Skip to main content

Civil Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings Announcement

CIVIL TENTATIVE RULING ANNOUNCEMENT

If the Tentative Ruling in your case is satisfactory, you need not appear at the scheduled time, the ruling becomes final, and the prevailing party prepares the order.

However, if you are not satisfied with the Tentative Ruling, and wish to appear and argue the matter, YOU MUST NOTIFY the Clerk’s Office and opposing counsel of your intent before 4:00 p.m. TODAY. If a TELEPHONIC HEARING is requested per CCP §367.5, you MUST register online to appear telephonically using Vcourt.

When doing so, you must indicate as to which issue(s) and/or motion(s) a hearing is being requested. If requesting a hearing for clarification of a tentative ruling, specify what matter(s) and/or issue(s) need clarification.

 You may request a hearing by calling the calendar line at (209) 530-3162 or the main line at (209) 530-3100, prior to 4:00 p.m. - OR- by e-mailing at civil.tentatives@stanct.org Email requests must be made prior to 4:00 p.m. AND confirmed by return e-mail. If you do not receive confirmation e-mail from the clerk, you MUST call (209) 530-3162 to request your hearing.

Please refer to Local Rule of Court 3.12 concerning Court reporter fees.

 If a Hearing is required or you have requested a Hearing for a Law and Motion Matter Scheduled in Department 21, 22, 23 or 24 in Modesto, please contact the Court Reporter Coordinator at (209) 530-3105 or ctreport@stanct.org to request a reporter and determine availability. If a Staff Reporter is not available, you may need to provide your own.

 Effective April 2, 2012

Staff Court Reporters may be available, though it is not guaranteed, to report law and motion matters on the following schedule:

Department 21 - Wednesdays and Fridays only. Staff Reporters may be available on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Please call to confirm.

Department 22 - Tuesdays and Thursdays only. Staff Reporters may be available on Wednesdays and Fridays. Please call to confirm.

Department 23 - Wednesdays and Fridays only. Staff Reporters may be available on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Please call to confirm.

Department 24 - Tuesdays and Thursdays only. Staff Reporters may be available on Wednesdays or Fridays. Please call to confirm.

If a Staff Reporter is not available, counsel can make arrangements to have their hearing reported by a private CSR. Please contact the Court Reporter Coordinator at (209)530-3105 to request a Staff Reporter and to determine if a Staff Reporter will be available for your hearing

November 17, 2026

                           

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-20-005193 - SIERRA CLUB vs DEL PUERTO WATER DISTRICT - Defendant's Motion to Discharge Peremptory Writ of Mandate – GRANTED.

This case began in 2020. The case was affirmed in part and reversed in part in appellate case F085896 with a remittitur issued on April 1, 2025. The Court issued a modified judgment based on that ruling. The District has now supplied a Partially Recirculated Draft Environmental Impact Report and Second Final EIR. and Respondent now seeks to discharge the writ.

The Court finds that the District has complied with the Court’s Peremptory Writ of Mandate and Modified Judgment entered April 8, 2025 by remedying the deficiency concerning the Project’s potential effects on downstream terrestrial species. The Court accepts the District’s Final Return, discharges the Peremptory Writ of Mandate, and terminates its continuing jurisdiction over the compliance proceedings under Public Resources Code section 21168.9(b). The Court will sign the proposed order. Respondent to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

The issue is whether Respondent has brought the Project into compliance with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq. and the previously issued writ of mandate. (National Parks and Conservation Assn. v. County of Riverside (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1352.)

Respondent (the “District”) contends that it has done so by addressing the Project’s potential impacts on downstream terrestrial species, as it was required to do by the Court of Appeal’s Opinion.

Petitioners do not dispute that the District added an analysis of the potential impacts on downstream terrestrial species. Instead, Petitioners contend that Respondent’s new analysis is insufficient because it relies on a separate flaw in the Project. According to Petitioners, the District fails to fully describe the Project’s operational impacts on Del Puerto Creek flows, fails to include mitigation measures for said impact, and instead relies on an unenforceable flow regime that is improperly characterized as a Project component when it really is a mitigation measure.

Petitioners argue that under Lotus v. California Department of Transportation (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 645 the District’s failure to address the mitigation issues of downstream effects of the project.

Petitioners’ arguments are misplaced. As an initial matter, the SFEIR does indeed describe the Project’s impacts on Del Puerto Creek flows. It explains that “[t]he Project would reduce the amount of natural Del Puerto Creek runoff that passes through the proposed reservoir site and enters lower Del Puerto Creek.” (SRM00433.) The SFEIR further estimates that “at the San Joaquin River confluence, average annual natural Del Puerto Creek flow would decrease . . . approximately . . . 63 percent.” (SRM00433–34.) The SFEIR further states that “[a]lthough the Project would reduce natural runoff from Del Puerto Creek, it would not eliminate downstream flow or other water sources that presently influence lower Del Puerto Creek.” (SRM00434.) The SFEIR then describes the releases, flows, discharge and runoff that would continue post-Project implementation. (SRM00433–40.) The Project itself includes, inter alia, release requirements that are operational components of the Project. (SRM00164 [“operation of the Project would include reservoir releases . . . ”].) The SFEIR concludes that “the Project would not be expected to modify Del Puerto Creek flows to the extent that riparian habitats adjacent to the creek would be adversely affected.” (SRM00440.)

The Court of Appeal expressly discussed the release requirements and noted the Project’s “conclu[sion] that the operation of the project would ensure that major flow events would be released downstream of the proposed dam in order to mimic the natural patterns of flow variability.” (Opinion, 14.) The Court of Appeal found the release requirements sufficient with respect to the analysis of any impact on downstream aquatic species, but noted that a similar analysis was missing for any impact on downstream terrestrial species. The Court of Appeal stated “[i]t may very well be the case that the project’s efforts to mimic natural patterns of flow variability will result in the project having no impacts to downstream terrestrial species . . . What matters in the present action is that the FEIR does not expressly conclude as much.” (Opinion, 15.) Thus, the District’s reliance on the release requirements in its analysis of any impact to downstream terrestrial species was not improper. The District prepared the analysis as required.

In addition, Petitioners’ arguments exceed the scope of these proceedings. The release requirements appeared in the original EIR but Petitioners did not challenge them in its original petition. “The failure to assert such a challenge before the entry of judgment or the failure to successfully appeal the judgment on an issue arising from facts in existence before the entry of judgment precludes a party from asserting the challenge in connection with postjudgment proceedings concerning compliance with the writ. [Citation.]” (Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 455, 481.)

The Court intends to sign the proposed order.

CV-24-009799 - GUTZLER, REBECCA vs DOE, JOHN - Defendant Lowe's Home Centers, Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, Summary Adjudication of Issues – DENIED.

 

Preliminarily, Defendant did not appear at the initial hearing, but the Court has a new remote access package and excuses the lack of appearance.

 

However, Defendant also did not request a hearing prior to the initial hearing date, and the Court needs to know why that requirement should be waived.

 

Objections

 

Plaintiff objects to certain opinions of Defendant’s expert, Dr. Gomez. The Court SUSTAINS the following objections: Nos. 1; 3; 4; 5 as to the sentence “Plaintiff did not slip in water and this is not a slip and fall incident.”; and 7. The remaining objections to Dr. Gomez’s opinions are OVERRULED because they go to weight, not admissibility.

 

Plaintiff’s Objection No. 9 to the declaration of Randal Peterson is OVERRULED for the purposes of this motion.

 

Defendant’s objections to certain opinions of Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Teetz and Dr. Hashish, are OVERRULED because they go to weight and not admissibility.

 

Plaintiff submitted supplemental objections to the Declaration of Brandi Ontiberos. The objections are OVERRULED. Plaintiff’s objections are matters for cross-examination, not admissibility.

 

Legal Standards

 

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.) A defendant meets their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that “a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)

 

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party’s are liberally construed.” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

 

Discussion

 

The Complaint alleges two causes of action against Defendant: negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff alleges that water on the concrete floor in the outdoor lawn and garden area of Defendant’s store caused Plaintiff to slip and fall resulting in serious injuries. Defendant’s motion argues that Lowe’s did not breach any duty of care, that the wet floor did not cause Plaintiff’s injury, and that Plaintiff cannot show that Lowe’s was negligent in hiring, supervising, or retaining any employees. Plaintiff opposes and disputes Defendant’s characterizations.

 

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.) “[T]he negligence ‘elements of breach of that duty and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury’s determination.’ [Citation.]” (Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 11, 32.)

 

Triable issues of material fact preclude summary judgment or summary adjudication of any cause of action.

 

Breach

 

Defendant argues that it did not breach any duty of care.

 

“[T]hose who own or occupy propertyhave a duty to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition. [Citations.]” (Staats v. Vintner's Golf Club, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 826, 833.) “To comply with this duty, a person who controls property must [conduct reasonable inspections] and, if a dangerous condition exists that would have been discovery by the exercise of reasonable care, has a duty to give adequate warning of or remedy it. [Citations.]” (Id.)

 

Defendant argues that it satisfied its duty of care by “taking reasonable steps to remedy the situation,” (Memorandum at 8), because employees squeegeed the ground to clean up excess water approximately 30 minutes before Plaintiff fell. Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether the condition of excess water was remedied. Witnesses testified that there was water on the ground where Plaintiff fell; a photograph and a video show water on the ground; and deponents did not recall whether anyone had squeegeed the area where Plaintiff fell or when any such squeegeeing occurred. (See, e.g., UMF No. 28.) In addition, Defendant’s argument that it squeegeed the excess water is belied by its later contention that the wet ground was an obvious, highly visible condition that any customer would have seen. (See, e.g., Memorandum at 8–9.)

 

The Court has viewed the video and does note the visible cones which may constitute either a defense or a mitigation, but this does not appear sufficient to fully negate Plaintiff’s stage at the MSJ stage.

 

Next, Defendant argues that it satisfied its duty of care by giving adequate warning of the condition because it placed two highly visible warning cones in the area where Plaintiff fell. However, Plaintiff disputes the yellow cones were visible and disputes that she saw them. (See, e.g., UMF Nos. 4, 9, 27.)

 

Plaintiff’s expert also opines that the cones do not define any specific hazardous area to avoid as opposed to placing cones around the perimeter of the hazardous area to clearly demonstrate the location of the potential hazard. While a photograph and video show the existence of yellow cones, the question of whether such cones provided were “highly visible” or provided adequate warning of the excess water is for the jury. (Scott v. Alpha Beta Co. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 305, 308 [where Defendant had notice of water on floor, “it was an issue for the jury to determine whether the steps defendant took to remedy or warn about the danger were sufficient”].)

 

The Court has viewed the video and has carefully considered whether the video is sufficiently dispositive as to negate any claim of inadequacy of the warning. The Court need not accept Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony and has concerns. This is a close case, but in doing this analysis, the Court is required to make assumptions against the motion. 

 

Next, Defendant argues that it had no duty to warn Plaintiff of the presence of water on the ground because it was an obvious condition that anyone would have seen.

 

“ ‘Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.’ [Citation.]” (Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447.)

 

Defendant argues that the water on the ground was open and obvious, that Plaintiff saw the water on the ground, and that it was a highly visible condition that could be readily perceived by any customer. But Plaintiff disputes that she saw the water on the ground or was aware of any slip hazard. (See, e.g., UMF Nos. 10–13.) The case Defendant relies on is distinguishable as it addresses falling into an empty swimming pool, “[p]laintiff admitted during his deposition that he was fully aware of the danger[,]” and there was no evidence that plaintiff “was foreseeably required to expose himself to the danger of falling into the empty pool.” (Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447.) Here, the condition was not as obvious as an empty pool and Defendant reasonably expected customers to walk across the wet ground in its store.

 

Causation

 

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by Plaintiff slipping in water and would have occurred whether or not there was water on the ground. This conclusion comes well short of the requirement for summary judgment.

 

Plaintiff sufficiently raises a material dispute to Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s specific type of fracture is inconsistent with a slip and fall on a wet floor. (See, e.g., UMF No. 47 [Defendant argues that if Plaintiff slipped, her body would have fallen backwards and to the left while her foot slipped forward but Plaintiff argues slip-related fall directions vary]; see also, e.g., UMF Nos. 29, 31–44, 46, 49.) The parties’ respective experts offer conflicting testimony regarding the type of fracture and cause of the fracture. “It is within the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of experts and the weight to be given to their testimony.” (In re Schmidt's Estate (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 262, 272.) “The trial court’s gatekeeping role does not involve choosing between competing expert opinions.” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 772.)

 

Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention

 

It does not appear that Plaintiff can establish negligence against Defendant based on negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. However, because Plaintiff raises triable issues of material fact as to breach and causation as discussed above, Plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate negligent hiring, supervision, or retention does not dispose of any cause of action.

CV-26-008034 - E & J GALLO WINERY vs ARGLASS VF2 LLC – a) Defendant's Motion to Admit Steven J. Rosenwasser Pro Hac Vice - GRANTED; b) Defendant's Motion to Admit William E. Eye Pro Hac Vice – GRANTED.

a) The unopposed application of Attorney Steven J. Rosenwasser to appear as counsel pro hac vice on behalf of Defendant Arglass VF2 LLC is GRANTED. Steven J. Rosenwasser is permitted to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this action, subject to compliance with all applicable California laws, rules, and professional responsibilities. The Court will sign the proposed order. Defendant to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

 

The Court finds that the application substantially complies with California Rules of Court, rule 9.40. The applicant has demonstrated that they are admitted to practice and in good standing in another jurisdiction, has not filed any pro hac vice applications in California in the preceding two years, has associated with California counsel of record, and has complied with the fee and service requirements.

b) The unopposed application of Attorney William E. Eye to appear as counsel pro hac vice on behalf of Defendant Arglass VF2 LLC is GRANTED. William E. Eye is permitted to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this action, subject to compliance with all applicable California laws, rules, and professional responsibilities. The Court will sign the proposed order. Defendant to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

 

The Court finds that the application substantially complies with California Rules of Court, rule 9.40. The applicant has demonstrated that they are admitted to practice and in good standing in another jurisdiction, has not filed any pro hac vice applications in California in the preceding two years, has associated with California counsel of record, and has complied with the fee and service requirements.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 22***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-23-007641 - KHINOO, JANICE DENYSE vs ASPIRANET – Final Fairness Hearing – DROPPED.

No moving papers have been filed.

CV-25-007803 - THOM, HILLARY vs COUNTY OF STANISLAUS – a) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories - HEARING REQUIRED; b) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents – HEARING REQUIRED.

a-b) HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court notes that the parties previously stipulated to a continuance of these hearings based on their continuing efforts to meet and confer with the goal of informal resolution of the disputed matters herein. In view of the fact that no further updates have been provided and there are no oppositions on file, Counsel shall appear at the time of the hearing to advise the Court of the present status of the dispute

CV-25-004052 - CATON, JOE LEROY vs AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE INC - Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication by Defendant American Medical Response West – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 17, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

Defendant concedes that his counsel inadvertently failed to serve all relevant exhibits and materials referenced in the moving papers on opposing counsel at the time the moving papers were submitted to the court. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s opposition was based, in large part, on the perceived lack of admissible evidence supporting the moving arguments and, specifically, the opinions expressed by Dr. Zimmet. As a result, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff has been deprived of the opportunity to address the subject evidence on its merits, and the interests of due process dictate that such an opportunity be afforded under the circumstances.

Therefore, the hearing is CONTINUED, as above, and Plaintiff may serve and file a supplemental opposition addressing the evidence in question no later than December 1, 2026. Defendant, in turn, may serve and submit a supplemental reply in response thereto no later than December 8, 2026.

CV-26-006084 - CASTILLO, JESUS VALDEZ vs ROSAS, JOSE F – a) Defendant's Motion to Waive Objections & Compel Answers to Interrogatories; [CCP 2030.290(B).] for Sanctions on Plaintiff [CCP 2030.290 (C), 2031.300 (C)] - DENIED, as MOOT; b) Defendant's Motion to Waive Objections & Compel Production of Documents; [CCP 2031.300(B).] for Sanctions on Plaintiff [CCP 2030.290 (C), 2031.300 (C)] – DENIED, as MOOT.

a-b) The issues presented herein have been rendered moot by Defendant’s service of verified responses on the same date the instant motions were served.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-24-000847 - ORTIZ, ALEJANDRO vs CITY OF MODESTO - Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant City of Modesto to Serve Responses to Inspection Demands and to Permit Inspection of the Subject Vehicle and End Sign Assembly - MOOT.

This motion is moot in light of the Court’s Tentative Ruling of 8/25/26 where these requests were granted per the parties stipulation.

CV-26-002814 - MONTOYA, GERARDO vs CSCMODESTO LLC – a) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further

Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One to Defendant CSC - Modesto, LLC, and Request for Sanctions - GRANTED; b) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One to

Defendant CSC - Modesto, LLC, and Request for Sanctions – GRANTED.

a) Discovery is construed broadly and includes information that may reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 538, recognizes California’s broad right to discovery, and Gonzales v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546, applies the reasonable-assistance standard. A burden objection must be supported by evidence showing the quantum of work required. West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407.

Putative class members’ identities, contact information, employment dates, and total number are relevant to identifying witnesses, investigating the alleged employment practices, and determining the scope of the proposed class. Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, recognizes the discoverability of putative class members’ contact information. Employees who executed releases may nevertheless remain percipient witnesses whose information is discoverable. The releases therefore do not render the interrogatories moot. (Code of Civil Procedure 2017.010).

In addition, Defendant’s claims of burden are unsupported. (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407).

Special Interrogatory No. 1 seeks the names and contact information of putative class members. The privacy concerns implicated by that request can be adequately addressed through a Belaire-West opt-out procedure. The motion is granted as to Special Interrogatory No. 1 subject to that procedure.

Special Interrogatory No. 2 seeks putative class members’ employment dates, which are relevant to the alleged practices, class scope, and potential damages. The motion is granted as to Special Interrogatory No. 2.

Special Interrogatory No. 3 seeks the total number of putative class members, which is relevant to the scope of the proposed class and certification issues. The motion is granted as to No. 3.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.250 requires an entity’s interrogatory responses to be signed under oath by one of its officers or agents. Unsworn interrogatory responses are tantamount to no responses. (St. Mary v Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762). Any further responses must therefore be verified by an officer or agent of CSC-Modesto, LLC.

Plaintiff’s motion is accordingly granted.

Within 14 calendar days after service of this order, Defendant CSC-Modesto, LLC shall serve complete, code-compliant further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 1–3, without general objections and verified under oath by an officer or agent of CSC-Modesto, LLC.

Within 21 calendar days after service of this order, Defendant shall mail a Belaire-West opt-out notice concerning the contact information responsive to Special Interrogatory No. 1.

Putative class members shall have 21 calendar days from the mailing date to opt out of disclosure.

Within seven calendar days after expiration of the opt-out period, Defendant shall disclose to Plaintiff the responsive contact information of all putative class members who did not timely opt out.

Monetary sanctions of $760.00 are hereby imposed against Defendants and their Counsel for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting this motion

b) Plaintiff has established good cause for the requested discovery because Requests for Production, Set One, Nos. 1–12 seek Plaintiff’s employment records, Plaintiff’s and putative class members’ timekeeping and payroll records, applicable wage-and-hour policies, and documents concerning the alleged joint-employer relationships. These

materials are directly relevant to the pleaded wage-and-hour claims and class-certification issues. Defendant did not supplement Request Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, and 11, and the remaining responses are deficient because they do not clearly state whether production is complete, preserve objections without identifying withheld material, assert privilege without a log, and incorporate general objections. Code of Civil Procedure 2031.210 –2031.240; Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1116).

The supplemental responses do not moot the motion because they were verified on behalf of Corrugated Supplies Company, LLC rather than the responding party, CSC-Modesto, LLC. The responses to Request Nos. 10 and 12 do not address the requested roles of the affiliated entities or satisfy the requirement to explain whether responsive documents never existed, were destroyed, or were never within Defendant’s possession, custody, or control.

The individual releases do not foreclose discovery relevant to the PAGA claim, percipient employee witnesses, or the validity and effect of the releases themselves. Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010. Plaintiff adequately met and conferred, including through the October 23, 2026, telephone conference and detailed deficiency email.

Therefore, within 14 calendar days after service of notice of this ruling, Defendant shall serve code-compliant further responses to Request Nos. 1–12, without general objections. The further responses must be verified under oath on behalf of CSC-Modesto, LLC by one of its officers or authorized agents. Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.250, subdivisions (a) and (b). Unsworn responses are treated as no responses. Appleton v. Superior Court, (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.

Within the same 14-day period, Defendant shall produce all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control and provide a Bates index identifying the documents produced in response to each request.

Any response asserting inability to produce shall state whether the responsive documents never existed, were destroyed, were lost, or were never within Defendant’s possession, custody, or control.

For any document withheld on a claim of privilege or work-product protection, Defendant shall contemporaneously provide a privilege log sufficient to identify the document and the basis for withholding it.

Putative class members’ time and payroll records may be produced using unique identifiers in place of names and other identifying information. To the extent disclosure of employee identities and contact information is required, the parties shall use a neutral, opt-out Belaire-West notice procedure.

Monetary sanctions are warranted because Defendant served objection-only responses after receiving two extensions, supplied incomplete and improperly verified supplemental responses only after the motion was filed, and has not shown substantial justification. Monetary sanctions of $875.00 are hereby imposed against Defendant and its counsel jointly and severally.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000330 - BORJA, ROSA ELVIA MALDONADO vs GONZALEZ, CARLOS HERNANDEZ – Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings – HEARING REQUIRED.