken” of records of any court of this state. (Evid. Code, § 452.) The court must take judicial notice of any matter specified in section 452 if a party requests it and gives sufficient notice to adverse parties and provides sufficient information to the court to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff previously conceded in appellate briefing that there are dissimilarities amount class members that cut against the instant motion for class certification. According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s prior admissions in the appellate briefing are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s current proposal for generalized proof.

Plaintiff opposes the request for judicial notice on the basis that it is not relevant to any issue before this Court on the motion for class certification and generally disputes Defendants’ characterization of any alleged concessions. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant fails to meet the standard for a binding judicial admission.

Defendant submitted a reply, arguing that the Plaintiff’s prior acknowledgement that he understands the evaluation and management services fee to encompass a variety of factually individualized efforts of nurses is relevant to the motion for class certification.

Courts “may take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, but can only take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments. [Citations.]” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1106 [internal quotation marks omitted].) Appellant’s brief is not an order, finding of fact, or conclusion of law.

Accordingly, the Court is inclined to DENY the request for judicial notice.

Motion for Class Certification

On April 9, 2024, Plaintiff submitted the instant motion for class certification pursuant to Code of Civil

Procedure section 382 and California Rules of Court, rules 3.764 and 3.765(b). On May 15, 2026, Defendant submitted an opposition brief. On June 5, 2026, Plaintiff submitted a reply brief.

“If the consent of any one who should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained . . . and when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.)

“The party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) “In turn, the community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. [Citations.]” (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted].)

Plaintiff seeks to certify the following class with respect to the causes of action for breach of contract and declaratory judgment:

All individuals who, from August 15, 2019 to the date of class certification,

(1) received treatment at Emanuel Medical Center’s (“Defendant”) emergency room,

(2) were charged an ER Visitation Fee, and (3) either, (i) paid the full amount of the

patient responsibility or (ii) made payment(s) in an amount more than the amount of

the patient responsibility attributable to charges other than the ER Visitation Fee.

(For purposes of this class definition, ER Visitation Fee refers to Defendant’s

charges for emergency department visits that are billed using one of five Current

Procedural Terminology (“CPT”) codes: 99281, 99282, 99283, 99284, and 99285)

(the “Class”).

Excluded from the Class are any officers or directors of Defendant, together with the

legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns of Defendant, and any judicial

officer assigned to this matter and their immediate families.

Plaintiff alternatively moves for an order certifying the above-defined Class as to one or more of the following issues: (1) whether Defendant’s Consent for Treatment and Conditions for Admission Contract (“COA”) permits Defendant to charge only for services rendered to specific patients; (2) whether Defendant’s ER Visitation Fees are fees for services rendered to specific patients, or are fees designed to cover the overhead, administrative, and operating costs of running an emergency room on a 24/7 basis; and (3) whether Defendant is liable for breach of contract.

Ascertainable and sufficiently numerous

Defendant does not dispute that the class is ascertainable and sufficiently numerous. Instead, Defendant argues that the class is unmanageable because Plaintiff’s class definition involves the individualized issues of (1) whether the patient ultimately owed anything for the ER Visitation Fee and (2) whether the patient performed under the proposed class definition by making payments in an amount more than the amount of the patient responsibility attributable to charges other than the ER Visitation Fee.

Defendant argues that identifying only the patients that Defendant billed after insurance payments and adjustments cannot be manageably done. The Court does not find this argument credible. It should not be difficult for Defendant to identify bills it sent to patients after insurance payments and adjustments. To the extent this issue implicates individualized damages calculations, it is “a general rule if the defendant's liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1022.) Further, Plaintiff has proposed a common pro rata formula to calculate damages from information contained in Defendant’s electronic records.

The second issue appears to go to identifying the class and not unmanageability of the class. The class is defined to include only patients who performed by paying either of the amounts defined in the class definition. Aside from individualized damages discussed above, Defendant has not identified any unmanageable issue related to the proposed certified class members.

Well-defined community interest

“[T]he community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. [Citations.]” (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted].)

Defendant contends that there is no common contract because the COA terms allegedly vary. Defendant does not point to any such alleged varying terms related to whether the COA allows the hospital to bill for an ER Visitation Fee but instead points to a separate estimate form, mentions that a patient may or may not ask questions about the COA, and points to statements regarding whether the patient agrees to pay hospital bills. Defendant also argues that each patient receives individualized evaluation and management services. Plaintiff replies that the COA is a common form contract and is therefore, ideally suited for class certification. Plaintiff also contends that the language of the COA was identical or substantially similar throughout the class period. Plaintiff further states that if there is an issue, the class definition can be modified to include patients with the June 22, 2019 or later version of the COA.

Defendant’s arguments do not appear related to whether the COA allows the hospital to bill for an ER Visitation Fee. Instead, the arguments appear to go to the merits of the breach of contract claim as opposed to whether there are predominant common questions of law or fact.

Next, Defendant argues that common issues do not predominate and largely reiterates its arguments that each patient requires an individual assessment, e.g., to determine whether a contract was formed, whether class members performed, whether there was a breach, and whether patients actually paid anything. Plaintiff replies that Defendant’s own practice was to treat each emergency patient as if they signed the COA even when the patient could not sign due to incapacity, gave verbal consent, or had another sign on the patent’s behalf. Plaintiff argues that there is limited to no relevance of any purported patent estimate that is separate and apart from the COA. Plaintiff also replies that whether the ER Visitation Fee is for services rendered or is for overhead has nothing to do with the individual services the patient received. The common question is whether any ER Visitation Fee should be charged, not which one was charged.

As above, Defendant’s arguments appear to be either beside the point or germane to identifying class members, not whether the class members have predominant common questions of law or fact. Defendant’s arguments regarding affirmative defenses, the adequacy of Plaintiff as a class representative, and Plaintiff’s trial plan fail for the same reason. The common question is whether Defendant breached the COA, and the class is defined to include only patients who were charged and paid all or some of the ER Visitation Fee.

The Court will hold a hearing on the motion for class certification.
 

b) On April 20, 2026, Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc., dba Emanual Medical Center submitted a Motion to Seal Records Filed in Connection with Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification pursuant to rules 2.550 and 2.551 of the California Rules of Court. Defendant seeks an order to seal select records and information in Plaintiff’s class certification memorandum and the Declaration of Gretchen Carpenter because they contain information or references to information that Defendant has designated Highly Confidential and/or Confidential according to the September 30, 2025 Amended Stipulation and Protective Order, namely, information relating to sensitive patient details and/or proprietary business information. On June 5, 2026, Plaintiff submitted a notice of non-opposition.

Accordingly, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, the unopposed motion to seal is GRANTED. The Court intends to sign the proposed order Defendant submitted on April 20, 2026.

c) On May 15, 2026, Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc., dba Emanual Medical Center submitted a Motion to Seal Records Filed in Connection with Its Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification pursuant to Rules 2.550 and 2.551 of the California Rules of Court. Defendant seeks an order to seal select records and information in Defendant’s (1) Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification, (2) Declaration of Jeffrey B. Margulies In Support of EMC’s Opposition, (3) Declaration of Kristen Ramirez In Support of EMC’s Opposition, and (4) Declaration of Jason-Alec Soto In Support of EMC’s Opposition, because they contain information or references to information that Defendant has designated Highly Confidential and/or Confidential according to the September 30, 2025 Amended Stipulation and Protective Order, namely, information relating to sensitive patient details and/or proprietary business information. On June 5, 2026, Plaintiff submitted a notice of non-opposition.

Accordingly, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, the unopposed motion to seal is GRANTED. Moving party to submit a proposed order within 5 court days of this ruling.

CV-25-010287 – MCDONALD, VENUS vs CITY OF MODESTO CITY COUNCIL – Petitioner’s Petition of Writ of Administrative Mandate – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court will hold a hearing on the issue of standing.

Background

Petitioners Venus McDonald and Modesto Smoke Shop submitted the instant petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 on October 23, 2025. On November 5, 2025, Petitioners submitted a notice of motion. On December 9, 2025, Petitioners submitted an opening brief. On January 14, 2026, Respondent City of Modesto (“City”) submitted an opposition brief. On January 23, 2026, Petitioners submitted a reply brief. On March 2, 2026, Petitioners submitted an additional pleading stating that Modesto Police Department has denied Modesto Smoke Shop’s application for a permit.

Writ of Administrative Mandate

“Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(a).) “The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(b).) “Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.)

“If the administrative decision involved or substantially affected a ‘fundamental vested right,’ the superior court exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo in which the court must examine the administrative record for errors of law and exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence. [Citations.]” (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1057.) “Where no fundamental vested right is involved, the superior court's review is limited to examining the administrative record to determine whether the adjudicatory decision and its findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.” (Ibid.)

Petition

The gravamen of the petition is that Modesto Smoke Shop was improperly issued a citation for carrying flavored tobacco products when, on or about June 14, 2025, Modesto Police Department officers conducted a compliance check at Modesto Smoke Shop, seized Zig-Zag Orange rolling papers and hemp-derived CBD gummies, and issued a citation to Modesto Smoke Shop. According to Petitioners, the Zig-Zag Orange rolling papers are orange in color but not in flavor; and the CBD gummies contain no THC. The petition seeks judicial review of the City’s final administrative decision dated September 17, 2025, which upheld a June 14, 2025 citation that was issued to Modesto Smoke Shop on the basis that the City’s final decision lacks substantial evidence, is preempted by state law, exceeds the City’s jurisdiction, violates due process, violates equal protection, and fails to meet the City’s burden of proof.

The City does not dispute that a citation was issues for the Zig-Zag Orange rolling papers, which City refers to as “Orange tobacco wraps” in its papers. City states that the CBD gummies were prohibited by the Governor’s emergency regulations but denies that any citation was issued for the CBD gummies.

Standing

City argues that Modesto Smoke Shop failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and thus is barred from bringing a writ because Modesto Smoke Shop itself did not appeal the citation or appear at the hearing. Instead, as City admits, Petitioner Venus McDonald appealed the citation, Petitioner McDonald appeared at the administrative hearing and presented evidence and cross-examined witnesses, and then City made a final decision affirming the citation. Therefore, City’s argument that Modesto Smoke Shop failed to exhaust its administrative remedies lacks merit. City allowed Petitioner McDonald to appear at the hearing, City allowed Petitioner McDonald to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and then City issued a final decision on the merits based on the evidence Petitioner McDonald presented at the hearing. City is estopped from now arguing that administrative hearing was procedurally faulty or somehow improper.

Next, City argues that Petitioner McDonald lacks standing because the citation was issued to Modesto Smoke Shop, not Petitioner McDonald. According to City, because Petitioner McDonald, who is the manager of Modesto Smoke Shop, was not present when the citation was issued and because there is no evidence that she is financially impacted by the citation, she has no standing.

“Ordinarily, a petitioner seeking a writ of mandate or administrative mandate must show that he or she is beneficially interested in the outcome.” (Sacramento County Fire Protection Dist. v. Sacramento County Assessment Appeals Bd. II (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 327, 331.) “‘Ordinarily, a party to the administrative proceeding has a sufficient interest to seek review of the decision.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid., 331 n.1.) “The requisite standing to maintain an action for administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure s 1094.5 exists where, as here, the petitioner was a party to the administrative proceeding which the court is to review.” (Beverly Hills Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 306, 317.) “It is settled law in California that if a person is permitted by statute to appear and take part in an administrative hearing, he is sufficiently beneficially interested to seek a writ of mandate to review the administrative decision or disposition.” (Memorial Hosp. of So. Cal. v. State Health Planning Council (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 167, 178.)

Ultimately, whether Petitioner McDonald has standing to bring the petition depends on whether Petitioner McDonald can establish the requisite beneficial interest and/or that she was a party to the administrative hearing. Here, Petitioner McDonald participated in the administrative proceeding. Petitioner McDonald is identified as the “Appellant” in the administrative record, including but not limited to the Administrative Appeal Hearing Transcript. (E.g., AR3-7; AR2-10) And City allowed Petitioner McDonald to appear at the hearing, City allowed Petitioner McDonald to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and then City issued a final decision on the merits based on the evidence Petitioner McDonald presented at the hearing. The parties should be prepared to address this issue at the hearing and the Court may request further briefing.

Finally, City argues that Petitioner McDonald is not a licensed attorney and thus, cannot represent Modesto Smoke Shop. Because Ms. McDonald does not indicate that she is a California-licensed attorney, she cannot represent the smoke shop. “‘A corporation cannot represent itself in court, either in propria persona or through an officer or agent who is not an attorney.” [Citations.]” (Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 729.) The Court once again encourages Modesto Smoke Shop to promptly seek legal advice from a California-licensed attorney regarding this matter.

PR-25-001101 – IN THE MATTER OF EOFF, MATTHEW – Petitioner's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, and for Monetary Sanctions – CONTINUED to June 25, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

This matter is CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to June 25, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22, to be heard with the related discovery motion on calendar that day.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-23-002816 – THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA vs VIVEROS, ROBERT, Jr – Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on the moving papers, the declaration of counsel and attached evidence, and the Court’s order deeming matters admitted on 12-18-25, as well as the lack of opposition hereto, the Court finds that the Petitioner, as the moving party, has demonstrated fulfillment of the statutory requirements for forfeiture of the subject funds and is entitled to judgment herein. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1); Health & Saf. Code §§ 11470(f), 11488.4, and 11488.5, et seq.) 

The subject funds shall be distributed pursuant to Health & Saf. Code § 11489.

CV-24-005251 – AVILES, JOSUE vs SMOLINSKIY, YURIY – Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions as Admitted; Request for Monetary Sanctions Against Yuriy Smolinskiy in the Amount of $500 – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The Court finds that Defendant has failed to respond to the subject discovery entirely and objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(a).)  Accordingly, the Court has no discretion but to grant Plaintiff’s request.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c); St. Mary’s v. Superior Court (Schellenberg) (2014) 223 Cal.App.4^th 762, 777-778.). The matters contained in Request for Admissions, Set One, are deemed admitted. 

The Court further finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with this motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2033.280(c), 2023.010, 2030.030 et seq.) Therefore, monetary sanctions in the amount of $500 are awarded against Defendant Yuriy Smolinskiy, payable to Plaintiff’s counsel.

CV-24-008809 – TIMMINS, LACEY vs CLEARCAPITALCOM INC – a) Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Compelling Further Response to Plaintiff’s Requests for Special Interrogatories from Rocket Mortgage LLC and for Monetary Sanction – HEARING REQUIRED. b) Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Compelling Further Response to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production from Rocket Mortgage LLC and for Monetary Sanction – HEARING REQUIRED. c) Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Compelling Further Response to Plaintiff’s Requests for Special Interrogatories from Clearcapital.com Inc. and For Monetary Sanction – HEARING REQUIRED. d) Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Compelling Further Response to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production from Clearcapital.com Inc. and for Monetary Sanction – HEARING REQUIRED. e) Defendant Clear Capital’s Motion to Phase Discovery to Address Plaintiff’s Standing and Individual Claims First – HEARING REQUIRED. f) Defendant Rocket Mortgage LLC’s Motion to Sequence Discovery – HEARING REQUIRED.

Counsel shall appear to advise the Court of the status of their discussions regarding a potential discovery referee. (Code Civ. Proc § 639(a)(5).)

CV-25-008263 – NAVARRETE, ANABELLE vs JM WIRELESS LLC – Defendant JM Wireless LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings – GRANTED.

Based on review of the papers and evidence submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the parties entered an agreement to arbitrate which was electronically signed by Plaintiff on 9-18-24.  In addition, the Court finds that the agreement is subject to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, based on the express terms of the written agreement coupled with Defendant’s evidence demonstrating that the subject agreement involves interstate commerce.  (9 U.S.C. § 2.)

Further, the Court further finds that the subject agreement contains a valid delegation clause granting the arbitrator the exclusive authority to determine the issues of arbitrability, including enforceability, scope, and unconscionability discussed in the instant motion.(Aanderud v. Superior Court (Vivint Solar Developer, LLC) (2017) 13 Cal.App.5^th 880.)  Therefore, all remaining issues raised in the papers herein shall be submitted to the arbitrator.

All further proceedings are stayed pending completion of arbitration.  (9 U.S.C. § 3.)

CV-25-011555 – CERVERA, CECILIA vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO INC – a) Defendant American Honda Motor Co. Inc’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff Cecilia Cervera’s Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One and Sanctions – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to September 10, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23. b) Defendant American Honda Motor Co. Inc’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff Cecilia Cervera’s Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One and Sanctions – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to September 10, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

a-b) These matters are CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to September 10, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23, to be heard following the hearing on Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 24***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***