Civil Tentative Rulings

October 06, 2026

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-003518 – HERNANDEZ, OLEGARIO vs GROWER DIRECT NUT COMPANY INC – Compliance Hearing - CONTINUED to December 8, 2026, at 8:30 am.

Having reviewed and considered the declaration filed on September 28, 2026, the Court CONTINUES the hearing to December 8, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21 for (1) a supplemental declaration from the settlement administrator (to be filed no later than five court days before the continued hearing) addressing the status and disposition of any uncashed settlement checks, and (2) a proposed order authorizing Apex to transfer all unclaimed funds to the cy pres recipient.

The settlement administrator filed a declaration on September 28, 2026. The declaration states that payment of the following is complete: PAGA Counsel’s attorney fees; PAGA Counsel’s attorney expenses; settlement administration fees. The following payments/checks were sent on May 5, 2026: payment to LWDA; PAGA Settlement checks to the Aggrieved Employees. The deadline for the Aggrieved Employees to cash their settlement award check is November 1, 2026. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, uncashed funds will be sent to the cy pres recipient, CASA of Stanislaus County.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-23-004628 – COUGHLIN, SAMANTHA vs FRESHPOINT CENTRAL CALIFORNIA INC – Compliance Hearing – CONTINUED to November 10, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21.

On September 28, 2026, the settlement administrator submitted a declaration stating that there exists an amount of $6,717.60 that remains uncashed after the September 9, 2026 check cashing deadline. The uncashed funds will be sent to California State Controller’s Office – Unclaimed Property Fund on October 24, 2026.

Accordingly, the hearing is CONTINUED to November 10, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21. Settlement administrator is directed to provide a supplemental declaration at least five court days before the continued hearing confirming the uncashed funds were sent to the California State Controller’s Office – Unclaimed Property Fund.

CV-26-005580 – JENNINGS, ANDY vs AMERICOLD LOGISTICS LLC – a) Defendant Americold Logistics LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Harassment/Hostile Work Environment – SUSTAINED without leave to amend; b) Defendant Americold Logistics LLC’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages – GRANTED with leave to amend.

a) For the below reasons, Defendants’ demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action for Harassment/Hostile Work Environment is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. The Court intends to sign the proposed order.

Defendant Americold demurs to Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Harassment/Hostile Work Environment on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.10(e) and 430.50(a). Defendant argues that the FAC alleges only personnel management decisions and thereby fails to allege the type of severe or pervasive conduct that amounts to harassment based on his disability. Plaintiff’s opposition was filed and served one day late, but Defendant timely replied.

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), codified at Government Code section 12940(j), prohibits employees from harassing employees on the bases of certain protected characteristics, including “physical disability.” (Gov. Code, § 12940(j)(1).)

The California Supreme Court has explained “that ‘harassment consists of a type of conduct not necessary for performance of a supervisory job. Instead, harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives. Harassment is not conduct of a type necessary for management of the employer’s business or performance of the supervisory employee’s job.[’] [Citations.]” (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 645–646.)

Here, the First Amended Complaint does not allege conduct that amounts to harassment based on Plaintiff’s alleged physical disability. The FAC alleges that Defendant gave Plaintiff gloves that were too small, Defendant would not give Plaintiff gloves that fit despite repeated requests, and that Defendant assigned Plaintiff to work in the freezer unit without adequate training. The FAC further alleges that after Plaintiff was diagnosed with a cold-related condition affecting his hands and fingers, Defendant characterized Plaintiff’s refusal to use inadequate personal protective equipment as a refusal to work and Defendant isolated Plaintiff in a separate area of the facility. Plaintiff’s allegations relate to conduct necessary to performance of a supervisory job and thus do not sufficiently allege harassment. The FAC does not allege conduct that “sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt the victim's emotional tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim’s ability to perform the job as usual, or otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim’s personal sense of well-being.” (Gov. Code, § 12923.)

Plaintiff’s cited authorities are inapposite. Government Code Section 12923 merely provides that a single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment. Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any conduct amounting to harassment under FEHA. Roby confirmed the distinction between discriminatory conduct and harassment, explaining that “harassment often does not involve any official exercise of delegated power on behalf of the employer.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706, as modified (Feb. 10, 2010).) “[H]arassment focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee[.]” (Id.) And Janken likewise confirms that “harassment consists of a type of conduct not necessary for performance of a supervisory job. Instead, harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives. Harassment is not conduct of a type necessary for management of the employer's business or performance of the supervisory employee's job.” (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 63.)

Leave to Amend

It does not appear that Plaintiff can plead sufficient facts to allege harassment under FEHA. Accordingly, leave to amend is DENIED.

b) The motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED with leave to amend. The Court intends to modify and sign the proposed order. Plaintiff shall serve and file any amended complaint no later than 21 days after service of the signed order.

Defendant moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages from the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s opposition was filed and served one day late, but Defendant timely replied.

Punitive damages are available “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294.) “Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294.) “ ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Id.)

The issue is whether Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pleads oppression, fraud, or malice within the definition of Civil Code section 3294 in order to support a prayer for punitive damages. It does not. The First Amended Complaint contains only conclusory statements that “Defendants conduct was willful, deliberate, oppressive, and/or in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights.” (FAC, ¶¶ 51, 60, 66, 72.) It “is devoid of any factual assertions supporting a conclusion petitioners acted with oppression, fraud or malice.” (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

In addition, the First Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient allegations to support punitive damages against the corporate defendant because it does not sufficiently allege that Michelle Doe was an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant Americold. (Civ. Code, § 3294(b).)

PR-24-001121 – IN THE MATTER OF THE MARIA A GONZALEZ 2016 IRREVOCABLE TRUST - DENIED.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

First, the motion is procedurally defective. It was served by mail on the opposing party less than 16 court days plus 5 calendar days before the hearing date. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005(b).) Second, the date of the hearing set forth in the body of the notice of motion is incorrect.

Third, the Moving Party has failed to present any court-recognized evidence (such as a certified hearing transcript) confirming the Moving Party’s contention that the petition was dismissed without prejudice. The Court notes that the probate examiner’s contemporaneous notes indicate that the dismissal was WITH prejudice.

The Moving Party’s argument that “[a] hearing cannot be set on a matter dismissed with prejudice” is based on an incorrect assumption. The Court can and does accept papers and set post-dismissal motions for hearing on a regular basis.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-22-004004 – GRAY, EDWARD vs SKY HOTELS INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and Paga Settlement and Class Counsel Award and Service Awards – HEARING REQUIRED.

Based on the moving papers and supporting evidence, the Court is inclined to GRANT the motion. It appears that proper notice to the settlement class has been given in compliance with the law and as required by the Court’s order granting preliminary approval.  Having considered the unopposed motion herein and the supporting declarations and evidence, the Court finds that the settlement was entered into good faith, is fair, reasonable and adequate, and satisfies the standards for final approval under California law.  (Civil Code §1781; Code Civ. Proc. §382; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.769.)  Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the proposed settlement and the associated fees and costs are approved as set forth in the motion and supporting papers, as follows:

Fees and costs of Settlement Administrator: $9,790

Payment to Class Representatives: $50,000

PAGA allocation to LWDA (75%) and class members (25%):  $30,000

Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees:  $161,666.67

Class Counsel’s costs:  $30,000

In accordance with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 384, the Court sets a compliance hearing for November 6, 2027 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23 to confirm full administration of the settlement.  Class counsel shall submit a compliance report no later than 5 court days before the date of the hearing, which shall include the total amount that was actually paid to the class members pursuant to the subject settlement.  At the time of the compliance hearing, the Court shall direct that the judgment be amended to order that the sum of the unpaid funds, plus interest as required by the statute, be distributed as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

Class Counsel shall submit a revised proposed order incorporating the above revisions for the Court’s signature.

CV-24-000951 – PALON, ERIK vs CENTRAL VALLEY TRAINING CENTER – Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of Private Attorneys General Act (CAL. Labor Code 2698, et Seq.) Settlement Agreement and Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, General Release Fee, and Settlement Administration Costs – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on the information provided in the moving papers and supporting evidence, including the supplemental declaration of counsel, the Court finds the proposed settlement is within the range of reasonableness and provides for relief that is genuine, meaningful, and consistent with the State’s goal of benefitting the public through enforcement of its labor laws. Therefore, the Court approves the settlement and the distribution of the settlement funds, including the amounts allocated to attorney’s fees and costs, and to the representative plaintiff, as set forth in the moving papers.  (Lab. Code § 2699(l)(2).)

The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff.

CV-25-007803 – THOM, HILLARY vs COUNTY OF STANISLAUS – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories – CONTINUED, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, to November 17, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents – CONTINUED, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, to November 17, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

CV-25-008202 – RUIZ, VICTORIA REYNA MENDOZA vs MERLIN PLASTICS CALIFORNIA INC – Defendants and Cross-Complainants Merlin Plastics California, Inc. and Peninsula Plastics Recycling, Inc.’s Motion for Good Faith Settlement - GRANTED, and unopposed.

Upon review of the papers and evidence submitted, and in view of the lack of opposition, the Court finds sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the subject settlement was entered in good faith and within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(a)(2) and Tech-Bilt Inc. v. Woodward Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488.  

Therefore, pursuant to Code Civ. Proc.§ 877.6, a dismissal with prejudice shall be entered in favor of the Merlin Plastics California, Inc. and Peninsula Plastics Recycling, Inc. as to the Complaint herein. All existing or future claims by any party, joint tortfeasor, or co-obligor against Merlin Plastics California, Inc. and/or Peninsula Plastics Recycling, Inc. for equitable comparative contribution or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault or otherwise, arising from the facts or claims at issue in this lawsuit, are forever barred.

The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by the moving parties.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-24-002904 – VALLEY FIRST CREDIT UNION vs MOUTON, JORDAN – Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively Summary Adjudication – DENIED, in part, GRANTED, in part, unopposed.

Plaintiff's Complaint seeks summary judgment or summary adjudication. Plaintiff's notice of motion and separate statement identify only Causes of Action Three, Four, and Five as the subjects of the alternative request for summary adjudication. The Complaint asserts a Sixth Cause of Action for injunctive relief and a Seventh Cause of Action for declaratory relief against Defendants including Villamante. Accordingly, adjudication of the three noticed causes of action does not dispose of the entire action against Villamante Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is therefore DENIED.

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing each element of the causes of action on which judgment is sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) The motion must be supported by admissible evidence and a separate statement identifying the material facts claimed to be undisputed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) The

Defendant Villamante filed a general denial but has submitted no evidence identified in the materials presently before the Court creating a triable issue of material fact in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. The absence of an evidentiary opposition does not relieve Plaintiff of its initial burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171; Mosley v. Pacific Specialty Ins. Co. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 417, as modified on denial of reh'g (June 24, 2020); Denton v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 779; Thatcher v Lucky Stores (2000) 79 Cal.App.4^th 1081.

The evidence establishes that on October 5, 2019, Mouton entered into a Loan and Security Agreement with Plaintiff concerning a 2015 Cadillac Escalade, VIN 1GYS4MKJ5FR530179. The agreement granted Plaintiff a security interest in the vehicle and authorized Plaintiff to take possession upon default. Plaintiff's electronic lien records reflect perfection of its lien. The Poole declaration attests that Mouton failed to make the payment due June 8, 2023 and that the outstanding principal balance was $15,918.55 as of April 12, 2024.

The evidence further establishes that the vehicle was taken to AAMCO Transmissions of Vallejo for repair. The Adams declaration authenticates correspondence concerning Plaintiff's efforts to recover the vehicle. The correspondence states that Defendant Villamante was personally involved in the dispute concerning its release. An April 11, 2024, email from Poole states that the repair shop wanted approximately $4,500 to release the vehicle, that Plaintiff offered $2,050, that the offer was refused, and that the shop represented that it intended to conduct a lien sale even though Plaintiff had received no lien-sale notification. An April 15 communication further states that the repossession company spoke with “James (owner)” concerning release of the vehicle.

The Bureau of Automotive Repair records submitted with the Adams declaration identify AAMCO Transmissions of Vallejo as the licensed business and Villamante as its president, secretary, and treasurer

On April 30, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel sent AAMCO a written demand for immediate surrender of the Escalade and stated that Plaintiff was tendering $1,825, by cash or cashier’s check, as the statutory amount Plaintiff maintained was due under Civil Code section 3068. The letter additionally authorized Daybreak Metro to take possession on Plaintiff's behalf. Adams declares there was no response to the letter and subsequent attempts to contact Villamante were unsuccessful.

Civil Code section 3068 provides a possessory lien for qualifying vehicle repairs and storage. Where the lien arises from work or services performed with the registered owner's consent, however, the lien is extinguished unless the lienholder applies for authorization to conduct a lien sale or commences an action within 30 days after the lien arises. Once the lien is extinguished, the lienholder must surrender the vehicle to the legal owner upon demand and the statutory tender required by subdivision (c).

Plaintiff's evidence establishes that the vehicle had been at the repair facility for substantially longer than 30 days before Plaintiff sought its return and that Plaintiff had received no lien-sale notification when the parties' dispute arose. Plaintiff thereafter expressly demanded return and offered statutory tender. There is no contrary evidence before the Court establishing a superior possessory right in Villamante.

Therefore, the motion for summary adjudication of the Third Cause of Action is GRANTED.

Plaintiff has established its perfected security interest, Mouton’s default, Plaintiff's resulting immediate right to possession, Villamante’s involvement in retaining the vehicle, and Plaintiff's unsuccessful demand for its return. (Adams Declaration, Poole Declaration)

Code of Civil Procedure section 667 authorizes a judgment in an action for recovery of personal property for possession of the property or its value if delivery cannot be had, together with damages for detention.  Plaintiff has established a superior right to possession of the 2015 Cadillac Escalade, VIN 1GYS4MKJ5FR530179.

The motion for summary adjudication of the Fourth Cause of Action for Conversion is GRANTED.

Conversion requires the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession, the defendant's wrongful exercise of dominion over the property, and resulting damages. A defendant's intentional refusal to return property after a demand for its return may constitute substantial interference sufficient to establish conversion. CACI No. 2100; Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240.

Plaintiff's security interest and Mouton’s default established Plaintiff's immediate possessory interest. The evidence further establishes Villamante’s personal participation in the negotiations concerning release of the vehicle, Plaintiff's demand for its return, Plaintiff's stated tender, and the continued failure to surrender the vehicle. (Adams Declaration, Poole Declaration).

Plaintiff has therefore established the interference necessary for conversion, and no contrary evidence creates a triable issue.

The motion for summary adjudication of the Fifth Cause of Action for Trespass to Chattel is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s alternative motion for summary adjudication of the Third Cause of Action for possession/claim and delivery, Fourth Cause of Action for conversion, and Fifth Cause of Action for trespass to chattels is GRANTED, subject to the limitations concerning damages and relief stated below.

The Court does not, on this record, treat the $15,918.55 outstanding loan balance as automatically establishing an identical money judgment against Villamante.

Civil Code section 3336 provides that the presumptive measure of conversion damages is the value of the property at the time of conversion, with interest from that time, or an amount sufficient to indemnify the injured party for the natural, reasonable, and proximate loss caused by the conversion, together with fair compensation for time and money properly spent pursuing the property. CACI No. 2102 likewise places upon Plaintiff the burden of proving the amount of compensable conversion damages and identifies fair market value at the time of conversion as the usual measure.

Plaintiff's evidence reflects two different concepts. The $15,918.55 figure represents Mouton’s outstanding loan balance, while the KBB material separately identifies a $25,702 retail valuation for the Escalade.

Plaintiff argues that, although the vehicle's asserted value exceeded its secured debt, it seeks only the $15,918.55 it would have recovered through its collateral. That theory may support limiting Plaintiff's recovery to the value of its secured economic interest rather than recovering the vehicle's full value. The loan balance, however, is not itself Villamante’s contractual obligation. The evidence must establish the compensable loss resulting from Villamante’s tort, and any recovery must avoid duplication if Plaintiff subsequently obtains the vehicle or its proceeds. However, because the undisputed evidence establishes that Plaintiff's secured debt was $15,918.55 and Plaintiff submits evidence that the converted collateral was worth substantially more than that amount, Plaintiff may establish $15,918.55 as the value of its economic interest lost through the conversion. To prevent double recovery, however, credit is required for the vehicle or proceeds if the collateral is subsequently recovered.

Civil Code section 3336 measures interest from the time of conversion. The submitted evidence reflects communications concerning surrender of the vehicle before April 15, while the formal written demand and stated statutory tender are dated April 30, 2024. Plaintiff has not sufficiently established why April 15, 2024 is the legally operative conversion date for purposes of the particular interest award requested

Plaintiff's request for 10 percent prejudgment interest beginning April 15, 2024, is therefore DENIED without prejudice.

Accordingly:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Third Cause of Action for Possession/Claim and Delivery is GRANTED.
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Fourth Cause of Action for Conversion is GRANTED.
4. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Fifth Cause of Action for Trespass to Chattels is GRANTED.
5. Plaintiff's request to presently enter a $15,918.55 monetary award against Villamante is GRANTED.
6. Plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest at 10 percent from April 15, 2024 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure  to conclusively establish that date as the date of conversion
7. Any ultimate recovery shall not permit duplicative recovery for both the collateral and the same economic loss represented by the collateral.

CV-25-003769 – SOLIS, SERENTIY vs PONCE, PALOMA MONIQUE – Defendant’s Motion for Order Determining the Inapplicability of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege with Regard to Plaintiff’s Records from Kim Underwood, MFT or Finding that the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege has been Waived and for an Order Releasing the Patient’s Treatment Records of Kim Underood, MFT – GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part, unopposed.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has affirmatively tendered her mental and emotional condition in this action by alleging severe and continuing mental and emotional injury and by identifying, according to the unopposed moving papers, emotional distress, anxiety, PTSD, and ARFID as injuries caused by Defendants’ alleged conduct. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1016, the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not apply to confidential communications relevant to the mental or emotional conditions Plaintiff has placed in issue. (In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415; Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833.)

The exception is not unlimited. Disclosure extends only to information relevant to the conditions placed in controversy and does not automatically open Plaintiff’s entire psychotherapy history to discovery. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 849.) Notably, psychotherapy records implicate substantial privacy interests independent of the statutory privilege. California discovery is broad, but discovery of private medical information must be tailored to the legitimate needs of the litigation. (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 859; Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1; see also Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552–557.) The Court should balance the intrusion against the legitimate need for the information and employ less intrusive means or protective limitations where practicable.

Accordingly, Kim Underwood, MFT, shall produce records and communications responsive to the subpoena only to the extent they are reasonably related to the existence, nature, severity, duration, treatment, prognosis, or causation—including reasonable alternative or preexisting causes—of Plaintiff’s claimed emotional distress, anxiety, PTSD, ARFID, and related mental or emotional injuries alleged in this action. Unrelated psychotherapeutic communications remain protected.

The Court declines to find a blanket waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege based solely on Plaintiff’s failure to object to the subpoena. Evidence Code section 912 governs waiver of privilege and generally requires an uncoerced disclosure of a significant part of the privileged communication, consent to disclosure, or failure to claim the privilege in a proceeding in which the holder has the legal standing and opportunity to do so. Here, Ms. Underwood’s counsel affirmatively asserted the privilege before any potential production. Nothing in the record establishes that Plaintiff or the guardian ad litem voluntarily disclosed a significant part of the confidential psychotherapeutic communications or consented to unrestricted disclosure. The motion is therefore denied to the extent it seeks unrestricted production of Plaintiff’s psychotherapy records.

CV-25-009849 – IXTA, ERIC RUIZ vs ACE COMMERCIAL PLASTERING INC – Plaintiff Eric Ruiz Ixta’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 9, 10, and 11, and for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant and its Counsel – GRANTED.

Any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civ. Proc., § 2017.010. Furthermore, in the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant's right to discovery is broad. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531).

The Requests for Production at issue, Nos 9, 10 and 11 relate to Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims clearly relevant and discoverable in this matter. Code of Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.

Defendant Ace Commercial Plastering, Inc.’s supplemental responses incorporate its prior objections and state that documents “currently” in its possession, custody, and/or control responsive to each request were produced and identified by Bates number. Defendant also reserves the right to supplement its responses

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220, a statement of compliance must state whether compliance will be in whole or in part and that all documents in the demanded category that are within the responding party’s possession, custody, or control and to which no objection is made will be included in the production. If the responding party is unable to comply, section 2031.230 requires a statement affirming that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry were made and specifying the reason for the inability to comply. Where an objection is asserted, section 2031.240 requires the responding party to state clearly the extent and specific ground for the objection and, where privilege or work product is asserted, provide sufficient factual information to permit evaluation of the claim, including a privilege log if necessary.

Defendant’s responses do not unequivocally state whether its production constitutes full or partial compliance or whether all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced. The statement that documents “currently” in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control “which are responsive” were produced, coupled with the incorporation of objections and reservation of the right to supplement, does not provide the clarity required by Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.220

The Court does not, however, find that the gaps identified by Plaintiff establish that additional responsive records necessarily exist. Defendant disputes that inference and maintains that all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced. Defendant also contends that some apparent gaps may correspond to periods during which Plaintiff did not work. Accordingly, the Court will not order Defendant to produce particular records merely because Plaintiff believes they should exist.

Plaintiff’s motion is granted.

Defendant shall provide an unequivocal, Code Compliant, further verified response to each request within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order as follows: (1)  If Defendant’s position is that it has fully complied, it shall so state in conformity with section 2031.220 whether said compliance is in whole or in part ; (2)  state whether all responsive documents in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control to which no objection is made have been produced; (3) If, after diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Defendant cannot fully comply with a request or a separable portion thereof, it shall provide a statement complying with section 2031.230; (4) produce any additional responsive, nonprivileged documents located through that inquiry.

The record reflects repeated meet-and-confer efforts concerning the adequacy of Defendant’s responses. Defendant maintained that its existing responses were sufficient and declined to provide further responses, instead directing Plaintiff to explore the apparent gaps through a PMK deposition. Because the responses themselves did not provide the unequivocal statement of compliance required by the Discovery Act, the Court does not find substantial justification for Defendant’s opposition to the limited relief granted herein.

Monetary sanctions of $1060 are hereby imposed against Defendant Ace Commercial Plastering, Inc., Michael Sullivan & Associates, LLP, and Ryan J. Carlson jointly and severally, for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting this motion, payable to Plaintiff’s Counsel within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Order. Code of Civ. Proc. 2031.310.

Plaintiff shall submit a Proposed Order that complies with this ruling no later than October 13, 2026.

CV-26-002812 – OGBOGU, KENNETH vs ASHIEGBU, LINDA – Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default - MOOT.

In light of the Court’s order of August 4, 2026, that set aside the default at issue, no default exists to be set aside.

Defendant Chloe Ashiegbu’s motion is therefore moot. 

The following is the tentative ruling for a cases calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000019 – MAIBES, SANDY vs COLEMAN, CANDENCE – Defendant’s Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judgment – HEARING REQUIRED.