Civil Tentative Rulings

April 3, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-21-002809 – ESPINOZA BAIL BONDS INC vs CROWNOVER, SAMANTHA MARILYN – Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Correct Judgment – DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. 

The Court does not have the power to change the name of the plaintiff from “Espinoza Bail Bonds, Inc.” to “Jose Espinoza dba Espinoza Bail Bonds”.  The Court generally cannot change the plaintiff's form of business from a corporation to a sole proprietorship doing business as (dba) a fictitious business name under CCP section 473. California courts have consistently held that a corporation and an individual sole proprietor operating under a fictitious business name are separate legal entities, and substituting one for the other constitutes adding a new party rather than correcting a clerical error. See e.g. Meller & Snyder v. R & T Properties, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1303 ( "…[I]t cannot be seriously argued that R & T Properties, Inc. is the same entity as Mr. Tieger, an individual, dba R & T Properties.").  Courts have emphasized that doing business under a fictitious business name does not create a separate legal entity—it merely describes an individual operating under another name. Pinkerton’s, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1342.  Here, a corporation and not Mr. Espinoza, was the only named plaintiff.

Plaintiff requests alternative relief which the Court grants.  Therefore, the Court hereby VACATES and SETS ASIDE the default and default judgment in this matter.  Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend the complaint to name a new party plaintiff.  Plaintiff shall prepare and file the amended complaint within the next ten (10) days. 

The Court notes that the five-year rule has not yet run, but that the parties should be aware of the issue.

The Court schedules a Case Management Conference for June 8, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. in Department 21.

CV-21-003789 – ESPINOZA BAIL BONDS INC vs VELA, FERNANDO – Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Correct Judgment – DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. 

The Court does not have the power to change the name of the plaintiff from “Espinoza Bail Bonds, Inc.” to “Jose Espinoza dba Espinoza Bail Bonds”.  The Court generally cannot change the plaintiff's form of business from a corporation to a sole proprietorship doing business as (dba) a fictitious business name under CCP section 473. California courts have consistently held that a corporation and an individual sole proprietor operating under a fictitious business name are separate legal entities, and substituting one for the other constitutes adding a new party rather than correcting a clerical error. See e.g. Meller & Snyder v. R & T Properties, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1303 ( "…[I]t cannot be seriously argued that R & T Properties, Inc. is the same entity as Mr. Tieger, an individual, dba R & T Properties.").  Courts have emphasized that doing business under a fictitious business name does not create a separate legal entity—it merely describes an individual operating under another name. Pinkerton’s, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1342.  Here, a corporation and not Mr. Espinoza, was the only named plaintiff.

Plaintiff requests alternative relief which the Court grants.  Therefore, the Court hereby VACATES and SETS ASIDE the default and default judgment in this matter.  Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend the complaint to name a new party plaintiff.  Plaintiff shall prepare and file the amended complaint within the next ten (10) days. 

The Court notes that the five-year rule has not yet run, but that the parties should be aware of the issue.

The Court schedules a Case Management Conference for June 8, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. in Department 21.

CV-24-008027 – GOMEZ, PAOLA vs TURLOCK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication – CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to April 7, 2026 at 8:30 a.m.

The Court is likely to deny the motion on the current contested causes of action, but has acquired a fairly serious cold, impacting its efficiency. The Court apologizes for the delay.

CV-24-009186 – LVNV FUNDING LLC vs BARAJAS, MARIA – Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment, if Entered: CCP 473(b) – HEARING REQUIRED.

Plaintiff has not opposed the motion, and it is likely to be granted.

CV-25-005600 – MILLS, MICHAEL vs CITY OF MODESTO – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court anticipates granting a continuance. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s assertions of untimeliness given that Plaintiff was present when the date was reset to accommodate the Court’s availability.

There are a number of irregularities in the opposition, but the first question is determining whether a continuance is required.

Plaintiff asserts, incorrectly, that Department 22 was closed and Department 21 declined to hear the ex parte request for a continuance. The Court suspects these were mixed up.

Nonetheless, it would be inequitable to deny a continuance based on the failure to obtain an ex parte hearing under these circumstances. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(h)) Neither would it be appropriate to deny the motion for discovery failures given the procedural posture and the fact that there may not be any discovery failures.

The Court cannot consider lack of diligence in granting a requested continuance.

The Court is uncertain whether the additional information will be helpful or necessary, but it does appear to be relevant. 

The Court notes further that the declaration of Bong J. Walsh contains references to a CV and a second exhibit, but the Court does not seem to have those exhibits. Both of these appear to be likely to be relevant.

Finally, the Court reads Rule of Court 2.108 as requiring line numbers to be at least loosely associated with lines. The rules require oppositions to be twenty pages or fewer, and Plaintiff has (for instance) 34 lines on page 7 of his opposition. The Court disbelieves this is either double spaced or 1 ½ spaced as required by the rules, and suspects it was done to stay within the twenty page limit.

It cannot be easier to seek forgiveness than permission. The Court has an affirmative duty to ensure attorneys comply with the rules of court, and will take the actions necessary to gain compliance.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 22***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-23-004890 – JONES, STUART vs MODESTO INSURANCE CENTER INC – Defendant Pacific Specialty Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Summary Adjudication – DENIED.

Defendant Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (“PSIC”) moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, on Plaintiff’s causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, reformation, and punitive damages. The motion is based primarily on PSIC’s contention that the policy is voidable due to material misrepresentations in the insurance application concerning occupancy, and that PSIC acted reasonably as a matter of law in its claims handling.

Having considered the moving papers, opposition, reply, evidentiary submissions, and the applicable law, the Court finds that triable issues of material fact preclude summary judgment and summary adjudication. The motion is therefore DENIED.

The Court GRANTS PSIC’s requests for judicial notice.  The Court OVERRULES all objections to the evidence submitted as generally going to weight and not admissibility.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The Court must strictly construe the evidence of the moving party and liberally construe the evidence of the opposing party, resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party.

ANALYSIS

A. Rescission / Misrepresentation Defense

PSIC contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the insured made material misrepresentations in the application regarding owner occupancy, which independently defeat coverage regardless of intent.

While California law permits rescission or avoidance of coverage based on even innocent misrepresentations, the threshold factual issue here - who made the alleged misrepresentation and under what circumstances - is disputed.

The record reflects evidence that:

*   The insurance application was “pre‑filled” by the broker;

*   The insured allegedly informed the broker the property was a rental;

*   The insured signed an application reflecting owner occupancy, but disputes whether he knowingly or intentionally adopted a false statement;

*   The broker selected the policy form and insurer.

Whether the insured knowingly misrepresented a material fact, or whether the misstatement resulted from broker error or negligence, presents a classic factual dispute that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Although the insured’s signature is relevant evidence, it is not dispositive as a matter of law in light of the competing evidence concerning broker involvement and the insured’s understanding of the application. Accordingly, PSIC has not established its rescission or misrepresentation defense as a matter of law.

B. Waiver and Estoppel

Plaintiff further contends that PSIC waived, or is estopped from asserting, rescission or denial of coverage based on PSIC’s own conduct after issuance of the policy.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, reflects that:

*   PSIC conducted underwriting inspections in which non‑insured occupants were encountered and identified as tenants;

*   Policy correspondence and premium notices were sent to addresses other than the insured property;

*   PSIC renewed the policy and accepted premiums for multiple years without modifying the policy or inquiring further into occupancy;

*   PSIC issued a renewal offer after the loss while simultaneously asserting that the policy was fundamentally inconsistent with the risk.

Whether PSIC’s conduct constituted waiver or estoppel depends on what PSIC knew, when it knew it, and whether its conduct reasonably induced reliance by the insureds. These are fact‑intensive issues that cannot be resolved as a matter of law on the present record.

C. Breach of Contract

PSIC alternatively argues that, even if rescission is not established, it is entitled to judgment because it paid all covered benefits owed under the policy.

Plaintiff has produced evidence creating triable issues of material fact concerning:

*   Whether certain damages were caused by vandalism versus wear and tear;

*   Whether smoke damage, flooring and carpeting damage, and copper wiring losses were properly adjusted and paid;

*   Whether coverage determinations were adequately explained and consistently applied;

*   Whether damage occurred within periods of occupancy sufficient to trigger coverage under the policy terms.

Where, as here, competing evidence exists regarding causation, scope of loss, and policy application, summary adjudication of the breach of contract claim is improper.

D. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

PSIC asserts that the genuine dispute doctrine bars Plaintiff’s bad faith claim as a matter of law.

However, the reasonableness of PSIC’s conduct is itself disputed. Plaintiff has presented evidence that PSIC:

*   Reclassified damage initially identified as vandalism as “wear and tear”;

*   Delayed payments while requesting information Plaintiff contends was unnecessary or duplicative;

*   Failed to clearly articulate the basis for coverage and denial decisions;

*   Adjusted the claim under a policy it simultaneously contends should never have applied.

Whether PSIC’s investigation, valuation, and payment decisions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances is a question of fact, not law, on this record. The genuine dispute doctrine does not apply where the insurer’s investigation or reasoning itself is subject to reasonable dispute.

E. Reformation

PSIC seeks summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s reformation claim, arguing there was no mistake as a matter of law.

Plaintiff, however, has presented evidence supporting a theory of unilateral mistake, and potentially mutual mistake, including evidence that:

*   The insured believed the broker had procured appropriate tenant‑occupied coverage;

*   The property had long been insured as a rental;

*   PSIC may have possessed information suggesting tenant occupancy but nonetheless issued and renewed an owner‑occupied policy.

Whether Plaintiff can meet the heightened burden of proof for reformation is a question for trial. On summary judgment, the Court’s role is limited to determining whether a triable issue exists, and one plainly does.

F. Punitive Damages

Because triable issues remain as to bad faith, PSIC is not entitled to summary adjudication of punitive damages. Whether PSIC acted with oppression, malice, or fraud depends on factual determinations regarding its conduct and state of mind, which cannot be resolved on this motion.

CONCLUSION

Because triable disputes of material fact are present, Defendant Pacific Specialty Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment, and the alternative motion for summary adjudication, are DENIED in their entirety.

CV-24-002604 – CANO, MARIA vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO INC – Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs – DENIED.

Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (DMC) is the prevailing party following summary judgment and is entitled to recover allowable costs as a matter of right under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subject to plaintiffs’ burden to show that particular items are not authorized, not reasonably necessary, or unreasonable in amount. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5; Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) Plaintiffs have not met that burden on this record.

The Court further finds DMC’s Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offers served January 21, 2025 were made in good faith based on the information available at the time, and plaintiffs did not obtain a more favorable judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1); Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 692, 698–699.) Accordingly, in the Court’s discretion, DMC’s post-offer expert witness fees are recoverable.

Deposition costs (including transcript and reporter attendance fees) are authorized and were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(3).)

Records subpoena/medical records costs are allowed as reasonably necessary costs of taking depositions/obtaining records in this medical negligence action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(3); Evers v. Cornelson (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 310, 317.) Plaintiffs’ objections based on nonuse in the summary judgment papers are overruled; necessity is assessed at the time incurred.

Filing, motion, jury, and e-filing fees are expressly authorized and are allowed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subds. (a)(1), (a)(12), (a)(13).)

Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto Inc. is awarded costs in the amount stated in its Memorandum of Costs: $18,700.43.

CV-25-010739 – NORFORD, LEON vs MOUNTAIN VIEW SECURITIES INC – Defendant, Mountain View Securities Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, Strike Punitive Class Claims, and Stay the Action Pending the Outcome of Individual Arbitration – DENIED.

Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is DENIED. Defendant has not met its burden to prove Plaintiff executed or otherwise assented to the arbitration agreement. Defendant’s submission of an unsigned agreement and an ADP acknowledgment record, without competent evidence authenticating attribution and intent (such as a reliable electronic signature record or audit trail/metadata tying Plaintiff to the agreement and its terms), is insufficient to establish contract formation under California law. Because Defendant has not shown an agreement to arbitrate, the Court does not reach Plaintiff’s alternative enforcement defenses.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-21-005695 – GHARRAEE, ZAHRA vs TRADER JOES COMPANY – Defendant, Trader Joe’s Company’s Motion to Strike & Tax Costs – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The Court requires further briefing on the issue of which of Plaintiff’s section 998 offers triggers the cutoff date for the determination of Plaintiff’s expert fee costs.

This matter is accordingly continued to May 7, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

The parties shall provide briefing on the matter, no longer than three pages each no later than 5 court days prior to the next hearing.

CV-21-004330 – LEFANTY, LISA vs KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS – Compliance Hearing – CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion.

The court notes that the check cashing period has not expired and the amount of unclaimed funds is not final. ( Code of Civil Procedure section 384).

This matter is accordingly continued to May 7, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

Class Administrator shall file an updated declaration no later than May 1st, 2026.

CV-23-000752 – RODRIGUEZ, VERONICA vs WW GRAINGER INC – Compliance Hearing – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The Court notes that contrary to its Final Approval Order, the Class Administrator failed to file the required Final Report.

Accordingly, this matter is continued to May 22nd, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

Class Administrator shall file said Final Report no later than May 15th, 2026.  

CV-23-000865 – LEGRANDE, JULIAN vs PENINSULA PLASTICS RECYCLING INC – Compliance Hearing – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The court notes that the check cashing period has not expired and the amount of unclaimed funds is not final.  (Code of Civil Procedure section 384)

This matter is accordingly continued to May 7, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

Class Administrator shall file an updated declaration no later than May 1st, 2026.

CV-23-001538 – ALVARADO, JAVIER vs NORTHSTAR CHEMICAL INC – Final Fairness – HEARING REQUIRED.

Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court finds the payment to the Class Representative, to the Class Members and the Class Administrator to be appropriate given all relevant factors of the settlement. The Court also finds Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees and costs to be reasonable and comparable to the award of fees generally issued by California Courts. The Court is therefore inclined to grant final approval of the Class Action Settlement herein. 

In accordance with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. §384, the Court sets a compliance hearing for November 25, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 to confirm full administration of the settlement. 

Class counsel shall submit a compliance report no later than five (5) court days before the date of the hearing, which shall include the total amount that was actually paid to the class members pursuant to the subject settlement.  At the time of the compliance hearing, the Court shall amend the judgment to direct that the sum of the unpaid funds, plus interest as required by the statute, be distributed as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

In addition, the Court orders that Notice of the Court’s Order Granting Final Approval and Judgment shall be posted on the Settlement Administrator’s website for a period of at least 90 days.  (Civ. Code §1781(g); Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.771(b).)

CV-24-009989 – OWENS, CHARLES vs SMITH GAMBRELL & RUSSELL INTERNATIONAL LLP – Compliance Hearing – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The Court notes that the Compliance declaration submitted does not indicate where the uncashed funds will be directed.

The Court requires an updated declaration to that effect filed by April 9, 2026.

The matter is accordingly continued to April 15^th 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

CV-25-008918 – STONE, CLINTON LEE vs STONE, PAUL RUSSELL – Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Answer – DENIED, without prejudice.

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Proof of Service does not demonstrate adequate notice of this motion on Defendant. (Civ. Proc. Code § 1005 (b)).

Accordingly, this motion is denied, without prejudice.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***