Civil Tentative Rulings

May 6, 2026

The following are the tentative ruling for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-009801 – GAUSTON CORP vs VEC PARTNERS INC – Plaintiff Gauston Corp's Motion to Compel Further Responses and a Production Re: Request for Production, Set One, And Request for Sanctions – HEARING REQUIRED.

In this case, overbroad requests met with overbroad objections. Discovery was not, as intended by the legislature, self-executing.

Defendant now asserts that it can produce some subset of the requested information. The Court anticipates the parties will, at minimum, provide concrete suggestions as to how to fashion an order, if one is still required.

Defendant MD retained Defendant CEI to serve as the design builder on a project in Oakdale, California. Defendant CEI subcontracted with Plaintiff Gauston Corp to perform concrete work. Plaintiff initiated this action alleging that it is owed $462,610.00 for performing contracting work pursuant to a contract. The First Amended Complaint in this matter alleges four causes of action. The first two causes of action—breach of contract and reasonable value—are alleged against Defendant CEI; the third cause of action—claim on mechanics lien release bond—is asserted against Defendant MD and another defendant.; the fourth cause of action—claim on payment bond—is alleged against CEI and another defendant.

Plaintiff served the below requests for production on Defendant MD. MD responded with objections and refused to produce any records in response to the requests.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:	All DOCUMENTS that relate to YOUR claim as against CEI in connection with the PROJECT.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:	All DOCUMENTS that relate to any defective work at the PROJECT.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:	All DOCUMENTS that relate to any delay claim YOU maintain in connection with the PROJECT.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:	All COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and CEI that relate to the PROJECT.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:	All COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and any third party (excluding YOUR attorney(s)) that relate to the PROJECT.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:	All of YOUR internal COMMUNICATIONS that relate to the PROJECT.

Plaintiff argues that the requests are relevant to the subject matter of the instant action. Plaintiff has not been paid for its work on the project and a CEI witness testified at deposition that the reason Plaintiff has not been paid is because of a separate ongoing dispute between Defendants MD and CEI. Defendant MD responds that the requests (1) are overbroad, not reasonably particularized, and unduly burdensome, (2) are not related to the lien claim against MD and instead related to the claims against Defendant CEI, (3) seek privileged information, and (4) violate privacy rights of MD and third parties.

All of the RFP’s contain some degree of overbreadth; RFP’s 2, 9, 10, and 11 are substantially overbroad. The parties’ meet and confer efforts were in some respects meaningful, but these efforts did not appear designed to resolve the issues.

MD asserts that discovery should be obtained via co-defendant CEI, but this claim is not supported. Further, MD’s apparent claim that there is an arbitration privilege triggered by the separate case is unsupported by case law.

The Court expects the parties to meet and confer prior to hearing and narrow or eliminate the issues.

CV-25-011123 - PEREZ, VELIA vs RUSHMORE SERVICING – Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint – HEARING REQUIRED.

Plaintiff’s opposition was filed four court days before the hearing. This is untimely (see Code Civ. Proc. § 1005) and deprived Defendant of the opportunity to file a reply brief. The Court’s options are to strike it, reset the hearing and permit a reply, or, with the permission of Plaintiff, go forward with the hearing.

The Court believes a reply would be helpful to it and is disinclined to strike the opposition.

CV-25-012124 - STANISLAUS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS vs CARDOSO, JOHN S – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order of Judgment Possession - GRANTED, unopposed.

Plaintiff has discharged its burden of demonstrating it is entitled to prejudgment possession by eminent domain of a 500,756 square foot fee acquisition from a portion of the real property identified as west of 201 Russell Road,, Modesto, County of Stanislaus, California, and bearing Stanislaus County Assessor’s Parcel Number 012-047-010f or its planned State Route 132 West  Freeway/Expressway Project for the public benefit and for all uses necessary, incidental and convenient thereto pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.

Plaintiff has, based on an appraisal, deposited the sum of $584,000.00 into the State Treasury as probable compensation that will be awarded Defendants in the eminent domain proceeding. (California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1255.410 and 1255.010 et seq.).

Plaintiff is hereby authorized and empowered to enter upon and take prejudgment possession of the subject property. Plaintiff shall be entitled to take possession of the subject property within  (30) days of service of this Order.

Service of this Order shall be made in the manner specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.450, subdivisions (d) and (f).  

If the owner(s) or occupant(s), if any, fail to deliver possession of the Property upon the demand of County pursuant to this Order, a Writ of Assistance may issue ex parte upon the affidavit of a representative of Plaintiff showing that such owner(s) or occupant(s), if any, have failed to deliver possession of the Property.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-25-003480 - I TO I LLC vs M&D OPTICAL FRANCHISE LLC – Plaintiff I to I LLC’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint – DENIED without prejudice.

Plaintiff I to I LLC moves for leave to file an amended complaint. This instant matter was initiated on April 14, 2025. On August 20, 2025, Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. On September 4, 2025, the Court denied the application for preliminary injunction. On February 17, 2026, Plaintiff submitted the instant motion to filed an amended complaint.

Plaintiff’s moving papers do not fully comply with California Rule of Court, rule 3.1324(b). The papers do not explain the reasons why Plaintiff seeks to add new defendants or why it is necessary and proper to do so. Nor do the moving papers explain why plaintiff seeks to remove a defendant when it does not appear there is a request for dismissal of that defendant in the case file. The Court also notes that Plaintiff is seeking to drop certain causes of action but there is also no request for dismissal of those causes of action the case file.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED without prejudice.

PR-25-001101 – IN THE MATTER OF EOFF, MATTHEW - Objector's Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings - DENIED without prejudice.

The motion is procedurally defective. First, there is no evidence that the Moving Party met and conferred with Petitioner by one of the means set forth in Code of Civil Procedure § 439 before filing this motion.

More importantly, the parties have both relied on extrinsic evidence in this motion, which is not permitted. Specifically, both parties have submitted declarations, factual exhibits, and other materials outside the pleadings. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a general demurrer, “and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) This is not a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication.

Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings functions as a general demurrer, Moving Party’s fourth ground for the motion—i.e., that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible—is improper. The only statutory bases for a respondent to move for judgment on the pleadings are either: (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading, or (2) the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that respondent. (See Code of Civil Procedure § 438(c)(2)(B).)

In addition, new arguments and evidence were raised for the first time on reply, which deprives the opposing party of a fair opportunity to respond.

Also, the Court notes that Petitioner filed a surreply. Surreplies are not authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure and may not be filed without specific permission from the Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court did not reach the merits of this motion and instead DENIES it without prejudice. The motion may be renewed if procedurally proper. Any renewed motion must be confined to the face of the pleadings and judicially noticeable matters, and must be preceded by a good faith meet-and-confer.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Marie Silveria sitting on assignment in Department 23:

CV-25-005435 – IN RE 517 FORT HENRY DRIVE MODESTO CA 95354 – a) Petitioner's Petition Regarding Unresolved Claims and Deposit of Undistributed Surplus Proceeds of Trustee's Sale- HEARING REQUIRED.

 b) Claimant's Motion for Claim of Surplus Funds – HEARING REQUIRED.

a-b) It has come to the Court’s attention that a probate proceeding was initiated with regard to the estate of James Shryock, the deceased trustor of the property at issue herein, and that a will and a creditor’s claim were submitted in that proceeding which may affect the distribution of the subject property. Therefore, in the interests of justice, the Court proposes to take judicial notice of the probate proceeding (PR23-919), the existence of the will, and the creditor’s claim filed therein. (Evid. Code § 455; Estate of Russell (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 758, 765–766; Pike v. Archibald (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 114, 117.)

Therefore, the parties shall appear at the time of the hearing to present information relevant to the propriety of taking judicial notice of the above matters and the tenor of the matters to be noticed. (Evid. Code § 455.)

CV-25-012214 - SANCHEZ, ALEJANDRA CHAVEZ vs AMERICAN PALLET INC - Defendant American Pallet & Lumber, Inc.’s Motion for Protective Order Limiting Discovery; and Request for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $6,435.00 - DENIED.

Plaintiff withdrew all written discovery on March 25, 2026, and appeared for deposition on April 27, 2026. With no outstanding interrogatories or inspection demands and the deposition completed, the immediate disputes underlying the motion are moot.

While Defendant raises concerns about recurrence, the Civil Discovery Act generally contemplates reactive judicial intervention in response to actual discovery served, not hypothetical future disputes. In addition, while CCP § 2019.020(b) permits the Court to set the sequence and timing of discovery “in the interests of justice,” the California Supreme Court has held that courts “should not do so without good reason.” (Rosemont v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 709, 713.) Here, the Court finds that Defendant has not sufficiently demonstrated good cause justifying an order altering the normal order of discovery at this time.

That being said, the Court notes that the record appears to reflect significant meet-and-confer dysfunction and a pattern of escalating discovery conflict between the parties herein. Therefore, the Court reminds counsel that discovery is intended to be self-executing, and good faith communication should involve serious efforts at informal negotiation and resolution, not mere bickering between counsel. (See, e.g., Townsend v. Superior Court (EMC Mortgage Co.) (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431; Obregon v. Superior Court (Cimm’s, Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424.) The Court remains optimistic that the informal resolution of the issues presented herein signals counsel’s commitment to genuine good faith efforts with regard to any future disputes, and the Court expects strict compliance with the meet-and-confer requirements of the Discovery Act in this regard.

Lastly, the parties are cautioned that if similar disputes recur, the Court will consider the appointment of a discovery referee to manage discovery and reduce the burden on the Court and the parties.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-21-002070 – ESPINOZA BAIL BONDS INC vs ARTEA, JOSE MIGUEL - Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Correct Judgment – DENIED without prejudice.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s initiation of this lawsuit by Plaintiff’s Counsel in the wrong name of Espinoza Bail Bonds Inc. as opposed to the correct nomenclature of Jose Espinoza dba Espinoza bail bonds amounts to more than a clerical error. (Bastajian v. Brown, (1941)19 Cal. 2d 209).   A corporation and an individual sole proprietor operating under a fictitious business name are separate legal entities, and substituting one for the other constitutes adding a new party rather than correcting a clerical error. ( Meller & Snyder v. R & T Properties, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313 n.5.).

As a result, the court may not make the requested amendment nor grant the requested relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(d)).

Plaintiff’s alternative request for an order vacating the default judgment and set aside the judgment so that Plaintiff may amend the complaint to correct Plaintiff’s name is procedurally defective for not being included in the notice of motion or motion. Plaintiff’s filing also does not appear to fully comply with the notice of motion and motion requirements of California Rules of Court 3.1110 and 3.1112. Therefore, the Court declines to address the request for alternative relief.

Plaintiff shall submit a Proposed Order within five court days that complies with this ruling.

CV-25-002159 - LOPEZ, ARTURO HIPOLITO, Jr. vs RODRIGUES, JOHN GILBERT - Plaintiff's Petition for Relief from Claim-Filing Requirements of Government Code 945.4 – GRANTED, unopposed.

The court finds that Petitioner’s Petition meets the requirements of Government Code § 946.6(a)(b) and (c)(1).

Accordingly, Petitioner’s petition is granted. Petitioner is hereby relieved from the requirements of Section 945.4.

To the extent that Petitioner has already filed suit in this matter, said suit is deemed compliant with the applicable requirements of the Government Code.

The Court will sign the Proposed Order.

CV-25-003773 - PHILLIPS, JOHN vs RAMSEY, TERRY GENE - Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Dismissal for Limited Purpose of Approving Minor's Compromise and Receiving Proof of Deposit – GRANTED.

Good cause existing, Plaintiffs are granted relief from their premature dismissal of this action on January 27, 2027, for the limited purpose of obtaining the Court’s approval of the settlement reached between the parties and executed on December 30, 2025. ( Code of Civ. Proc.  §§372(3), 473 (b and § 128 (8); Scruton v. Korean Air Lines Co., (1995) 39 Cal. App. 4th 1596; Pearson v. Superior Court (2012), 202 Cal.App.4th 1333; Williams v. Superior Court (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 36.) 

The Court’s order of January 27, 2026, dismissing this action with prejudice is hereby vacated for said limited purpose.

A Court’s Motion to dismiss is set for September 3, 2026. Counsel is ordered to file their motion prior to that date.

The Court will sign the Proposed Order.

A Court’s Motion to Dismiss is set for September 3, 2026. Counsel shall file their motion prior to that date.

CV-25-009665 - NAVA, PEDRO SOSA vs FCA US LLC - Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration - GRANTED.

The Court finds that Defendant has discharged its burden of demonstrating evidence of a  written agreement between the parties regarding the present dispute according to the terms of the standalone Arbitration Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant executed by Plaintiff on March 7, 2025 regarding the purchase of Plaintiff’s 2025 RAM 1500, VIN: 1C6SRFUP9SN579902 and concurrently signed with the Retail Installment Sales Contract regarding said vehicle. (Brockman v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., (2025), 114 Cal. App. 5th 569, reh'g denied (Oct. 16, 2025); Gamboa, v NorthEast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158; Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transp., (2022) 75 Cal. App. 5th 748).

The Court further finds that Plaintiff did not challenge the authenticity of her signature on said agreement. Plaintiff’s challenges to the admissibility of the Retail Sales Installment Contract,  standalone Arbitration Agreement, the Warranty Information Handbook and a copy of the Warranty Claims Summary for said vehicle ( Exhibits A, B, C and E respectively) are sustained on the asserted grounds. (Evid. Code §§ 1200, et seq § 1400, 403,  and 702.)) The objection to Exhibit E, Ms. Graham’s letter to Plaintiffs requesting that they arbitrate their dispute is overruled to the extent that said letter was authored by Ms. Graham and would constitute a business record.

The supplementary declaration of Peter Robin in his capacity as the Finance Manager of Turlock Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram where said vehicle was purchased, and as joint custodian of said dealership’s business records permits the admission of said Retail Sales Installment Contract and Arbitration Agreement.  (Chambers v. Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC, (2021) 71 Cal. App. 5th 583; (Evid. Code, § 1271).

Though the law favors contracts for arbitration of disputes between parties, there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate.  (In re Uber Techs. Wage & Hour Cases, (2023), 95 Cal. App. 5th 1297, review denied (Jan. 17, 2024), cert. denied sub nom Uber Techs., Inc. v. California, 145 S. Ct. 142 (2024), and cert. denied sub nom. Lyft, Inc. v. California, 145 S. Ct. 143 (2024))

When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter, including arbitrability, courts generally should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts. (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transp., supra). A party's acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement. (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transp., supra).

Mutual assent, as a requirement for an enforceable contract, is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings. (Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC, (2021) 69 Cal. App. 5th 512).

A party who signs a document is presumed to have read it and to understand its contents. (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC, (2017)13 Cal. App. 5th 1152). Additionally, if a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he may not avoid its terms on grounds that he failed to read it before signing it, absent fraud, coercion, or excusable neglect. (Bolanos v. Khalatian, (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 1586). Plaintiffs do not attest to an inability to read and understand English, or the documents presented to them. Plaintiffs also do not allege any fraud or coercion that would serve to permit the avoidance of the terms of the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, even failing to read an agreement before signing it does not prevent formation of a contract. (Iyere v. Wise Auto Grp., (2023) 87 Cal. App. 5th 747).

Furthermore, a party presenting an agreement to arbitrate does not have an affirmative duty to explain the contents to the party to whom the agreement is being presented. ( Brookwood v. Bank of Am., (1996) 45 Cal. App. 4th 1667). Based on Plaintiff’s undisputed signature on the Agreement to Arbitrate, the Court finds that Plaintiff agreed  “that any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between” Plaintiff and Defendant including the present dispute be submitted to arbitration. 

An express warranty is any “written statement arising out of a sale to the consumer of a consumer good pursuant to which the manufacturer ... undertakes to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the consumer good ... .” (§ 1791.2, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) (Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC, (2022) 77 Cal. App. 5th 209, aff'd, 17 Cal. 5th 189 (2024).  No consideration was therefore required for the issuance of said warranty to Plaintiff by Defendant Plaintiff’s purchase of said vehicle was enough for said issuance. However, as to the agreement to arbitrate, the court finds that Defendant’s undertaking to pay for the costs of arbitration provide valuable consideration for the Agreement to Arbitrate. (Civ. Code § 1605; Prop. California SCJLW One Corp. v. Leamy, (2018) 25 Cal. App. 5th 1155; Horton v. Kyburz (1959) 53 Cal.2d 59). 

The Court also finds that the provisions of the Agreement to Arbitrate by which Defendant  undertook to pay all fees and costs for the arbitration, by which the arbitrator may resolve only disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant and “may not consolidate claims without the consent of all parties”, and permitting Plaintiff and Defendant to bring claims against each other in “ your or its individual capacity and not as a Plaintiff or class member in any class or representative action”,  all support a finding that Defendant is a party to said agreement and has undertaken obligations under said agreement by which it intends to be bound and agreed to resolve any disputes between the parties including “claims arising out of your warranty” to arbitration. (Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Grp., (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 539).

Additionally, even if Defendant were not found to be a direct party to the arbitration agreement, the Court finds that Defendant may compel Plaintiff’s claims herein to arbitration as a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement. (Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Grp., (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 539).  

Based on the foregoing findings, the Court need not address the issue of equitable estoppel.

A procedural unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion. (Swain v. LaserAway Med. Grp., Inc., (2020), 57 Cal. App. 5th 59, as modified (Nov. 3, 2020). However, procedural unconscionability alone does not invalidate a contract but requires courts to closely scrutinize the substantive terms to ensure they are not manifestly unfair or one-sided (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, (2019) 8 Cal. 5th 111, 447).

Furthermore, when there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, the degree of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low, and the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of substantive unconscionability is high. (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 771). Notably, the degree of unfairness required for unconscionability of an arbitration agreement must be as rigorous and demanding for arbitration clauses as for any other contract clause. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra).

The existence of an opt out provision weighs against a finding of procedural unconscionability, but the circumstances under which the party was expected to exercise said opt out are also relevant. Evidence of lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, and or surprise where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form would support a finding of procedural unconscionability. (Swain v. LaserAway Med. Grp., Inc., (2020) 57 Cal. App. 5th 59, as modified (Nov. 3, 2020)

The court finds, to the extent that the arbitration agreement included an opt out provision, was a standalone one-page agreement with important provisions capitalized and or bolded that it exhibited little to no procedural unconscionability. ((Swain v. LaserAway Med. Grp., Inc., (2020) 57 Cal. App. 5th 59, as modified (Nov. 3, 2020); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 899).

As to substantive unconscionability, the Court finds that the agreement requires both parties to submit their disputes to arbitration and exhibits a “modicum of bilaterality”.  (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal. 4^th, 83).  Plaintiff has not raised any issues of substantive unconscionability that would render said arbitration agreement unenforceable. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, (2019) 8 Cal. 5th 111, 447; Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 771).

As to the provisions contained in the Warranty Booklet, the Court finds that the warranty Defendant seeks to rely on does not constitute an agreement between the parties, but a “written statement arising out of a sale to the consumer of a consumer good pursuant to which the manufacturer ... undertakes to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the consumer good ... .” (Civil Code § 1791.2, subd. (a)(1), Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC, (2022) 77 Cal. App. 5th 209, aff'd, 17 Cal. 5th 189 (2024) ( Emphasis added). There was no assent by Plaintiff to the terms included in the warranty booklet. Mutual assent, as requirement for an enforceable contract, is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.(Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC, (2021) 69 Cal. App. 5th 512,; see also Civ. Code § 1550).

The Court therefore finds that there was no arbitration agreement between the parties as far as the Warranty Booklet is concerned.

The Court  finds that a valid enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties as to the present dispute based on the standalone Agreement to Arbitrate. (9 U.S.C.A. § 2; Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.2)

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is hereby granted.

Plaintiff’s claims are hereby referred to arbitration, and this matter is stayed pending the conclusion of said arbitration. (9 U.S.C.A. § 3;Civ Proc. Code § 1281.4).

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order within five (5) court days conforming to this ruling.

The following is the tentative rulings for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000194 - SMITH, MICHAEL S vs HOLM, MISTY – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Discovery – HEARING REQUIRED.