Civil Tentative Rulings

October 20, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-25-007023 - CASTILLO, LUCRECIA vs MCGINNIS, MASON JAMES - Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate/Set Aside Dismissal - HEARING REQUIRED

 

This matter was asserted to have been settled. An unconditional notice of settlement was filed on December 5, 2025.  If the dismissal is set aside – and it appears that the attorney affidavit would otherwise be sufficient for that purpose – the Court must also determine if a settlement has occurred and whether that is enforceable.

 

The Court is also required under the code (using the word “shall”) direct the attorney claiming fault to pay the reasonable fees and costs of the attorney to opposing counsel or parties. In this case, Plaintiff’s counsel’s actions appear to have incurred substantial defense costs.

 

The Court also needs to determine the effect of a policy limits payout, if one has occurred.

CV-26-008174 - IN RE 719 SOUZA AVENUE MODESTO CA 95351 - Petitioner’s Petition for Claims Surplus Funds from Trustees' Sale - HEARING REQUIRED.

 

The Court will hold a hearing as noticed. To date, no claims have been submitted to the Court. Money that remains unclaimed for three years shall escheat. (Gov. Code § 68084.1.)

 

On August 21, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition regarding surplus funds from the sale of real property pursuant to Civil Code section 2924j(c). The petition relates to the sale of real property that was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure on November 5, 2025, as a result of default. The non-judicial foreclosure sale proceeds amount exceeded the amount of funds due and owing under the Deed of Trust foreclosed upon. Petitioner identified three potential heirs of the last surviving joint tenant and notified them of the surplus funds. Petitioner received claims from two of the three heirs and subsequently distributed two-thirds of the surplus funds. Petitioner did not receive a claim from the sole remaining heir. In accordance with Civil Code section 2924j(d), a hearing was set for consideration of all claims against surplus funds on deposit with the Court from proceeds of trustee’s sale of property.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-23-003431 - BLAND, JOQUITA vs STANISLAUS COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT - Defendants Stanislaus County Sheriff Department and Deputy Skyler Perriera's Motion for Summary Judgment, Summary Adjudication - DENIED in part, GRANTED in part.

For the reasons below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Court GRANTS summary adjudication of the first and second causes of action.

Governing Law

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that a cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more elements cannot be established or that a complete defense exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy; consequently, the moving party’s evidence is strictly construed, the opposing party’s evidence is liberally construed, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the opposing party. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-851; Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038; Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.)

The pleadings frame the issues on summary judgment, and the moving party's burden is measured against the allegations of the operative pleading. (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.)

In addition to moving for summary judgment, “[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(2).)

Requests for Judicial Notice

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is unnecessary as the Court probably need not make such a ruling to consider papers filed in the instant case. (See Bienville Water Supply Co. v. City of Mobile (1902) 186 U.S. 212, 217.)

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of Defendant Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Office Use of Force Policy is GRANTED.

Merits

The Complaint asserts three causes of action. The first cause of action is general negligence. The second cause of action is on form pleading for Intentional Tort, although it is not clear which particular intentional tort Plaintiff asserts. The third cause of action is styled as a Constitutional/Civil Rights Violation and cites to California Civil Code Section 52.1, which is known as the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act.

Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that the first and second causes of action are legally deficient because the Complaint pleads common law torts directly against the Sheriff’s Department without a statutory basis. “Under California law a public entity is not liable under a claim brought by a plaintiff unless liability is provided for by statute or required by the state or federal constitution. [Citations.]” (Garcia v. City of Merced (E.D. Cal. 2008) 637 F.Supp.2d 731, 746.) The first and second causes of action are barred by Government Code section 815. The Complaint does not identify any statutory basis for liability against the Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff’s opposition does not dispute that the first and second causes of action are legally barred.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary adjudication of the first and second causes of action.

Defendants have not met their burden as to the third cause of action for conduct in violation of the Bane Act claim.

“[T]he Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Bane Act) (Civ. Code, § 52.1) . . . prohibits ‘threat[s], intimidation or coercion’ designed to prevent a person’s exercise or enjoyment of their constitutional or statutory rights.” (Animal Protection & Rescue League, Inc. v. County of Riverside (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 914, 920, reh'g denied (May 27, 2025).) “ ‘A plaintiff must show (1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“[A] Bane Act claim “also requires a showing of ‘a specific intent to deprive that person of those [constitutional] rights,’ which can be proven by ‘reckless disregard’ of those same rights [Citation.]” (R.N. by and through Neff v. Travis Unified School District (E.D. Cal. 2022) 599 F.Supp.3d 973, 981.) There are two requirements for a finding of specific intent. “The first is a purely legal determination [of whether the] . . . right at issue clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances of the case.” (Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 803, as modified (Nov. 17, 2017).) “If the trial judge concludes that it is, then the jury must make the second, factual, determination.” (Ibid.) “Did the defendant commit the act in question with the particular purpose of depriving the citizen victim of his enjoyment of the interests protected by that . . . right?” (Ibid.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not identified a specific right that was violated, but Plaintiff’s opposition identifies the right to be free from the use of excessive force under California Penal Code § 835a and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of her rights or reckless disregard of her rights. Applying the first step of the specific intent test, the right at issue is Plaintiff’s right to be free from the use of excessive force. As to the second step, Plaintiff has raised sufficient factual disputes regarding the reasonableness of the force used against Plaintiff. On the facts presented, a reasonable jury could find that Defendants acted either with the particular purpose of depriving Plaintiff of her rights or acted in reckless disregard of such rights.

The third cause of action does not exceed the scope of Plaintiff’s Government Claim, which identifies violations of civil rights.

Summary judgment is therefore not warranted.

Exemplary Damages

The Bane Act “provides for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, civil penalties, and attorney”s fees.” (Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 17 Cal.App.5^th at 791.)
 

Pursuant to Government Code section 818, exemplary damages are barred as to the Sheriff’s Department only.

Objections

Defendants submitted objections to Plaintiff’s evidence submitted in opposition. The objections are not material to disposition of this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).)

Proposed Order

Defendants to serve and submit a proposed order consistent with this ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.).

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-006817 - NORTH MILL EQUIPMENT FINANCE LLC vs AUEN, EDWARD L - Plaintiff's Motion for Assignment Order and for Order Restraining Judgment Debtors - GRANTED, and unopposed.

The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff.

CV-25-003899 - ISAAK, LIAM vs GRIMMWAY ENTERPRISES INC - a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Grimmway Enterprises, Inc.’s Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Set One Special Interrogatories – DROPPED. b) Plaintiff Grimmway Enterprises, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Set One Requests for Production of Documents - GRANTED, as to Request No. 38; DENIED, as to Request Nos. 25, 26, 28, and 37.

a)            DROPPED, due to the parties’ informal resolution of the issues presented. The Joint Status Statement submitted on 10-9-26 fails to identify any interrogatories remaining at issue.

b)            Based on the information contained in the Joint Status Statement submitted on 10-9-26, it appears that the parties have substantially narrowed the scope of the disputed issues presented in this motion, leaving only Request Nos. 25, 26, 28, 37, and 38 for determination by the Court at this stage. The Court rules as follows with regard to those Requests:

The motion is DENIED as to Request Nos. 25 and 37. Defendant has provided sufficient responses and has produced responsive documents.

As to Request Nos. 26 and 28, the Court concludes that Defendant’s objection based on the unintelligibility of Plaintiff’s definition of “SUBJECT CARROTS,” as applied to the subject requests, is well-taken. Therefore, it appears that Defendant is unable to intelligently respond to these requests as phrased, and no further response is required.

As to Request No. 38, the Court finds the information sought to be generally discoverable, to the extent that non-privileged responsive materials exist and are in Defendant’s possession, and Defendant’s response does not comply with the Code requirements in that it does not disclose whether responsive materials exist.   However, the Court finds Defendant’s objection based on the seemingly unlimited time period applicable to complaints of foodborne illnesses to be valid and concludes that responsive materials in this regard should be limited to those involving recalled Bunny Luv organic baby carrots falling within the November 16, 2024, recall and the relevant best-if-used-by date range.

Therefore, the motion is GRANTED as to Request No. 38, subject to the above-specified time limitation.  Defendant shall provide a further verified response and produce responsive documents within 14 days.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 24***

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000962 - BRENTWOOD LLC vs GILL, DALTON - Defendant’s Demurer - HEARING REQUIRED.