Civil Tentative Rulings

November 04, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-007642 – PEREZ, CHRISTINA vs CARSWELL GROUP INC – Compliance Hearing – CONTINUED to November 20, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21.

The hearing is CONTINUED to November 20, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21. Class Counsel to submit a proposed amended judgment to direct that the sum of the unpaid funds be distributed to the State  Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund at least five days before the hearing. (See December 19, 2025 Revised Judgment and Order, ¶ 18.)

On September 21, 2026, the Settlement Administrator filed a declaration stating that it issued and mailed checks for all authorized payments; the check cashing period for Settlement Class Members expired on September 7, 2026; and that 18 checks totaling $6,015.09 remain uncashed.

CV-26-004140 – GEMPESAW, FEDERICO J vs SUTTER VALLEY HOSPITALS – a) Defendant Sutter Valley Hospital’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint – SUSTAINED without leave to amend; b) Defendant Sutter Valley Hospital’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint – GRANTED with leave to amend.

a) Defendant’s demurrer to the First Amended Complaint’s eleventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. The Court will modify and sign the proposed order. Defendant to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

On September 4, 2026, Defendant filed a demurrer to Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 435 on the grounds that the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) fails to state a claim. Defendant contends that the claim fails because (1) the FAC does not allege outrageous conduct and/or (2) the FAC does not allege severe emotional distress, and/or (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act. There is no opposition in the Court file.

“A prima facie case requires (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.” (Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 155.) “Ordinarily mere insulting language, without more, does not constitute outrageous conduct. The Restatement view is that liability ‘does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities . . . . There is no occasion for the law to intervene . . . where some one’s feelings are hurt.’ [Citation.]” (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946 disapproved of on other grounds by White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563.)

The FAC fails to plead outrageous conduct sufficient to state a cause of action of intentional infliction of emotional distress. For example, paragraph 133 of the FAC alleges that Defendant’s conduct included making age-based discriminatory comments and move to a lesser position, questioning and undermining Plaintiff’s protected leave rights, retaliating against Plaintiff for reporting unsafe working conditions and filing OSHA complaints, issuing unwarranted disciplinary write-ups, and ultimately terminating his employment. Such conduct does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law. (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80 [“An essential element of such a claim is a pleading of outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency.”].)

Leave to Amend

Plaintiff provided no opposition. As such, it does not appear that Plaintiff can plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Leave to amend is DENIED.

b) The motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to amend. The Court STRIKES from the First Amended Complaint the requested portions of paragraphs 59, 88, 96, 124, 138, and paragraph 5 of Prayer for Relief. The Court will sign the proposed order. Defendant to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

On August 28, 2026, Defendant filed a motion to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint related to Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. On October 22, 2026, Plaintiff opposed. On October 28, 2026, Defendant replied.

Punitive damages are available “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294.) “Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294.) “ ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Id.)

“[A]n employer shall not be liable for punitive damages based on its employee’s acts, ‘unless the employer [1] had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or [2] authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or [3] was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.’ Moreover, ‘[w]ith respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.’ [Citation.]” (Nargizyan v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 581, 604, as modified (May 14, 2026), review denied (Aug. 12, 2026).)

“The term [‘managing agent’] is subject to a narrow construction that limits corporate liability for punitive damages to only those employees who ‘exercise substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.’ [Citation.]” (Id.)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not oppose striking paragraph 59 of the FAC because it concerns the FMLA interference claim.

The FAC fails to plead sufficient facts to show that Steve Romero exercises substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine Defendant’s corporate policy. Instead, the FAC merely alleges that Mr. Romero had the authority to write Plaintiff up. The FAC alleges that Mr. Romero made comments warning that Plaintiff’s leave could be denied and urging Plaintiff to move to a different position, but such allegations are not sufficient to plead that Mr. Romero had authority over Plaintiff’s leave or work schedule, let alone authority to make decisions regarding policies of the company as a whole. While his job title is generically that of a “Director,” there are no allegations that Mr. Romero is a director of the company as a whole. The instant matter is distinguishable from Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442. The managing agent in Colucci “had substantial discretionary authority over daily store operations, which led to the ad hoc formulation of policy” and made “decisions [that] affected company policy over a significant aspect of [Defendant’s] business.” (Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442, 452.) Here, the FAC is devoid of allegations that Mr. Romero made decisions that affected Defendant’s company policy or business as a whole.

The FAC also fails to plead sufficient facts regarding malice or oppression. Plaintiff relies on Colucci, supra, which is again distinguishable. The defendant in Colucci attempted to hide its reason for terminating the plaintiff and concocted a false explanation. Here, there is no allegation that Defendant attempted to fabricate a reason to terminate Plaintiff or hide its reason. Instead, the FAC alleges that Defendant cited an error regarding available leave hours as a basis for Plaintiff’s termination. Here, Defendant was “forthright about its reason for terminating the plaintiff,” which does not support an inference of malice or oppression. (Colucci, supra 48 Cal.App. at 455.)

Leave to Amend

The Court is skeptical that leave to amend is likely to cure the apparent defects. Nonetheless, given the preference for leave to amend and the fact that Plaintiff might have the ability to make these claims, the Court grants leave to amend.

CV-26-007057 – TURLOCK GOSPEL MISSION vs CITY OF TURLOCK – Plaintiff Turlock Gospel Mission’s Application for Pro Hac Vice Admission of Lacy A. Cooper - GRANTED.

Lacy A. Cooper is permitted to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this action, subject to compliance with all applicable California laws, rules, and professional responsibilities. The Court will sign the proposed order.

On September 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed an application for admission pro hac vice of Attorney Cooper. There is no opposition in the Court file. On October 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended application.

The Court finds that the application substantially complies with California Rules of Court, rule 9.40. The applicant has demonstrated that she is admitted to practice and in good standing in another jurisdiction, has disclosed any prior pro hac vice applications, has associated with California counsel of record, and has complied with the fee and service requirements.

Plaintiff to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-20-001720 – CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING PROTECTION ALLIANCE vs EASTERN SAN JOAQUIN GROUNDWATER AUTHORITY – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Ratify Publication of July 14, 2026 Summons, or in the Alternative, Granting Leave for Republican and Extending Deadline for Filing of Proof of Publication of Summons -CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion

This matter is CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to December 1, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22, for further review and consideration.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-25-010171 – NEWREZ LLC vs JOBE, JASON – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Answers to Special Interrogatories – DROPPED; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Answers to Form Interrogatories – DROPPED; c) Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admission to be Admitted – DROPPED.

a-c) These matters are DROPPED, due to Defendant's submission of a Notice of Stay of Proceedings based on a pending bankruptcy petition.

CV-26-004686 – WELLS FARGO BANK NA vs ROBLES, ISAAC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to CCP 437C - DENIED, without prejudice.

The Court notes a discrepancy in the electronic address for defense counsel as reflected in the proof of service for the instant motion, which does not match the electronic address appearing on Defendant’s pleadings herein. Without Plaintiff’s affirmative representation that the address reflected on the proof of service was confirmed pursuant to the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6(b)(3), and in view of the lack of opposition to the motion, the Court cannot definitively conclude that service was appropriately accomplished in this regard.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-25-007216 – NEWTON, MARISSA vs DAVILA, IVAN – Defendant’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff’s Marissa Newton and Armando Gonzalez – SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the Third Cause of Action for Negligent Representation and OVERRULED as to the Fourth Cause of Action for Fraud (Concealment/Fraudulent Nondisclosure)

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleading. The Court accepts as true all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A complaint is liberally construed with a view toward substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) Only ultimate facts need be pleaded; a plaintiff need not plead every evidentiary fact that may ultimately constitute the plaintiff's proof. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

Third Cause of Action for Negligent Representation

Negligent misrepresentation requires “(1) the misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) with intent to induce another's reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.” (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1249.) Negligent misrepresentation requires a positive assertion of fact and ordinarily cannot be based solely upon an omission or implied representation. (Wilson v. Century 21 Great Western Realty (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 298, 306; see also Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 243.)

Here, paragraph 58 of the FAC incorporates paragraphs 1 through 57. Paragraph 59 then alleges that Defendants represented, expressly and/or through misleadingly incomplete advice and information, that Plaintiffs could proceed with the purchase without disclosure of material adverse facts concerning water service and community amenities, thereby implying that no such adverse facts existed or warranted disclosure. Paragraph 60 alleges the representations were false or misleading because Defendants omitted material information.

Those allegations principally describe omissions or an implied representation rather than identifying with sufficient particularity the affirmative assertion of past or existing fact necessary for negligent misrepresentation.

The FAC does separately allege in paragraph 70 that Barbara Maybee represented that the golf course “was closed due to drought conditions,” when Plaintiffs allege it was actually closed because of water issues in Diablo Grande. Plaintiffs further allege they relied on that representation in purchasing the property. The alleged statement concerns the existing reason for the golf course's closure, rather than a future promise that the golf course would reopen. At the pleading stage, the Court also cannot determine as a matter of law that “drought conditions” and the financial and operational water problems alleged elsewhere in the FAC are necessarily equivalent.

The difficulty is that paragraph 70 is pleaded after the Third Cause of Action and therefore is not incorporated into that cause by paragraph 58. Plaintiffs expressly acknowledge the matter and propose to amend the Third Cause of Action to incorporate the paragraph 70 statement, connect it to the allegation that Defendants lacked reasonable grounds for making the representation, and allege additional circumstances concerning the communication, including its timing, place or medium, recipients, and transactional context.

Leave to amend should be liberally granted where there is a reasonable possibility the pleading defect can be cured. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Stevens v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 601.) Plaintiffs have identified a specific amendment capable of curing the present pleading defect.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the Third Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).

Fourth Cause of Action for Fraud (Concealment/Fraudulent Nondisclosure)

For fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts establishing the content of the omitted facts, the defendant's awareness of their materiality, the inaccessibility of the information to the plaintiff, the general point when disclosure should or could have been made, and actual and justifiable reliance upon the omission. Mere conclusory allegations that omissions were intentional and undertaken to deceive are insufficient. (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 43-44.)

Read as a whole, the FAC sufficiently alleges those matters for purposes of demurrer.

First, the FAC identifies the information allegedly concealed. Paragraph 68 alleges concealment of serious water-service and water-availability issues, including delinquent obligations, shut-off risk and substantial rate increases, as well as closure or unavailability of the clubhouse and/or public swimming pool. Paragraphs 18 through 24 provide additional allegations concerning the alleged water problems and the asserted materiality of those conditions to the purchase.

Second, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a basis for a duty to disclose. The FAC alleges that Barbara Maybee acted as Plaintiffs' agent in purchasing the property, eXp served as the supervising broker, and Defendants undertook to represent and advise Plaintiffs in connection with the purchase. Paragraph 69 further alleges Defendants were Plaintiffs' fiduciaries and agents, had superior access to material information, knew Plaintiffs were relying on them, and provided partial advice or information that was misleading without full disclosure.

Third, paragraph 32 alleges that the eXp Defendants knew of the water-availability and amenity issues at or before close of escrow and intentionally failed to disclose them. Paragraph 71 alleges Defendants intentionally concealed the material facts to induce Plaintiffs to proceed with the purchase and close escrow.

Defendants emphasize that certain allegations are made on information and belief. But allegations made on information and belief are not disregarded merely because they are pleaded in that form. The problem arises where the allegations merely assert a conclusion without identifying information providing a factual basis for the pleader's belief. (Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1158-1159.)

Here, the FAC additionally alleges the buyer-agent and broker relationship, specific preexisting water conditions, Defendants' asserted superior access to material information, Plaintiffs' reliance upon Defendants, and Plaintiffs' discovery of the water and amenity issues after completing the purchase. For purposes of a general demurrer, those allegations are sufficient when construed together

Finally, Plaintiffs allege reliance and resulting injury. Paragraphs 37 and 38 allege Plaintiffs relied upon the broker/agent defendants' representations and omissions in proceeding with the purchase and would not have purchased the property, or would have paid substantially less, if they had known the allegedly concealed facts. Paragraphs 39 and 40 allege Plaintiffs discovered the water and amenity problems after purchasing the property, and paragraph 41 alleges resulting economic damages, including diminished value, increased water costs and other losses.

Whether the eXp Defendants actually knew the alleged information before closing, whether the information was otherwise available to Plaintiffs, and whether the alleged water problems rather than drought conditions caused the golf course's closure, present factual issues that cannot be resolved against Plaintiffs on demurrer. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not whether Plaintiffs will ultimately be able to prove the allegations. (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214; Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280.)

Accordingly, the demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment/Fraudulent Nondisclosure is OVERRULED. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).

Plaintiffs shall file their Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of the date of service of the Court’s order.

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order that comports with this ruling by no later than November 6, 2026.

CV-25-009849 – IXTA, ERIC RUIZ vs ACE COMMERCIAL PLASTERING INC – a) Plaintiff Elidio Ruiz Ixta’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 9, 10, and 11, and for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant and its Counsel - GRANTED; b) Plaintiff Jesus Alejandro Ruiz’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 9, 10, and 11 and for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant and its Counsel – GRANTED; c) Plaintiff’s Samuel Ruiz Ixta’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One Nos. 9, 10, and 11 and for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant and its Counsel – GRANTED.

a) GRANTED.

Any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civ. Proc., § 2017.010. Furthermore, in the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant's right to discovery is broad. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531).

The Requests for Production at issue, Nos 9, 10 and 11 relate to Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims clearly relevant and discoverable in this matter. Code of Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.

Defendant Ace Commercial Plastering, Inc.’s supplemental responses incorporate its prior objections and state that documents “currently” in its possession, custody, and/or control responsive to each request were produced and identified by Bates number. Defendant also reserves the right to supplement its responses

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220, a statement of compliance must state whether compliance will be in whole or in part and that all documents in the demanded category that are within the responding party’s possession, custody, or control and to which no objection is made will be included in the production. If the responding party is unable to comply, section 2031.230 requires a statement affirming that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry were made and specifying the reason for the inability to comply. Where an objection is asserted, section 2031.240 requires the responding party to state clearly the extent and specific ground for the objection and, where privilege or work product is asserted, provide sufficient factual information to permit evaluation of the claim, including a privilege log if necessary.

Defendant’s responses do not unequivocally state whether its production constitutes full or partial compliance or whether all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced. The statement that documents “currently” in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control “which are responsive” were produced, coupled with the incorporation of objections and reservation of the right to supplement, does not provide the clarity required by Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.220

The Court does not, however, find that the gaps identified by Plaintiff establish that additional responsive records necessarily exist. Defendant disputes that inference and maintains that all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced. Defendant also contends that some apparent gaps may correspond to periods during which Plaintiff did not work. Accordingly, the Court will not order Defendant to produce particular records merely because Plaintiff believes they should exist.

Plaintiff’s motion is granted. Defendant shall provide an unequivocal, Code Compliant, further verified response to each request within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order as follows: (1)  If Defendant’s position is that it has fully complied, it shall so state in conformity with section 2031.220 whether said compliance is in whole or in part ; (2)  state whether all responsive documents in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced; (3) If, after diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Defendant cannot fully comply with a request or a separable portion thereof, it shall provide a statement complying with section 2031.230; and (4) produce any additional responsive, nonprivileged documents located through that inquiry.

The record reflects repeated meet-and-confer efforts concerning the adequacy of Defendant’s responses. Defendant maintained that its existing responses were sufficient and declined to provide further responses, instead directing Plaintiff to explore the apparent gaps through a PMK deposition. Because the responses themselves did not provide the unequivocal statement of compliance required by the Discovery Act, the Court does not find substantial justification for Defendant’s opposition to the limited relief granted herein.

To the extent that this motion is identical to the prior motion addressed by the Court and the other related motions on calendar for this day, monetary sanctions of $185 are hereby imposed against Defendant Ace Commercial Plastering, Inc., Michael Sullivan & Associates, LLP, and Ryan J. Carlson jointly and severally, for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting this motion, payable to Plaintiff’s Counsel within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Order. Code of Civ. Proc. 2031.310.

Plaintiff shall submit a Proposed Order that complies with this ruling no later than November 5, 2026.

b) GRANTED.

Any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civ. Proc., § 2017.010. Furthermore, in the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant's right to discovery is broad. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531).

The Requests for Production at issue, Nos 9, 10 and 11 relate to Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims clearly relevant and discoverable in this matter. Code of Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.

Defendant Ace Commercial Plastering, Inc.’s supplemental responses incorporate its prior objections and state that documents “currently” in its possession, custody, and/or control responsive to each request were produced and identified by Bates number. Defendant also reserves the right to supplement its responses

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220, a statement of compliance must state whether compliance will be in whole or in part and that all documents in the demanded category that are within the responding party’s possession, custody, or control and to which no objection is made will be included in the production. If the responding party is unable to comply, section 2031.230 requires a statement affirming that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry were made and specifying the reason for the inability to comply. Where an objection is asserted, section 2031.240 requires the responding party to state clearly the extent and specific ground for the objection and, where privilege or work product is asserted, provide sufficient factual information to permit evaluation of the claim, including a privilege log if necessary.

Defendant’s responses do not unequivocally state whether its production constitutes full or partial compliance or whether all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced. The statement that documents “currently” in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control “which are responsive” were produced, coupled with the incorporation of objections and reservation of the right to supplement, does not provide the clarity required by Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.220

The Court does not, however, find that the gaps identified by Plaintiff establish that additional responsive records necessarily exist. Defendant disputes that inference and maintains that all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced. Defendant also contends that some apparent gaps may correspond to periods during which Plaintiff did not work. Accordingly, the Court will not order Defendant to produce particular records merely because Plaintiff believes they should exist.

Plaintiff’s motion is granted. Defendant shall provide an unequivocal, Code Compliant, further verified response to each request within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order as follows: (1)  If Defendant’s position is that it has fully complied, it shall so state in conformity with section 2031.220 whether said compliance is in whole or in part ; (2)  state whether all responsive documents in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced; (3) If, after diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Defendant cannot fully comply with a request or a separable portion thereof, it shall provide a statement complying with section 2031.230; and (4) produce any additional responsive, nonprivileged documents located through that inquiry.

The record reflects repeated meet-and-confer efforts concerning the adequacy of Defendant’s responses. Defendant maintained that its existing responses were sufficient and declined to provide further responses, instead directing Plaintiff to explore the apparent gaps through a PMK deposition. Because the responses themselves did not provide the unequivocal statement of compliance required by the Discovery Act, the Court does not find substantial justification for Defendant’s opposition to the limited relief granted herein.

To the extent that this motion is identical to the prior motion addressed by the Court and the other related motions on calendar for this day, monetary sanctions of $185 are hereby imposed against Defendant Ace Commercial Plastering, Inc., Michael Sullivan & Associates, LLP, and Ryan J. Carlson jointly and severally, for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting this motion, payable to Plaintiff’s Counsel within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Order. Code of Civ. Proc. 2031.310.

Plaintiff shall submit a Proposed Order that complies with this ruling no later than November 5, 2026.

c) GRANTED.

Any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civ. Proc., § 2017.010. Furthermore, in the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant's right to discovery is broad. Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.

The Requests for Production at issue, Nos 9, 10 and 11 relate to Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims clearly relevant and discoverable in this matter. Code of Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.

Defendant Ace Commercial Plastering, Inc.’s supplemental responses incorporate its prior objections and state that documents “currently” in its possession, custody, and/or control responsive to each request were produced and identified by Bates number. Defendant also reserves the right to supplement its responses

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220, a statement of compliance must state whether compliance will be in whole or in part and that all documents in the demanded category that are within the responding party’s possession, custody, or control and to which no objection is made will be included in the production. If the responding party is unable to comply, section 2031.230 requires a statement affirming that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry were made and specifying the reason for the inability to comply. Where an objection is asserted, section 2031.240 requires the responding party to state clearly the extent and specific ground for the objection and, where privilege or work product is asserted, provide sufficient factual information to permit evaluation of the claim, including a privilege log if necessary.

Defendant’s responses do not unequivocally state whether its production constitutes full or partial compliance or whether all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced. The statement that documents “currently” in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control “which are responsive” were produced, coupled with the incorporation of objections and reservation of the right to supplement, does not provide the clarity required by Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.220

The Court does not, however, find that the gaps identified by Plaintiff establish that additional responsive records necessarily exist. Defendant disputes that inference and maintains that all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced. Defendant also contends that some apparent gaps may correspond to periods during which Plaintiff did not work. Accordingly, the Court will not order Defendant to produce particular records merely because Plaintiff believes they should exist.

Plaintiff’s motion is granted. Defendant shall provide an unequivocal, Code Compliant, further verified response to each request within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order as follows: (1)  If Defendant’s position is that it has fully complied, it shall so state in conformity with section 2031.220 whether said compliance is in whole or in part ; (2)  state whether all responsive documents in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced; (3) If, after diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Defendant cannot fully comply with a request or a separable portion thereof, it shall provide a statement complying with section 2031.230; and (4) produce any additional responsive, nonprivileged documents located through that inquiry.

The record reflects repeated meet-and-confer efforts concerning the adequacy of Defendant’s responses. Defendant maintained that its existing responses were sufficient and declined to provide further responses, instead directing Plaintiff to explore the apparent gaps through a PMK deposition. Because the responses themselves did not provide the unequivocal statement of compliance required by the Discovery Act, the Court does not find substantial justification for Defendant’s opposition to the limited relief granted herein.

To the extent that this motion is identical to the prior motion addressed by the Court and the other related motions on calendar for this day, monetary sanctions of $185 are hereby imposed against Defendant Ace Commercial Plastering, Inc., Michael Sullivan & Associates, LLP, and Ryan J. Carlson jointly and severally, for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting this motion, payable to Plaintiff’s Counsel within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Order. Code of Civ. Proc. 2031.310.

Plaintiff shall submit a Proposed Order that complies with this ruling no later than November 5, 2026.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-001040 – HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRA vs GALTON, TAMMY LOU – a) Defendant’s Demurrer – HEARING REQUIRED; b) Motion to Strike – HEARING REQUIRED.

a-b) HEARING REQUIRED.