Civil Tentative Rulings

May 13, 2026

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-25-011622 - MENDEZ, ERNESTO A vs GORDON, STEVEN - Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court’s understanding is that the matter is now moot, but it is unclear how it came to be that the DMV removed the violation. The Court needs this information to determine whether to designate a prevailing party.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-26-000863 - GONZALEZ, JOSE vs SILVA, BRANDON - Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint - OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part with leave to amend.

On March 26, 2026, Defendants County of Stanislaus, Jeff Dirkse, and Brandon Silva (collectively, “Defendants”), submitted a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, accompanied by a request for judicial notice. Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for false imprisonment; to Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for false detention and arrest in violation of the Bane Act and California Civil Code § 52, paragraphs (a) and (b); and, to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for abuse of process.

Plaintiff submitted an opposition on April 8, 2026, accompanied by a request for judicial notice. Defendants submitted a Reply on April 15, 2026.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice

Pursuant to California Evidence Code § 452 and § 453, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice of the following documents: (1) the preliminary hearing transcript in People v. Jose Manuel Gonzalez, Stanislaus County Superior Court Case No. CR-23-006692 (Exhibit A); the court’s order granting Plaintiff pretrial diversion pursuant to Penal Code § 1001.95 in People v. Jose Manuel Gonzalez, Stanislaus County Superior Court Case No. CR-23-006692 (Exhibit B).

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is DENIED.

Demurrer

For the reasons set forth below, the Demurrer to second (false imprisonment) and seventh (false detention and arrest) causes of action is OVERRULED; and the Demurrer to fifth cause of action (abuse of process) is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Moving Party to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling. Plaintiff shall serve and file any amended complaint no later than 21 days after service of the signed order.

The Second (False Imprisonment) and Seventh (False Detention and Arrest in Violation of the Bane Act) Causes of Action

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s second and seventh causes of action for false arrest and false detention and arrest in violation of the Bane Act are barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Collateral estoppel applies when the following requirements are fulfilled: “(1) the issue is identical to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and (3) necessarily decided; (4) the doctrine is asserted against a party to the former action or one who was in privity with such a party; and (5) the former decision is final and was made on the merits.” (McCutchen v. City of Montclair (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1144 [internal quotations marks and citation omitted].)

“Federal and state courts have consistently held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may preclude relitigation in a civil suit of issues that were decided in a prior criminal proceeding.” (Ibid.) “A finding of probable cause to hold the defendant over for trial is a final judgment on the merits for the purposes of collateral estoppel under the California law.” (Ibid., 1145–1146.) “Generally, the requirements of the doctrine of collateral estoppel ‘will be met when courts are asked to give preclusive effect to preliminary hearing probable cause findings in subsequent civil actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution.’” Greene v. Bank of America (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 922, 933, as modified on denial of reh'g (May 28, 2015) [citations omitted].)

There are exceptions to the rule.  First, “if after arrest but before the preliminary hearing additional evidence of a defendant's guilt is discovered, and that evidence is presented at the preliminary hearing, the probable cause determination at the hearing would not be conclusive as to whether there was probable cause to arrest.” Haupt v. Dillard (9th Cir. 1994) 17 F.3d 285, 289, as amended (Apr. 15, 1994); McCutchen, 73 Cal.App.4th at 1146. “If the evidence known to the arresting officers is materially different from the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, however, the identity-of-issues requirement will not be met.” Wige v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3d 1183, 1186 (emphasis in original); McCutchen, 73 Cal.App.4th at 1146.

Second, if “the plaintiff in a civil suit can demonstrate that the issue of probable cause was not litigated at the preliminary hearing for tactical reasons,” collateral estoppel would not apply because the actually litigated requirement will not be met. (McCutchen, 73 Cal.App.4th at 1147.)

Another “notable exception to this rule would be in a situation where the plaintiff alleges that the arresting officer lied or fabricated evidence presented at the preliminary hearing.” Greene v. Bank of America, 236 Cal.App.4th at 933. “When the officer misrepresents the nature of the evidence supporting probable cause and that issue is not raised at the preliminary hearing, a finding of probable cause at the preliminary hearing would not preclude relitigation of the issue of integrity of the evidence.” (Ibid [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].) However, “if the plaintiff alleges that the arresting officer lied or fabricated evidence at the preliminary hearing, plaintiff challenges that evidence at the preliminary hearing as being false, and the magistrate decides the credibility issue in the arresting officer's favor, then collateral estoppel still may preclude relitigation of the issue in a subsequent civil proceeding involving probable cause.” (Ibid.)

Here, the parties dispute whether any exceptions apply to the application of collateral estoppel this instance. Plaintiff argues that collateral estoppel does not apply because (1) the issue of probable cause was not litigated at the preliminary hearing for tactical reasons, (2) the fabricated evidence exception applies and Plaintiff’s cell phone contains exculpatory evidence, and (3) the Court must accept the Complaint’s pleading that Defendants did not have probable cause (Complaint, ¶ 39).

Defendants reply that the (1) the fact that Plaintiff’s criminal attorney did not call additional witnesses, does not mean probable cause was not litigated at the preliminary hearing for tactical reasons and (2) the Court expressly found that Defendant Silva did not lie on the stand, and (3) Plaintiff does not identify what exculpatory evidence is recorded on Plaintiff’s cell phone.

The Court finds that the arguments submitted by the parties amount to disputes not appropriate for determination on a demurrer. The parties dispute whether the issue of probable cause was actually litigated and also dispute whether the court at the preliminary hearing made a credibility finding in the arresting officer’s favor.

Therefore, Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s second and seventh causes of action are OVERRULED.

The Fifth Cause of Action: Abuse of Process

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for abuse of process fails because Defendants have immunity under Government Code § 821.6.

“A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” (Gov. Code, § 821.6.) The California Supreme Court has clarified that the immunity extends broadly to any tort claim alleging injury due to the institution or prosecution of an official proceeding, whether such claim is “formally labeled as a claim for malicious prosecution or not.” (Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 922.) Courts have held that, as a matter of law, “public employee defendants [are] immune from liability for any injury caused in prosecuting [a] criminal proceeding.” (Taylor v. Jones (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 885, 891.) However, “[w]here . . . the plaintiff's claim of injury does not stem from the initiation or prosecution of proceedings, section 821.6 immunity does not apply.” (Leon, 14 Cal.5th at 924.)

Plaintiff’s Opposition asserts that Plaintiff “alleges at least two categories of conduct that fall outside the protected zone of prosecutorial immunity.” (Opposition, 7.)

Plaintiff’s first “allegation is that Defendants used the criminal process to suppress evidence and avoid civil liability” by unlawfully seizing and retaining Plaintiff’s cell phone. (Ibid.) Plaintiff argues that the “ongoing retention of Plaintiff’s personal property” falls outside the scope of immunity because it does not constitute the “institution or prosecution of an official proceeding.” (Reply, 8 [citing Leon, 14 Cal.5th at 922.)

Plaintiff’s first allegation is not pleaded in the Complaint and was made for the first time in its Opposition. The Complaint references “exculpatory evidence” related to criminal proceedings but courts have held “public employee defendants . . . immune from liability for any injury caused in prosecuting [a] criminal proceeding.” (Taylor v. Jones (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 885, 891.)

Plaintiff’s second allegation regarding the abuse of process cause of action is that Defendant Silva prepared and submitted false or incomplete reports requesting that Plaintiff be charged with a felony. According to Plaintiff, such conduct falls outside the scope of section 821.6 immunity because it “constitutes investigative conduct undertaken before or contemporaneous with the decision to arrest – not prosecutorial advocacy in preparation for trial.” (Opposition, 8–9.)

Plaintiff’s second allegation is barred by section 821.6 immunity. Defendants filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff. (Defendants’ RJN, Ex. A.) The Complaint alleges that Defendants misused the legal process by submitted false statements to the District Attorney in order to “smear Plaintiff’s reputation, preoccupy him with a criminal case, intimidate him, and prevent him from pursuing claims against them for improper and excessive use of force.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 58–59.) “If a law enforcement officer has initiated an official proceeding, the officer will enjoy immunity for that conduct under section 821.6, regardless of whether the officer's conduct may include certain acts described as investigatory.”  Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 924.)

Therefore, Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for abuse of process is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

PR-26-000163 - ESTATE OF LEGGETT, PATRICIA - Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate Order Expunging Lis Pendens - DENIED.

By way of this motion, Moving Party is seeking to vacate an order that was made in another case (Case No. 2024004) before another judicial officer. Such a request is improper. For this reason, the motion is DENIED. Moreover, if the Moving Party believes that recording a lis pendens on the property because of this particular case (as opposed to Case No. 2024004) is appropriate, then the Court encourages her to seek legal advice on her options.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 23***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-23-004665 - PAULEEN BAJWA & MCKELLAR ENTERPRISES vs RAS AUTOMOTIVE INC - Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants Ras Automotive, Inc., Harinderjit Kaur, and Vik Randhawa; and Their Counsel Philip Minter, Esq. Pursuant to CCP 128.5 and 128.7 - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

Given that this motion cannot be heard ahead of Defendant’s related substantive motion,  Motion for Leave to File a Supplementary Answer, in respect of which Plaintiffs seek monetary sanctions, this matter is continued to June 12, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court

CV-25-012165 - STANISLAUS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS vs GONSALVES, JOSEPH A - Plaintiff’s Motion for Order for Prejudgment Possession - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court requires clarification from Plaintiffs regarding service of the Writ of Summons, Complaint, and the Moving Papers on Husky Oil and ALL PERSONS UNKNOWN CLAIMING ANY TITLE OR INTEREST IN OR TO THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED HEREIN.

CV-26-000239 - BELL, WILLIAM vs BENHAM, CHRISTOPHER - Plaintiff’s Motion for Alternative Service on the Defendants - DENIED, without prejudice.

The Court notes Defendant Benham’s Bankruptcy filing of February 24, 2026, and the automatic stay imposed thereby. ( 11 U.S.C. § 362; Burton v. Infinity Cap. Mgmt., 862 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 2017); In re LPM Corp., 269 B.R. 217 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 300 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2002))

However, to the extent that this motion also addresses non bankrupt debtor Jesse Medlock and involves procedural issues relating to service and default the Court has jurisdiction and the authority to address same. The automatic stay protects the property of the bankruptcy estate. (In re LPM Corp., 269 B.R. 217 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 300 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

The Court is willing to consider alternative means of service of Plaintiff’s Writ of Summons and Complaint on Defendants. However, Plaintiff’s motion fails to state the proposed alternative means of service. ( Civ. Proc. Code §§ 415.20, 415.30 or 415.50)

Regarding any possible request for Default Judgment against Defendants at this time, the Court notes that default or default judgment cannot be entered absent proof of valid service of the writ of summons in this action. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 412.20, 585.) Plaintiff has not established that any Defendant has been properly served with the summons and complaint in this case.

The Court also notes that Plaintiff has not sought any relief from the stay automatically imposed by said bankruptcy filing.

Accordingly, the motion is denied without prejudice entirely as to Defendant Benham based on the stay, and on the noted deficiencies with the motion, and as to Defendant Medlock also denied without prejudice based on the deficiencies above noted. 

Plaintiff shall submit a Proposed Order in five court days conforming to the Court’s ruling.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000368 - SCHEPER, GARRETT vs HILL, CHANCE - Defendant’s Demurrer - HEARING REQUIRED.