Civil Tentative Rulings

September 23, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-21-003139 – SOUZA, ANITA vs BERT, PATRICK J – Motion to Enforce Settlement – HEARING REQUIRED.

CV-24-009799 – GUTZLER, REBECCA vs DOE, JOHN – Defendant Lowe’s Home Centers’ Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, Summary Adjudication of Issues – CONTINUED to October 1, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 21.

The Court apologizes for the delay in ruling.

CV-25-005065 – ESQUIVEL, WILLIAMS ELIGORIO GUTIERREZ vs CITY OF MODESTO – Defendant’s Motion to Continue Trial - GRANTED.

Trial is reset for March 16, 2027 at 9:30 a.m., and the Mandatory Settlement Conference is reset for 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-21-005754 – GAVERT, JAMES vs CF MODESTO LLC – a) Defendant Andreh Saralou M.D.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint – SUSTAINED, with leave to amend; b) Defendant Andreh Saralou M.D.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint – MOOT; c) Defendant The Estate of Michael Brodie’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion to October 7, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22 of this Court.

a) SUSTAINED, with leave to amend; 

A cause of action for Elder Abuse must allege facts establishing that the defendant had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the plaintiff, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care; knew of conditions that made the plaintiff unable to provide for her basic needs; and denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the plaintiff (oppression, fraud, malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (recklessness).  (Carter v. Prime Healthcare (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396).

Statutorily, under the Elder Abuse Act and Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), as well as in common parlance, the function of a health care provider is distinct from that of an elder custodian, and the fact that some health care institutions, such as nursing homes, perform custodial functions and provide professional medical care does not mean that the two functions are the same. (Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 364). The Act requires a defendant to have had significant responsibility for attending to one or more of those basic needs of the elder or dependent adult that an able-bodied and fully competent adult would ordinarily be capable of managing without assistance, including food, clothing shelter, hygiene and hydration. (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc., (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148).

Defendant treated decedent as an in-patient wound care physician specialist, and a physician does not automatically assume the requisite caretaking or custodial relationship for a claim of neglect under the Act simply because the elderly patient happens to reside in a skilled nursing facility and the physician provides services to patients in that facility. (Frankland v. Etehad (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 503).

The Court notes a distinction may exist between at home wound care and in-patient wound care. (Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 382). However, the Second Amended Complaint fails to factually support its allegations that Defendant acted as more than a wound care specialist in this instance.  

Therefore, regarding Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of the Elder Abuse Act, the Court finds the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint insufficient at the pleading stage to establish a robust custodial or caretaking relationship between decedent James Gavert and Defendant that would support an elder abuse cause of action.  (Frankland v. Etehad, supra).

Defendant’s demurrer is accordingly sustained with leave to amend. (Code of Civil Procedure §§ 430.10 and 430.30

Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint within ten (10) of service of the Court’s ruling amplifying factual allegations of Defendant’s direct, daily involvement and responsibility for basic needs beyond the issuance of wound care orders or professional negligence. 

b) MOOT.

In light of the Court’s ruling regarding Plaintiff’s companion demurrer, this motion is rendered MOOT.

c) CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion to October 7, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22 of this Court.

CV-26-006115 – WELCH, SAVANNAH vs EAST BAY HC RESOURCE – Defendant East Bay HC Resource’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual Paga Claim; to Stay Plaintiff’s Representative Paga Claim; and to Stay All Discovery Pending the Court’s Ruling on this Motion, or in the Alternative Pending Completion of the Ordered Arbitration – GRANTED.

Without directly addressing the issue of interstate commerce, the court finds, to the extent that the parties agreed in their Arbitration Agreement that the Federal Arbitration Act would govern their disputes, that the parties’ Arbitration Agreement is governed by Federal Arbitration Act. (Tuufuli v. W. Coast Dental Admin. Servs., LLC, (2026)117 Cal. App. 5th 1048).

The Court also finds that a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties covering the instant dispute. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 1281.2; Gamboa v. NorthEast Community. Clinic, (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 158).

The Court also finds that Plaintiff voluntarily signed the arbitration agreement and that same was not a contract of adhesion. Furthermore, Plaintiff expressly appended her initials to the portion of the arbitration agreement that stated that she agreed to same voluntarily. (Defendant’s Exhibit B at page 4). The undisputed record also establishes that Plaintiff was able to save any information she recorded in the portal, exit and return to continue inputting any additional information preventing any finding of oppressions.

The court additionally finds that the arbitration agreement is a separate, standalone four-page document, prominently identified as a voluntary mutual arbitration agreement, with clearly defined subtopics which clearly stated that arbitration was voluntary and not a condition of employment. This negates a finding of oppression. Regarding Plaintiff’s claims of a lack of understanding of legal jargon and statutory references, a party is deemed to have read and to understand the contents of a document he appends his signature to. (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC, (2017)13 Cal. App. 5th 1152; Desert Outdoor Advertising v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 866). Moreover, an employer is not required to explain the terms of an arbitration agreement to an employee though a lack of explanation may contribute to a finding of procedural unconscionability. Any state law requiring that would contravene the FAA.  (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111).

The Court therefore finds that the agreement does not demonstrate any procedural unconscionability.  (Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a). Ramirez v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., (2024) 16 Cal. 5th 478; Lim v. TForce Logistics, LLC, (2021) 8 F.4th 992 (6 Cal. Jur. 3d Arbitration and Award § 47; OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, (2019) 8 Cal. 5th 111, 447; Lange v. Monster Energy Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 436; (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 771)

 

Substantive unconscionability typically is found in the employment context when an arbitration agreement is one-sided in favor of the employer without sufficient justification (Cook v. Univ. of S. California, (2024), 102 Cal. App. 5th 312, 321 reh'g denied (June 13, 2024).  Plaintiff makes general claims of substantive unconscionability but does not make a specific reference to any specific provision of the arbitration agreement that is alleged to be substantively unconscionable. The Court finds no substantive unconscionability regarding said arbitration agreement.

To the extent that the arbitration agreement provides Plaintiff may not bring any class, collective or representative action, this does not constitute an unlawful waiver of Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims.  (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, (2022)142 S. Ct. 1906, reh'g denied, 143 S. Ct. 6; Adolph v. Uber Techs., Inc., (2023) 14 Cal. 5th 1104). The Court also finds that this provision does not contribute to a finding of substantive unconscionability.

The Court also finds that said arbitration agreement exhibits a modicum of bilaterality and meets the Armendariz requirements (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.) (2000) 24 Cal. 4^th 83).

Accordingly, the Court finds that a valid enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties that covers the instant dispute. Defendant’s motion is hereby granted.

Plaintiff’s individual claims including his Private Attorney General Action (PAGA) claims are hereby ordered to arbitration. Plaintiff’s representative Private Attorney General Action (PAGA) action is hereby stayed pending the conclusion of said arbitration. (Adolph v Uber Techs Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5^th 1104, Code of Civil Procedure, § 1281.4)

For the avoidance of doubt, any discovery in this matter is also stayed pending the conclusion of arbitration.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is hereby granted. (Evidence Code section 452(d)).

Plaintiff shall submit Proposed Order that conforms with this ruling within five court days. 

PR-26-000396 – ESTATE OF EDMISTON, MAX WAYLON – Petitioner’s Motion for Change of Venue – GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and unopposed.

It appearing to the Court that Merced County is indeed the correct venue for this case, the Court GRANTS the unopposed request for change of venue.

Accordingly, the Court orders that the Clerk of the Court to transfer this case—including all pleadings, orders, and other documents in the court file—to Merced County. Any court costs associated with the transfer are to be paid by Petitioner.

As for the request to transfer the original will (which is currently lodged under Case No. PR-26-000399), it is DENIED without prejudice. Under Probate Code § 8203, there are procedural requirements for transferring an original will, one of which is that the Petitioner must provide “the case number of the proceeding in the court to which transfer is prayed.” In addition, there must be no proceeding pending in the court from which the transfer is requested. It therefore appears to the Court that the transfer of the estate case must be completed first. Then the original will can be transferred through an ex parte petition.

Moving Party is ordered to submit a proposed order within five court days that reflects this ruling.

PR-25-001101 – IN THE MATTER OF EOFF, MATTHEW – a) Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Two; Request for Monetary Sanctions – DROPPED; b) Petitioner’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admission, Set Two, Admitted; Request for Monetary Sanctions – DROPPED; c) Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses and Production to Requests for Production, Set Two; Request for Monetary Sanctions – DROPPED.

a-c) At the request of the Moving Party, the hearings on these motions are DROPPED. 

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-23-001880 – CARRILLO, ALFONSO MARTINEZ vs HERNANDEZ, JUAN – Defendant Dairy Farmers of America Inc.’s Motion for an Order Granting Application of Michael D. Mitchell to Appear Pro Hac Vice – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The application complies with the requirements of Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 9.40. Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

CV-24-005270 – DAVIS, MICKEY ERNEST vs COUNTY OF STANISLAUS – Defendant C.W. Brower, Inc.’s Motion for Terminating and Monetary Sanctions for Failure to Appear at Court Ordered Deposition – DENIED, as to terminating sanctions; GRANTED, as to monetary sanctions.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s 4-10-26 order constitutes misuse of the discovery process (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010(d), (g).)  However, under the circumstances the Court declines to award terminating sanctions at this time.  Plaintiff is again ordered to appear for his deposition on a date and time to be selected and properly noticed by defense counsel, no later than October 30, 2026.

In addition, Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to comply in this instance will likely result in terminating sanctions being granted in the future.

The Court further finds that moving Defendant is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with the instant motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§  2025.450(g), 2023.010, 2023.030; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1348(a).)   Therefore, Plaintiff is ordered to pay $540 in monetary sanctions to defense counsel.  This award is made in addition to the monetary sanctions previously imposed by the Court’s order on 4-10-26. 

CV-25-005279 – GONZALEZ, MARGARITA vs EVERBRIGHT LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories Set Two to Empower Solar Inc – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion to October 29, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court notes that the papers acknowledge that potential alternative procedures and/or  notice to affected customers were not fully explored by counsel during their previous meet and confer communications. Additionally, the Court notes that the parties submitted a stipulated protective order regarding the handling of confidential information after this motion was filed, which appears to demonstrate their ability to work together to resolve issues informally.

Therefore, the Court believes that the potential exists for the parties to informally resolve the issues presented herein if genuine efforts to meet and confer are continued in good faith. Therefore, the hearing is continued, as above, for that purpose, and the parties are ordered to meet and confer in person or by online video conference to discuss the issues herein. The parties are further ordered to submit a Joint Status Statement by October 20, 2026, describing their efforts to meet-and-confer and any resolution or narrowing of the issues they were able to achieve.

The parties are reminded that discovery is intended to be self-executing, and good faith communication should involve serious efforts at informal negotiation and resolution, not mere bickering between counsel. (See, e.g., Townsend v. Superior Court (EMC Mortgage Co.) (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431; Obregon v. Superior Court (Cimm’s, Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424.) Therefore, the Court expects the parties to make genuine efforts to informally resolve their differences with due civility to one another and to demonstrate their best efforts in this regard.

CV-25-005585 – DIAS, RYAN vs DIAS, MARCUS - a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, and for Monetary Sanctions Against Matthew Dias and his Counsel of Record, Kenneth R. Hedberg – HEARING REQUIRED; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set One, and for Monetary Sanctions Against Matthew Dias and his Counsel of Record – HEARING REQUIRED; c) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, and for Monetary Sanctions Against Marcus Dias and his Counsel of Record, Kenneth R. Hedberg – HEARING REQUIRED; d) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set One, and for Monetary Sanctions Against Marcus Dias and his Counsel of Record – HEARING REQUIRED; e) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, and for Monetary Sanctions as to Michelle Dias and her Counsel of Record, Kenneth R. Hedberg – HEARING REQUIRED; f) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set One, and for Monetary Sanctions Against Michelle Dias and her Counsel of Record – HEARING REQUIRED.

a-f) HEARING REQUIRED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-21-002797 – ROY, NATASHA H vs PRASAD, MALVIN – Referee’s Motion for Final Distribution of Proceeds of Sale, for Authority to Make Distribution, to Compel Co-Owners to Complete IRS Form W-9, for Referee Fees and Costs, for Authority to Maintain a Closing Reserve, and Request to be Discharged as Referee – GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part.

Good cause existing, Referee’s motion is granted except as to Referee’s request for payment of up to 10 hours of additional referee time without further Order of the Court. This request is denied. The Court acknowledges that Referee may have additional work regarding this matter after this hearing. However, Referee shall submit a request to the Court for any such payment supported by an invoice for same.

Similarly, regarding Referee’s request to hold $5,000 of the sale proceeds in reserve for 90 days for additional expenses, any use of said $5,000 shall be supported by invoices submitted to the Court. Code Civ. Proc., § 873.010, 120, 160, 520, 750, 810, 820).

Referee shall submit a Proposed Order which complies with the Court’s ruling no later than September 31, 2026.

CV-25-006645 – LVNV FUNDING LLC vs VELEZ, GEORGE – Defendant’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – MOOT.

Based on the Notice of Entire Settlement of this Entire Case on a conditional basis filed with the Court on 8/25/26, this

motion is now moot.

CV-26-000462 – CASAREZ, ENRIQUE vs WESTERN DENTAL SERVICES LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Order Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 473 - DENIED.

Civil Proc. Code §473 permits the Court to “relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Emphasis added).

Plaintiff’s belief that a failure to reserve a hearing to argue against a proposed tentative ruling automatically results in a decision against the party who failed to request a hearing is incorrect. Rather, Tentative Rulings are based on a review of the pleadings and arguments made in the moving and opposing papers.  Additionally, in this case, there were no procedural defects or deficiencies that resulted in the ruling at issue.

The Court’s ruling at issue had nothing whatsoever to do with Plaintiff’s misunderstanding of local hearing-reservation requirements, as evidenced by the fact that the Tentative Ruling is issued ahead of and typically is the basis of any request for a hearing, and the Court did not know and could not have known when the pleadings were under review and the Tentative Ruling issued that Plaintiff would fail to comply with court rules to request a hearing.

Therefore, as the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike was based on the merits of the pleadings - including Plaintiff’s Opposition and Defendant’s Response thereto - and was not the result of Plaintiff’s failure to properly request a hearing on the Court’s Tentative Ruling, the Court finds, notwithstanding the liberal application of this provision, that no basis exists in light of said provision to grant Plaintiff’s request. 

Based on the foregoing, even if Plaintiff provided new facts, circumstances and or evidence, which the Court finds that Plaintiff did not, reconsideration will not yield a different result. Code of Civ Pro §1008(a).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is hereby denied.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000669 – SBE LP vs RIVERA, JOSE J – Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons – HEARING REQUIRED.