Civil Tentative Rulings

September 29, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-26-002154 – WRIGHT, SHANNA vs SODHI, JAKRUN S – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Special Interrogatories – HEARING REQUIRED; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production of Documents – HEARING REQUIRED.

The parties are ordered to appear. On August 25, 2026, the Court continued these motions and ordered the parties to meet and confer and file a joint statement of remaining issues. The parties’ September 11, 2026, Joint Statement indicates that Defendants served Third Amended Responses on September 10, 2026, that most of the disputed items have been resolved, and that the parties’ telephone meet and confer “remains pending.” At the hearing, the parties shall advise the Court whether any of the remaining issues identified below have been resolved. As to any issue that remains in dispute, the Court’s tentative ruling is as follows.

a) Based on the Joint Statement, the Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories is MOOT as to Special Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, 6, and 10. Special Interrogatory No. 11 is not identified as a remaining issue in the Joint Statement, and the motion is DENIED as to No. 11. The motion is GRANTED as to Special Interrogatory No. 1, as narrowed by Plaintiff in the Joint Statement.

Special Interrogatory No. 1 asks Defendants to identify all persons who worked on or participated in Plaintiff’s representation and to describe each person’s role. Defendants state that they did not track which support staff performed clerical tasks on Plaintiff’s matters. That does not excuse Defendants from answering. “If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (b).) Plaintiff has offered to accept identification of the support and administrative personnel employed by Sodhi Law Group, APC, during her representation, together with their job titles, and Defendants have acknowledged that they could provide the names of the employees who worked for them during that period. The objection under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060, subdivision (f), is overruled.

Defendants shall serve a further verified response to Special Interrogatory No. 1 that: (1) identifies by name and job title each attorney and each support or administrative staff member employed by Sodhi Law Group, APC between September 5, 2023, and April 21, 2025; (2) for each person Defendants know participated in Plaintiff’s matters (including by signing correspondence or proofs of service, recording time, or receiving or handling papers served in Plaintiff’s matters), describes that person’s role; and (3) identifies which of those persons are no longer employed by Sodhi Law Group, APC. Defendants are not required to reconstruct which employee performed each individual task.

b) Based on the Joint Statement, the Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is MOOT as to Request Nos. 2, 3, 5, 8, and 14, and as to the general work-product issue. The motion is GRANTED in part as to Request Nos. 6, and 9. HEARING REQUIRED on 13.

Request No. 6. The remaining dispute concerns email metadata. Plaintiff submitted a July 11, 2024, communication log generated from Sodhi Law Group’s records, listing emails sent to Plaintiff by date, time, sender, recipient, subject, and matter. (P’s Ex. E, p. 85.) A statement of inability to comply must affirm that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry were made and must specify the reason the responding party is unable to comply. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) Whether a known source of responsive records was searched goes to the adequacy of that statement and is not a new interrogatory. Defendants shall serve a further verified response stating whether they searched the system that generated the July 11, 2024, communication log, and shall either produce the communication records for Plaintiff’s matters that the system is able to generate or state, in compliance with section 2031.230, why they are unable to do so.

Request No. 9. The existence and contents of an insurance agreement under which an insurer may be liable to satisfy all or part of a judgment are discoverable (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.210), and a request for production is an authorized method of obtaining that information (Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 743–744). Defendants’ belief that Plaintiff’s claims lack merit does not make the request premature. Request No. 9 is not limited to policies in effect during Plaintiff’s representation. The declarations pages Defendants produced describe claims-made policies, and the most recent produced policy period ends April 27, 2025. Defendants shall produce the declarations page for each professional liability insurance policy issued to any Defendant covering any period after April 27, 2025, including any renewal policy and any extended reporting period endorsement, or, if none exists, serve a verified statement that complies with section 2031.230.

Request No. 13. The Court anticipates that the parties will have resolved this issue or will be able to resolve this issue. This may require a declaration by Defendants if one has not already been provided.

All further responses ordered above shall be verified and served no later than October 19, 2026. No monetary sanctions are issued.

CV-26-003494 – MCCLINTON, GINO vs COUNTY OF STANISLAUS PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE – Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint – SUSTAINED with leave to amend in part, and without leave to amend in part.

For the reasons set forth below, the demurrer is SUSTAINED with 15 days’ leave to amend.

The Court earlier sent a brief disclosure but for clarity: I, Judge Mayne, was a prosecutor for just short of 20 years ending in December 2020 and am familiar with the long-term attorneys of the public defenders’ office which includes all of the attorneys named in this case. Also, I am reasonably certain that Attorney Doe Kennedy’s first name is Amy.

This does not constitute a conflict.

Procedural Irregularities

Moving Defendants have set forth nine objections. The Court notes that the demurrer itself is non-standard in that the demurrer is not separated from the notice of demurrer, and the demurrer does not distinctly specify the statutory grounds on which the objections are taken. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.60.) Nor does the demurrer fully comply with rule 3.1320, subdivision (a), of the California Rules of Court. Some of the grounds appear to go to one cause of action alone, but Defendants listed everything under a demurrer to the complaint as a whole.

Also, the stipulation for extension rules in Code Civ. Proc. section 1054(b) do not appear to apply to demurrers given Code Civ. Proc. section 430.41(a)(2)’s requirement of a court order.

Despite these procedural irregularities, the Court will address the merits.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request judicial notice of five records from Plaintiff's underlying criminal proceedings. The unopposed request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

Grounds 1 and 2: Improperly Named Defendants

Plaintiff appears to concede that the proper public-entity Defendant should have been the County of Stanislaus and does not oppose dismissal of the Board of Supervisors or the Public Defender’s Office as separate Defendants.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to those two entitities.

Ground 3: Claims Against the County

Plaintiff concedes that the complaint should be better drafted to expressly include sections 815.2 and 820 by number. (See Opp., at p. 5.) On this concession, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer with leave to amend.

Ground 4: Claims Against Jennifer Jennison and Reed Wagner

The complaint contains very few specific allegations concerning Jennison or Wagner individually. Instead, Plaintiff alleges generally that they were supervisory attorneys responsible for policies, procedures, and oversight. The complaint says almost nothing to tie either of these Defendants to the particular events at issue

This type of improper supervision claim requires more. (See, for instance, Y.P. v. Wells Fargo Co. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5^th 1069.)

It is not clear that leave to amend will be fruitful, but given the remainder of the rulings, the Court grants leave to amend.

Ground 5: The "Administrative Error" Argument

Defendants characterize the alleged conduct as a mere administrative error that cannot amount to malpractice.

Even characterizing this as an administrative error, the attorney is responsible to ensure clients aren’t issued bench warrants when they have made arrangements to show up. Defendants’ theory would avoid malpractice liability in civil and criminal cases for a variety of actions and inactions.

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was promised remote access, repeated requests for the remote link allegedly went unanswered, substitute counsel appeared and failed to convey to the court that Plaintiff was available to appear remotely (and had been told he could do so by his lawyer), a bench warrant issued as a result, office personnel allegedly admitted fault, Defendants allegedly promised to correct the warrant, nothing being done before Plaintiff’s arrest. Plaintiff allegedly remained incarcerated for several days.

Defendants’ contention that malpractice can never arise from attorney office systems, communication failures, calendaring failures, or failures to correct a warrant that was issued under mistaken or clouded circumstances is unpersuasive.

The demurrer is OVERRULED as to this ground.

Ground 6: Actual Innocence

Plaintiff accurately concedes that there are no cases directly on point. But the rule outlined in cases like Wiley v. County of San Diego (1998) 19 Cal.4^th 532 and  DiPalma v. Seldman (1994) 27 Cal.App.4^th 1499 requiring factual innocence does not logically apply to this case.

The damage alleged to Plaintiff is that he got arrested and he shouldn’t have. The violation Plaintiff was arrested for was failing to appear in court, and he would have appeared if not for the alleged errors by Defendants. Wiley’s rule is that a Plaintiff should not gain when they are correctly convicted, even if that conviction could have been avoided with more skillful lawyering, as no injustice occurred.

Here, as alleged, an injustice occurred as the thing Plaintiff was initially incarcerated for was failure to appear which he alleges was due to attorney error.

Defendants’ citation to Lynch v. Warwick (2002) 95 Cal.App.4^th 267 is inapposite. In that case, Lynch tried to get damages incurred for hiring a new lawyer at a late stage of the case on a breach of contract claim. Like Plaintiff in this case, he did not allege factual innocence. But unlike Plaintiff in this case, his damages were rationally chargeable to the underlying crime he committed.

The demurrer is OVERRULED as to this ground.

Grounds 7 and 8: Fiduciary Duty

The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the seventh and eighth grounds.

A breach of fiduciary duty theory is distinct from a professional negligence/legal malpractice claim, as are the elements. (Compare Akhlaghpour v. Orantes (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 232, 254–255, with, e.g., Stanley v. Richmond (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1086.)

Defendants accurately observe that there are no cases with exactly this fact pattern. But the allegation is that there was a failure to timely inform Plaintiff of their error.

 

The Court finds that the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is sufficiently alleged.

Ground 9: Causation

Defendants argue that Plaintiff ought to have known better than to try to appear by Zoom without a link and should have come when no link appeared. This may well be a successful argument to the trier of fact but is not dispositive at the pleading stage.

That Plaintiff got jail credit for the time served may mitigate, but does not eliminate, damages. Plaintiff alleges that the timing of the custody caused him harm.

The demurrer on this basis is OVERRULED.

CV-26-007924 – DOE, JANE TB vs MARTINEZ, JOHN – Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonym - DENIED.

Plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable desire to avoid embarrassment and potential future employment and housing consequences but has not presented specific evidence that this is the “rarest of cases,” justifying pseudonomity. (Cf. Roe v. Smith (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 227, 238–240; Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 105, 111.)

Here, the asserted concerns are largely speculative and are not meaningfully distinguishable from those faced by many plaintiffs pursuing public employment discrimination and harassment claims. Because court proceedings are presumptively open, and less restrictive measures remain available to protect confidential information, the Court is constrained by the law to deny the motion.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-001460 – CITIBANK NA vs FIGUEROA, MONICA – Defendant’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – GRANTED, and unopposed.

On July 29, 2026, Attorney Penley filed a motion to be relieved as counsel for Defendant Monica Figueroa. There is no opposition in the Court file.

The unopposed motion is GRANTED, effective on the filing of the proof of service of the signed order on the client. Attorney Penley is ordered to serve and file a new proposed order within five court days that reflects the continued Court Trial Date of November 13, 2026.

CV-26-001469 – AARZA GROUP INC vs MARTIN, ROBERT – Defendants’ CCTMO LLC & T-Mobile West Tower LLC’s Application of Davon F. Harris to Appear Pro Hac Vice – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The unopposed application of Attorney Devon F. Harris to appear as counsel pro hac vice on behalf of Defendants CCTMO LLC and T-Mobile West Tower LLC is GRANTED.

The Court finds that the application substantially complies with California Rules of Court, rule 9.40. The applicant has demonstrated that she is admitted to practice and in good standing in another jurisdiction, has disclosed any prior pro hac vice applications, has associated with California counsel of record, and has complied with the fee and service requirements.

Accordingly, Devon F. Harris is permitted to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this action, subject to compliance with all applicable California laws, rules, and professional responsibilities.

The Court was unable to locate a proposed order in the court file for this application. Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

CV-26-007801 – IN RE GONZALEZ, MICHEL – Petitioner’s Petition for Approval for Transfer of Structured Settlement Payment Rights by and Between Michel Gonzalez and MIC-BRY8, LLC Pursuant to California Insurance Code 10134, Et Seq. – CONTINUED to October 13, 2026.

The Court has reviewed the Annuity Contract that Petitioner submitted on September 17, 2026. According to the Payee’s August 5, 2026 Declaration, Payee has already assigned all payments due to her under the contract in a prior transfer in 2022. (August 5, 2026 Declaration of Michel Gonzalez, ¶ 6.) As Payee’s Declaration appears to be an error, the Court will provide an opportunity for Payee to submit a corrected declaration, including her understanding of any remaining payments due to her if the current proposed transfer is approved by this Court.

Accordingly, the hearing is CONTINUED to October 13, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22. Payee to submit a corrected declaration no later than five court days before the hearing.

PR-25-000299 – ESTATE OF JACKSON, GARY – Petitioner’s Motion to be Relived as Counsel - CONTINUED to October 16, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

Based on the reply that was filed on September 21, 2026, an opposition was served. However, the Court was unable to locate a copy of the opposition in the court file. The filing may have been rejected for some reason. Consequently, this matter is CONTINUED to October 16, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22. The client’s opposition is to be filed no later than October 5, 2026.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-000957 – ALICEAROMERO, EVELYN vs DENIZ BROS AG SERVICES INC –  a) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff Carmen Alicea; Request for Sanctions – GRANTED, and unopposed; b) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff Evelyn Alicea-Romero; Request for Sanctions – GRANTED, and unopposed; c) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff Evelyn Alicea-Romero to Provide a Signed Verification for her Response to Request for Production of Documents, Set One – GRANTED, and unopposed; d) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff Evelyn Alicea-Romero to Provide a Signed Verification for her Response to Form Interrogatories, Set One – GRANTED, and unopposed; e) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff Carmen Alicea to Provide a Signed Verification for her Response to Form Interrogatories, Set One – GRANTED, and unopposed; f) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff Carmen Alicea to Provide a Signed Verification for her Response to Request for Production of Documents, Set One – GRANTED, and unopposed.

a) The Court finds that Plaintiff unreasonably failed to appear for a properly noticed deposition, entitling Defendant to an order compelling such attendance pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450 et seq. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff is directed to appear for her deposition on a date and time to be selected via mutual agreement but no later than November 13, 2026.

The Court further finds that Defendant is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with the instant motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(g), 2023.010.) Therefore, sanctions are awarded against Plaintiff in the amount of $322.50, to be paid to defense counsel.

Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

b) The Court finds that Plaintiff unreasonably failed to appear for a properly noticed deposition, entitling Defendant to an order compelling such attendance pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450 et seq. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff is directed to appear for her deposition on a date and time to be selected via mutual agreement but no later than November 13, 2026.

The Court further finds that Defendant is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with the instant motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(g), 2023.010.) Therefore, sanctions are awarded against Plaintiff in the amount of $322.50, to be paid to defense counsel.

Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

c) Plaintiff shall provide the missing verification to for her Response to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, within 30 days.

Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

d) Plaintiff shall provide the missing verification to for her Response to Form Interrogatories, Set One, within 30 days.

Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

e) Plaintiff shall provide the missing verification to for her Response to Form Interrogatories, Set One, within 30 days.

Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

f) Plaintiff shall provide the missing verification to for her Response to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, within 30 days.

Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

CV-26-004706 – QUARLES, CHAKARA vs AMERICAN ADVANCE MANAGEMENT INC – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration; Stay Action Pending Completion of Arbitration; Dismissal of the Class Claims with Prejudice – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on review of the papers and evidence submitted by the moving party, and in view of the lack of opposition thereto, the Court finds that the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate which covers the subject matter of the dispute herein. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.)

Plaintiff’s putative class claims are DISMISSED based on the arbitration agreement’s waiver of

class proceedings.

All further proceedings are stayed pending completion of arbitration.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4.)

CV-25-007643 – PITRE, TERENCE vs TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University’s Form Interrogatories – Employment; Request for Sanctions – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to November 12, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

Based on the parties’ representations in their 9-1-26 Joint Status Statement relative to other pending discovery motions in this matter, it appears that meet and confer efforts are continuing with regard to the issues herein. Therefore, the hearing is continued, as above, and the parties are directed to submit a Joint Status Statement describing their continued efforts and explaining their respective positions on any issues remaining in dispute, no later than November 2, 2026.

CV-25-011401 – SWANSON, ROBERT vs ADIAN, NANCY – Plaintiff’s Motion to Serve Summons and Complaint by Publication CCP 415.50 - DENIED.

Due process requires that a method of service superior to publication be employed, and publication can be utilized only as a last resort. Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence as that concept is defined by the applicable case law. (See, e.g. Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 749, n.5.)

In addition, the motion lacks a supporting declaration addressing the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 415.50(a)(1) or (2). (See, e.g. Olvera v. Olvera (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 32, 42 n.9.)

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-25-001822 – NAITAMAR, SELMANE vs NAITAMAR, HAJER – Plaintiff’s Motion to Determine Property Value – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court again notes that Mr. Hillas who was appointed as appraiser in this matter has still not filed his Appraisal Report. There has been no new filing since the last hearing including a Motion to Determine Value filed by Defendant.

The parties should attend the hearing prepared to address these issues and provide the Court with an update.

CV-25-012408 – DULISSE, DOMINIC vs CAMBRIDGE HEALTHCARE SERVICES LLC – Defendants’ Petition to Compel Binding Arbitration and to Stay the Superior Court Matter Pending the Hearing on the Petition - DENIED.

A party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236. Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute absent an agreement to do so. Code of Civil Procedure 1281.2; 9 U.S.C.A. § 2; Costa v. Road Runner Sports, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 224; Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13.

Here, defendants rely upon a purported arbitration agreement that was not signed by decedent Peter Dulisse. Rather, the agreement was electronically signed by Gayle Reinegger. Defendants contend that Ms. Reinegger executed the agreement as decedent's agent.

The Court finds defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing the existence of a valid arbitration agreement binding upon decedent.

Defendants have not submitted competent evidence demonstrating that Ms. Reinegger possessed authority to execute the arbitration agreement on decedent's behalf. The arbitration agreement itself contains a recitation that the signer was authorized by the resident's consent, instruction, and/or durable power of attorney. However, agency cannot be established solely by the declarations or representations of the purported agent. Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804; Lombardo v. Gramercy Court (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1028.

The Court has not been provided with a durable power of attorney, conservatorship order, advance health care directive granting authority to enter arbitration agreements, or other admissible evidence establishing an agency relationship, actual or ostensible, between Peter Dulisse and Ms. Reinegger.  Absent such evidence, defendants have not carried their burden.

The evidence submitted by Plaintiffs further raises substantial questions regarding decedent's capacity at the time the arbitration agreement was executed on April 12, 2025. Plaintiffs submit facility records dated near the time of admission reflecting advanced dementia, altered mental status, inability to provide history, lack of orientation, poor insight, and a notation that the resident "doesn't have capacity to make decisions d/t Dementia." The records further reference cognitive impairment and dementia. (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits A, B and C).

Assuming defendants rely upon alleged consent or instructions from decedent as the basis for Ms. Reinegger's authority, the evidence before the Court does not support a finding that decedent possessed the requisite capacity to confer such authority at the time of execution.

The arbitration agreement indicates it was electronically signed by Ms. Reinegger. Under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, an electronic signature is attributable to a person only if it was the act of that person. (Civ. Code § 1633.9(a).)

Defendants have not presented evidence describing the electronic signature process, security procedures, authentication measures, or other facts demonstrating that the electronic signature was in fact placed by Reinegger. Garcia v. Stoneridge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41; Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047.)

Accordingly, defendants have not established the authenticity of the electronic signature upon which they rely.

The threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.  The Court finds that Defendants have failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement was executed by decedent or by a person authorized to bind him. Therefore, the petition is denied. Gamboa v. NorthEast Community. Clinic, (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 158, Cal. Civ Proc. Code § 1281.2; Cal. R. Ct. 3.1330; Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394,413. 

The Court therefore does not reach Plaintiffs' remaining arguments concerning unconscionability, uncertainty, or the scope of the agreement.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***