Civil Tentative Rulings

June 12, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 21***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-23-002593 – MILLER ARMS COMPANY INC vs CITY OF RIVERBANK – Defendant’s Motion to Bifurcate Trial – GRANTED, and unopposed.

On April 23, 2026, Defendants submitted a motion to bifurcate trial. Defendants seek an order bifurcating the liability and damages phases of trial. On June 1, 2026, Plaintiff submitted a notice of non-opposition.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 598, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ unopposed motion to bifurcate trial.

CV-25-012211 – NORRIS, PAUL vs BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents – GRANTED.

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to compel. Defendant shall produce unredacted copies of the Guerin reports and draft reports by June 18, 2026, at 5 pm. Defendant shall produce relevant, non-privileged documents in response to RFP Set 4 Request Nos. 24, 28, 29, 34; RFP Set 6 Request Nos. 8 and 13; and RFP Set 7 Request No. 2 by July 13, 2026, at 5 pm. For information over which Defendant asserts privilege, Defendant shall serve a privilege log by July 13, 2026, at 5 pm. The privilege log shall include at least the following information: entry numbers (consecutively numbered starting with 1), the date of the communication/work product, the author/sender, the recipient(s), the type of privilege asserted, whether the document is withheld or redacted, the description of the communication/information, and asterisks following the names of lawyers. Defendant shall identify documents responsive to each request by bates number and serve such identification on Plaintiff by August 12, 2026. All other relief denied. Moving party to submit a proposed order that conforms to this ruling within five court days.

Redacted reports

A party that seeks to protect communications from disclosure based upon the attorney-client privilege must establish the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise—i.e., a communication made in the course of an attorney-client relationship.” (City of Petaluma v. Superior Court (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1032.) “For purposes of the attorney-client privilege, ‘client’ is defined in relevant part as ‘a person who, directly or through an authorized representative, consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service or advice from him in his professional capacity . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
 

"However, the right to assert the attorney-client privilege is not absolute.” (Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1142, 1149.) “Evidence Code section 912, subdivision (a) specifically provides that waiver of the privilege occurs when any holder of the privilege ‘has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to such disclosure made by anyone.’” (Ibid.) “[A]n implied waiver occurs where the plaintiff has placed in issue a communication which goes to the heart of the claim in controversy.” (Ibid.)
 

Defendant argues that there is an attorney-client relationship between Defendant and Ms. Guerin because Ms. Guerin was expected to use her legal expertise in creating findings of fact for the report into Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. The question of whether the report itself is a privileged communication is moot because Defendant has waived privilege over the report itself as well as Ms. Guerin’s findings by putting the investigation and findings at issue in the litigation and also by producing the full report and draft reports with only a few redactions.

Defendant next argues that the underlying communications between CSU employees and in-house counsel that were communicated to Ms. Guerin are privileged because the communications were confidential and the primary goal of the communications was to obtain or provide legal advice. Along with its opposition to the instant motion, Defendant provided a privilege log of redactions made to the draft Guerin Report.

The majority of the redacted information has been waived pursuant to Evidence Code section 912 and/or via implied waiver. Defendant produced nearly all of the report yet seeks to redact information under headings such as “Reasons for Alleged Adverse Actions” and “Placing Paul Norris on Administrative Leave of Absence” and “Paul Norris’s Non-Retention.” In another example, in the first entry on page four of the privilege log, Defendant has redacted information regarding what appears to a request to talk about facts related to Mr. Norris’s non-retention. Such information goes to the hearing of the claim in controversy and thus privilege is waived. It is well settled “that the law does not permit a party to use a confidentiality privilege as both a shield and a sword.” (Ford v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 277, 286.)

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to compel Defendant to produce unredacted copies of the reports and draft reports.

Requests for Production

Defendant agreed to supplement certain responses and to identify responsive documents by bates number.

As to RFP Set 4 Requests Nos. 1 and 2, it appears the relevant overtime records have been produced. Request No. 24 seeks Ms. Strottman’s written reports and/or complaints relating to Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s conduct or behavior. Such reports or complaints are not privileged simply because Ms. Strottman is an attorney. To the extent such documents exist, they are relevant and should be produced and/or identified on a privilege log. Request No. 28 seeks documents relating to key persons’ job duties and/or job classifications. Such documents are relevant and should be produced. Request No. 29 seeks documents relating to why one of Plaintiff’s subordinates moved to a different role. Such documents are relevant to the extent they relate to Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s conduct or behavior and should be produced. Request No. 34 seeks documents relating to an investigation pertaining to Plaintiff’s job performance. Such documents are relevant and should be produced.

RFP Set 5 Requests Nos. 4–7 seek offer letters Ms. Knott received for roles she held before and after working for Plaintiff and applications Ms. Knott filled. Such documents do not appear relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

RFP Set 6 Requests No. 5 seeks a report related to a separate investigation into a separate employee’s complaints. Such a report does not appear relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant has agreed to produce documents in response to Request No. 8. Request Nos. 9–12 seek several text messages related to key personnel’s employment. The requests are overbroad and do not appear relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant has agreed to produce the text message sought in Request No. 13. Requests Nos. 15–16 seek documents relating to a site visit that multiple deponents have testified is unrelated to the instant case.

RFP Set 7 Request No. 2 seeks communications between certain individuals relating to Plaintiff. Such communications are relevant and should be produced. Communications are not privileged simply because one party is an attorney.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to compel as to RFP Set 4 Requests Nos. 24, 28, 29, 34; RFP Set 6 Requests Nos. 8 and 13; and RFP Set 7 Request No. 2. Defendant shall produce responsive, non-privileged documents by July 13, 2026, at 5 pm. For any information over which Defendant asserts privilege, Defendant shall serve a privilege log by July 13, 2026, at 5 pm. The privilege log shall include at least the following: entry numbers (consecutively numbered starting with 1), the date of the communication/work product, the author/sender, the recipient(s), the type of privilege asserted, whether the document is withheld or redacted, the description of the communication/information, and asterisks following the names of lawyers. Defendant shall identify documents responsive to each request by bates number and serve such identification on Plaintiff by August 12, 2026.

PR-25-000754 – In the Matter of THE GEORGE GARY VENIOT LIVING TRUST – a) Petitioner Tawna Veniot's Motion to Compel Responses from Respondent, Dana Garth, to Requests for Production of Documents and for Monetary Sanctions Against Respondent for Misuse of the Discovery Process – GRANTED in part and denied in part, and unopposed. b) Petitioner Tawna Veniot's Motion to Compel Responses from Respondent, Dana Garth, to Special Interrogatories and for Monetary Sanctions Against Dana Garth for Misuse of the Discovery Process – GRANTED in part and denied in part, and unopposed. c) Petitioner Tawna Veniot's Motion to Compel Responses from Respondent, Dana Garth, to Form Interrogatories and for Monetary Sanctions Against Dana Garth for Misuse of the Discovery Process – GRANTED in part and denied in part, and unopposed. d) Petitioner Tawna Veniot's Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted and for Monetary Sanctions Against Respondent, Dana Garth, for Misuse of the Discovery Process – GRANTED in part and denied in part, and unopposed.

a) Requests for Production

The Court finds that Respondent has entirely failed to respond to the subject discovery and that all objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300(a).) Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to an order compelling Respondent to provide verified responses, without objection, to Petitioner’s Requests for Production, Set One, within 21 days. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300(b).)

The Court further finds that Petitioner is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with this motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.300(c), 2023.010 et seq.) Therefore, monetary sanctions in the amount of $694.50 are awarded against Respondent Dana Garth, payable to Petitioner’s counsel of record, Fores Macko Johnston & Chartrand. The Court declines to set a timeline for the payment of sanctions, as that is unnecessary. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 610, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995).)

Petitioner’s alternative request for an order rendering judgment by default against Respondent and dismissing any objections or cross-petitions is DENIED. That sanction is disproportionately punitive at this stage of the proceedings.

Petitioner is directed to submit a new proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

b) Special Interrogatories

The Court finds that Respondent has entirely failed to respond to the subject discovery and all objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(a).) Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to an order compelling Respondent to provide verified responses, without objection, to Petitioner’s Special Interrogatories, Set One, within 21 days. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(b).)

The Court further finds that Petitioner is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with this motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.290(c), 2023.010 et seq.) Therefore, monetary sanctions in the amount of $604.50 are awarded against Respondent Dana Garth, payable to Petitioner’s counsel of record, Fores Macko Johnston & Chartrand. The Court declines to set a timeline for the payment of sanctions, as that is unnecessary. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 610, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995).)

Petitioner’s alternative request for an order rendering judgment by default against Respondent and dismissing any objections or cross-petitions is DENIED. That sanction is disproportionately punitive at this stage of the proceedings.

Petitioner is directed to submit a new proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

c) Form Interrogatories

The Court finds that Respondent has entirely failed to respond to the subject discovery and all objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(a).) Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to an order compelling Respondent to provide verified responses, without objection, to Petitioner’s Form Interrogatories, Set One, within 21 days. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(b).)

The Court further finds that Petitioner is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with this motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.290(c), 2023.010 et seq.) Therefore, monetary sanctions in the amount of $784.50 are awarded against Respondent Dana Garth, payable to Petitioner’s counsel of record, Fores Macko Johnston & Chartrand. The Court declines to set a timeline for the payment of sanctions, as that is unnecessary. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 610, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995).)

Petitioner’s alternative request for an order rendering judgment by default against Respondent and dismissing any objections or cross-petitions is DENIED. That sanction is disproportionately punitive at this stage of the proceedings.

Petitioner is directed to submit a new proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

d) Requests for Admissions

Petitioner submitted the instant motion supported by a declaration. Petitioner states that it propounded requests for admissions on Respondent and received no response. Therefore, Respondent requests that the matters set forth in the Requests for Admissions, Set One, be deemed admitted.

“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response . . . [t]he requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) “The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(c).)

Accordingly, Petitioner’s unopposed request to deem matters admitted is GRANTED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.280(b). The truth of any matters specified in Defendant’s Requests for Admissions, Set One, are deemed admitted, without objection. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(a)‑‑(b).) 

Petitioner is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in conjunction with this motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2033.280(c), 2023.010 et seq.) Therefore, monetary sanctions in the amount of $634.50 are awarded against Respondent Dana Garth, payable to Petitioner’s counsel of record, Fores Macko Johnston & Chartrand. The Court declines to set a timeline for the payment of sanctions, as that is unnecessary. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 610, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995).)

Petitioner’s alternative request for an order rendering judgment by default against Respondent and dismissing any objections or cross-petitions is DENIED. That sanction is disproportionately punitive at this stage of the proceedings.

Petitioner is directed to submit a new proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-001829 – DANIELYAN, INESA vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – Plaintiff Inesa Danielyan’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Expenses – GRANTED, in the reduced amount of $44,995.72.

The Court exercises its discretion in determining what award is justified in this context. (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5^th 462.)

Attorney’s Fees

Hours Reasonably Worked –

Regarding the lodestar fees calculation, the Court finds, on the basis of Counsel’s declarations and supporting exhibits, including time records, and the Court’s own review of the time entries submitted by Plaintiffs’ counsel, as well as the Court’s experience and general familiarity with the amount of time reasonably allocated to the types of tasks described herein, that the hours claimed were reasonably incurred and substantially contributed to the ultimate successful result.  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 394.) However, the Court determines that a portion of the time claimed by Plaintiffs’ counsel herein should be reduced as follows:

1.2 hours billed by Hovanes Margarian for “communication with defendant” between 3/9/24 and 3/9/25 as improper block billing which does not provide sufficient specificity for the Court to assess the reasonableness of the time incurred in relationship to the task(s) described

1.5 hours billed by Patrick Kimball for “communication with defendant” between 10/1/24 and 3/5/26 as improper block billing which does not provide sufficient specificity for the Court to assess the reasonableness of the time incurred in relationship to the task(s) described

2.3 hours claimed by Hovanes Margarian in connection with “review” of various documents prepared by other billers in this matter, as duplicative.

6.9 hours claimed by Hovanes Margarian (1.9) and Patrick Kimball (5.0) as “anticipated time” in connection with the instant motion, as excessive for the tasks described.

Reasonable Hourly Rates –

In its determination, the Court has considered the skill and experience of the timekeepers, the nature of the work performed, the customary billing rate for each timekeeper, and the prevailing rate for comparable legal services in the local community.  (Serrano v Unruh (Serrano IV) (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 643; Serrano v Priest (Serrano III) (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.)  The law further instructs that the relevant local community for the purpose of determining reasonable fees is the community where the action is pending. (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147.)  Lastly, the law provides that the trial judge is “the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 49.) As a result, the Court finds that counsel’s requested rates are not reflective of the prevailing rates in Stanislaus County and should be reduced.

Therefore, the hourly rate for Hovanes Margarian and Patrick Kimball are approved in the reduced amount of $500.  The hourly rate for Armen Margarian is approved in the reduced amount of $450.  The hourly rate for Ms. Oganyan is approved in the requested amount of $150.

Multiplier -

The Court exercises its discretion to decline to award a multiplier to increase the fee award in this instance. Plaintiff has failed to convince the Court that the nature of the case warrants a multiplier herein. Moreover, to the extent that the contingent nature of the recovery factors into this analysis, the Court finds that this element is already reflected in the lodestar fees awarded.

Costs & Expenses

The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover the costs and expenses incurred as set forth in the Memorandum of Costs filed on 3-5-26, in the amount of $4,565.72. The Court notes that Defendant failed to move to strike or tax the challenged cost items within the time period prescribed by Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1700.  Even if the challenges raised in connection with the instant motion in this regard were timely, Civ. Code § 1794(d) envisions a broader scope of recoverable “expenses” than is defined by CCP § 1033.5.

Summary of Award –

 

The Court’s lodestar calculation and total award is as follows:

Timekeeper	Hours	Hourly Rate	Subtotal
H. Margarian	8.1	500	$    4,050.00
A. Margarian	28.2	450	12,690.00
P. Kimball	45.7	500	22,850.00
E. Oganyan	5.6	150	840.00
		Total Fees	$40,430.00
		Costs	4,565.72
		AWARD	$ 44,995.72

CV-25-004507 – VALVERDE, ANTHONY vs SILVA, EMANUEL – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Emmanuel Silva to Provide Further Written Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, and Production of Cell Phone Records; and Request for Sanctions – GRANTED, in part.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for the production of Defendant Silva’s cell phone records relative to the occurrence of the accident, as the evidence establishes that Defendant had his cell phone in the vehicle at the time and cannot recall whether he used the phone within the 20-minute period before the accident. Additionally, there appears to be no other method by which to obtain relevant information that the subject records may disclose, i.e. the existence of additional witnesses, the existence of potential distractions, and the like.

However, the Court is mindful of the law’s protection of Plaintiff’s privacy interests in his cell phone usage, as well as the information reflected thereby, and of the Court’s duty to balance the respective rights of the parties in this situation to reach a proper resolution of the issue.

Therefore, the Court finds that good cause exists to compel limited production of the requested records, to include records evidencing Defendant Silva’s cell phone activity within the 20 minute periods occurring immediately before and after the time of the accident. Therefore, Defendant shall provide verified further responses identifying any responsive materials within the above-defined parameters within 14 days.

The Court declines to award sanctions.

CV-25-001828 – CHAVOLLA, EVA vs DARLING INGREDIENTS INC – Defendant’s Petition to Compel Arbitration and Stay Civil Court Proceedings – DENIED, without prejudice, as premature.

The Court notes that the arguments relative to the instant petition reference allegations made in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which is not contained in the Court’s file. Therefore, the motion is premature at this juncture, as the state of the pleadings appears to be unsettled herein.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-23-004665 – PAULEEN BAJWA & MCKELLAR ENTERPRISES vs RAS AUTOMOTIVE INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions Against Defendant’s RAS Automotive Inc., Harinderjit Kaur, and Vik Randhawa; and Their Counsel Philip Minter Esq. Pursuant to CCP 128.5 and 128.7 – DENIED.

The motion is procedurally defective in several respects.

Plaintiff improperly combines requests for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure §§ 128.5 and 128.7 into a single motion, contrary to the statutory requirement that such requests be made separately. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(A), 128.7, subd. (c)(1).)

Additionally, the motion improperly seeks § 128.7 sanctions against represented parties in a manner inconsistent with the statute. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (b).)

Further, Plaintiff has not demonstrated strict compliance with the safe harbor provisions. The version of the motion served during the safe harbor period does not appear to be identical to the motion filed, and there is an insufficient showing that a complete, properly noticed motion was served at least 21 days before filing. (See Galleria Plus, Inc. v. Hanmi Bank (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 535, 538 (Galleria Plus).)

The above procedural defects are fatal. Strict compliance with the procedural rules governing sanctions motions is a necessary precursor to granting them. Statutory non-compliance subjects a sanctions order to reversal. (See Galleria Plus, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 538; see also Martorana v. Marlin & Saltzman (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 685, 698-700 [noncompliance with Section 128.7(c)(1) may be raised for first time on appeal in appropriate situations].)

Even so, the Court notes that it would decline to impose sanctions on the merits. The filing of Defendants’ motion under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6, though unsuccessful, does not demonstrate that it was presented for an improper purpose or in bad faith within the meaning of §§ 128.5 or 128.7.

For the above reasons, the motion for sanctions is DENIED.

CV-23-006303 – HILMAR CHEESE COMPANY INC vs FERREIRA, TIMOTHY – Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 664.6 – DENIED.

This matter came on for hearing and was continued to allow the parties to meet and confer regarding the documents at issue and to file a Joint Status Statement (“JSS”) addressing whether the motion should proceed. The Court has reviewed the JSS and the papers submitted.

Background and Findings

1.  On September 5, 2025, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement and Limited Release (SALR)  that, among other terms, (a) required Hilmar to provide specified “Agreed Books and Records,” (b) permitted the Trustee, within fifteen days after receipt, to make a further request for books and records if the Agreed Books and Records did not suffice for his needs, and (c) provided that if the parties were not able to reach agreement on further books and records that satisfied the Trustee, the Trustee could declare the Agreement null and void.
2. Hilmar provided an initial production on September 6, 2025, and a supplemental production on September 23, 2025.
3. On September 19, 2025, the Trustee expressly invoked Section 1(b) of the Settlement Agreement and made a further request for books and records, identifying categories of missing documents and insufficient data.
4. On September 22, 2025, Hilmar responded that certain requested materials did not exist and addressed other items, and on September 23, 2025, provided a supplemental production.
5. Also on September 23, 2025, the Trustee’s expert, Kyle TenHuisen, submitted a declaration stating that, Hilmar had provided some but not all requested information and that the documents and information provided to date were insufficient to allow completion of an accurate appraisal absent an inspection consistent with “Site Inspection Option No. 2.”
6. On September 26, 2025, Trustee’s counsel referenced the TenHuisen declaration in correspondence with Hilmar’s counsel as stating the Trustee’s position regarding additional missing documents necessary to meet the Trustee’s needs.
7.  On March 4, 2026, after further exchanges and following Hilmar’s filing of the instant motion, Trustee’s counsel stated that the parties were not able to reach an agreement for the production of further books and records which satisfied the Trustee and declared the September 5, 2025, Settlement Agreement null and void.

Legal Conclusion

The Court finds that the parties’ Settlement Agreement and Limited Release gives Defendant the discretion to determine the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s production of Agreed Books and Records (Settlement Agreement and Limited Release Sections 1(b) and (c)).

Under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6, the Court may enter judgment only pursuant to the terms of a settlement. On this record, the Court finds:

        1. The Trustee timely invoked Section 1(b) of the Settlement Agreement and made a further request for additional books and records.

        2. The parties thereafter were unable to reach agreement on further production sufficient to satisfy the Trustee, as reflected in Mr. TenHuisen’s September 23, 2025, declaration, the September 26, 2025, correspondence, and the continued disagreement over the availability and sufficiency of requested materials.

        3. The Trustee ultimately declared the Settlement Agreement null and void pursuant to Section 1(b) after the parties were unable to reach agreement on further production.  Notwithstanding that Defendant did not expressly declare said Agreement null and void till March 2026, to the extent that Defendant had previously expressed said insufficiency and that the Agreement provides for the requested relief upon the sufficient production of books and records, Plaintiff may not obtain the requested relief.

        4. The record further reflects that the parties were unable to reach agreement regarding additional production, as confirmed in the JSS, despite being given the opportunity to meet and confer following the Court’s continuance.

Plaintiffs contend that the Trustee failed to identify with sufficient specificity the documents required to satisfy his concerns. The Court agrees that a more particularized identification of requested materials may have assisted the parties in resolving their dispute. However, the SALR does not require the Trustee to provide an exhaustive list of documents as a condition to exercising the nullification provision. The relevant inquiry is whether the Trustee invoked the contractual procedure and whether the parties were unable to reach agreement.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Hilmar argues that the Trustee’s actions violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the Settlement Agreement. However, the implied covenant cannot be used to impose obligations beyond those expressly agreed upon in the contract. (Bevis v. Terrace View Partners, LP (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 230, as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 21, 2019); Carma Devs. (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342).

The Settlement Agreement explicitly provided a mechanism for the Trustee to declare the Agreement null and void if further production did not satisfy his needs. The Trustee’s invocation of this provision was consistent with the express terms of the Agreement and does not constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract, which allowed the Trustee to declare the Agreement null and void under the specified conditions.

Plaintiffs contend that the Trustee’s determination must be objectively reasonable. The Court has considered Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 44. Under Storek, where a contract confers discretion based on a party’s satisfaction, that discretion is exercised based on the party’s good faith judgment, rather than an objective reasonableness standard imposed by the Court.

Applying that standard, the Court finds that the Trustee’s determination that the production was insufficient was made in good faith. The Trustee’s position is supported by the record, including the valuation expert’s statements regarding the information required to complete the appraisal. The Court therefore finds that the Trustee acted within the scope of the discretion afforded under the SALR.

Because the Agreement was declared null and void by its own terms following the parties’ inability to reach agreement on further production that would satisfy the Trustee, there is no enforceable settlement to reduce to judgment under § 664.6.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is hereby DENIED. No judgment shall be entered under § 664.6 based on the September 5, 2025, Settlement Agreement, and the books-and-records claims remain unresolved for purposes of further proceedings consistent with this Court’s docket and the parties’ pleadings.

CV-25-005613 – JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA vs VALDOVINOS, ERIKA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order that Matters in Request for Admission of Truth of Facts be Deemed Admitted – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff submitted the instant motion supported by a declaration. Plaintiff states that it propounded requests for admissions on Defendant and received no response. Therefore, Plaintiff requests that the truth of facts specified be deemed admitted.

“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response . . . [t]he requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) “The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(c).)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s unopposed motion is GRANTED.

The proposed order references an attachment that is not included. (Plaintiff may have intended to cross-reference the attachments to the underlying requests for admissions that were propounded on Defendant, but the language in the proposed order is unclear.) Plaintiff is directed to submit a new proposed order within five court days that includes the attachment.

CV-25-005891 – JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA vs KING, JULIE A – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order that Matters in Request for Admission of Truth of Facts be Deemed Admitted – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff submitted the instant motion supported by a declaration. Plaintiff states that it propounded requests for admissions on Defendant and received no response. Therefore, Plaintiff requests that the truth of facts specified be deemed admitted.

“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response . . . [t]he requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) “The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(c).)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s unopposed motion is GRANTED.

The proposed order references an attachment that is not included. (Plaintiff may have intended to cross-reference the attachments to the underlying requests for admissions that were propounded on Defendant, but the language in the proposed order is unclear.) Plaintiff is directed to submit a new proposed order within five court days that includes the attachment.

CV-25-000052 – BANK OF AMERICA NA vs PELAYO, CHRISTINA MARIA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings – GRANTED without leave to amend, and unopposed.

The Court finds that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for breach of contract and/or common counts. Defendant’s answer expressly admits all material allegations of the complaint and asserts no legally valid affirmative defenses. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 431.20, subd. (a), 438, subd. (c)(1)(A).)

Defendant failed to file an opposition, so the Court has no grounds for finding that the answer could be amended to state a valid defense.

Accordingly, the unopposed motion is GRANTED without leave to amend.

The Court has reviewed the memorandum of costs that was filed and finds the costs uncontroversial.

Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A. and against Defendant Christina Pelayo in the total sum of $8,635.16, which comprises damages in the principal sum of $8,276.55 and court costs of $358.61.

The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion. However, the proposed judgment contains a typographical error as to the total amount. The Court will revise the proposed judgment to reflect the correct total and then will sign it. 

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***