Civil Tentative Rulings

October 09, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-26-000851 - CRUZ, JAIME CANALES vs NUNOSANTOS, STEPHANIE - Plaintiff's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel - GRANTED.

The unopposed motion to be relieved as counsel is GRANTED, effective on the filing of the proof of service of the signed order on the clients. Attorney Yahoudai is directed to submit within five court days a revised proposed order listing the next case management conference set for December 28, 2026, at 2:00 pm in Department 21.

On September 8, 2026, Attorney Yahoudai filed a motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs. There is no opposition in the Court file.

CV-26-008845 - KUYKENDALL, RAYLON vs STANISLAUS REGIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY - Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate - CONTINUED to November 12, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21.

The hearing is CONTINUED to November 12, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21. There is no proof of service in the Court file.

On September 16, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging Respondent Stanislaus Regional Housing Authority’s termination of Petitioner’s housing choice voucher pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.

“[P]roof of service of a copy of the filed petition must be lodged with the court prior to a hearing or any action by the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088.5.)

The Court intends to set a briefing schedule after service is completed.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-010714 - CERVANTEZ, YENI ALEJANDRA CORTEZ vs CITY OF TURLOCK - Defendant, City of Turlock's Motion for Summary Judgment - DENIED.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Governing Law

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that a cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more elements cannot be established or that a complete defense exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy; consequently, the moving party's evidence is strictly construed, the opposing party's evidence is liberally construed, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the opposing party. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-851; Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038; Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.)

The pleadings frame the issues on summary judgment, and the moving party's burden is measured against the allegations of the operative pleading. (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.)

Procedural Defects in Notice

The notice for the motion for summary judgment was defective. It listed the wrong hearing date and the address for a courthouse in Merced instead of Stanislaus County. The Court was unable to locate a timely corrected notice in the court file.

Incomplete Motion

The complaint contains three causes of action: (1) general negligence; (2) premises liability; and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress. The motion is completely focused on the premises liability cause of action; it does not address the other two causes of action at all.

A public entity is not liable for common-law tort liability unless authorized by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815.) Thus, a plaintiff generally cannot rely solely on ordinary common law negligence against the public entity. Furthermore, negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort, but rather, a species of negligence. (See Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 124, 129 [“Negligent infliction of emotional distress is a form of the tort of negligence, to which the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages apply.”].)

Thus, if the premises liability cause of action were found wanting, it is unlikely that the general negligence or negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of action could survive. Still, the supporting memorandum should have addressed these issues. Without any argument or citation to authorities regarding these additional causes of action, the motion is incomplete.

Merits

Defendant established that no City employee received a complaint or work order concerning the particular puddle at issue before Plaintiff’s fall, and Plaintiff testified that she did not know how long the puddle had been present. Defendant therefore met its initial burden, and Plaintiff failed to counter that with a triable issue concerning the City’s actual notice of the particular puddle under Government Code section 835.2, subdivision (a).

However, triable issues remain concerning constructive notice and the adequacy of the City’s inspection system under Government Code section 835.2, subdivision (b). The evidence, construed in Plaintiff’s favor, shows that the subject restroom was located next to an operating water feature (SUF Nos. 1–2; AMF Nos. 10–11); wet patrons foreseeably used the restroom during the day (AMF Nos. 3, 11–13); City employees had previously observed water or wet floors in the restrooms (AMF Nos. 14–16); the City’s written procedures recognized that excess water could create a slip hazard (AMF Nos. 17, 35); and routine cleaning generally occurred in the morning, while additional daytime service depended on a complaint or other specific notice (SUF Nos. 18–20, 24–25; AMF Nos. 18, 23–25, 27–29). From this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that wet-floor conditions were sufficiently recurring and foreseeable that a reasonably adequate inspection system required inspections during water-feature operating hours and would have discovered the alleged condition.

The Court does not determine on summary judgment whether the accident puddle had existed long enough for a particular inspection to discover it, whether the City’s inspection practices were reasonable, or whether Plaintiff’s description of the puddle and fall is credible. Those are disputed factual questions.

Evidentiary Objections

Defendant submitted evidentiary objections to the declarations of Kevin Golshani and Matthew Vista. The Court need rule only on objections to evidence it deems material to disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) The Court concludes that the challenged evidence is not material to its disposition of the motion. Even without considering the challenged portions of the Golshani and Vista declarations, the remaining evidence raises a triable issue concerning constructive notice and the adequacy of Defendant’s inspection system. The Court therefore declines to rule on the objections.

CV-26-002317 - MONTIEL, JESSENIA vs ARATA, GASTON, DDS - Defendant's Motion to Seal Specified Court Records - DENIED.

Defendants seek an order sealing the complaint and answer in their entirety. The Court finds Defendants have failed to establish the findings required by California Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).

To the extent Defendants rely on the privacy interests of a nonparty employee, the motion does not establish Defendants' standing or authority to assert those interests on the employee's behalf. No evidence demonstrates that the employee seeks the requested relief on her own behalf, and there was not even a declaration from the employee at issue submitted in support of the motion.

Even assuming the Court were to consider the employee's privacy interests, Defendants have failed to show that sealing the entire complaint and answer is narrowly tailored or that no less restrictive means exist.

The Court further finds that Defendants' asserted concerns regarding reputational harm, professional consequences, or the existence of unadjudicated allegations do not constitute sufficient overriding interests to justify sealing the foundational pleadings in this action. By Defendants’ logic, any licensed businessperson (e.g., dentist, doctor, lawyer, plumber, electrician, etc.) who was accused of sexual harassment or even professional negligence but then settled the case without adjudication would be entitled to seek sealing of related court pleadings.

The Court notes that a large portion of the supporting memorandum and declarations are devoted to attacking the merits of Plaintiff’s case; they draw similarities between this case and the Momani case, emphasize alleged weaknesses in Plaintiff's claims, indicate a lack of corroboration, and point out alleged credibility problems. But these issues have little bearing on whether an overriding interest justifies sealing court records.

The existence of a settlement agreement with a confidentiality clause likewise does not support sealing the complaint and answer. Dr. Arata specifically states at paragraph 8 of his declaration, “The confidentiality provisions [in the settlement agreement] concern only the settlement amount and payment terms; they do not restrict, and I do not ask this Court to restrict, the disclosure of factual information relating to Plaintiff's claims.” As the pleadings do not disclose settlement amounts or settlement payment terms, the confidentiality clause is irrelevant to this motion.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is DENIED.

CV-26-007326 - ARMAS, ERVIN E vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO INC - Defendant American Honda Motor Co. Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint - SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Plaintiff alleges that he purchased a certified pre-owned, used 2021 Honda Pilot. To the extent the first and third causes of action seek the replacement-or-restitution remedy applicable to a “new motor vehicle” under Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), the complaint does not allege that a manufacturer’s new-car warranty was issued with Plaintiff’s purchase as required by Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189, 196.

The second cause of action expressly invokes Civil Code sections 1791.1, 1792, and 1794 and alleges that the vehicle is a consumer good. The complaint simultaneously establishes that the vehicle was used. Accordingly, the claim does not fall within the provisions governing implied warranties for new consumer goods.

The complaint does not presently allege sufficient facts to state a claim against Defendant American Honda Motor Co. Inc. (“AHM”) under Civil Code section 1795.5. Although Plaintiff alleges generally that AHM issued a written warranty, that express warranties accompanied Plaintiff’s purchase, and that AHM was a manufacturer “and/or distributor,” the complaint does not allege facts showing that AHM acted as the distributor or retail seller making an express warranty with respect to the used vehicle, issued a separate certified pre-owned warranty with this sale, or participated in the transaction in a manner bringing AHM within section 1795.5. Facts asserted for the first time in the opposition cannot cure the operative complaint.

The demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED as to all three causes of action.

Leave to amend is GRANTED because Plaintiff has identified specific proposed allegations concerning AHM’s certified pre-owned program, its issuance of a separate warranty with the sale, and its alleged participation with the dealer in the certified pre-owned transaction. Thus, the Court cannot conclude at this stage that there is no reasonable possibility of stating a claim under Civil Code section 1795.5.

Plaintiff shall file and serve a first amended complaint within 20 days. Defendant shall respond within the time provided by law.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 23***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-24-002332 - CASTRO, MICHAEL ANDREW vs MUSCARELLA, STEVEN - Motion for Final Approval of Class and Representative Action Settlement; Service Payment; Reasonable Attorney’s  Fees and Costs - HEARING REQUIRED.

Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court finds the payment to the Class Representative, to the Class Members and the Class Administrator to be appropriate given all relevant factors of the settlement. The Court also finds Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees and costs to be reasonable and comparable to the award of fees generally issued by California Courts. The Court is therefore inclined to grant final approval of the Class Action Settlement herein. 

In accordance with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. §384, the Court sets a compliance hearing for May 20, 2027, at 8:30 am in Department 24 to confirm full administration of the settlement. 

Class counsel shall submit a compliance report no later than five (5) court days before the date of the hearing, which shall include the total amount that was actually paid to the class members pursuant to the subject settlement.  At the time of the compliance hearing, the Court shall amend the judgment to direct that the sum of the unpaid funds, plus interest as required by the statute, be distributed as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

In addition, the Court orders that Notice of the Court’s Order Granting Final Approval and Judgment shall be posted on the Settlement Administrator’s website for a period of at least 90 days.  (Civ. Code §1781(g); Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.771(b).

CV-25-003469 - JOHNSON, JESSICA DEANN vs DHANOTA, VIKKY - Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint against Selene Finance, LP [C.C.P. 872.510 & 464] - GRANTED, conditionally, unopposed.

Plaintiff seeks leave to add Selene Finance, LP as a defendant based on Selene’s acquisition, after the filing of the operative First Amended Complaint, of the beneficial interest in the deed of trust encumbering the property that is the subject of this action. Plaintiff's alternative third cause of action seeks partition of the property.

Code of Civil Procedure section 464 authorizes a supplemental complaint alleging material facts occurring after the former complaint. Section 872.510 further provides that a plaintiff in a partition action “shall join as defendants” persons having or claiming interests of record in the estate sought to be partitioned. Accordingly, because Selene acquired its interest after the First Amended Complaint was filed and now holds an interest in the property subject to the alternative partition claim, supplementation and joinder are appropriate. Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739.

However, Plaintiff shall correct the proposed supplemental complaint before filing. The proposed pleading alleges that Fifth Third Bank, National Association transferred its beneficial interest to Selene by an assignment recorded on June 20, 2026. The assignment submitted with the motion instead identifies Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Everett Financial, Inc. d/b/a Supreme Lending, as the assignor, and the Recorder’s endorsement reflects that the assignment was recorded on January 20, 2026, as Document No. 2026-0002478.

Plaintiff shall therefore correct the allegations concerning the identity of the assignor, the recording date, and any corresponding description of the chain of beneficial interests so that the supplemental complaint accurately reflects the recorded instrument or other properly supported facts.

Plaintiff’s motion is therefore granted conditionally as above stated.  

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted. Evidence Code § 452(d)

Plaintiff shall file the corrected supplemental complaint within 10 days of service of this order. Upon filing, the Clerk shall issue an amended or supplemental summons pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 464(c) and 412.10. Plaintiff shall serve Selene Finance, LP in the manner provided for initial service of summons and complaint and shall serve the previously appearing parties in accordance with applicable law.

The following are the tentative ruling for cases calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***