Civil Tentative Rulings

June 10, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-009680 – GIBSON, ANWAR vs GUTIERREZ, RUBEN – Defendant’s Motion for Leave of Court to File Memorandum of Costs – GRANTED and unopposed.

Civ. Proc. Code § 1032 (a)(4) defines a “Prevailing party” to include “a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered.” § 1032 (b) states that unless expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.

For purposes of the statute awarding the prevailing party in litigation its costs, a defendant against whom the plaintiff does not recover any relief is a prevailing defendant.  (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002), 97 Cal.App.4th 132, modified on denial of rehearing.)

The right to recover costs of suit is statutory, and prevailing parties in civil litigation are guaranteed awards of the costs expended in the litigation. (Rozanova v. Uribe, (2021) 68 Cal. App. 5th 392, rehearing denied, review denied.)  (See also Yolo Land & Water Def. v. Cnty. of Yolo, 105 Cal. App. 5th 710, (2024), as modified (Oct. 3, 2024), review denied (Jan. 15, 2025)). \

A voluntary dismissal of an entire action deprives the court of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction in that case, except for the limited purpose of awarding costs and statutory attorney fees. (Gogri v. Jack in the Box Inc. Inc., (2008)166 Cal. App. 4th 255).

A defendant who seeks costs after a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal need not file a proposed judgment in addition to its memorandum of costs. (Fries v. Rite Aid Corp., (2009)173 Cal. App. 4th 182).

Plaintiff’s re-filing of this suit in a different county does not make Defendant any less the prevailing party herein for the purposes of Defendant’s entitlement to costs herein.  (DisputeSuite.com, LLC v. Scoreinc.com, (2017) 2 Cal. 5th 968).

Defendant’s Memorandum of Costs shall be filed.

CV-25-012120 – STANISLAUS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS vs BRAY, RADUS L – Defendant’s Motion to Increase Probable Compensation Deposit – DENIED without prejudice.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary objections:

1. OVERRULED.
2. SUSTAINED. Evidence Code section 1414 is not met given the section 1152 considerations so foundation is insufficient. If we reached relevance, that objection would be overruled.

3-4: SUSTAINED (Evidence Code § 1152).

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED. (Evidence Code § 453).

The Court has broad discretion to consider a motion to redetermine probable compensation including one based on grounds of erroneous factual inputs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.030).

However, Defendants do not provide competent admissible evidence to support their request for an upward revision of the deposit of probable compensation herein. Defendant cites to Zhou v. Unsource Worldwide (2007) 157 Cal.App.4^th 1471, 1478, and Moving Picture Etc. Union v. Glasgow Theaters, Inc. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 395, 405) for the proposition that the statements made in the settlement letter are admissible.

But in each of those cases, the statement’s primary purpose was not found to be settlement. In this case, the statements are made in furtherance of settlement.

The parties may benefit from meeting and conferring prior to resubmission of the motion.

CV-26-003831 – MALDONADOPADILLA, PAOLA vs COELHO, KELLEY MARIE – Respondent’s Motion to Strike (SLAPP) Petition for Civil Harassment Order – GRANTED in full.

DISCLOSURE/NOTE: The Court is familiar with Respondent Coelho as she has been involved in two other separate unsuccessful petitions for civil harassment restraining orders. Those cases were related to each other, but do not appear to be legally related to this case. The Court gives no consideration to the facts in those cases.

Prior to the bringing of this petition, Petitioner’s current counsel attempted to engage me (Judge Mayne) on the main courthouse steps to express his support for my rulings in the other two cases. I did not engage with him and left the area.

CONSIDERATION OF THE OPPOSITION

Petitioner was self-represented. At the prior hearing, her current counsel appeared but did not file a notice of appearance. He also appeared to make a general appearance. The Opposition was signed by Petitioner only on May 28, 2026. On June 5, 2026, counsel subbed in with a substitution of attorney form. On June 5, 2026, Petitioner’s counsel filed an “adoption of prior pleadings of petitioner.”

Under these circumstances, accepting the Opposition as filed is either mandatory or discretionary. If it is discretionary, I choose to consider it.

STANDARD

An anti‑SLAPP motion is evaluated under a two‑step process. First, the moving party must establish that the challenged claims arise from protected activity—i.e., acts in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition or free speech, including statements or writings made in judicial proceedings or in connection with issues under review by a court. If that burden is met, the analysis proceeds to step two, where the burden shifts to the plaintiff or petitioner to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits by presenting legally sufficient claims supported by admissible evidence. (See Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)

Courts construe protected activity broadly at step one. (See Brodeur v. Atlas Entertainment, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 [“[I}t is … beyond dispute that the anti-SLAPP statute, including the scope of the term “public interest,” is to be construed broadly.”].) Claims predicated on litigation conduct, declarations, discovery responses, and court rulings generally fall squarely within the statute. The “illegality exception” is narrow and applies only where the defendant’s conduct is conceded to be illegal or conclusively shown to be illegal as a matter of law.

The Court can strike a cause of an action or factual allegations or both. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5^th 376, 488.)

INITIAL ALLEGATIONS

Petitioner alleges that after a meeting at her home in 2023 where Respondent attempted to glean closed session information from a public agency Petitioner served on, Respondent began a pattern of harassment. That included: publishing false and defamatory statements about her and her non-profit organization. The specifics of the false statements are unstated.

Petitioner further alleges that people “associated with the respondent” were outside her residence watching or recording her. Further, unfamiliar vehicles were parked near her home and left “abruptly.”

She further alleges that Respondent had appeared at one her public events and engaged in “disruptive or intimidating behavior.”

A CAD log attached to the petition indicates that Petitioner told police that Respondent had come and recorded her house.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS

Respondent – and Petitioner in Opposition– appear to agree that the non-profit referenced is the Family Advocacy & Resources Alliance, which Petitioner manages. Petitioner’s statements are vague as to specifics, and this made Respondent’s efforts to identify potentially protected speech more difficult.

But Respondent contends that any statements made were a matter of public interest on a public forum regarding the non-profit activities of FARA. These are alleged to be protected statements under section 425.16(c).

Respondent attaches a demand letter ostensibly from Petitioner to Respondent identifying several allegedly defamatory statements, addressed further below. Most of the items covered by the demand letter cover protected speech – one of them is that Respondent called for an audit of all non-profits and specifically FARA in the city of Turlock. This is a First Amendment-protected petitioning of the government. On the other hand, allegations that Petitioner fabricated a crime, if false and partly based on non-public information, may be defamatory, and defamatory statements may be a part of a pattern of harassment. (E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5^th 688, 701.) 

PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION

There is no declaration, but the Opposition is verified. Respondent treats the factual assertions as a declaration, as does the Court. However, assertions of what the initial Petition says are not new factual assertions that can be considered if they are not in the Petition.

I spent a significant amount of time attempting to reconcile the claims of the Opposition and the initial pleadings. I failed to do so.

The following portions of the verified Opposition do not appear to have a factual basis (the opposition does not have page numbers listed):

• “Petitioner presented evidence that Respondent repeatedly appeared near Peititioner’s residence in various vehicles over an extended period of time...” (Opp. p.3, ll.6-8)
• “Petitioner additionally presented evidence that Respondent repeatedly contacted Petitioner through calls, messages, and social media communications after Petitioner attempted to distance herself from Respondent.” (p.3, ll. 13-15)
• “The Petition further alleges conduct directed toward Petitioner’s family members, including repeated appearances near Petitioner’s adult son’s workplace and conduct that caused fear and emotional distress with the household.” (p.3, ll. 17-20)
• “Petitioner additionally submitted corroborating witness declarations from family members and other individuals who personally observed portions of the conduct.” (p.4. ll. 8-10)

The following allegation is vague, does not contain a time frame, and does not explain what happened:

• “Petitioner also alleges that Respondent obtained and transmitted confidential information concerning Petitioner’s minor child in a manner Petitioner reasonably perceived as intimidating and threatening.” (p.3 ll. 21-24)

ANALYSIS

The first prong of the analysis is whether protected speech is implicated. Both sides agree that it is. The Court cannot consider protected speech and the burden shifts to Petitioner to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of her civil harassment claim.

Petitioner has fallen well short of this requirement. The evidence submitted consists largely of conclusory allegations, lacks sufficient admissible evidentiary support, and lacks the detail required to find a likelihood of success by the clear and convincing evidence standard by demonstrating a pattern of harassment.

Further, the Court must find a substantial risk of future harm and the lack of detail on the timing of these events disables it from finding such a risk. (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4^th 399, 401.)  

The petition for civil harassment restraining orders is STRICKEN pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. The June 24, 2026 hearing is vacated.

Respondent shall file and serve any motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, subdivision (c), within the time permitted by law.

Respondent to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-25-004260 – SHOLES, CAMERON vs TURLOCK RV CENTER INC – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication – DENIED.

Plaintiff filed this action on May 1, 2025. Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: (1) a breach of contract claim, (2) a claim pursuant to the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), and (3) a claim pursuant to the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq. Trial is currently scheduled for July 14, 2026.

Defendants Turlock RV Center, Inc., Express Systems, Inc., and Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company (collectively, “Defendants”) submitted the instant motion pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, seeking an order granting summary judgment on all causes of action and forms of relief, or in the alternative, summary adjudication as to specific causes of action or claims for damages.

Defendants’ arguments in support of summary judgment are not applicable to all causes of action. “[E]stablished principles of statutory construction indicate that the parol evidence rule is inapplicable” to causes of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act. (Wang v. Massey Chevrolet (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 856, 868 [reversing, remanding, and directing trial court to vacate its order granting summary judgment and enter a new order denying the motion for summary judgment].) Similarly, “the parol evidence rule does not bar [a] section 17200 claim.” (Ibid, 871.)

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

The motion for summary adjudication is procedurally defective. The issues to be summarily adjudicated are not “stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).)

Accordingly, the motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.

CV-26-000992 – ITRIA VENTURES LLC vs PROTECH PHONE REPAIR INC – Plaintiff’s Application for Writ of Attachment – HEARING REQUIRED, and unopposed.

The Court will hold a hearing on the application. “No order or writ shall be issued under this article except after a hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 484.040.)

“At the hearing, the court shall consider the showing made by the parties appearing and shall issue a right to attach order, which shall state the amount to be secured by the attachment determined by the court in accordance with Section 483.015 or 483.020, if it finds all of the following:

(1) The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued.

(2) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based.

(3) The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based.

(4) The amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 484.090.)

Defendant Protech Phone Repair sold $117,000 in receivables to Plaintiff for the purchase price of $90,000 and additional fees of $1,400. Per the parties’ agreement, Defendant was funded $88,600 and agreed to pay periodic amounts of $1,500 to Plaintiff on a weekly basis until the purchase price was paid in full. Defendant has failed to make payments due under the parties’ agreement. The last payment that cleared was on January 7, 2026. Plaintiff’s application was submitted on May 15, 2026 and stated that the amount owed under the agreement is $103,000.

The Court is inclined to GRANT the unopposed application. Moving party to submit a proposed order within five court days.

CV-26-004126 – GOLDEN HOMESTEAD LLC vs WEBB, GLENN – Petitioner’s Petition for Judicial Declaration of Abandonment – CONTINUED to July 15, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 22.

The Court was unable to locate proof(s) of service of the unopposed petition. “Copies of the petition shall be served upon the homeowner, any known registered owner, and any known person having a lien or security interest of record in the mobilehome by posting a copy on the mobilehome and mailing copies to those persons at their last known addresses by registered or certified mail with a return receipt requested in the United States mail, postage prepaid.” (Civ. Code, § 798.61.)

Accordingly, the hearing is continued to July 15, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 22. Petitioner shall submit the required proofs of service at least 5 court days before the hearing.

PR-25-001101 – IN THE MATTER OF EOFF, MATTHEW – Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, and for Monetary Sanctions – CONTINUED to June 25, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

This matter is CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to June 25, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22, to be heard with the related discovery motion on calendar that day.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-25-003541 – GLORIA, ESTEBAN vs FINNEGAN, CHERYL LYNN – Defendant Cheryl Lynn Finnegan’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint – GRANTED.

Defendant has met her initial burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff’s claims are barred as a matter of law. The undisputed evidence establishes that Finnegan was employed by Sylvan Unified School District, was on duty, and was operating a school bus along an assigned route transporting students at the time of the subject incident. These facts establish that she was acting within the course and scope of her public employment.

As a result, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the Government Claims Act. The evidence further establishes that Plaintiff’s claim was rejected, notice of rejection was sent in early January 2024, and Plaintiff did not file suit until April 16, 2025 - well beyond the six-month statutory period. The action is therefore time-barred under Government Code section 945.6.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiff fails to do so. Plaintiff presents no admissible evidence showing that Finnegan was acting outside the course and scope of employment. Plaintiff’s reliance on assertions of distraction, argument, and speculation is insufficient to create a triable issue.

Plaintiff does not dispute the operative dates relevant to the timeliness of the action. Accordingly, the statutory bar applies as a matter of law.

Plaintiff’s estoppel arguments are unavailing. The record does not demonstrate any actionable misrepresentation of fact, and estoppel does not arise based on litigation positions or alleged misstatements of law.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s opposition was filed late. The Court has discretion to disregard the untimely opposition. Even if considered, the opposition fails to raise a triable issue for the reasons stated above.

Requests for Judicial Notice:

Both parties’ requests for judicial notice are GRANTED. The Court takes notice of the existence and filing of the documents, but not the truth of disputed matters asserted therein.

Evidentiary Objections:

All objections are OVERRULED as immaterial to the disposition of the motion.

Disposition:

The Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant.

CV-25-005406 – CAPITAL ONE NA vs SERENO, JACLYN – Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of the Pleadings – DENIED, without prejudice.

Proof of service of the instant motion is not admissible herein because it does not comply with the requirements of Code Civ. Proc. § 2015.5.  In the absence of a response from Defendant, the Court cannot conclude that service was properly accomplished in this instance.

CV-26-000780 – CHAHAL, NAHAR SINGH vs NEWREZ LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – DENIED, without prejudice.

Counsel fails to sufficiently demonstrate his inability to obtain the client’s consent to a substitution of attorneys pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 284(1). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(c).)

CV-26-003220 – HARRELL, DEBRA vs CITY OF MODESTO – Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Mandate (CCP 1085); Request for Emergency Stay and Immediate Release of Property – DENIED.

Summary of Reasons:

The administrative decision challenged in the First Amended Petition was issued pursuant to Modesto Municipal Code section 5 4.204, which sets forth multiple, independent grounds for designating a dog as “vicious” and abating the resulting public nuisance. The Hearing Officer made express factual findings corresponding to those statutory criteria, including findings that the dog was involved in multiple bite incidents, that at least one incident resulted in documented injuries to a person acting peacefully and lawfully, that defensive intervention was required, and that the dog posed an ongoing threat of bodily harm. Those findings were adopted by the City Manager in the final administrative order.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, the Court’s role is limited to determining whether the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the proceedings were conducted in a manner consistent with due process. The Court does not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony. The administrative record, as summarized in the Hearing Officer’s findings and the City Manager’s order, contains evidence of reasonable, credible, and solid value supporting the determination that the dog is “vicious” within the meaning of Modesto Municipal Code section 5 4.204.

The record further reflects that Petitioner received notice of the hearing, appeared and testified, submitted written materials, and was afforded an opportunity to respond to the evidence presented by the City. The Hearing Officer expressly found that the requirements of administrative due process - notice and an opportunity to be heard - were satisfied. On this record, Petitioner has not established a prejudicial abuse of discretion or a denial of a fair hearing.

Accordingly, because substantial evidence supports the administrative decision and no due process violation has been shown, the First Amended Petition for writ relief is denied.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-21-000749 – SCHMIDT, JON vs TRINUT FARM MANAGEMENT INC – Defendant Sarbjit Athwal’s Demurrer to Plaintiff Jon Schmidt’s First Amended Complaint (FAC) – OVERRULED.

Defendant’s statute of limitations argument is not established on the face of the pleading. The FAC does not allege a specific date of breach, and Plaintiff asserts tolling and other accrual theories. Resolution of accrual and tolling issues is fact dependent and not appropriate on demurrer.

The applicability of the relation back doctrine likewise presents factual issues. The Court previously required briefing on notice, mistake, and prejudice. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s role was not understood until discovery and that Defendant not only had notice of the action but participated in its defense. Resolution of these factual issues is not appropriate at the pleading stage.

Defendant’s standing argument depends on interpretation of the assignment, which is not conclusively established by the FAC. Additionally, without conceding lack of standing, Plaintiff notes that Summit Gold intended to convey all of its rights and obligations then accrued to Plaintiff, and if the assignment did not effectuate the transfer, the assignment can be amended. 

For all these reasons, Defendant’s demurrer must be OVERRULED.

Defendant shall file a substantive response to the First Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of notice of the Court’s ruling on the demurrer.

CV-23-004553 – BARSTOW, CHEYENNE vs PSR EMERITUS INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint – GRANTED.

California policy strongly favors liberally permitting amended pleadings. “The policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified.” (Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.)

In this particular case, the Court has its doubts about whether the application of relation-back is appropriate given the description of the new defendant (as set forth in paragraph 6 of the proposed amended complaint) in relation to the current defendant. However, the trial date in this case has been vacated. And the current defendant has decided to bow out of the case and deliberately take a default as opposed to litigating further. As a result, the Court cannot see any significant prejudice to either defendant from permitting this amended pleading. Consequently, the Court errs on the side of liberality and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion, thus leaving it to the new defendant to challenge the propriety of the pleading. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [finding the “ ‘preferable practice’ ” to be permitting an amended pleading and letting the adverse party “ ‘test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.’ [Citation.]”].) But the Court also adds the following caveat: if Defendant Peters is not served by August 11, 2026, the Court will dismiss the action against him. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 583.210(a).)

The Court VACATES the Court’s Motion to Dismiss scheduled for June 10, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 and SETS a Case Management Conference for August 17, 2024, at 8:30 am in Department 24.

Plaintiff to file the amended complaint within five court days. The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion.

CV-25-007555 – GARY, STANLEY vs VASQUEZMARIN, EMANUEL – a) Plaintiff Stanley Gary’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – GRANTED, and unopposed. b) Plaintiff Brian Harrison’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – GRANTED, and unopposed.

a) Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel for Plaintiff Stanley Gary

The unopposed motion of Attorneys Giorgio Cassandra and Elliott Eghbali from the law firm of BD&J, PC, to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Stanley Gary is GRANTED, effective on the filing of a proof showing service of the signed order on the client.

The Court notes that the information in the proposed order regarding the “next scheduled hearing” set forth in Item 7a is now stale. Moving Counsel are directed to submit a new proposed order within five court days that updates the information for the next case management conference to September 28, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24.

b) Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel for Plaintiff Brian Harrison

The unopposed motion of Attorneys Giorgio Cassandra and Elliott Eghbali from the law firm of BD&J, PC, to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Brian Harrison is GRANTED, effective on the filing of a proof showing service of the signed order on the client.

The Court notes that the information in the proposed order regarding the “next scheduled hearing” set forth in Item 7a is now stale. Moving Counsel are directed to submit a new proposed order within five court days that updates the information for the next case management conference to September 28, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24.

CV-25-011144 – LISTMAN, REBECCA LYNN vs DHILLON, SUKBINDER – Defendant’s Application of Matthew W. Casey to Appear Pro Hac Vice – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The unopposed application of Attorney Matthew W. Casey to appear as counsel pro hac vice on behalf of Defendant Sukbinder Dhillon is GRANTED.

The Court finds that the application complies with California Rules of Court, rule 9.40. The applicant has demonstrated that he is an attorney in good standing in another jurisdiction, is not a California resident or regularly engaged in practice in California, and is properly associated with California counsel. The verified application includes all information required under rule 9.40(d), including disclosure of prior pro hac vice appearances.

The Court further finds that the procedural requirements of rule 9.40(c), including notice and service on all parties and the State Bar, have been satisfied.

Accordingly, Matthew W. Casey is permitted to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this action, subject to compliance with all applicable California laws, rules, and professional responsibilities.

The Court was unable to locate a proposed order in the court file for this application. The Moving Party is directed to submit a proposed order within five court days that comports with this ruling.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***