Civil Tentative Rulings

August 13, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-25-003433 – TORRES, CANDIDO RODRIGUEZ vs STANISLAUS COUNTY – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – GRANTED.

Based on both the parties’ arguments and the Court-raised issue that the notice of rejection was sent after legal rejection was made, the case was filed untimely and the six-month statute of limitations applies. As such, County’s motion is granted.

Further the risk management firm had no legal authority even if agreed to by the County to do anything unilaterally other than reject because the 45-day statutory deadline had passed.

All objections are OVERRULED. The Court does not consider any legal conclusions reached by the declarants and bases any conclusions on the documents themselves and not on declarants’ interpretations of them.

The Request for Judicial Notice is denied as moot, as I believe it is unnecessary in the instant case. (See Bienville Water Supply Co. v. City of Mobile (1902) 186 U.S. 212, 217.)

In this case, Plaintiff Rodriguez Torres crashed on April 11, 2023, allegedly due to a defect in the road, and he and his wife Plaintiff Rodriguez presented a claim to the County on October 6, 2023. Notices of rejection were mailed by County contractor George Hills on April 3, 2024. Plaintiff filed suit on April 11, 2025.

Government Code section 945.6 provides for a six-month statute of limitations after receiving a denial, but a two-year statute from the date of the event if no denial is sent.

Government Code section 912.4 holds that the claim was deemed to have been rejected 45 days after its submission when no action was taken.

While the county was well past the 45-day limit for their rejection, Katelaris v. County of Orange (2001) 92 Cal.App.4^th 1211 shortens the time to six months from the time of rejection even under these circumstances. Tardy notice of rejection only delays the start of the six-month clock.

Plaintiffs argue that because the board or an authorized employee did not send the rejection letter, it is of no import. But in fact the rejection letter complies with statutory notice; even though the outside contractor apparently believed it was rejecting the claim at that point, the claim had already been rejected by operation of law.

The contractor’s notice is likely sufficient in any event. Even assuming the County did no investigation and did nothing, the notice requirement is designed to provide Plaintiffs with the specific information on when the time for filing the suit would expire.

This notice did so, and the contractor had both apparent and actual authority to send the letter. Plaintiffs were on notice of the requirements to sue within six months of the rejection, and did not do so. Such a failure is jurisdictional and the motion must be granted.

The Court does not reach the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the County to show compliance with (apparent) statutory requirements that it be the County, not a contractor, who considers whether to accept or reject claims. If it did, it would conclude that the evidence submitted by the County is sufficient to overcome any presumption that it did not.

CV-25-005600 – MILLS, MICHAEL vs CITY OF MODESTO – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – DENIED.

Evidentiary objections:

Plaintiff’s objections:

1. OVERRULED. Goes to weight, not admissibility.
2. OVERRULED. The Court does not appear to have these pages of the deposition.
3. SUSTAINED.

SECOND 3. SUSTAINED. Even if overruled, the Court would consider the apparent overbreadth of the sworn claims.

4. OVERRULED.
5. OVERRULED.
6. OVERRULED.

Defendant’s objections:

To Walsh declaration:

1. OVERRULED. “One or more,” is not necessarily “multiple.”

2.-7. OVERRULED. Dr. Walsh’s declaration contains much boilerplate language, but appears to reference the specific defects at the location.

8. OVERRULED.

9. OVERRULED.

10. OVERRULED.

11. OVERRULED.

12. OVERRULED.

To Robyn Mills declaration:

13. OVERRULED.

14. OVERRULED.

15. OVERRULED.

16. SUSTAINED on foundational grounds.

To Michael Mills declaration:

17. OVERRULED.

18. OVERRULED.

19. SUSTAINED as to “trip and fall hazard,” only.

Procedural notes: The Court granted Plaintiff’s request for additional time for discovery and to address defects in its initial filings. No additional information was provided and the defects in the Wong declaration were repaired.

Factual Summary: Plaintiff fell on an area of the sidewalk which had cracks, and raised asphalt. The cracks appear to be safely less than an inch high. The height of the raised asphalt is not entirely clear to me. I have reviewed the photographs and evidence.

Plaintiff testified that he stumbled on a crack and then hit the slightly raised asphalt and fell.

Defendant asserts two grounds for its motion. The first is triviality, which at this stage the Court rejects for the reasons outlined below. The second is lack of notice, which is partially based on sworn statements which are inconsistent with other sworn statements by the same people and is not well-taken.

Triviality

Government Code §830.2 defines "excluded conditions" as those that a trier of fact determines are of "such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances" that, when the property is foreseeably used with due care, the risk of injury created would not be substantial.”

Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5^th 102 is instructive. In Stack, the Court reviewed the lengthy history of sidewalk defect cases and expressly endorsed a holistic view, where the size of a defect was one factor to consider. (Even considering the disputes over the sizes of the defects in the sidewalk here, the primary defect in Stack was larger.)

Here, the declaration of Bong Walsh asserts – with some degree of boilerplate – that the specific defects here combined to make for a hazard. Further, I lack full measurements of all defects and it is unclear whether this defect is trivial.

In some cases, triviality of the risk cannot be established as a matter of law because under the particular facts reasonable minds may differ about whether the risk was trivial. (Stathoulis v City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 569 (triable issue of fact if competing and conflicting evidence regarding size, nature, and quality of defect to surface presented danger to pedestrians exercising ordinary care).) In this case, it is not entirely clear what the net change between the crack defect and the raised asphalt creates.

Plaintiff’s familiarity with the area is a factor to consider, although the Stack court entirely disregarded it under the theory that the issue was the danger to the general public. In this case, there had likely been thousands of safe traversals of the area by Plaintiff. The Court adopts the Stack court’s views on Plaintiff’s familiarity with the area for the purposes of this motion only.

Walsh’s expert opinion on the dangerousness of the condition is not so unsupported from the facts that it is insufficient to find a reasonable basis for the conclusion. Defendant observes accurately that this Court can disregard expert declarations where they are unsupported, but here there are references to the subject defects and a rationale for the dangerousness of that defect.

Notice

Richard Mendoza declared under penalty of perjury “A review of the City of Modesto’s records reveals that the City had received no complaints about an offset or trip hazard on the sidewalk in front of [the address] at any time prior to August 9, 2024. Based on this review, I can confidently state that the City of Modesto had no notice of an obviously dangerous condition invoving the sidewalk where Plaintiff claims to have tripped and fallen prior to August 9, 2024.”

At his deposition, his confidence had abated. He acknowledged that prior repairs had apparently been done by the City, and that was likely in response to a citizen call and a review of the sidewalk status.

Whether the City had other notice or not is sufficiently disputed by the Robyn Mills declaration. Further, the Court must consider the countervailing declaration in the context of what appear to be inaccurate assertions

Government Code section 835(b) provides that liability exists when the public entity "had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition … a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition."

Further, a public entity has constructive notice of a dangerous condition if Plaintiff proves that the condition has existed "for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character."  Whether the defect had existed for an adequate length of time and whether the defect was sufficiently conspicuous that the entity should fairly be charged with notice both of its existence and of its dangerous character are ordinarily questions of fact to be resolved from all relevant circumstances. (Carson v Facilities Dev. Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830).

Both actual and constructive notice are sufficiently raised by Plaintiff to bring about a triable issue.

CV-26-001061 – MCKINLEY CONGER JOLLEY & GALARNEAU LLP vs LEMOS, ANNETTE RENE – Petitioner’s Amended Petition to Confirm Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration Award – DENIED, without prejudice.

The petition fails to demonstrate the date of service of the arbitration award on the Respondent.

CV-26-003831 – MALDONADOPADILLA, PAOLA vs COELHO, KELLEY MARIE – Respondent’s Motion for Award of Mandatory Attorney Fees and Costs – GRANTED in a reduced amount of $7,728 in fees and $265.34 in costs, and unopposed.

As the prevailing party on her Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP), Respondent is entitled to an award of her attorney’s fees and costs in connection therewith.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c)(1).)  In that regard, the Court finds that Respondent has submitted sufficient evidence establishing the reasonableness of the time expended based on the declaration of her counsel. 

The Court must consider the proper rate of attorney fees via lodestar factors outlined in Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4^th 1122.

The Court finds that a reasonable rate for an attorney in Stanislaus County finishing their first year is $300 per hour.

Upward or downward adjustments are permitted. In this case, the advocacy was effective, well-presented, and notably efficient.  As such, the Court places a 40% upward adjustment on the rate, resulting in a base rate of $420 per hour.

On that basis, and in the absence of any controverting evidence or opposition on this issue, the Court finds that Respondent is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $7,993.34, consisting of $7,728 in attorney’s fees (18.4 hours at $420/hour), $156.56 in incurred costs, and $108.78 in fees in connection with the filing of the instant motion and proposed order.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-008419 – GUTIERREZ, ROBERTO vs NINO, ARTURO – Plaintiff’s Roberto and Bertha Gutierrez’s Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative for Summary Adjudication – GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs to submit a new proposed order within 10 court days consistent with this ruling.

Request for Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), Plaintiff requests judicial notice of (1) the original complaint filed on October 22, 2024, (2) Defendant’s Answer filed on March 17, 2025, (3) the Declaration of Mark J. Condon filed September 17, 2025 in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Deem the Truth of Matters and Genuineness of Documents Specified in Requests for Admission, Set One, Admitted and Conclusively Established, and (4) the Court’s Order dated October 24, 2025 deeming the truth of matters and genuineness of documents specified in Requests for Admission, Set One, admitted and conclusively established.

It is unnecessary for the Court to take judicial notice of filings in the instant case. (See Bienville Water Supply Co. v. City of Mobile (1902) 186 U.S. 212, 217.) The request for judicial notice is DENIED as moot.

Governing Law

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.) A plaintiff meets their burden “of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).) Once the plaintiff satisfies that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must show “that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed.” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

In addition to moving for summary judgment, “[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(2).

Background

On or about January 16, 2001, the parties entered into a written purchase agreement for the property located at 608 Benson Avenue, Modesto, California, APN 035-42-03 (the “Property”).  The transaction was financed by an All Inclusive Purchase Money Promissory Note secured by an All Inclusive Purchase Money Deed of Trust recorded in Stanislaus County as Document No. 2001-004026.

Prior to the parties purchase agreement, an underlying promissory note was secured by a deed of trust recorded May 20, 1997 as Document No. 1997-038472. Under the All-Inclusive Purchase Money Promissory Note, Defendant, as payee, covenanted and agreed to pay all installments of principal and interest that became due under the underlying note as those sums became due and payable. The original amount of the underlying promissory note was $81,000.00.

Plaintiffs fully performed all obligations under the purchase agreement, the Note, and the All-Inclusive Deed of Trust. On May 28, 2004, Defendant received a payment from Fidelity National Title in the amount of $98,930.77.

After receiving the payoff, Defendant failed to remit funds to the then-beneficiary of the 1997 deed of trust, failed to execute a reconveyance of the All Inclusive Deed of Trust, and appears to have personally retained the majority of the payoff funds.

On April 3, 2024, a Notice of Default was recorded and a Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded on July 5, 2024 against the Property on the underlying deed of trust. To protect the Property, Plaintiffs made a payment in the amount of $45,729.51 toward the underlying note. Subsequently, Plaintiffs made an additional payment in the amount of $20,542.58 to reinstate after a second notice of default and notice of trustee’s sale were recorded on or about June 20, 2025.

Procedural History

On October 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint alleging the following causes of action: specific performance, breach of written contract, and declaratory relief. On June 12, 2025, Plaintiffs moved for an order deeming the truth of matters specified and the genuineness of the documents specified in its Requests for Admissions, Set One, admitted. On October 24, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion.

Specific performance

“ ‘Specific performance of a contract may be decreed whenever: (1) its terms are sufficiently definite; (2) consideration is adequate; (3) there is substantial similarity of the requested performance to the contractual terms; (4) there is mutuality of remedies; and (5) plaintiff's legal remedy is inadequate. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Union Oil Co. of California v. Greka Energy Corp. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 129, 134.)

Plaintiffs have met their prima facie burden of showing there is no triable issue of material fact as to specific performance based on the terms of the agreements at issue, consideration paid to Defendant, the requested performance being similar to the contractual terms, mutuality of remedies, and the inadequacy of damages to clear the title. Because Defendant did not file an opposition, there is no contrary evidence raising a triable issue of material fact.

The agreements at issue require Defendant to satisfy the underlying note and deed of trust obligations and to execute the necessary reconveyance documents. The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the Defendant’s remaining obligations under the said agreements. Plaintiffs have already made substantial payments towards the underlying note, but it appears there may be an outstanding balance.

Accordingly, summary adjudication is GRANTED on the cause of action for specific performance. Defendant shall pay off any outstanding amount due under the underlying note and shall execute and record the appropriate reconveyance documents.

Breach of contract

A breach of contract claim “requires a showing of ‘(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.’ [Citations.]” (D'Arrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 790, 800 [emphasis added].)

Plaintiffs have met their prima facie burden of showing that there is no triable issue of fact as to breach of contract based on the agreements at issue, Plaintiffs’ payment to Defendant in the amount of $98,930.77, Defendant’s failure to remit the payoff funds to the beneficiary of the underlying May 20, 1997 note and deed of trust and failure to execute the associated reconveyance documents, and Plaintiffs’ payments towards the underlying note and associated interest and fees in the amount of $66,272.09. Defendant breached the contract and Plaintiffs were harmed as a result. Because Defendant did not file an opposition, there is no contrary evidence raising a triable issue of material fact.

Accordingly, summary adjudication is GRANTED on the cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $66,272.09.

Declaratory relief

“Any person interested under a written instrument . . . or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, . . . may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) “The court may refuse to exercise the power granted by this chapter in any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.)

A party is not entitled to declaratory relief simply because it proved its underlying claims. (Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Assn. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 923, 930.) “[D]eclaratory relief is an equitable remedy and need not be awarded if the circumstances do not warrant.” (Ibid.) “The propriety of a trial court's denial of declaratory relief involves a two-prong inquiry. The first prong concerns whether ‘a probable future dispute over legal rights between parties is sufficiently ripe to represent an ‘actual controversy’ within the meaning of the statute authorizing declaratory relief (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060), as opposed to purely hypothetical concerns.’ (Steinberg v. Chiang (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 338, 343, 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 249.)” (Artus, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at 930–931.) “The second prong concerns ‘[w]hether such [an] actual controversy merits declaratory relief as necessary and proper (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061).’ [Citations.]” (Artus, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at 930–931.)

The separate statement must identify “[e]ach supporting material fact claimed to be without dispute with respect to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350.)

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that there is no triable issue of fact as an actual, present controversy between the parties regarding the requested declaratory relief. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that they owe Defendant no further sums relating to the purchase transaction of the Property, that Plaintiffs’ obligations secured by the All Inclusive Purchase Money Deed of Trust have been fully satisfied, and that Defendant retains no enforceable interest in the Property. Nothing in Plaintiffs’ separate statement (or memorandum) demonstrates the existence of an actual controversy as to whether Plaintiffs’ performed or whether Defendant retains any interest in the Property.

Accordingly, summary adjudication is DENIED on the cause of action for declaratory relief.

CV-26-005707 – BEOUGHER, DENNIS vs CITY OF PATTERSON – Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief – CONTINUED to November 5, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation filed on August 4, 2026, and the Court’s Order signed on the same day, the hearing is CONTINUED to November 5, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

Petitioner’s opening brief, limited to 20 pages, shall be filed on or before August 27, 2026.

Respondent’s opposition brief, limited to 20 pages, shall be filed on or before September 24, 2026.

Petitioner’s reply brief, limited to 15 pages shall be filed on or before October 8, 2026.

PR-23-000289 – In the Matter of THE MACHADO FAMILY CREDIT BYPASS TRUST – a) Petitioner’s Motion to Quash Subpoena for Production of Business Records – CONTINUED to August 18, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22. b) Petitioner's Motion for Consolidation of Trials of Related Actions – CONTINUED to August 18, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

a-b) These matters are CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to August 18, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22 for further review and consideration.

PR-25-000754 – In the Matter of THE GEORGE GARY VENIOT LIVING TRUST – a) Petitioners Richard Pomares and Dana Garth’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, Lack of Standing, Fraud on the Court, Expiration of Time Limits, and No Legal Claim; or in the Alternative, Improper Venue – DENIED. b) Petitioner Dana Garth’s Motion for Relief from Admissions Deemed Admitted, Leave of Court Allowing for Filing of Admissions – GRANTED.

a) Motion to Dismiss

For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Procedural

As a threshold matter, the motion is procedurally defective. California does not generally authorize dismissal of a pleading through a freestanding motion to dismiss. Rather, the Code of Civil Procedure provides specific statutory procedures for challenging a pleading, including a demurrer, motion to strike, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or, where appropriate, summary judgment or summary adjudication. Respondents have not identified any statute authorizing dismissal of Petitioner's Probate Code section 850 petition through the present motion. The Court has previously rejected similar freestanding motions to dismiss on this basis.

The Court also notes that it was unable to locate a proof of service filed in relation to the moving papers. Pursuant to rule 3.1300(c) of the California Rules of Court, proofs of service are to be filed at least five court days before the hearing. However, in light of the fact that the opposing party has not raised an objection based on service, any defect in service is waived.

Merits

Even if the Court were to reach the merits, the motion would be denied.

Petitioner's petition seeks relief pursuant to Probate Code sections 850, 855, 859, and 17200 concerning the ownership and administration of alleged trust property. The probate court has jurisdiction over such proceedings, and Respondents have not demonstrated otherwise.

Respondents principally argue that the petition is barred because Petitioner failed to file suit within 120 days following service of a notification purportedly given pursuant to Probate Code section 16061.7. However, the petition does not seek to invalidate or contest the trust instrument. Rather, Petitioner seeks to enforce the trust and obtain a determination regarding the identity of the proper successor trustee and ownership of trust property. On the present record, Respondents have not established that Probate Code section 16061.8 bars the petition as a matter of law.

The remaining arguments regarding standing, venue, arbitration, no-contest provisions, and alleged fraud depend upon disputed factual issues concerning the operative trust documents and the parties' respective rights under those documents. Those issues are not properly resolved through the present motion.

Objections

The Court finds that the opposing party’s objections were not material to disposition of the motion and therefore declines to rule on them.

b) Motion for Relief from Admissions

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

Procedural

The Court was unable to locate a proof of service filed in relation to the moving papers. Pursuant to rule 3.1300(c) of the California Rules of Court, proofs of service are to be filed at least five court days before the hearing. However, in light of the fact that the opposing party has not raised an objection based on service, any defect in service is waived.

Merits

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300 permits withdrawal or amendment of admissions where the admissions resulted from mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect and where the party who obtained the admissions will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining the action on the merits.

The Court finds Respondent has made a sufficient showing that her failure to timely serve responses was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Respondent has submitted a declaration explaining the circumstances surrounding the default and has provided proposed responses. Although the showing is not particularly strong, the Court is mindful of California's policy favoring resolution of cases on their merits.

The Court further finds Petitioner has not demonstrated substantial prejudice within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300. The loss of the evidentiary benefit associated with deemed admissions does not alone constitute substantial prejudice.

Accordingly, the June 12, 2026 order deeming admitted the matters contained in Petitioner's Requests for Admission, Set One, is vacated.

With that stated, the Court observes that the moving party did not seek, nor does the Court grant, relief from any waiver of objections from the submission of untimely responses. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(a).)

Accordingly, within 14 days of service of the order, the moving party shall serve verified, code-compliant responses without objections to the propounding party’s Requests for Admission, Set One. To the extent the proposed responses omit responses to any requests or fail to comply with the Civil Discovery Act, amended responses are required.

Sanctions

The Court declines to award sanctions in connection with this motion.

Objections

The Court reserves on Petitioner's evidentiary objections to the extent necessary. Any objections directed to matters irrelevant to the present motion are sustained on relevance grounds. The remaining objections need not be reached.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-25-008062 – MPLI CAPITAL HOLDINGS IV vs MACEDO, CYNTHIA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted.

Based on the moving papers and the Court’s 3-12-26 order deeming matters admitted, the Court finds that the Complaint states facts sufficient to constitute the stated causes of action against Defendant, and Defendant’s Answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1)(A).) Therefore, the motion is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered on the underlying debt in the principal amount of $11,111.61 plus unpaid sanctions of $810.

In addition, Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to recover costs herein. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1032.)  However, the instant motion fails to substantiate the requested amount in this regard. Therefore, Plaintiff may submit a memorandum of costs within the statutory time period.

The Court will sign the proposed order, but Plaintiff’s counsel shall submit a revised form of judgment consistent with the Court’s ruling herein.

CV-25-011109 – DOE 1, JANE vs ALTMAN, ROBERT J, MD – a) Defendant Sutter Gould Medical Foundation’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to August 21, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23. b) Defendant Sutter Gould Medical Foundation’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to August 21, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

a-b) These matters are CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to August 21, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court requires more time to review these matters.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David Hood in Department 24:

CV-21-002353 – SHAW, NOLAN vs CRABTREE, ROBERT – Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 663a – Withdrawn by moving party.

CV-23-001227 – CARSON HYBRID ENERGY STORAGE LLC vs TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Witness, Utilities System Efficiencies, Inc. to Comply with a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records; and Request for Sanctions in the Amount of $1,460 – DENIED, without prejudice.

Civ. Proc. Code § 2025.450 authorizes a  party who serves a deposition notice for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice to move to compel the deponent’s attendance when the deponent fails to appear for the deposition without having saved a valid objection.

However, said Motion to Compel must be accompanied by a separate statement which “provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue”. CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1345.  Plaintiff’s motion fails to comply with this requirement. Plaintiff also fails to address in any of its moving papers the basis for its entitlement to the requested deposition and the requested documents.

Good faith meet and confer communication should involve serious efforts at informal negotiation and resolution, including a meaningful assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party’s position in light of all available information. (Townsend v. Superior Court(EMC Mortgage Co.) (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431; Obregon v. Superior Court(Cimm’s, Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424).

A reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with opposing counsel; rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 1277).

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s brief and perfunctory meet and confer letter sent the day prior to the filing of this motion does not meet the stated requirements.   Civ. Proc. Code § 2016.040 (a).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is hereby denied without prejudice.

CV-23-005108 – ESQUIVEL, JUDY vs MONTUY, POLLY – Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Default – GRANTED.

The Court finds that Defendant’s motion was filed within the statutory 6-month window and is supported by Counsels’ Affidavit of Fault and Defendant’s proposed Answer. Civ. Proc. Code § 473(b); County of San Bernardino v. Mancini (2022), 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, rehearing denied, review denied.  

Furthermore, mandatory relief is requested which is available even where Counsel’s mistake, inadvertence, or neglect is inexcusable. Rodrigues v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal. App. 4^th 1027; In re Marriage of Nishida & Kamoda, (2026)120 Cal. App. 5th 298 ;Colon-Perez v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 403 review granted;  Jackson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. (2019) 243 32 Cal.App.5th 166; Luri v. Greenwald, (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 1119;Talbott v. Ghadimi, (2025)109 Cal. App. 5th 967.

Judicial policy also favors liberally granting relief under this provision and favors trying cases on their merits. (Kramer v. Traditional Escrow, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 13).

Defendant’s Proposed Answer amounts to substantial compliance with the Code provision and places Plaintiffs on notice of the defenses asserted. (Cnty. of Stanislaus v. Johnson, (1996) 43 Cal. App. 4th 832).

Accordingly, the court grants the motion.

The Court sets a hearing for 9/11/26 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 24 for a consideration of reasonable fees and costs incurred by plaintiff as a result of defendant’s actions.  Plaintiff must file and serve by electronic mail a declaration in support of fees and costs by no later than 8/28/26.  Any response by defendant must be filed and served by electronic mail by no later than 9/8/26. No reply to defendant’s response is authorized or will be considered. 

CV-24-004360 – PLAZA SERVICES LLC vs SHANKAR, VEENA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Defendant’s Default Under Settlement and Release Agreement – DENIED without prejudice.

Plaintiff’s motion fails to demonstrate proof of service on Defendant. Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 (b).

Accordingly, the motion is denied without prejudice.

CV-25-007352 – WELLS FARGO BANK NA vs MADRIGAL, LEA A – Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment – GRANTED.

After full consideration of the evidence adduced, and the written submissions by the Plaintiff, and Defendant, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s moving evidence establishes Defendant’s indebtedness to Plaintiff in respect of Defendant’s credit card issued to Defendant by Plaintiff, and purchases made thereon per the credit card agreement between the parties.  Further, that Defendant has defaulted in repayment on said credit card to Plaintiff.(Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Nos. 1-12; Civ. Proc. Code § 437(c)(Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., (2001), 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850, as modified (July 11, 2001); Coyote Aviation Corp. v. City of Redlands, (2025)111 Cal. App. 5th 955; Evid. Code § 1271; Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, rehearing denied, review denied.

The Court further finds the absence of a triable issue of material fact regarding Defendant’s said indebtedness to Plaintiff.  Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment in its favor herein.

Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS judgment in favor of Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank.NA and against Defendant Lea A. Madrigal in the instant matter for the sum of $7,528.42.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

 

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***