Civil Tentative Rulings

October 28, 2026

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-26-007429 - HUDSON, SIOBHAN vs TEAM COMPANIES LLC - Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement - HEARING REQUIRED.

The motion states that out of state attorney A. Brooke Murphy has been admitted pro hac vice in this case but that does not appear to be accurate. An “attorney fees provision . . . is illegal to the extent it includes fees for services rendered by [attorneys who are not] a member of the California State Bar and [who have not] been admitted pro hac vice.” (Golba v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1265.)

The pro hac vice application for Ms. Murphy was filed on October 22, 2026.

Plaintiff’s counsel may wish to withdraw this pleading.

Plaintiff’s counsel also provides insufficient information for the Court to grant preliminary approval. The Court does not know the expected claim conversion rate, other than additional efforts if it exceeds two percent. Plaintiff suggests that the attorney fee provision can be reviewed at the final approval stage. While Rule of Court 3.769 outlines the final approval stage as requiring an appropriate inquiry into fairness, the Court must understand either via a percentage or lodestar method what the recovery for the class members is expected to be.

 

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-25-010939 - TWO JINN INC vs RIVERA, ALBERTO - Plaintiff's Motion to Deem Facts as Admitted or in the Alternative to Compel Responses from Defendant Ciara Rivera - GRANTED, unopposed.

The Court finds that Defendant has failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions, Set One, served on Defendant on August 19, 2026, without substantial justification.

Plaintiff’s motion is accordingly granted.

Accordingly, all objections to said Requests for Admissions by Defendant are hereby waived. Code of Civil Procedure §2033.280(a). Furthermore, said Request for Admissions, Set One, are hereby deemed admitted for all purposes including trial.    Civ Proc. Code §§.2033.010, 2033.020, 2033.250, 2033.280; St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762.

CV-26-006815 - CRISP, CURTIS vs FLORES, CRUZ - Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Complaint - GRANTED in part, with leave to amend, DENIED, in part.

A motion to strike is an appropriate procedural vehicle for attacking an unsupported request for punitive damages or other improper relief. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159).

To support punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege ultimate facts showing oppression, fraud, or malice within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294. Although evidentiary detail is unnecessary, conclusory allegations that merely characterize conduct as intentional, willful, malicious, or oppressive are insufficient. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6–7; Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)

The Complaint alleges facts that may support punitive damages against Defendant Cruz Flores, but it does not allege ultimate facts showing that an officer, director, or managing agent of Richter Entertainment Group (REG) had advance knowledge of an employee’s unfitness, authorized or ratified the alleged wrongful conduct, or personally engaged in oppression, fraud, or malice as required by Civil Code section 3294(b). (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563; College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704). The allegations that REG generally controlled event or security operations, and that discovery may establish authorization or ratification, are insufficient. 

Where punitive damages are sought against a corporate employer for the conduct of another, the complaint must allege facts showing that the corporation had advance knowledge of an employee’s unfitness and employed that person with conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety, authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct, or was itself guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. The required knowledge, authorization, ratification, or culpable conduct must be attributable to an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

A “managing agent” is an employee who exercises substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566–567, 573.) Corporate ratification requires actual knowledge of the wrongful conduct and its outrageous nature. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 726.)

Plaintiff’s allegations, if proved, could support punitive damages against Cruz Flores but do not adequately plead punitive damages against REG. Those allegations may support ordinary negligence, retained-control, or agency theories. They do not allege ultimate facts showing that an REG officer, director, or managing agent personally engaged in oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct; had advance knowledge that Cruz Flores or any security employee was unfit; authorized the alleged use of force; or acquired actual knowledge of the conduct and its allegedly outrageous nature and thereafter adopted or approved it.

The pleading also does not allege facts establishing that Cruz Flores was REG’s employee. Nor do the post-incident allegations sufficiently plead ratification by REG. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 726.)

Plaintiff’s reliance on Turner v Whittel is misplaced, as no allegations are made that an REG officer, director, or managing agent was present, and personally incited or abetted the assault, directed the alleged assault, or participated in the post-incident response.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED, in part with leave to amend, as to the following portions of the Complaint, but only insofar as those portions seek punitive damages against REG (Code of Civil Procedure § 436):

1. Attachment 11(g), page 6 of the Complaint:
   The phrase:

“and against any other defendant as permitted by law and according to proof.”

2. Attachment EX-2, page 33 of the Complaint, first sentence:
   The phrase:

“and against any Doe defendant or entity defendant shown by proof to have authorized, ratified, approved, directed, or engaged in the conduct through an officer, director, managing agent, or other person whose conduct permits punitive damages under California law.”

3. Attachment EX-2, page 33 of the Complaint, fifth sentence:
   The sentence:

“Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that discovery may establish that one or more entity defendants or Doe defendants authorized, ratified, approved, directed, permitted, or consciously disregarded the conduct described herein, including by failing to remove or control the person who applied force, permitting him to return toward the operational area, and treating Plaintiff—the victim of the assault—as the problem after he had been injured.”

4. Attachment EX-2, page 33 of the Complaint, final sentence:
   The phrase:

“and against any other defendant as permitted by law.”

These portions are stricken only to the extent they are asserted against REG. The allegations and punitive-damages request against Cruz Flores are not affected by this ruling

Portions Not Stricken

The motion is DENIED as to REG’s request to strike:

1. Paragraph 11(g), page 3 of the Complaint:
   The general reference to:

“punitive damages where permitted by law.”

2. Paragraph 14(a)(2), page 3 of the Complaint:
   The checked box requesting punitive damages.

The ruling is limited to punitive damages against REG. The Court declines to strike the complaint’s generic punitive-damages prayer and checked punitive-damages box to the extent those provisions support the claim against Flores. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 20 days if Plaintiff can allege facts satisfying Civil Code section 3294(b) as to REG. 

Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of service of the Court’s order.

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order within five court days that complies with the Court’s ruling.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-23-000893 - ASPIRE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY vs FERDIN, ISAAC MANUEL - Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Dismissal, Enforce Settlement and Enter Judgment against Defendants [CCP 664.6] - GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to judgment pursuant to the terms of the Stipulated Settlement Agreement entered into between the parties and the Court’s Order dated 10-23-23, by which the Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the parties’ settlement herein. Therefore, the motion is granted, the dismissal shall be set aside, and judgment shall be entered in Plaintiff’s favor against Defendant Ferdin herein for the total amount of $10,852.84, which represents the unpaid principal amount of $9,232.13 plus interest of $1,245.71, and costs of $375.

The Court notes that the proposed judgment submitted by Plaintiff incorrectly describes the respective amounts set forth in the motion. Therefore, Plaintiff shall serve and submit a form of proposed order and a revised form of proposed judgment consistent with the Court’s ruling herein. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

CV-24-010298 - HUNTINGTON, SHERRY MICHELLE vs HMCLAUSE INC - Plaintiff's Motion for an Order (1) Preliminarily Approving the Class Action Settlement; (2) Approving Notice of Settlement; (3) Setting Hearing for Final Approval - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 4, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court requires clarification of several items in the moving papers, as follows:

1. The moving papers indicate an estimated average payment of $1,936.46 per class member, after expenses; however, that figure fails to reflect deductions for the expenses sought to be approved herein.

2. The calculation of the “net settlement” is described differently in the moving papers as opposed to the settlement agreement, particularly as to whether the 35% PAGA penalty distribution to aggrieved employees is included in that calculation.

3. The settlement agreement purports to include a claim for PAGA penalties based on “sick leave” violations pursuant to Lab. Code § 246, which is not reflected in the PAGA notice sent to the LWDA in December 2024. Therefore, the Court is not convinced that this penalty claim is properly included in the PAGA release.

4. Likewise, the settlement agreement purports to include a “day of rest” claim, which does not appear to be asserted in the operative pleading herein.

5. In addition to the “sick leave” and “day of rest” claims described above, the settlement agreement purports to release additional class and PAGA claims for assorted violations (i.e., suitable seating,  workplace-temperature, vacation, etc.) that are not discussed in the moving papers or in counsel’s discussion of Plaintiff’s estimate of potential recovery in this action.

The Court requires clarification of these issues before ruling on the instant motion; therefore, the hearing is CONTINUED, as above, for this purpose. Class counsel shall provide supplemental information addressing these issues no later than November 25, 2026.

CV-25-004183 - TATUM, SUZANNE vs CITY OF TURLOCK - Defendant City of Turlock's Motion for Summary Judgment - GRANTED.

Preliminarily, the Court notes Plaintiff’s opposition includes a request for a continuance pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(h).  The Court presumes that request to be MOOT at this stage, in view of the Court’s previous continuance of the hearing to the instant date. The Court further notes that Plaintiff has not submitted any additional evidence supporting her opposition despite the continuance.

The Court finds that Defendant, as the moving party, has met the initial burden of demonstrating the City’s entitlement to summary judgment on the Complaint herein. The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of admissible evidence demonstrating a material factual dispute preventing judgment for Defendant. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden with regard to the specific issue of whether the subject pothole constituted a dangerous condition within the meaning of Gov. Code § 835 on the date of the accident. Specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s declaration calls into question the issue of whether Defendant’s descriptive and measurement evidence in this regard concern the specific pothole which Plaintiff alleges caused the accident. (See UMF 4.)

As the Court cannot ascertain from the evidence submitted whether the same pothole is being addressed by both sides herein, this appears to be a factual dispute that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.

However, the Court further finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden regarding whether the City had actual or constructive notice of the condition. Plaintiff submits no evidence contradicting the City’s claim that it lacked actual notice before Plaintiff’s report. Nor does Plaintiff submit admissible evidence from which the Court could determine that the condition existed long enough for a reasonable inspection program to reveal it before her accident. Even assuming Plaintiff could establish duration, she has not submitted evidence that the City’s roadway-inspection program was inadequate under the circumstances. (Gov. Code § 835.2(b).)

Therefore, because Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue that the City had actual or constructive notice of the particular condition in question, the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s evidence are OVERRULED.

CV-25-009847 - DOMINGUEZ, VERONICA ESTHER vs FCA US LLC - Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement - HEARING REQUIRED.

Counsel shall appear to confirm the status of the underlying settlement completion and to address any remaining disputed issues.

UD-26-000355 - CHAVEZ FAMILY TRUST vs WRIGHT, SHAUN - Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default & Default Judgment - HEARING REQUIRED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-24-007913 - GUTIERREZ, HOMAR vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC - Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees - GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part.

Plaintiff is the prevailing buyer and is entitled to recover reasonably incurred attorney fees, costs, and expenses under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). The parties’ Code of Civil Procedure section 998 settlement expressly reserved the amount of attorney fees and costs for determination by the Court. Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s entitlement to fees, but challenges the reasonableness of the hours claimed, the requested multiplier, and the claimed costs.

The Court begins with Plaintiff’s requested lodestar of $35,940.00. The Court finds the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff’s counsel reasonable in light of counsel’s experience, the evidence submitted concerning prevailing rates, and the absence of a sufficiently developed contrary market-rate showing. The Court nevertheless has independently reviewed the billing records and finds that certain hours were duplicative, excessive, clerical, or not yet actually incurred.  Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99; Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 470; Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785.

The Court therefore makes the following reductions:

1. $275.00 for the duplicative November 12, 2024 billing entry;
2. $1,087.50 for excessive or duplicative time associated with written discovery;
3. $675.00 for excessive time associated with the PMK motion to compel and related ex parte work, accounting for counsel’s use of templates and the absence of a hearing on the motion;
4. $490.00 for unnecessary second-partner review and internal conferencing;
5. $1,822.50, representing a 30 percent reduction to the time billed for motions in limine based on template use;
6. $805.00 for clerical or administrative work billed at attorney rates; and
7. $1,562.50 for anticipated hearing preparation and appearance time that had not been actually incurred when the motion was filed, bearing in mind that attorney fees awarded are based on time reasonably and actually expended. The Court declines to make Defendant’s remaining requested reductions. The remaining time was reasonably related to commencing and prosecuting the action, conducting discovery, preparing the matter for trial, and obtaining the settlement. That certain work was performed using templates, or ultimately was not filed or used because the action settled, does not by itself establish that the work was unnecessary when performed, though the Court has taken the use of templates into account in reviewing the requested fees.

After reductions totaling $6,717.50, the Court awards Plaintiff a lodestar of $29,222.50.

Plaintiff’s request for a 0.5 lodestar multiplier is DENIED. Although counsel represented Plaintiff on a contingent basis and obtained a favorable settlement, the action did not involve a demonstrated novel or unusually difficult legal issue, no deposition occurred, and the matter did not proceed to trial. Counsel’s experience, the contingent nature of the representation, and the delay in payment are adequately reflected in the approved hourly rates and lodestar. An enhancement is not necessary to arrive at a reasonable fee and would risk counting the same considerations twice. The request for a $17,970.00 lodestar enhancement is denied. Multipliers are not automatic and are awarded only when the lodestar does not adequately compensate counsel. (See E. Attorney Fees as Costs, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Trials & Ev. Ch. 17-E).

Plaintiff’s request for $767.95 in costs and expenses is GRANTED. Counsel’s declaration and supporting invoice establish that the expenses were incurred in this action, and Defendant has not identified any particular item that was unrelated, unnecessary, or unreasonable.

Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff:

• Attorney fees: $29,222.50
• Costs and expenses: $767.95
• Total award: $29,990.45

If Plaintiff seeks compensation for time actually spent preparing for and attending the hearing, Plaintiff shall state at the hearing the actual time expended and the identity and hourly rate of the attorney who performed the work. The Court will determine whether any additional amount should be awarded based on the showing made.

CV-25-001822 - NAITAMAR, SELMANE vs NAITAMAR, HAJER - Plaintiff's Motion to Determine Property Value - HEARING REQUIRED.

Based on the failure to file the required Appraisal Report, the Court requires a hearing for the parties to update the Court on the status of said appraisal.

CV-26-002929 - BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE vs BOGAN, TAI C - Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons - GRANTED.

The Court finds good cause under Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 to consider Defendant’s motion timely. Defendant declares that he electronically submitted the motion on May 4, 2026, but the submission was rejected because he did not pay the first-appearance fee. Defendant thereafter acted to correct the filing deficiency, and Plaintiff does not oppose the motion.

A registered process server’s return creates a rebuttable presumption of the facts stated in the return. Evid. Code, § 647. A defendant’s declaration denying service, if credited, may rebut that presumption. Fernandes v. Singh (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 932.

Here, the proof of service states that Defendant was personally served on April 4, 2026, and describes the person served as approximately 5 feet 4 inches to 5 feet 6 inches tall and weighing 160 to 180 pounds. Defendant denies that he was served, declares that he was elsewhere at the stated time, and states that he is approximately six feet tall and weighs closer to 380 pounds. The Court finds Defendant’s evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption arising from the return. (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383.

Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving facts establishing effective service and personal jurisdiction. (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866.) Plaintiff has filed a non-opposition and submitted no evidence rebutting Defendant’s showing. The record also does not establish substituted service or another statutorily authorized method of service. Actual notice alone is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, and the purported service of the summons and complaint on Defendant Tai C. Bogan is QUASHED. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 415.10, 418.10.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***