Civil Tentative Rulings

July 09, 2026

The following are the tentative ruling for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-002864 – GUTIERREZ, WENDY MARILYN QUINTERO vs MERCADO, JOSE – a) Defendants Jorge Mercado & Josephine Mercado’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories to Plaintiff Wendy Marilyn Quintero Gutierrez and for Sanctions – GRANTED; b) Defendants Jorge Mercado & Josephine Mercado’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories to Plaintiff Alann Flores-Canales and for Sanctions – GRANTED.

Defendants Jorge Mercado and Josephine Mercado's motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 1, 2, 12, 20, and 28 is GRANTED.

The challenged responses are evasive and incomplete. Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.220 requires interrogatory responses to be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. Plaintiff's responses either repeat allegations from the complaint, provide broad categories of alleged defects without identifying the specific defects at issue, or provide vague temporal responses such as "after the purchase" or "gradually after they moved into the property." Such responses do not provide the information sought by the interrogatories and do not permit defendants to determine the precise factual bases for plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff's contention that responsive information may be found in previously produced documents does not excuse compliance with the discovery statutes. To the extent plaintiff seeks to rely upon Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230, the responses do not sufficiently identify the specific documents from which the requested information may be ascertained.

The court further finds the requested information is directly relevant to the claims and damages alleged in the complaint and is discoverable.

Plaintiff Wendy Marilyn Quintero Gutierrez shall serve verified further responses, without objections, to Special Interrogatories Nos. 1, 2, 12, 20, and 28 within 10 calendar days of service of the order.

The request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. While sanctions are appropriate because plaintiff unsuccessfully opposed the motion and the responses necessitated court intervention, the court notes substantial overlap between the motions directed to the two plaintiffs and modest duplication in counsel's work. Accordingly, sanctions are reduced from the requested $2,025.90 to $1,260.00, payable jointly and severally by plaintiff Wendy Marilyn Quintero Gutierrez and plaintiffs' counsel to defendants, through counsel, within 30 days.

1. Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Alann Flores Canales)

Defendants Jorge Mercado and Josephine Mercado's motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 1, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 is GRANTED.

The challenged responses are evasive, incomplete, and in several instances non-responsive to the interrogatories posed. Responses stating only that alleged defects were discovered "after they moved into the property" do not provide meaningful information concerning dates of discovery. Likewise, merely repeating allegations from the complaint does not answer interrogatories seeking specific facts, identification of individuals, identification of documents, or disclosure of the factual basis for claimed knowledge.

Particularly deficient are the responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 10, 12, 13, 17, 19, and 20. Plaintiff alleges that someone represented the foundation crack was merely "cosmetic," that a structural engineer inspected the property and reached certain conclusions, and that multiple HVAC estimates were obtained. Defendants are entitled to discovery regarding the identities of those people, the factual basis for those allegations, and the documents supporting them. Plaintiff's responses do not provide that information.

The court rejects Plaintiff's argument that the motion should be denied because responsive information exists somewhere within plaintiffs' document production. The discovery statutes require direct, code-compliant responses. General references to produced documents do not satisfy that obligation.

Accordingly, plaintiff Alann Flores Canales shall serve verified further responses, without objections, to Special Interrogatories Nos. 1, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 within 10 calendar days of service of the order.

The request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. The court finds sanctions appropriate under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300(d). However, because substantial portions of counsel's work on this motion overlap with the companion motion brought against co-plaintiff Gutierrez, the court finds a reduction in the amount requested is warranted. Sanctions are awarded in the amount of $1,260.00, payable jointly and severally by plaintiff Alann Flores Canales and plaintiffs' counsel to defendants, through counsel, within 30 days.

CV-24-009853 – JONES, LATISHA MONIQUE vs KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set Three) - GRANTED in part; b) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication – GRANTED in part; DENIED in part.

a) Defendant’s response to the subject request is deficient, entitling Plaintiff to a further response thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(a).)

Admissibility at trial is not the test for discoverability.  Here, Plaintiff has demonstrated that the sought-after materials may be relevant or admissible on Plaintiff’s FEHA claims, and Defendant’s objections and unilaterally imposed time parameters are not well-taken. Specifically, the Court notes that Defendant’s arguments against providing the subject information rely primarily on persuasive authorities, which fail to address the issue in the context of discovery. (However, Plaintiff’s claim that unpublished federal cases may not be cited in California courts is not well-taken.)

The Court makes no express or implied findings on admissibility at trial.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the alternative request for summary adjudication.

b) Summary judgment is DENIED. Summary Adjudication is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Plaintiff operated a personal interior design/property business while working for Kaiser. Company assets were used by her in doing so.

She also complained about a monkey image which she alleged was racist and reported it to human resources. While out on medical leave, she was fired. She claims the firing was pretextual.

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment or Adjudication in General

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.) A defendant meets their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that “a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed.” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

In addition to moving for summary judgment, “[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(2).)

B. Shifting Burdens for FEHA and Labor Code Claims

FEHA retaliation claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework. First, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that she engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action, and that a causal connection exists between the two. If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext for retaliation. Throughout this analysis, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. (See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802, as applied to FEHA retaliation claims in California; Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042–1044.)

For Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 98.6, the burden‑shifting framework articulated in Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. applies. Under this standard, Plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that protected activity was a contributing factor in the employer’s decision to take an adverse employment action. If a plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action for legitimate, independent reasons even if the plaintiff had not engaged in protected activity. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the employer at the second step. (Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718–721.)

OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

The Court rules as follows on the parties’ objections to evidence.

Plaintiff’s objections:

        SUSTAINED: 1, 2, 3, 4

Defendants’ objections:

        OVERRULED: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 15. I note that hearsay is offered for the proof of the matter asserted and statements by party-opponents are exceptions to the rule.

        SUSTAINED: 6, 10, 11

        SUSTAINED in part: 12, 13, 14: Observed workplace actions and practices are admissible.

OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT

The Court declines Defendants’ invitation to strike the Plaintiff’s separate statement.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

As explained below, not all of Defendants’ arguments are successful, and many of Plaintiff’s causes of action survive this motion. Therefore, the request for summary judgment is DENIED.

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION:

ISSUE NO. 1: Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action and prayer for punitive damages all fail as a matter of law as to KFHP because KFHP never employed plaintiff and cannot be held liable to her.

The record is largely undisputed that KFHP did not employ Plaintiff, did not control her day-to-day work, and did not make the termination decision. (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 15-16, 62-63.)

Plaintiff argues that summary adjudication of this issue should be denied on the theory of integrated enterprise.

To determine whether two business entities are an integrated enterprise, courts analyze the following four factors: interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership. (Laird v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 727, 737.) “Although courts consider the four factors together, they often deem centralized control of labor relations the most important.” (Id. at p. 738.) “To make a sufficient showing of ‘interrelation of operations’ on summary judgment, the plaintiff must do more than merely show that officers of the subsidiary report to the parent corporation or that the parent benefits from the subsidiary's work. …. What the plaintiff must show, rather, is that the parent has exercised control “ ‘to a degree that exceeds the control normally exercised by a parent corporation.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s opposing evidence focuses on KFHP-employed HR personnel providing advice and conducting investigations. (See Pl.’s Resp. to UMF Nos. 15-16, 62-63.) However, without proof of authority over hiring, firing, or discipline, the type of evidence on which Plaintiff is relying is typically insufficient to establish employer liability under FEHA or the Labor Code. (See Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 124–125 [entity that provides personnel guidance or participates in employment-related processes, but lacks authority to hire, fire, or discipline, is not an employer under FEHA].)

While Plaintiff cites shared policies and HR involvement, that evidence goes more to coordination than to centralized control of labor relations; under controlling authority, this is not enough. Accordingly, summary adjudication of Issue No. 1 is GRANTED.

ISSUE NO. 2: Plaintiff’s first cause of action for retaliation under Labor Code sections 1102.5-1105 fails as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, plaintiff cannot show she engaged in any actionable protected activity, nor can she show retaliatory animus or a causal connection between any reported protected activity and an alleged adverse action.

The Court uses the Lawson standard.

Defendants’ contention to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no real dispute that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity: she reported the offensive monkey picture to Ms. Douglas and then restated the same to Ms. Sapin during a September 2022 interview. (See UMF Nos. 49-50; OMF Nos. 15, 30-39, 40, 48-52; Pl.’s Opp, at pp. 4-5.) Defendants’ argument that Douglas did not qualify as a supervisor is unpersuasive.

While there is no certain evidence presented that Plaintiff’s protected activity was a contributing factor to her termination, a jury could infer from the timeline plus the comparator evidence (see OMF Nos. 96-104) that Jones was treated differently than other employees because of her participation in discrimination complaints and that the protected activity was therefore a contributing factor.

The burden shifts to Defendants to show by clear and convincing evidence that Defendants would have taken the same action for legitimate, independent reasons. (See Lawson, supra.) Defendants do not meet this burden. Accordingly, summary adjudication of this issue is DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 3: Plaintiff’s second cause of action for retaliation under Labor Code section 98.6 fails as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, plaintiff cannot show she engaged in any actionable protected activity, nor can she show retaliatory animus or a causal connection between any reported protected activity and an alleged adverse action.

The Lawson standard also applies to this cause of action, and for the reasons set forth above, summary adjudication is also DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 4: Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for retaliation under FEHA fails as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, plaintiff cannot show she engaged in any actionable protected activity, nor can she show retaliatory animus or a causal connection between any reported protected activity and an alleged adverse action.

As discussed above, Plaintiff engaged in protected activity. (See UMF Nos. 49*-50*; OMF Nos. 15, 30-39, 40, 48-52; Pl.’s Opp, at pp. 4-5.) Nor is there a dispute that KFH terminated her for a facially legitimate reason. (See UMF No. 37.) So, the burden switches back to the Plaintiff to produce substantial, admissible evidence that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext for retaliation. As previously noted, a jury could infer from the timeline plus the comparator evidence (see OMF Nos. 96-104) that Jones was treated differently than other employees because of her participation in discrimination complaints.

Viewing the situation in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, summary adjudication is DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 5: Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for retaliation under CFRA fails as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, plaintiff cannot show retaliatory animus or a causal connection between any actionable reported protected activity and an alleged adverse action.

The McDonnell Douglas standard applies to a CFRA retaliation claim. For the reasons stated above under Issue No. 4, the request for summary adjudication of this issue is DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 6: Plaintiff’s first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action for retaliation fail as a matter of law because there were legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for each alleged adverse employment action.

Summary adjudication of Issue No. 6 is DENIED. This issue is duplicative of issues presented above.. As Plaintiff notes on page 14 of her opposition, a FEHA retaliation claim requires that “(1) the plaintiff establish a prima facie case of retaliation, (2) the defendant articulate a legitimate nonretaliatory explanation for its acts, and (3) the plaintiff show that the defendant's proffered explanation is merely a pretext for the illegal termination.” (Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 476, reh'g denied and opinion modified (Mar. 5, 1992).) As Defendants have articulated this issue, the third element is excluded.

ISSUE NO. 7: Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for discrimination under FEHA fails as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, plaintiff cannot show discriminatory animus, nor a causal connection between any alleged disability/medical condition and an alleged adverse action.

Summary adjudication is DENIED. Defendant has successfully shifted the burden to Plaintiff. Sandell v. Taylor-Listug (2010) 188 Cal.App.4^th 297, 310, permits the Plaintiff to make this determination by inference. This is a close case, but given the timing of the firing and Kaiser’s own policies, the Court finds that sufficient inference has been made.

ISSUE NO. 8: Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for discrimination under FEHA also fails as a matter of law because there were legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for each alleged adverse employment action.

Like Issue No. 6, Issue No. 8 fails to articulate all the elements for a FEHA claim and is therefore DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 9: Plaintiff’s third cause of action for wrongful termination fails as a matter of law because it is derivative of plaintiff’s retaliation and discrimination claims, and thus fails for the same reasons her retaliation and discrimination claims fail.

Because retaliation and discrimination claims have in fact survived summary adjudication summary adjudication of Issue No. 9 is DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 10: Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for failure to make reasonable accommodation in violation of FEHA fails as a matter of law because plaintiff was granted all requests for reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability.

The following facts are undisputed: Plaintiff’s role involved IT support responsibilities (UMF No. 5); her job required in-person work (UMF No. 6); Plaintiff sometimes needed to be on her feet up to 75% of the day (UMF No. 7); Plaintiff took several medical leaves (UMF No. 38); all leave requests were granted (UMF No. 39); and Plaintiff was able to extend her leave from December 27, 2022, to August 7, 2023 (UMF No. 40).

UMF Nos. 38-40 indicate that Plaintiff was provided with reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff argues on page 17 of her opposition that Kaiser failed to reasonably accommodate her, but the points she flags go to discrimination, not to failure to reasonably accommodate.

For the foregoing reasons, summary adjudication of this issue is GRANTED.

ISSUE NO. 11: Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA fails as a matter of law because plaintiff was granted all requests for reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability.

For the same reasons that summary adjudication of Issue No. 10 is GRANTED, summary adjudication of Issue No. 11 is GRANTED as well.

ISSUE NO. 12: Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action for failure to provide a work environment free from discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation fails as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot establish a viable claim for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation under FEHA.

Because FEHA claims have survived, the ninth cause of action survives as well. Thus, summary adjudication is DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 13: Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action for failure to provide a work environment free from discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation also fails as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot identify any reasonable step that defendants should have taken – but failed to take – to avoid conduct prohibited by FEHA.

There is ample evidence indicating that Plaintiff did in fact identify reasonable steps that KFH should have taken but failed to take. For example, Plaintiff contends Defendants should have conducted a more rigorous investigation of the monkey picture incident (see UMF Nos. 52-53); that Sapin made condescending remarks (which would indicate a lack of sensitivity training) (UMF No. 58); that Jackson failed to act on Williams’ complaint about racist conduct by Perez (which again indicates a lack of training) (OMF No. 15); and that Defendants should have reexamined the evidence on which her termination was based given the noticeable flaws in the methodology (UMF No. 23).

Accordingly, summary adjudication of this issue is DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 14: Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails as a matter of law because the conduct at issue is neither extreme nor outrageous.

Summary adjudication is DENIED.

As Kaiser concedes, this is derivative of other, surviving claims.

ISSUE NO. 15: Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress also fails as a matter of law because there is no evidence that defendants intended to cause plaintiff severe or extreme emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard of the probability that plaintiff would suffer severe or extreme emotional distress.

Outside of the unique legal structures imposed on FEHA and Labor Code claims, a defendant who is contending that a plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence must provide affirmative proof that he or she cannot satisfy her burden; mere argument is not enough. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854–855, as modified (July 11, 2001) [“Summary judgment law in this state, however, continues to require a defendant moving for summary judgment to present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence. In this particular at least, it still diverges from federal law. For the defendant must ‘support [ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b).) The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing. But, as Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson (9th Cir.2000) 212 F.3d 528 concludes, the defendant must indeed present “evidence”: Whereas, under federal law, ‘pointing out through argument’ (id. at p. 532) may be sufficient (see generally Schwarzer et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2001) ¶¶ 14:137 to 14:137.6, pp. 14-32 to 14-33 [setting out the ‘disagree[ment]’ of the ‘[c]ourts' on the issue]), under state law, it is not.”] [footnotes omitted; emphasis added].)

Here, Defendants do not make any effort to show admissions by Plaintiff or that she has been unable to discover any evidence to support her position on this issue. For this reason, Defendants have failed to meet their initial burden of proof, and summary adjudication of this issue is DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 16: Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress also fails as a matter of law because there is no evidence that plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress.

For the reasons stated above under Issue No. 15, summary adjudication of this issue is DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 17: Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages fails as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot meet her burden under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), by producing clear and convincing evidence of conduct by KFH or KFHP that constitutes malice, oppression, or fraud.

For the reasons stated under Issue No. 15, summary adjudication of this issue is DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 18: Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages also fails as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot meet her burden under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), by producing clear and convincing evidence that any conduct that could give rise to punitive damages liability was committed, authorized, or ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of defendants.

Summary adjudication is GRANTED.

UMF Nos. 71-73 indicate that Tony Jackson, Debbie Sapin, and Wilmer Perez—i.e., the chief actors in this controversy—were not officers, directors, or managing agents of KFH and were not involved in policymaking. The connections to Adao and Newkirk are speculative and OMF 15, 56, and 63 are substantially below the standard required to make this showing.

Defendant to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.

CV-24-010016 – REEVES, MARNIE ANN vs RENNER, JEREMY LEE – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the First Amended Complaint, in its Entirety, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of the First, Second and Third Causes of Action of the First Amended Complaint – GRANTED in full.

Objections to the Reeves Declaration:

1-18: All objections are OVERRULED. The declaration is accepted only for the specific facts and not the conclusions from those facts. The hearsay objections as to things Renner is alleged to have said are not well taken, as they are either not hearsay, an alleged statement by the party opponent, or both.

19-35, 38-42: OVERRULED, except as to assertions that Meta AI or Truthfinder are accurate statements of whether a person is Renner-associated. Reeves describes the items and provided signed declarations under penalty of perjury; I disbelieve any technical deficiencies are sufficient to not consider the declarations. (I note that Reeves substantially followed the rules governing this motion, which are not intuitive, and Renner very promptly repaired a technical deficiency in his filing when the Court called attention to it.)

36-37: SUSTAINED.

 

Factual Summary

Marnie Reeves, the Plaintiff, engaged with multiple people claiming to be the actor Jeremy Renner, related to Jeremy Renner, or Jeremy Renner’s management team over a period of time both before and after filing this lawsuit.

Various Renners would tell her that the other Renners were scammers, but he was the real Jeremy Renner. Reeves sent money to many people, including people in Colorado, France, and to unknown bitcoin wallets.

The text messages (see, for instance, Exhibit 40) regularly have a person identifying as Renner professing a desire to maintain a romantic relationship with Reeves, and asking for money.

Accounts like “PrivateJeremmyR” contacted her and she engaged these accounts.

She paid for a meet and greet at the Hotel Per La in Los Angeles. This was arranged via a “Lasse Larsson,” who gave strict instructions to lie to the bank about the wire transfer and to assert it was for family. The money was wired to a “Jen Joiner.”

The letter she received from (ostensibly) the hotel said her confirmation number was 7, that she was in room 7, and spelled “Address” incorrectly. The letter is not on any specialized stationery and appears to be a Word document with uneven capitalization.

Reeves believes a song by Renner, “Wait,” is Renner singing about her.

Reeves eventually had at least seven emails for Renner, and additionally believed multiple other people were working with Renner, including an account from “J. Renner Inc.” Reeves asserts that Renner changed the contact information to a person who wasn’t him. The registered owner of the company is “James Arnol Renner.” (I note here that, like all claims in this case from social media accounts, the actual source of the J. Renner Inc. account is unknown.)

Reeves purchased a “fan card” which misspells her name and has some irregular capitalization.

Reeves spoke to an account ostensibly run by Renner’s mother who said the other Jeremy Renner(s) were frauds but that her son wanted to talk to Reeves.

Reeves asserts that she had a video call with Jeremy Renner on August 28, 2023. The specific claim is, “Defendant was in his car driving to the store per the Plaintiff and Defendant’s conversation, his phone was to the left of him, and he said, ‘I just called to say hi and how are you doing today.’ The video call was very clear and I could see him and a parking lot he was pulling into. He looked at me front view at least 3 times during the conversation. Plaintiff knew then she was safe to send the additional payments after August 2023.”

Reeves engaged with a Renner as late as September 2025 and indicated she still wanted to pursue a relationship and alternatively that she was angry with him for his failures. She alleged to a Renner that he was fake because he did not know of this lawsuit.

This case was filed on December 13, 2024, and a demurrer was filed by Renner in February, 2025.

Renner’s Claims

Renner filed a declaration saying that he never had the phone number attributable to many of the contacts with Reeves, he did not ask for any money from her, he did not receive any money from her, he did not have anything to do with any of the many social media accounts and emails that contacted Reeves, and that he was entirely disconnected with Reeves except for one meeting at a Sweet Grass Vodka event in which they had no substantive conversation.

Renner also provides evidence that he has attempted to deter fans from falling for romance scams.

Renner asserts incorrectly that no celebrity would charge money for a meet and greet. (See, for instance, https://www.weirdal.com/vip-package-faqs/ (page accessed July 8, 2026.))

The Court also rejects Renner’s conclusion that this was a single scammer or a single group of scammers.

Governing Law

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.) A defendant meets their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that “a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed.” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

In addition to moving for summary judgment, “[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(2).

Analysis

Renner has met the first hurdle. His clear disclaiming of any of the social media contacts and of any ownership of the emails, phone numbers, or businesses is sufficient to shift the burden to Reeves to show that the people she sent money to were Renner or agents of Renner.

Reeves clearly has competent evidence that she has made payments to multiple people and certainly has enough evidence that she intended to form a relationship with Renner.

But Reeves’ factual disputes are insufficient. In UMF’s 66-75, Renner disclaims any knowledge of the individuals Reeves sent money to – Julie Parsons, Mythe Thien Nguyen Dinh, Dorie Nichols, and Mle Michovska Mihaela. Reeves says Renner was aware of these people, but the basis for that is that Renner told her to send the money to these people, and in some cases there are tenuous connections to them via website or (assertedly) AI searches.

The web searches are not evidence, and the remainder is entirely speculative.

Reeves assert that she was contacted via many different phone numbers on WhatsApp. She cites the following text from August 1, 2025:

 “I understand we talked before, then all of the sudden I could not access my telegram anymore, then by that time I gained full access to it, this whole stuff has already taken place, I was so confused. I do feel it’s some one in my circle.”

Reeves analysis is: “This is not how imposters act or say.” This analysis is not compelling.

Celebrities are not immune from committing crimes of all sorts. Renner’s celebrity status provides him no immunity from ordinary summary judgment analysis. Renner’s celebrity status does provide motive for scammers to imitate him though, and the manner in which this was done does not reflect a well-oiled entertainment management organization as Reeves alleges.

The phone call

Reeves asserts that she made a video phone call in which she saw the “front” of Renner three times in August, 2023. Under Code Civ. Proc. section 437c(e), the Court may not determine credibility unless the matter is so incredible as a matter of law as not to be believed.

Inferences from facts however may be made. I assume that the phone call occurred.

This was the linchpin allegation that brought this case past the demurrer stage. This was also the closest portion of this ruling, and I have carefully considered the allegation.

Reeves said Renner “looked” at her, implying but not directly asserting that she saw his face. But Reeves provides no evidence of control over the phone. The call, as described, has a driving “Renner” not viewable by Reeves except when he looked at the phone three times while driving.

Even if she saw his face, the alleged ratification of prior contacts would very strongly indicate this was not the actual Jeremy Renner; I have tried to give the flavor of the contacts, and there are no remaining signs that the actual person Jeremy Renner had anything to do with any of this. Reeves also expressed doubts before and after the phone call, including months after Renner had appeared in this case. Reeves herself seems unpersuaded that this evidence was dispositive.

Further, in People v. Schlimbach (2011) 193 Cal.App.4^th 1132, fn6, an appellate court found that the Court may determine as a matter of law that a factual assertion is not credible under unusual circumstances.

In that case, the assertion that a person with a 0.24% blood alcohol might appear to be intoxicated when he was not, and that another had a speech impediment which the officer mistook for being under the influence. This obviously is not impossible, but was of sufficiently remote probability that the appellate court found it to be facially incredible and that a trial court would be within its rights to ignore it.

Conclusion

There is virtually no evidence that Renner got the money or asked for the money, and the evidence is insufficient to tie him to the phone call. If this were a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, Renner is not liable beyond a reasonable doubt, and probably by the higher standard of criminal factual innocence.

I note here that this case has used substantial resources of the court and counsel. I would caution the legislature not to impose a cure worse than the problem; this case has doubtless been vexing to Renner (and surely to Reeves, who appears to still believe the actor stole her money). Lawsuits against people who did nothing wrong are expensive and taxing; California’s efforts to reduce them – as by anti-SLAPP rules – have been laudable.

The Court will sign the proposed order. Defendant is to prepare a judgment consistent with this ruling.

CV-25-007268 – CRUZ, VANESSA vs COVENANT CARE CALIFORNIA LLC – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration – DENIED.

Governing Law

Under both federal and state law, it is the Court's responsibility to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute. (See 9 U.S.C. § 4 [“If the making of the arbitration agreement … be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2 [If the court “determines that [a written] agreement to arbitrate a controversy exists … [it may order enforcement].”]; Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 585, reh'g denied (Oct. 16, 2025), review denied (Dec. 17, 2025) [“[A] court, before granting a petition to compel arbitration, ‘ “must determine the factual issue of ‘the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.’ ” ’ [Citations.]”] [emphasis in original].)

State law applicable to contracts generally governs whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. (See Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 492; Stutler v. T.K. Constructors Inc. (6th Cir. 2006) 448 F.3d 343, 347; Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696, 701 [“Federal policy in favor of arbitration does not come into play … until a court has found the parties entered into a valid contract under state law.”].) 

Once the existence of the agreement is established, the burden of establishing grounds that prevent its enforcement is on Plaintiffs as the challengers. (See Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1153-1154.)

While the Court recognizes that the purported arbitration agreement contains a delegation clause, this dispute raises foundational issues, including whether Ms. Lopez possessed ostensible authority to agree to the arbitration provisions on behalf of her father. The law dictates that, regardless of the inclusion of a delegation clause in the subject agreement, these types of foundational issues ought to be determined by the Court. (Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1285.)

Discussion

In contending that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, Defendants mainly rely on the declaration of Jennifer Warkentin, a former Executive Director at the facility. Ms. Warkentin asserts that she was present when Valerie Lopez signed the arbitration agreement on behalf of the decedent, Juan Cruz. Ms. Warkentin states that, before Ms. Lopez signed the paperwork, Ms. Warkentin spoke with Mr. Cruz to ask him if Ms. Lopez was authorized to sign on his behalf, and he stated that she was so authorized. Ms. Warkentin further asserts that she explained to both Mr. Cruz and Ms. Lopez that the arbitration agreement was not a condition of residency.

The Warkentin declaration does not contain a description of in what manner she asked Mr. Cruz about the arbitration agreement.

Ms. Warkentin’s declaration appears contradicted by the declaration of Valerie Lopez. Ms. Lopez asserts that, at the time she signed the admission paperwork, she had no legal authority to act on behalf of her father. While Mr. Cruz did ultimately execute a power of attorney agreement naming Ms. Lopez as his attorney-in-fact, that did not occur until several months after the admission paperwork was completed. Ms. Lopez also states that her father was not present with her when she completed the paperwork (as he was still in the hospital that day), she does not recall anyone explaining the arbitration agreement to her, she does not recall Ms. Warkentin asking her if she was authorized to sign the arbitration agreement and the residency papers on her father’s behalf, and her father never spoke with Ms. Warkentin or any other staff at the facility until after his admission.

Lack of recollection is typically insufficient to overcome a direct assertion, but here the failure to describe the means by which Mr. Cruz was contacted leaves a substantial gap in the testimony presented.

Defendant appears to concede that ratification was likely required. The evidence before the Court that

Further, supporting documentation appears to adhere more closely to Ms. Lopez’s version of events. The record contains evidence establishing that decedent was not admitted to the facility until September 21, 2023, the day after the arbitration agreement was signed. Facility admission records reflect an admission date of September 21, 2023, and Plaintiffs’ evidence further shows that Valerie Lopez signed the admission and arbitration documents on September 20, 2023, while decedent was still hospitalized and not present at the facility. (See 6/11/26 Fish Decl., Exhs. 1-5.) In addition, there is a “required” section that should have been completed explaining Ms. Lopez’s authority to sign on her father’s behalf, but that section of the paperwork was left blank. (See 11/14/25 Warkentin Decl., Exh. A [pdf p. 9].) Finally, the only power of attorney agreement presented to the Court is dated January 5, 2024. (See 11/14/25 Morris Decl., Exh. C.) It was not in effect at the time that the admission paperwork was executed.

Conclusion

Because it appears to the Court that Ms. Lopez lacked actual or ostensible authority to sign on behalf of the decedent on admission to the facility, it further appears that no valid agreement was formed.

CV-25-012584 – PAIGE, DONALD vs DINAPOLI, MARY ELISBETH - Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - DENIED without prejudice.

It does not appear sufficient notice was given.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-26-002034 – ALFARO FARM LABOR CONTRACTOR INC vs ATHWAL INVESTMENTS LP – a) Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s Writ of Attachment – HEARING REQUIRED; b) Cross-Defendant Alfaro Farm Labor Contractor Inc.’s Demurrer to Cross Complaint – HEARING REQUIRED; c) Cross Defendant Alfaro Farm Labor Contractor Inc.’s Motion to Strike Cross Complaint – HEARING REQUIRED.

PR-23-000109 – IN THE MATTER OF LEO LANDUCCI AND PATRICIA LANDUCCI REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST OF 2007 – Respondent Kathleen Landucci’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs – HEARING REQUIRED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-001883 – BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE vs BROWN, GIA – Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Dismissal with Prejudice (C.C.P. Sections 1008(A), 473) – DENIED.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration was not timely filed pursuant to CCP § 1008(a).  In addition, Plaintiff’s request for relief based on counsel’s affidavit of fault has not been presented in the proper form, as no proposed pleading has been submitted. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b).)

CV-24-002604 – CANO, MARIA vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO INC – Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs of Defendant Silvia Diego, M.D. [C.C.P. 1033.5] - DENIED.

Defendant Diego is the prevailing party following summary judgment and is entitled to recover allowable costs as a matter of right under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subject to plaintiffs’ burden to show that particular items are not authorized, not reasonably necessary, or unreasonable in amount. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5; Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) Plaintiffs have not met that burden on this record.

The Court further finds that Dr. Diego’s Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offers served 1-17-25 were made in good faith based on the information available at the time, and plaintiffs did not obtain a more favorable judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1); Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 692, 698–699.) Accordingly, in the Court’s discretion, Dr. Diego’s post-offer expert witness fees are recoverable.

Records subpoena/medical records costs are allowed as reasonably necessary costs of taking depositions/obtaining records in this medical negligence action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(3); Evers v. Cornelson (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 310, 317.)

Defendant Silvia Diego, M.D. is awarded costs in the amount stated in her Memorandum of Costs: $29,740.46.

CV-24-007017 – LOCKWOOD, VEOLA vs CARPENTER, KEVID MD – Defendant American Medical Response West’s Motion for Summary Judgment - GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on the moving arguments and evidence, including the declaration of Kristin Weivoda and Barry Marsh and the attachments thereto, and in the absence of any opposition, the Court finds that Defendant, as the moving party, has met the burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment on Plaintiff’s Complaint herein. Specifically, the Court finds the undisputed facts support the conclusion that (1) Defendant’s personnel met the applicable standard of care in the care and treatment provided to Plaintiff’s decedent; and (2) Defendant is entitled to the statutory immunity provided in Health & Safety Code § 1799.107, as no allegation or evidence of bad faith or gross negligence is present herein.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge David Hood in Department 24:

CV-24-004401 – FLETES, IMELDA vs GROSSMAN, ERNEST – a) Defendant’s Motion to Deem Matters Admitted; Request for Sanctions – MOOT in part, granted in part; b) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One; Request for Sanctions – MOOT in part, granted in part; c) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One; Request for Sanctions - MOOT in part, granted in part.

a) MOOT in part, granted in part.

The Court finds that Defendant/Cross Defendant Ernest Grossman failed to timely respond to Defendant/Cross Complainant Rico’s Pizza’s Request for Admissions, Set One served on January 8, 2026, but that since the filing of this motion Mr. Grossman has served responses that are substantially compliant with Code of Civ. Proc. §2033.220.  Therefore, the Court is not required to and does not order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests are deemed admitted. See Code of Civ. Proc. §§’s 2033.220, 2033.280(c).

However, the Court finds that the filing of this motion was necessary to elicit Mr. Grossman’s responses, and therefore the Court finds that Rico’s Pizza is entitled to monetary sanctions of $225.00 for attorney’s fees reasonably incurred pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §§’s 2023.010(d), 2033.280(c) and Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1348(a).

Said sanctions are awarded against Ernest Grossman and are to be paid by no later than 9/8/26.

b) MOOT in part, granted in part.

The Court finds that Defendant/Cross Defendant Ernest Grossman failed to timely respond to Defendant/Cross Complainant Rico’s Pizza’s Requests for Production served on January 8, 2026.

The Court notes that Mr. Grossman has served responses since the filing of this motion. However, the Court finds that this motion was necessary to elicit Mr. Grossman’s responses, and therefore the Court finds that Rico’s Pizza is entitled to monetary sanctions of $210.00 for its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to §§2031.300(c), 2023.010 (d) and Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1348 (a). Said sanctions are awarded against Ernest Grossman and are to be paid by no later than 9/8/26.

c) MOOT in part, granted in part.

The Court finds that Defendant/Cross Defendant Ernest Grossman failed to timely respond to Defendant/Cross Complainant Rico’s Pizza’s properly propounded Form Interrogatories, Set One served on Ernest Grossman on January 8, 2026, but that since the filing of this motion Mr. Grossman has served responses.

However, the Court finds this motion was necessary to elicit Mr. Grossman’s said responses and accordingly finds that Rico’s Pizza is entitled to monetary sanctions of $225.00 for attorney’s fees reasonably incurred in bringing this motion pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc.§§2030.290(c) 2023.010(d) and Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1348(a). Said sanctions are awarded against Ernest Grossman and are to be paid by no later than 9/8/26.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***