Civil Tentative Rulings

September 9, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-25-011517 – HILTERBRAND, RANDY vs TESLA INC – Defendant Tesla Inc’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages Allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint – DENIED.

Defendant Harrison is alleged to have been in the driver’s seat while intoxicated, used his Tesla’s autopilot which disengaged after multiple warnings, and then drove into oncoming traffic. Plaintiff alleges multiple prior failings of Tesla’s autopilot system.

A motion to strike punitive damage allegations tests the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the truth of the allegations. At this stage, the Court accepts the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construes them liberally. While conclusory allegations alone are insufficient, punitive damages may be pleaded by alleging ultimate facts showing malice, oppression, or fraud within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294.( Code of Civil Procedure section § 436; Turman v. Turning Point of Central Calif., Inc. (2010) 191 CA4th 53, 63; Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1;  Grieves v. Sup. Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159). 

Here, the Second Amended Complaint alleges more than a defective product or ordinary negligence. Plaintiff alleges Tesla possessed extensive knowledge of risks associated with Autopilot, including driver overreliance, prior incidents, and the availability of alternative safety measures, yet consciously chose to continue the challenged conduct.

Tesla notes correctly that a significant number of the alleged similar incidents do not appear all that similar. 

Nonetheless, these allegations are sufficient to support a claim that Tesla acted with conscious disregard for the safety of others. (Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1); King v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, (2020), 53 Cal. App. 5th 675, as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 24, 2020; College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704; Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890).

Tesla's argument that the Second Amended Complaint merely relies on generalized allegations concerning autopilot isn’t correct. Whether Plaintiff can ultimately establish facts sufficient to reach trial and prevail at trial is not yet before the Court.

At the pleading stage, the Second Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts from which malice, oppression, or fraud may reasonably be inferred. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d1).

The Court likewise concludes that the Second Amended Complaint adequately alleges the involvement of Defendant’s officers, directors, or managing agents, specifically the CEO.  

Orient Handel v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 684 at 697 is cited by Tesla as requiring specificity in pleading the specific reliance. Tesla’s observation that the nexus between the public statements made by it, Harrison’s reliance on those statements, and the collision, are thin.

But Orient Handel is not a pleadings case; it’s a post-trial case. At the pleading stage, it appears to be enough.

The Court finds Plaintiff has alleged sufficient ultimate facts to support punitive damages against Tesla. The motion to strike punitive damage allegations, including the related punitive damage prayer, is therefore DENIED.

Plaintiff shall submit a proposed order that conforms to the Court’s ruling no later than September 16, 2026.

Defendant Tesla, Inc. shall file and serve its responsive pleading within 15 days.

CV-26-003474 – RIVERA, LUIS vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO INC – Defendant American Honda Motor Co. Inc’s Motion to Compel Arbitration – GRANTED.

A party moving to compel arbitration bears the burden of establishing the existence of a written arbitration agreement. Once the moving party makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidence disputing the agreement's existence. Here, Defendant produced the Warranty Booklet containing the arbitration provision. The Court finds Defendant thereby satisfied its initial burden. (Kostandian v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 872; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233, 244; Martinez v. BaronHR, Inc. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 962, 967).

The Court further finds the recent published decision in Kostandian v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 872 controlling on the issues presented. Kostandian addressed the same Honda Warranty Booklet arbitration provision and concluded Honda satisfied its burden by producing the booklet and reciting the arbitration terms.

Plaintiffs have not produced evidence sufficient to create a material factual dispute regarding the existence of the arbitration agreement. Plaintiffs' declarations state they were not informed about arbitration before signing their purchase documents and were not shown the Warranty Booklet before executing the sale contract. However, neither Plaintiff states that he or she never received the Warranty Booklet, received it only after delivery, or otherwise disputes receiving Honda's written warranty materials.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges receipt of Honda's written warranties and seeks relief based upon those warranties. Defendant correctly notes that Plaintiffs' claims arise directly from the warranty relationship governed by the Warranty Booklet and support the application of the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel to Plaintiffs’ claims herein. Equitable estoppel generically precludes a party from asserting rights he otherwise would have had against another when his own conduct renders assertion of those rights contrary to equity. (Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209).

The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs' reliance on Norcia. As discussed in Kostandian, Norcia is distinguishable where, as here, the plaintiff's claims are founded upon the manufacturer's written warranty and the arbitration provision is contained within the warranty materials upon which the claims are based.  (Kostandian, supra).

The Court likewise rejects Plaintiffs' argument that the arbitration provision fails for lack of consideration. The arbitration provision imposes mutual obligations on both parties, broadly applies to claims by either side, and includes a bilateral agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of the warranty relationship. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the absence of consideration sufficient to invalidate the provision.

Plaintiffs also fail to establish unconscionability. Any procedural unconscionability is minimal. The arbitration provision appears in the Warranty Booklet, first at page 3 of same and then at page 6, contains a conspicuous notice directing purchasers to the arbitration terms, and provides a 30-day opt-out procedure. Plaintiffs do not contend they exercised the opt-out right.

Plaintiffs have also not established substantive unconscionability. The arbitration agreement incorporates AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, allows the arbitrator to award available remedies, and requires Defendant to bear the majority of arbitration costs. Plaintiffs' concerns regarding discovery limitations are speculative and reflect characteristics of arbitration generally rather than any one-sided contractual term.

The Court further rejects Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss and jury-trial-waiver arguments for the reasons set forth in Defendant's moving and reply papers. Plaintiffs Complaint is not based on and Plaintiff’s do not rely on the Magnusson Moss Warranty Act. Plaintiffs have not shown that federal warranty law renders this arbitration provision unenforceable, nor have they cited authority sufficient to invalidate the agreement on constitutional grounds

Plaintiff’s claims are referred to arbitration and this matter is stayed pending the conclusion of said arbitration. (9 U.S.C.A. § 3;Civ Proc. Code § 1281.4). A Case Status Review is set for April 9, 2027 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21; all other dates are vacated.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-002391 – MUNOZ, JUAN HERNANDEZ vs GUTIERREZ, VELIA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees – DENIED, and unopposed.

Pursuant to Civil Code section 1780(e), Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $31,203.00 and costs in the amount of $275.00. There is no opposition or reply on file.

“[A] plaintiff seeking an award of attorney fees from a defaulting defendant must request those fees at the time the plaintiff requests entry of default.” (Garcia v. Politis (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1480; Code Civ. Proc., § 585; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.)

The Court entered judgment by default on June 23, 2026, which included an award of costs in the amount of $1423.16. “[A] party seeking entry of a default judgment must apply for all of the relief sought—including attorney fees—when application is made for entry of default.” (Garcia, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at 1479.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

CV-26-004768 – ABREGO, MARCELLA vs PATTERSON JOINT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT – Defendant’s Demurrer to Complaint – OVERRULED as moot.

On August 6, 2026, Defendant filed the instant demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint. The original complaint was superseded by the First Amended Complaint filed on August 25, 2026. Consequently, the demurrer to the original complaint is OVERRULED as MOOT.

CV-26-007417 – In Re BERMUDES, JUANITA – Petitioner’s Petition for Approval for Transfer of Structured Settlement Payment Rights by and Between Juanita Bermudes and MIC-BRY8 LLC Pursuant to California Insurance Code 10134 – DENIED without prejudice.

The proposed transfer does not appear to be in the payee’s best interest. Berkshire Hathaway has a hardship program that will pay Ms. Bermudes over $40,000 more for the same transfer. In addition, it does not appear Ms. Bermudes was aware at the time of filing her declaration that Petitioner is required to pay the first $1,500.00 towards the cost of independent professional advice. Instead, Ms. Bermudes did not seek any professional advice.

Accordingly, the petition is DENIED without prejudice.

PR-24-000861 – In the Matter of 2011 FRINK FAMILY TRUST – Petitioner’s Motion to Reopen Case and Vacate Request for Dismissal – DENIED with instructions.

Petitioner voluntarily dismissed this proceeding without prejudice on July 22, 2025. The dismissal was entered the same day.

As Petitioner acknowledges, relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) is unavailable. Section 473(b) requires that any motion for relief be made within six months after entry of the dismissal. Petitioner's motion was filed more than one year after entry of dismissal. The Court therefore lacks authority to grant relief under that statute.

Petitioner alternatively relies on Probate Code sections 800, 1000, and 17206, Code of Civil Procedure section 187, and the Court's inherent authority. The Court is not persuaded that those authorities provide an independent basis for vacating a voluntary dismissal after expiration of the statutory period governing relief from dismissals. Petitioner has cited no authority authorizing such relief under the circumstances presented here.

The Court recognizes that the dismissal was entered without prejudice and therefore did not operate as an adjudication on the merits. The Court further acknowledges that Petitioner is entitled to file his petition.

The Court has clarified with the clerk’s office that Petitioner can and should file his petition as a new case under a new case number and apologizes to Petitioner for any confusion.

For the reasons set forth above, the motion is DENIED, but with the instruction that the Court has authorized the petition to be filed under a new case number.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-23-007325 – MARTINEZ, JORDAN P vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – DROPPED, pursuant to Defendant’s Notice of Withdrawal submitted on 8-28-26.

CV-25-007201 – DELGADO, EFREN GOMEZ vs SAVEMART COMPANIES LLC – a) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Responses to Form Interrogatories and Request for Monetary Sanctions – DENIED, as MOOT. The Court declines to award sanctions. b) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Responses to Special Interrogatories and Request for Monetary Sanctions – DENIED, as MOOT. c) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Responses to Request for Production of Documents and Request for Monetary Sanctions – DENIED, as MOOT.

a-c) DENIED, as MOOT, based on Plaintiff’s service of verified responses. The Court declines to award sanctions.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

 

CV-25-009148 – PEREZ, HENRY ERNEST vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Henry Ernest Perez and Request for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $2,430.00 – HEARING REQUIRED.

In light of Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order to limit his deposition, the Court requires a hearing. 

The Court is inclined to grant the motion but orders Plaintiff to attend the hearing with proof of his alleged severe disability.

Both parties should come prepared to discuss the terms and reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff’s deposition.

The following is the tentative rulings for a case calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000530 – US BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION vs BONETA, JUAN – Defendant’s Motion for Order Deeming Requests for Admission Admitted – HEARING REQUIRED.