February 20, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-010016 – REEVES, MARNIE ANN vs RENNER, JEREMY LEE – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Admissions (Set Two) – DENIED in full. Sanctions are issued against Plaintiff in the amount of $4,650.

The Court does not appear to have the Code Civ. Proc. section 2033.050 declaration. Even assuming there was one, there does not appear to be justification for most of these RFA’s.

The Court has gone through each request individually and finds that Plaintiff’s claim that no substantive answers occurred to be in error.

For RFA’s 41, 42, and 48 onward, no substantive response was given, but to the extent there is specificity as to the reasons for these requests is shown,  no justification appears to exist for exceeding the 35-RFA presumptive limit. 

RFA 62 is sufficiently unclear and relies on an exhibit to justify the objections made.

Further, the RFA’s are generally compound.

RFA 43 appears relevant and requires an answer, but got one – Defendant disavows any connection to this person who was paid money by Plaintiff.

RFA 44 is related, but given the response to 43, no response is necessary.

RFA 45 was answered. The claim that Defendant did not sufficiently investigate his own email address is unsound.

RFA 46 was answered.

RFA 47 was answered, except for blood relations, which he asserts are unknown. This is a reasonable response.

Defendant appears to have carefully chosen to give objection-only answers to inquiries about people who were not sent money,  but generally provided answers about those who were sent money. This calculated effort to not get close to the line where the Court might have to make difficult decisions appears consistent with best discovery practices.

In considering sanctions, the Court must determine whether, under Code Civ. Proc. section 2033.290(d), sanctions would be unjust. The Court considers Plaintiff’s pro per status, and would not sanction technical failures or an arguably meritorious motion. Here, though, the Court believes it would not be an appropriate (and perhaps impermissible) use of discretion to deny sanctions.

The Court is aware of the billing rates in Los Angeles County, but cannot justify the requested rates in Stanislaus County. The Opposition and Separate Statement are of the expected quality for experienced attorneys.

The Court allows nine hours at $450/hour for attorney Alvarez for a total of $4,050 in sanctions. The Court allows one hour at $600 per hour for attorney Sorrell. The sanctions total $4,650, payable in sixty days.

CV-25-000819 – MALLEA, JACINTO STEPHEN vs CENTRAL VALLEY SPECIALTY HOSPITAL – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Requests for Monetary Sanctions of $10,210 – GRANTED in part; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, and Request for Monetary Sanctions of $27,760 - GRANTED in part.

The Court considers only the prior filings and the joint statements and not any newly submitted separate statements.

Given the progress made by the parties, the Court does not appoint a discovery referee against the parties wishes. No sanctions are issued.

To the specifics:

a) Special Interrogatory 4: The request is denied. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s answer is not credible. A false answer is a different issue than an insufficient answer.

Special Interrogatory 23: The request is granted. It appears that the dates of the trainings are not provided. This order does not apply to daily pre-shift reminders.

Special Interrogatory 28, 29: The request is provisionally denied. Defendant has asserted that no contention of non-compliance is being made “at this time.” This is, of course, the time as the trial is set for August.

By declining to provide additional information, Defendant will be unlikely to be permitted to raise it. If Defendant wishes to raise the issue at this time or at any future time, Defendant should provide a complete list, since  “This is not an exhaustive list,” is not sufficient to answer the interrogatory. The purpose of discovery is both to determine facts of the case and to limit issues.

Special Interrogatory 35: The request is denied. Plaintiff’s justification is essentially for the question, “Did you consider Plaintiff a high risk for pressure injury upon admission?” At this point, the contention interrogatory appears to call for expert opinion.

b) RFP 27. Granted in part. Sign-in sheets and time sheets appear excessive. The Court assumes that CVSH has personnel records either for budget or other purposes which indicate the number of staff and type of staff for each day or week. The Court orders those provided for the revised dates.

RFP 32: Granted. The group assignment sheets appear relevant to the inquiry, or, at minimum, likely to lead to discoverable evidence. Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff has enough to determine whether the bedsores were a systemic issue makes assumptions that may or may not be correct.

RFP 39: Granted in part. Any website portions about care given at the hospital which have since been removed or altered as of the date of the service of the RFP’s shall be provided. Further, Defendant shall provide the links to any portions of the web page which did not exist at the time of the service of the RFP’s.

The Court has no information whether the prior page is accessible via the Wayback Machine or other internet archives.

Website representations may be relevant. But Defendant is correct that the portions of the website which are publicly accessible now need not be assembled by it.

The Court declines to issue sanctions on any of these given the procedural history and partial wins by each party.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-006455 – WELLS, WESLEY vs CASTRO, JUAN – Defendant’s Motion for Order Compelling Cross-Defendant and Plaintiff Wesley Wells to Pay Administrative Fines and for Other Relief – DENIED.

The motion is procedurally defective. It was filed only 15 court days before the hearing date and served (electronically and by overnight service) only 16 court days before the hearing date. In addition, the email address for Attorney Dhillon was misspelled on both the proof of service attached to the motion and the one attached to the reply. The Court further notes that both the opposition and reply were untimely filed and served. The Court refers the parties to Code of Civil Procedure § 1005(b) for the deadlines applicable to a motion. Future untimely papers may be stricken by the Court or disregarded, or an untimely motion may be denied solely on a procedural basis.

Moreover, Responding Party is correct that the type of relief sought in this motion is not the proper subject of a motion. Administrative fines imposed by the Board of Barbering and Cosmetology are outside of the scope of motion practice. While the Court may ultimately determine that one side owes the other side money because of the fines or that one side is responsible for paying them, that determination would be made as part of a final judgment and cannot be granted as interim motion relief.

PR-25-001212 – ESTATE OF HEANEY, PATRICK – Petitioners Amanda Heaney and Tina Heaney’s Motion for Order Prohibiting Sale or Transfer of Estate Property Pending Determination of Authority - CONTINUED to March 10, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

An opposition to this motion was late-filed on February 17, 2026. The Court therefore CONTINUES this matter to give Moving Parties an opportunity to file a reply. Any reply is to be filed and served no later than March 3, 2026.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Marie Silveria sitting on assignment in Department 23:

2024004 – WELLS, TINA vs KEMP, HIRAM E – Defendant’s Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court notes that there is no notice of lis pendens contained in the court’s file in this matter, and Defendant has failed to provide sufficient evidence that a lis pendens has been recorded against the subject property in this action. Therefore, Defendant shall appear to provide evidence of the same at the time of the hearing.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-22-001828 – LONGORIA, OSCAR vs CITY OF MODESTO – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – Hearing Required.

Given the transfer of this Motion for Summary Judgment to Department 24, a hearing is required to address/clarify any issues this court may have that may not have been  addressed in the original hearing, following which a final ruling will be issued.  

CV-22-004332 – ARNOLD, KIMBLY vs STEARNS LENDING SERVICES LLC – Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

As a result of issues with the Court’s calendar, this matter is continued to March 10, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

CV-24-002421 - THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA vs MIRANDA, RAYMOND – a) Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Response to Request for Inspection of Documents and Tangible Things – GRANTED; b) Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Response to Request for Admissions – GRANTED; c) Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Response to Form Interrogatories, Set No. One – GRANTED.

a) The Court finds that Real Party in Interest Raymond Miranda failed to timely respond to Petitioner’s properly propounded Request for Inspection served on Real Party in Interest Raymond Miranda on July 14, 2024, or at all without substantial justification.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff is entitled to inspect all the requested documents and things therein. (Code of Civ. Proc., sections, 2017.010, 2031.300(a)).

Any objections by Real Party in Interest to said discovery are hereby waived.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion is hereby granted.  Said Real Party interest is ordered to identify and produce all the requested documents and things therein stated without objection and to permit Petitioner's counsel to inspect and copy said documents and things within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order. (Code of Civ. Proc. section 2031.300(a) and (b)).

b) The Court finds that Real Party in Interest Raymond Miranda failed to timely respond to Petitioner’s Request for Admissions propounded on said Real Party in Interest on July 14, 2024, or at all.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion is hereby granted. Therefore, any objection to said Requests for Admission, including one based on privilege or on the protection of work product are hereby waived and the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in said Requests for Admissions are deemed admitted. (Civ. Proc. Code section 2033.280 (a)).

c) The Court finds that Real Party in Interest Raymond Miranda has failed to timely respond to Petitioner’s properly propounded Form Interrogatories served on said Real Party in Interest on July 14, 2024, or at all without substantial justification. The Court further finds that Petitioner is entitled to responses to said discovery. (Code of Civ. Proc., sections 2017.010, 2030.290(b))

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion is hereby granted. Any objections by said Real Party in Interest to said discovery are hereby waived. Defendant is hereby ordered to provide verified, code compliant, objection free responses to said Form Interrogatories, Set One within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order. (CCP sections 2030.290(a) and (b); 2031.300(a).)

CV-25-001434 – ALESARGEZ, HELEN  vs CITY OF TURLOCK – Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint – OVERRULED.

The court finds, accepting the truth of factual allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint, assuming facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the asserted claims that Plaintiff has adequately pled factual allegations that may avoid the bar of non-compliance with the timely legal action initiation requirements of the Government Claim Act  (State of California ex rel. Bowen v. Bank of Am. Corp., (2005)126 Cal. App. 4th 225; (Capito v. San Jose Healthcare Sys., LP, (2024) 17 Cal. 5th 273).  Liapes v. Facebook, Inc., (2023) 95 Cal. App. 5th 910; Citizens for a Responsible Caltrans Decision v. Dep't of Transportation, (2020) 46 Cal. App. 5th 1103; Government Claims Act. Gov. Code, § 945.6, subd. (a))

When the relevant facts are not clear such that the cause of action might be, but is not necessarily, time-barred, a demurrer based on a statute of limitations will be overruled. (SLPR, L.L.C. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., (2020) 49 Cal. App. 5th 284 and Geneva Towers Ltd. P'ship v. City of San Francisco, (2003) 29 Cal. 4th 769).

A public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the Government Claims Act based on the affirmative conduct of its agents or employees which prevent or deter the filing of a timely claim.  (Munoz v. State of California, (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767;Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051; City of Stockton v. Superior Court, (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730; Santos v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.,(2017)17 Cal.App.5th 1065; Sofranek v. County of Merced, (2007)146 Cal.App.4th 1238).

Furthermore, whether equitable estoppel applies is normally a question of fact for the court to determine (Santos v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., (2017).17 Cal.App.5th 1065).

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer is hereby overruled.(Code of Civ Proc § 430.10).

Defendant shall file their Answer within fourteen (14) days of the service of notice of this order. (Code of Civil Proc. § 472 (b)).

CV-25-007027 – JAKOBS, KEITH C vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA – Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 396b and 397(a)(c) - DENIED.

The statutes governing a change of place of trial manifest an intent to secure to every litigant the right to trial before a fair and impartial tribunal, and to provide a procedure for the enforcement and protection of such right. (People v. Ocean Shore R.R., (1938) 24 Cal. App. 2d 420; Paesano v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 17).

The default rule is that the proper place of trial in an action is the Defendant’s residence. (Civ. Proc. Code ? 395). However, the special provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act venue statute control in cases involving FEHA claims or in cases involving FEHA claims joined with non-FEHA claims arising from same facts. (Brown v. Superior Ct., (1984) 37 Cal. 3d 477). Therefore, the proper venue for Plaintiff’s FEHA claims would prevail in this matter.

The Court therefore finds that” the county in which the person claiming to be aggrieved would have worked or would have had access to public accommodation, but for the alleged unlawful practices,” in this case is Stanislaus County. (Government Code ? 12965 (c)(3); Malloy v. Superior Court (2022) 83 Cal. App. 5^th 543). Venue in this matter is therefore proper in Stanislaus County.

The Court notes that exercising its discretion to transfer venue herein based on the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice is discretionary. (International Inv. Co. v. Merola (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 439; Malloy v. Superior Court (2022) 83 Cal. App. 5^th 543;  Rycz v. Superior Court of San Francisco County (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824). While generally the convenience of employees of either party will not be considered on a motion for change of venue for convenience of witnesses, when such employees are being called by an adverse party, the court may properly consider their convenience. (International Inv. Co. v. Merola (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 439; J. C. Millett Co. v. Latchford-Marble Glass Co. (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 218.)

Defendant provided affidavits of its employees whom it asserted Plaintiff would call as witnesses as a basis for requesting a change of venue based on the convenience of witnesses. Plaintiff has submitted a sworn declaration stating his intent at trial to only call his doctor and cousin to state his case in chief. Under those circumstances the USCB witnesses would not be called to testify at trial by Plaintiff, an adverse party. As a result, a basis no longer exists for the court to consider the convenience of the alleged witnesses regarding the change of venue herein requested.

On the other hand, Plaintiff has provided a declaration under seal to the court attesting to a health condition that would render him unable to appear and testify at a trial in Santa Barbara County. Therefore, even if venue were improper herein the Court find that good cause exists given Plaintiff’s said ill health and the materiality of his testimony, to exercise its discretion to retain this matter in Stanislaus County. ( Lieberman v. Superior Court (Volkswagen of America, Inc.) (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 396; Rycz v. Superior Court of San Francisco County (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824).

The Court therefore finds that Stanislaus County is the proper venue herein. (Government Code section 12965 (c)(3); Civ Proc Code section 397).

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is Transfer Venue is hereby denied.

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted. (Evid. Code section 452 (h)).

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***