Civil Tentative Rulings

October 16, 2026

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-26-009178 – TURKIEH, NAJIBA vs OAK VALLEY HOSPITAL DISTRICT – Petitioner’s Petition for Order Relieving Petitioner from the Claim Presentation Requirement Under Government Code Section 945.4 Pursuant to Government Code Section 946.6 – GRANTED.

The Court will modify and sign the proposed order.

Procedural and Factual Summary

On September 15, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant petition pursuant to Government Code section 946.6 seeking an order relieving her from the claim presentation requirement of Government Code section 945.4 as to Respondent Oak Valley Hospital District. The petition and related documents were served on October 2, 2026. Respondent filed and served its opposition on October 5, 2026.

The following is a summary of the events preceding the filing of the instant petition. On July 25, 2025, Petitioner underwent a closed reduction procedure and pinning at Oak Valley Hospital following a fall that resulted in a fractured finger. Petitioner subsequently began physical therapy.

On or about November 10, 2025, Petitioner was concerned she may have malunion. By December 2025, Petitioner had documentation from a physician identifying malrotation/malformation and stating that revision surgery was being discussed. Petitioner, through her prior counsel, submitted a notice of claim to Respondent on February 23, 2026. Respondent contends the presentation date was March 4, 2026. On March 19, 2026, Respondent denied the claim as untimely.

In March and April of 2026, Petitioner saw additional physicians. On April 1, 2026, one of the physicians informed Petitioner that a single Kirschner wire does not prevent rotation.

Petitioner’s prior counsel’s representation ended on or about April 13, 2026. On July 13, 2026, Petitioner retained new counsel.

On July 21, 2026, Petitioner, through her current counsel, presented an application for leave to file a late claim. On August 5, 2026, Respondent denied Petitioner’s application for leave to file a late claim.

Filing & Service

“If an application for leave to present a claim is denied or deemed to be denied pursuant to Section 911.6, a petition may be made to the court for an order relieving the petitioner from Section 945.4.” (Gov. Code, § 946.6.) “[T]he plain language of section 946.6 shows its six-month period begins to run on denial of an application for leave[.]” (City of San Diego v. Superior Court (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.)

The instant petition is timely before this Court because it was filed within six months of the denial of Petitioner’s late-claim application. The denial date is on or about August 5, 2026. The instant petition was filed in this Court on or about September 15, 2026.

“Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing.” (Code of Civ. Proc., 1005.)

The instant petition was not timely served by Petitioner, but Respondent submitted an opposition and did not request additional time to respond.

Analysis

Section 946.6 demonstrates the showing necessary to overcome a public entity’s denial of an application for leave to present late claim. First, the application must be presented within one year after the accrual of the cause of action. Second, the application was denied. Third, Petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to present a timely claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Gov. Code, § 946.6(c).) Upon such a showing, “[t]he court shall relieve the petitioner form the requirements of Section 945.4 . . . unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4.” (Ibid.)

Petitioner’s application for leave to present a late claim was timely. Petitioner submitted her application on July 21, 2026, which is within one year of both the date of Petitioner’s July 25, 2026 treatment and thus, is also within one year after Petitioner could have become aware of any potential cause of action related to the treatment that was performed on July 25, 2025. The Court makes no determination regarding the date of accrual of any cause of action at this time, but merely notes that it would logically be sometime after the July 25, 2025 treatment.

Petitioner’s notice of claim submitted in February or March of 2026 was denied as untimely. This rejection is  not clearly correct and it would unfair to reject this petition as even Respondent agrees the date of accrual is not the date of the surgery.

Petitioner has demonstrated mistake or excusable neglect. Petitioner did not know whether she was experiencing typical pain from her injury and the healing process, or pain due to potentially negligent medical care. Petitioner took steps to retain counsel, relied on that counsel, and retained new counsel who took prompt action.

Respondent has not demonstrated prejudice, as it was notified of a potential claim in February or March of 2026.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-26-001469 – AARZA GROUP INC vs MARTIN, ROBERT – a) Defendant’s CCTMO LLC and T-Mobile West Tower LLC’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Aarza Group Inc. – CONTINUED to October 29, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22. b) Defendant’s Robert Martin & Martin Group LLC’s Motion for Joinder in Co-Defendant CCTMO LLC’s and T-Mobile West Tower LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint – CONTINUED to October 29, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

a) Preliminarily, the Court notes that a stipulation to continue the demurrer hearing from September 22, 2026, to October 16, 2026, was filed on September 16, 2026. But because the stipulation did not contain a section requesting Court authorization of the same, it was never brought to the Court’s attention. The parties should note for future reference that any stipulation to continue a hearing on a matter must ask for Court approval and should contain an order section.

As it so happened, the Court posted a tentative ruling continuing the demurrer to October 16, 2026, due to inadequate efforts to meet and confer. The Court repeats that tentative ruling now with revised dates:

The demurrer is procedurally defective. It fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, which requires that the parties meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video conference.”

Here, the effort to meet and confer was insufficient. The only attempt to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 was the delivery of a written communication sent via email on July 14, 2026, to which Plaintiff did not respond. (Declaration of Sandra Vucinic, ¶¶ 4–5.)

A communication sent by email is insufficient. The Legislature’s specification of the authorized methods for meeting and conferring reflects its belief that more personal forms of communication—beyond written exchanges—are better suited to resolving disputes informally, thereby reducing the burden on both the courts and the parties.

Accordingly, the Court CONTINUES the hearing on the demurrer to October 29, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22. The parties are ordered to meet and confer by one of the methods set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41(a) by no later than six court days before the hearing. Moving Party to file and serve a declaration no later than five court days before the hearing describing the efforts to meet and confer and any narrowing of the issues.

b) This matter is CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to October 29, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22, to be heard with the related demurrer that has been continued to that day.

PR-25-000299 – Estate of JACKSON, GARY – Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – HEARING REQUIRED.

Having reviewed and considered the papers relevant to this motion, the Court would like to discuss the logistics of relief with both Moving Counsel and the client. Therefore, the Court will hold a hearing on this matter.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-003258 – ROSE, NORMA MAE vs CITY OF OAKDALE – Defendant City of Oakdale’s Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Adjudication – GRANTED.

Preliminarily, the Court notes Plaintiff’s representation in her opposition brief that the Second and Third Causes of Action are being dismissed from this action; however, no request for dismissal has been submitted to date.  Therefore, the Court will GRANT summary adjudication of the motion as to the Second and Third Causes of Action herein, as UNOPPOSED.

With regard to the motion for summary judgment/adjudication of the remaining First Cause of Action, the Court finds as follows:

Based on the moving papers and supporting evidence, including the declaration of Robert Ferrier and the materials submitted therewith, the Court finds that Defendant, as the moving party, has met the burden of producing evidence demonstrating the City’s entitlement to judgment on the Complaint herein. The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to submit admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of material factual disputes preventing judgment for Defendant.  Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in this regard.

Specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot establish that the condition of Loma Lane at the particular location of the incident constituted a dangerous condition of public property, rather than a trivial defect. Plaintiff has not identified the alleged depression or pothole with sufficient specificity. She did not measure or photograph it before the incident and does not know its depth or precise location. The expert inspection on which she relies postdated the incident and did not appear to identify the precise depression or pothole which allegedly caused her fall.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s expert evidence establishes only the alley’s general deterioration and does not demonstrate the nature or dimensions of the particular condition in question, nor does the later inspection permit a nonspeculative inference concerning the particular condition as it existed on the incident date. On this record, a trier of fact would have no evidentiary basis to determine that the particular condition posed a substantial risk of injury when the property was used with due care. Therefore, Plaintiff has not produced evidence sufficient to create a triable issue that a dangerous condition, as opposed to a trivial defect, existed.

Further, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a material factual dispute with regard to the City’s alleged notice of the condition in question. The City’s general awareness of roadway deterioration does not establish notice of the specific crack, pothole, or other condition alleged to have caused the injury. (Restivo v. City of Petaluma (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 267, 275–276.) Here, Plaintiff’s evidence concerning the general overall condition of Loma Lane does not show that the City knew or should have known of the particular depression or pothole hole alleged here, nor does it allow a nonspeculative inference that the particular condition in question existed for a sufficient time period before Plaintiff’s accident to charge Defendant with notice thereof.

Therefore, because Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue that the particular condition was dangerous rather than trivial, or that the City had actual or constructive notice of the particular condition in question, the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s objections to the declaration of Colleen Andersen are SUSTAINED on the grounds asserted.

CV-25-004706 – CID, HILMER DEL vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Pursuant to Civil Code Section 1794(D) – IN-PERSON APPEARANCES REQUIRED.

CV-25-010458 – SYNCHRONY BANK vs DOMINGUEZ, AMANDA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on the moving papers, the Court finds that the Complaint states facts sufficient to constitute the stated cause of action against the Defendant, and the Answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1)(A).) Therefore, the motion is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered on the underlying debt in the amount of $6,981.19.

In addition, Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to recover costs herein, based on the terms of the agreement and the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 1032.  However, the instant motion fails to substantiate the requested amount in this regard. Therefore, Plaintiff may submit a memorandum of costs within the statutory time period.

The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall serve and submit a revised form of proposed judgment consistent with this ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.) 

CV-26-005861 – ALPHA TURLOCK LLC vs ENRIQUEZ, ALEJANDRO URIEL PADILLA – Defendant’s Demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action of the Complaint and Demurrer to the Entire Complaint [CCP Section 430.10(E) and (F)] – SUSTAINED, in part and OVERRULED, in part, as follows:

The demurrer to the First Cause of Action for Specific Performance is sustained without leave to amend. The subsequent recorded transfer identified in Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice establishes that Plaintiff no longer owns the property and cannot convey it to Defendants. Specific performance is therefore unavailable, and amendment would be futile.

The demurrer to the Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract is overruled. The Complaint alleges the existence of a written agreement, Plaintiff’s performance or excuse, Defendants’ breach by refusing to close escrow and attempting to cancel without contractual justification, and resulting damages. Defendant’s reliance on Paragraph 21 does not defeat the cause of action at the pleading stage. The liquidated damages provision concerns the scope and measure of any recoverable remedy, and the contractual release is conditioned on payment of the stated sum, which is not established on the face of the pleadings. Any challenge to particular categories of damages is more appropriately raised by a motion to strike or at a later stage of the proceedings.

The demurrer to the Third Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief is overruled. The Complaint alleges an actual and present controversy concerning the validity and enforceability of the Agreement, Plaintiff’s performance, Defendants’ right to cancel, and the parties’ respective contractual rights and obligations. These allegations sufficiently state a claim for declaratory relief notwithstanding the subsequent sale of the property.

The special demurrer for uncertainty is sustained, with leave to amend, only to the extent that Plaintiff concedes that the complete agreement, including all amendments, has not been attached or otherwise pleaded. Plaintiff shall be permitted to amend to attach the complete transaction documents, or to plead their material terms verbatim, and to clarify the parties to the subject Agreement and the final agreed closing date. Leave to amend is limited to matters Plaintiff can allege consistently with its ability to submit the complete documents; the Court does not otherwise find the Complaint uncertain.

Plaintiff shall submit the amended pleading within 20 days.  Moving party shall serve and submit a proposed order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

UD-24-000777 – SUNRISE VILLAGE MHC LLC vs WANGUN, GWEN – a) Motion for Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Incurred on Appeal (APP24-00043) – GRANTED. b) Motion for Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Incurred on Appeal (APP25-000001) – GRANTED.

a) The Court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party herein and is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civ. Code § 1717.  Based on the moving papers and supporting evidence, the Court finds that the time expended and the hourly fees claimed are reasonable under the circumstances, as follows: 21.65 hours at Mr. Rowe’s hourly rate of $400, plus $60 in connection with the filing fee for the instant motion. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover to $8,300.00 in attorney’s fees from Defendant Wangun herein.

b) The Court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party herein and is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civ. Code § 1717.  Based on the moving papers and supporting evidence, the Court finds that the time expended and the hourly fees claimed are reasonable under the circumstances, as follows:12.3 hours at Mr. Rowe’s hourly rate of $400, plus $60 in connection with the filing fee for the instant motion. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover to $4,980.00 in attorney’s fees from Defendant Wangun herein.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 24***

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***