Civil Tentative Rulings

August 28, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-002542 – VIERRA, LANA vs VALVERDE, CONNIE – Defendant Connie Valverde’s Motion Requesting Reconsideration of Application for Good Faith Settlement Determination [C.C.P. 877.6 (A)(2)] – CONTINUED to September 11, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21.

The motion is well-taken.

Although Plaintiff dismissed Valverde from the complaint before Valverde filed the application for determination of good faith settlement, Valverde remains a cross-defendant in the action and contends that a good-faith determination remains necessary in light of the pending cross-claims.

However, the Court’s file does not reflect that the motion for reconsideration was served on all remaining parties, or, alternatively, does not contain a proof of service establishing such service. Due process requires that all affected parties receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Court rules on the motion.

If proof of proper service is filed, the Court will consider the motion on the continued hearing date.

CV-24-004750 – GOODY, JAMES JOSEPH vs FARINELLI, ALBERT – Defendants Yolanda Arnette Mccoy and Eulene Ramsey’s Motion for Summary Judgment – GRANTED.

This matter was originally set for hearing on August 21, 2026. Trial is scheduled to begin on September 22, 2026. The Court has found good cause to hear this matter within 30 days of trial, as the Court had a scheduling conflict and needed to move the hearing on its own motion from August 21 to August 28, 2026.

Governing Law

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.) A defendant meets their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that “a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed.” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

Discussion

The Court finds that Defendants Yolanda Arnette McCoy and Eulene Ramsey (“Moving Defendants”) have carried the initial burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment pursuant to the application of the “sudden emergency” or “imminent peril” doctrine. Specifically, the evidence submitted with the motion supports the conclusion that Defendant McCoy acted with reasonable care and was suddenly and unexpectedly confronted by an emergency she did not cause. (See UMF Nos. 1, 6-7, 9-10, 13-14; Shiver v. Laramee (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 395, 397.)

The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to submit admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a material factual dispute preventing judgment as a matter of law. The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the memorandum in opposition to the motion has arguments which do not appear to pertain to this case.

In his separate statement, Plaintiff disputed UMF Nos. 8, 11, 15, and 16. (UMF No. 12 is also disputed, but that raises a minor issue that is not critical to deciding this motion.)

All of Plaintiff’s disputed facts rely on the same set of evidence: Exhibit A, p. 37:20-23, and pp. 46:21-47:3. The cited portions state as follows:

        20 Q.· · Ms. McCoy, how long was the green Mustang

        21· traveling behind you on Oakdale-Waterford Highway on

        22· the date of the incident?

        23· · · ·A.· · For about two or -- two minutes.

        ***

        21 Q.· · And when law enforcement arrived, did you

        22· give them a statement?

        23· · · ·A.· · Yes.

        24· · · ·Q.· · And what was that statement?

        25· · · ·A.· · I said he was driving behind me, and he

          1· was merging in and out of traffic -- or in and out

          2· from around me trying to see how to pass.· And the

          3· third time he passed, he hit the lady and my car.

Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to UMF Nos. 8, 11, 15, and 16 are as follows:

        - For both UMF Nos. 8 and 15, Plaintiff contends, “Plaintiff attempted to pass the Defendant driver several times, but her actions prevented Plaintiff from passing safely;”

        - For UMF No. 11, Plaintiff states, “Defendant was driving slower than the actual speed limit, and was impeding traffic, and the Plaintiff from passing safely;” and

        - For UMF No. 16, Plaintiff asserts, “Defendant could have pulled over to the side to allow traffic to proceed. Nothing prevented the Defendant from safely pulling over to allow Plaintiff safely pass.”

The cited evidence does not adequately support any of these assertions. Specifically, the deposition passages do not show that it was Defendant’s actions that prevented Plaintiff from passing safely; that Defendant McCoy was driving slower than the speed limit; that Defendant McCoy was impeding traffic; or that there was nothing preventing Defendant McCoy from safely pulling over to allow Plaintiff to pass.

Because the Plaintiff’s statement of disputed facts lacks material evidentiary support, the Court deems Moving Defendants’ statement of facts undisputed. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

The Court notes that Plaintiff included his own deposition as evidence but never cited to it. If the inclusion was an implicit invitation for the Court to review the deposition testimony for triable issues, the Court declines that invitation.

The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion. In addition, Moving Defendants are instructed to submit a proposed judgment within five court days.

All future dates are vacated and a Case Status Review is set for October 30, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21. That date will be vacated upon signing of the judgment.

CV-24-006618 – CATT, TODD MICHAEL vs RENTERIA, MARCOS, JR - Defendant’s Motion to Strike Amendments to Complaint Based on Lack of Good Faith, Abuse of Process, and Collusive Misrepresentation – CONTINUED to September 2, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. to be heard with the Motion for Protective Order.

CV-26-006055 – THOMAS, ATORINA vs STATE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY INC – Petitioner’s Verified Petition to Compel Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Arbitration and to Appoint a Single Neutral Arbitrator - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court has questions regarding the proposed method of arbitrator selection.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

***There are no tentative rulings for Department 22***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-22-001828 – LONGORIA, OSCAR vs CITY OF MODESTO – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Compliance with Court Order and for Issue and Terminating Sanctions, and Request for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $1,860.00 –

GRANTED, in part; DENIED, in part.

The Court finds that Defendant’s conduct in failing to timely comply with the Court’s 2-26-26 order constitutes misuse of the discovery process (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010(d), (g).)  However, under the circumstances the Court notes the defense’s attempt to provide compliant further verified responses in advance of the instant hearing and declines to award issue, evidence, or terminating sanctions at this time. 

As Plaintiffs’ reply brief demonstrates, Defendant’s further verified responses appear incomplete, as the two subject requests and responses are identical as reflected therein and reference the same attached set of documents. Therefore, Defendant is again ordered to provide complete verified further responses, without objection, and to produce all responsive documents within 10 days. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.320(c).)

The Court further finds that Defendant’s conduct is attributable to its counsel and necessitated the instant motion, entitling Plaintiffs to an award of monetary sanctions herein. (Code Civ. Proc. §§  2031.320(c), 2023.010, 2023.030.)   Therefore, $1,560 in additional monetary sanctions is awarded against defense counsel, payable to Plaintiff’s counsel. 

Plaintiffs shall submit a revised form of order reflecting the Court’s ruling herein.

CV-26-001860 – SELFHELP ENTERPRISES vs NORTHEAST TERRITORIES PATTERSON LLC – a) Defendant Hartley Patterson, LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Action - OVERRULED; b) Defendant 50 Fathom Curve, LLC’s Demurrer to Amended Complaint – OVERRULED; c) Defendant Bruce Harrington’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint – SUSTAINED, with leave to amend; d) Defendant Bruce Harrington’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint – DENIED, as MOOT.

a) The Court finds that the First Amended Complaint alleges sufficient factual support for the stated claims, including the alter ego allegations which form a substantial basis for such claims.  The Court further notes that several of Defendant’s arguments appear to turn on the evaluation of extrinsic evidence, which is inappropriate on demurrer.

b) The Court finds that the First Amended Complaint alleges sufficient factual support for the stated claims, including the alter ego allegations which form a substantial basis for such claims.  The Court further notes that several of Defendant’s arguments appear to turn on the evaluation of extrinsic evidence, which is inappropriate on demurrer.

c) The Court finds that the First Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient factual support for the stated claims against Defendant Harrington. Specifically, the pleading fails to allege facts which, if established, would entitle Plaintiff to seek recovery from Defendant Harrington as the alter ego of the subject corporate entities.

d) The motion is MOOT, in view of the Court’s ruling on the related demurrer.

CV-26-004467 – GOMES, KEVIN vs BOISE CASCADE COMPANY – Defendant’s Motion for Pro Hac Vice Admission of Timothy S. Anderson on Behalf of Defendants Boise Cascade Company and Lisa Carriguiry - GRANTED, and unopposed.

The application complies with the requirements of Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 9.40.  The Court will sign the proposed order.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David Hood in Department 24:

CV-24-008960 – RODRIGUEZ, OSCAR vs CUPCAKE BOUTIQUE LLC – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production, Set One – GRANTED.

The Court finds that Plaintiff served deficient responses to Defendant’s Requests for Production Set One, Nos. 1-10. Notably, said responses were not verified and contained unsupported general and boilerplate objections not tied with sufficient particularity to the individual requests or to identifiable documents. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2031.250 (a) ; Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651;  Code of Civil Proc. 2031.240(b)(2).

Plaintiff’s responses were provided without an index identifying which Bates pages responded to which request which Code of Civ. Proc., § 2031.280(a) requires. Plaintiff also expressly stipulated to provide a production index identifying, by Bates range, the request or requests to which each document or category responded yet failed to do so.

Plaintiff also asserted attorney client and work product privilege but failed to support said objections with a privilege log to permit the Court to evaluate the claim. The purpose of a “privilege log” in discovery proceedings is to provide a specific factual description of documents in aid of substantiating a claim of privilege in connection with a request for document production and is intended to permit a judicial evaluation of the claim of privilege. (Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181). (See also Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1116). Additionally, the parties’ written stipulation expressly required a section 2031.240(c)-compliant privilege log for any responsive document withheld on those grounds. It also required a section 2031.230-compliant statement if Plaintiff contended that responsive documents did not exist or were not within Plaintiff’s possession, custody, or control. Plaintiff met neither of these requirements

As to Request for Production No.6, financial documents are not categorically outside the scope of discovery. The scope of discovery is broad, though personal financial information is subject to some degree of constitutional protection.  (Code of Civil Procedure. § 2017.010; Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution). The court makes its determination as to disclosure based on the threshold relevance requirement  and by balancing the needs of the propounding party as against the needs of the responding party. Protective orders may be issued to support the responding party’s privacy rights as applicable. Furthermore, where financial information goes to the heart of the case, or is a critical component thereof, as here, where Defendant contends that they paid Plaintiff sums of money for work Plaintiff did not undertake the requesting party has a greater need for access to that information and the court abuses its discretion in refusing to compel discovery under such circumstances. (Rawnsley v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 86).

The separate statement also identifies the following concrete deficiencies which are unchallenged:

• Requests Nos. 1 and 2: Defendant contends the production contains only limited communications and incomplete or cropped text-message screenshots.

• Requests Nos. 3 and 5: Plaintiff allegedly produced no communications or documents involving governmental officials, and the response to Request No. 3 appears to repeat the language of Request No. 1 rather than address the actual request.

• Request No. 4: Plaintiff agreed to produce licensing and business records but allegedly produced none. Defendant asserts that licensure and the identity of the contracting entity are disputed.

• Request No. 6: Plaintiff agreed to produce documents showing funds received but did not fully address requested records showing disbursement or allocation of those funds.

• Request No. 7: Defendant identifies allegedly missing plans, daily logs, schedules, progress reports, job-site photographs, and completion records

• Request No. 8: Defendant identifies an alleged discrepancy between the pleaded change-order amount, the statement of account, and the invoices produced, and contends no signed or acknowledged change orders were produced.

• Requests Nos. 9 and 10: Defendant states the production lacks third-party supplier, rental, subcontractor, labor-payment, and related records

Accordingly, within ten (10) calendar days after service of notice of entry of this order, Plaintiff Oscar Rodriguez dba Pacific Construction Concepts shall:

1. Serve verified, code-compliant further responses to Defendant’s Requests for Production, Set One, Nos. 1 through 10, without unsupported general or boilerplate objections;

2. Produce all nonprivileged responsive documents within Plaintiff’s possession, custody, or control;

3. Identify each produced document or category of documents by Bates numbers to the specific request number or numbers to which it responds;

4. Serve a privilege log complying with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.240(c) for any responsive material withheld based on attorney-client privilege or attorney work product; and

5. Serve a response complying with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 for any request as to which Plaintiff represents an inability to comply.

Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff Oscar Rodriguez dba Pacific Construction Concepts and Plaintiff’s counsel, Tyler A. Kelly, are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay monetary sanctions of $3,060.00 to Defendant, through defense counsel, within 30 calendar days after service of notice of entry of this order for Defendant’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in filing prosecuting this motion. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2033. 030 (a)). The $3,060.00 is calculated as follows:  $1,200.00 for 3 hours to prepare the meet and confer letter; $600.00 for 1.5 hours in negotiating and preparing the stipulation; $1,200.00 for 3 hours preparing the motion; and $60.00 in filing fees. 

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order that complies with the Court’s ruling no later than September 8, 2026.

CV-25-003769 – SOLIS, SERENTIY vs PONCE, PALOMA MONIQUE – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Production of Records of Kenneth Davis, MFT Pursuant to Deposition Subpoena and for Monetary Sanctions – WITHDRAWN, by moving party.

CV-26-002812 – OGBOGU, KENNETH vs ASHIEGBU, LINDA – Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order Permitting Repossession of Mercedes Benz S550 - DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff has presented evidence supporting the probable validity of his claim to possession, including his declaration concerning the parties’ oral agreement and documentary evidence that Plaintiff purchased, financed, and remains the registered owner of the vehicle. Plaintiff’s evidence indicates that Defendant was permitted to use the vehicle on the condition that she make the associated payments and refinance the loan, and that she allegedly failed to perform those obligations.( Code of Civil Procedure section 512.040 and 512.050).

The present application is, however, deficient in omitting the required statement that the property is not held under a tax, assessment, fine, or execution levy, subject to the statutory qualifications (Code of Civil Procedure section 512.010(b)(5). The statutory notice which must advise Defendant that a writ will issue if the Court finds Plaintiff’s claim probably valid and the other statutory requirements established is also absent.  (Code of Civil Procedure section 512.040 and 512.050). Further, the information required to be included in the Notice of Application and Hearing is absent. (Code of Civil Procedure section 512.040 (b) –(d). 

Additionally, the present record does not establish that the undertaking requirements referenced in Code of Civil Procedure section 512.060 have been satisfied nor does Plaintiff address the undertaking issue at all.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied without prejudice to a renewed application complying with Code of Civil Procedure sections 512.010 through 512.060 and the applicable undertaking requirements.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Richard D. Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings for Department 19***