Civil Tentative Rulings

September 15, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-007505 - SILVA, TAO vs CLARK PEST CONTROL INC - Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement - GRANTED.

On August 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for approval of settlement pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor Code, section 2698 et seq.

Having reviewed the unopposed motion and the supporting declarations and exhibits thereto, the Court finds that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate in view of PAGA’s purposes. (Lab. Code, § 2699(s)(2); Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 77 disapproved of on other grounds by Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664 [addressing standing to intervene].) The motion is GRANTED.

As to the requested litigation costs in the amount of $34,817.21, the Court awards a reduced amount of $31,789.81. The reduced amount is comprised of the costs shown in Exhibit C to the Bokhour Declaration ($21,225.17) and Exhibit 1 to the Bibiyan Declaration ($10,591.51), less postage. Postage is not allowable as costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5.)

Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the proposed settlement and the associated fees and costs are approved as set forth below:

Gross settlement amount: $794,291.00

PAGA Counsel Fees amount: $264,763.66

PAGA Counsel Litigation Costs amount: $31,789.81

Settlement Administration amount: $11,000.00

Plaintiffs’ Service Award amounts: $5,000 each

PAGA Fund amount, allocation to LWDA 75% and Aggrieved Parties ($25%): $476,737.53

Moving party is directed to submit a revised proposed order within five court days that comports with this ruling. 

CV-24-004750 - GOODY, JAMES JOSEPH vs FARINELLI, ALBERT - Defendants Yolanda Arnette Mccoy and Eulene Ramsey's Motion for Summary Judgment - GRANTED.

This matter was originally set for hearing on August 21, 2026. Trial is scheduled to begin on September 22, 2026. The Court has found good cause to hear this matter within 30 days of trial, as the Court had a scheduling conflict and needed to move the hearing on its own motion from August 21 to August 28, 2026.

On August 28, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel appeared to say handling counsel had resigned from the firm and requested a continuance of the hearing. I granted the continuance and said the tentative ruling, if unchallenged, would be confirmed. If the tentative ruling is challenged, I will hear argument based on the current state of the pleadings.

Governing Law

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.) A defendant meets their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that “a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed.” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

Discussion

The Court finds that Defendants Yolanda Arnette McCoy and Eulene Ramsey (“Moving Defendants”) have carried the initial burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment pursuant to the application of the “sudden emergency” or “imminent peril” doctrine. Specifically, the evidence submitted with the motion supports the conclusion that Defendant McCoy acted with reasonable care and was suddenly and unexpectedly confronted by an emergency she did not cause. (See UMF Nos. 1, 6-7, 9-10, 13-14; Shiver v. Laramee (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 395, 397.)

The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to submit admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a material factual dispute preventing judgment as a matter of law. The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the memorandum in opposition to the motion has arguments which do not appear to pertain to this case.

In his separate statement, Plaintiff disputed UMF Nos. 8, 11, 15, and 16. (UMF No. 12 is also disputed, but that raises a minor issue that is not critical to deciding this motion.)

All of Plaintiff’s disputed facts rely on the same set of evidence: Exhibit A, p. 37:20-23, and pp. 46:21-47:3. The cited portions state as follows:

        20 Q.· · Ms. McCoy, how long was the green Mustang

        21· traveling behind you on Oakdale-Waterford Highway on

        22· the date of the incident?

        23· · · ·A.· · For about two or -- two minutes.

        ***

        21 Q.· · And when law enforcement arrived, did you

        22· give them a statement?

        23· · · ·A.· · Yes.

        24· · · ·Q.· · And what was that statement?

        25· · · ·A.· · I said he was driving behind me, and he

          1· was merging in and out of traffic -- or in and out

          2· from around me trying to see how to pass.· And the

          3· third time he passed, he hit the lady and my car.

Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to UMF Nos. 8, 11, 15, and 16 are as follows:

        - For both UMF Nos. 8 and 15, Plaintiff contends, “Plaintiff attempted to pass the Defendant driver several times, but her actions prevented Plaintiff from passing safely;”

        - For UMF No. 11, Plaintiff states, “Defendant was driving slower than the actual speed limit, and was impeding traffic, and the Plaintiff from passing safely;” and

        - For UMF No. 16, Plaintiff asserts, “Defendant could have pulled over to the side to allow traffic to proceed. Nothing prevented the Defendant from safely pulling over to allow Plaintiff safely pass.”

The cited evidence does not adequately support any of these assertions. Specifically, the deposition passages do not show that it was Defendant’s actions that prevented Plaintiff from passing safely; that Defendant McCoy was driving slower than the speed limit; that Defendant McCoy was impeding traffic; or that there was nothing preventing Defendant McCoy from safely pulling over to allow Plaintiff to pass.

Because the Plaintiff’s statement of disputed facts lacks material evidentiary support, the Court deems Moving Defendants’ statement of facts undisputed. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

The Court notes that Plaintiff included his own deposition as evidence but never cited to it. If the inclusion was an implicit invitation for the Court to review the deposition testimony for triable issues, the Court declines that invitation.

The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion. In addition, Moving Defendants are instructed to submit a proposed judgment within five court days.

All future dates are vacated and a Case Status Review is set for October 30, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21. That date will be vacated upon signing of the judgment.

CV-25-008348 - GOMEZ, ARMANDO vs FRITOLAY INC - a) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant Frito-Lay, Inc.’s Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One); Request for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $5,575.00 - GRANTED; b) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant Frito-Lay, Inc.’s Further Responses to Form Interrogatories - General (Set One); Request for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $5,575.00 - GRANTED; c) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant Frito-Lay, Inc.’s Further Responses to Form Interrogatories - Employment Law (Set One); Request for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $5,575.00 - GRANTED.

a-c) On July 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed five motions to compel regarding discovery. Today, the Court addresses three of them. First, Plaintiff moves for an order compelling Defendant to further respond to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories (Set One) and for monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,575.00 against Defendant and its counsel. Second, Plaintiff moves for an order compelling Defendant to further respond to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories – General (Set One) and for monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,575.00 against Defendant and its counsel. Third, Plaintiff moves for an order compelling Defendant to further respond to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories – Employment Law (Set One) and for monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,575.00 against Defendant and its counsel.

“ ‘It is a central precept to the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 (§ 2016 et seq.) . . . that civil discovery be essentially self-executing. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A self-executing discovery system is ‘one that operates without judicial involvement.’ [Citation.] Conduct frustrates the goal of a self-executing discovery system when it requires the trial court to become involved in discovery because a dispute leads a party to move for an order compelling a response. [Citation.]” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1291–1292.)

Defendant failed to provide substantive responses to the interrogatories. Defendant objected to each interrogatory on the basis that Plaintiff was allegedly subject to an arbitration agreement. In its half-page response to the motion, Defendant states—unsupported by any declaration or exhibits—that Defendant subsequently located Plaintiff’s acknowledgement regarding Defendant’s Dispute Resolution Process and thus argues that its prior objections were properly asserted. Defendant provides no authority stating that a party may refuse to answer an interrogatory based on an objection that there allegedly exists a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. The objection appears to be without merit and Defendant’s failure to provide a substantive response is not in compliance with the code.

Defendant actions were without substantial justification. The case was not stayed or ordered to arbitration. Defendant alleges it did not locate Plaintiff’s assent to the alleged arbitration agreement until after it made the objections. Defendant never filed a motion to compel arbitration.

In its response to the motion, Defendant states that it will provide responses by September 30, 2026—which is over nine months after the deadline the parties agreed to and also two weeks after the scheduled hearing—but nothing prevented Defendant from providing responses sooner.

The motions to compel are GRANTED. Within 10 days of notice of the signed orders, Defendant shall provide complete further responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories (Set One), to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories – General (Set One), and to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories – Employment Law (Set One).

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300(d), the Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,000 against Defendant and its attorney of record, jointly and severally, in conjunction with Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Frito-Lay, Inc.’s Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One); the Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,500 against Defendant and its attorney of record, jointly and severally, in conjunction with Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Frito-Lay, Inc.’s Further Responses to Form Interrogatories – General (Set One); and, the Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,500 against Defendant and its attorney of record, jointly and severally, in conjunction with Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Frito-Lay, Inc.’s Further Responses to Form Interrogatories – Employment Law (Set One). Defendant and its attorney are to pay the sanctions to Abramson Law Group within 20 days of service of the signed order.

Because the work is duplicative, the Court awards six hours at $500 per hour for the first motion, and three hours for the latter two motions. Further failures by Defendant are likely to lead to case-related sanctions.

The Court will modify and sign the proposed orders Plaintiff submitted in connection with the motion. Plaintiff to give notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

Discovery motions set for the 16^th will be similarly handled.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-21-005754 - GAVERT, JAMES vs CF MODESTO LLC - Defendant, Andreh Saralou M.D.'s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint - The Court, on its own motion, CONTINUES the hearing on Defendant the Estate of Michael Brodie's Motion to Strike to September 23, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22.

The Court notes that Defendant Andreh Saralou, M.D. has filed both a demurrer and a motion to strike directed to the Second Amended Complaint, which are presently calendared for hearing on September 23, 2026. The motions raise overlapping and interrelated issues concerning the sufficiency of the allegations added in the Second Amended Complaint, including Plaintiffs' allegations regarding care and custody, the viability of the elder abuse cause of action, and the availability of enhanced remedies under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.

Resolution of the demurrer may affect, narrow, or eliminate some of the issues presented by the Estate's motion to strike. Consideration of the motions together will allow the Court to evaluate the operative pleading as a whole, avoid piecemeal adjudication of related pleading issues, conserve judicial resources, and reduce the possibility of inconsistent rulings regarding the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint.

Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy and efficient case management, the hearing on Defendant The Estate of Michael Brodie's Motion to Strike is CONTINUED to September 23, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22, to be heard concurrently with Defendant Andreh Saralou, M.D.'s demurrer and motion to strike.

No further briefing shall be required unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

CV-26-006895 - PNC BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION vs VALLEY HOME EXPRESS - a) Plaintiff's Writ of Possession as to Valley Home Express - HEARING REQUIRED; b) Plaintiff's Writ of Possession as to Casey Cicero - HEARING REQUIRED.

a-b) The Court has reviewed the applications, memorandum of points and authorities, declaration of Michael McGinley, supporting exhibits, proofs of service, and the court file.

The applications seek prejudgment possession of a 2025 Bobcat D705-9 Fork Lift Truck, Serial No. FDB21-5105-02412.

Based on the present record, plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that:

-               Plaintiff possesses a valid security interest in the collateral.

-               Defendants defaulted under the governing lease and guaranty.

-               Plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession of the collateral.

-               The collateral remains in defendants' possession or control.

-               The collateral is valued at approximately $110,000.

Because these matters are set by noticed application, the Court will conduct the scheduled hearing and permit any appearing defendant to present argument or evidence opposing issuance of the writs.

Intended Ruling Absent Opposition:

If no defendant appears, or if no evidence is presented that raises a substantial factual dispute concerning plaintiff's right to possession, the Court intends to:

-               GRANT Plaintiff's Applications for Writs of Possession;

-               ISSUE turnover orders pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 512.070;

-               WAIVE an undertaking on Plaintiff’s part and require Defendants to post bond in the amount of $138,253.75 if they oppose and retain possession of the collateral pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 515.010; and

-               DIRECT the Clerk to issue the writs.

If a defendant appears and contests the applications, the Court will hear argument and determine whether further evidence or briefing is necessary before ruling.

If a defendant opposes and retains possession of the fork lift by posting bond the Court notes it requires only a single bond as the applications address a single item of collateral.

3000065 - CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARTINEZ, JESUS - Conservator's Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - DENIED without prejudice.

Attorney Grant Toeppen’s motion to be relieved as counsel for Conservator Jesse Martinez is procedurally defective in several ways, including the following:

First, the notice of motion lists the wrong courthouse address.

Second, the proof of service for the motion fails to reflect service on the bond company as required by Probate Code § 1213(a)(4).

Third, the declaration filed in support of the motion fails to show adequate diligence to try to locate a current address for the client. Moving Counsel indicates that the client’s address is the “last known,” but the only effort made to track down the client was to send the motion papers to the client’s last known address with a return receipt requested. There is no indication that the receipt came back signed or that any other effort was made to uncover the client’s current address.

For the above reasons, the motion is DENIED without prejudice.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-000951 - PALON, ERIK vs CENTRAL VALLEY TRAINING CENTER INC - Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of Private Attorneys General Act (Cal. Labor Code 2698, Et Seq.) Settlement Agreement and Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, General Release Fee, and Settlement Administration Costs - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to October 6, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court notes that the moving papers appear to lack a sufficient discussion of the issues supporting the alleged fairness and adequacy of the settlement amount, such that the Court is unable to conclude that the proposed settlement provides for relief that is genuine, meaningful, and consistent with the State’s goal of benefitting the public through enforcement of its labor laws.  Specifically, the motion lacks a discussion of the reasonableness of the proposed settlement as compared to the estimated potential maximum and practical liability on the part of Defendant herein.

Plaintiff shall provide supplemental information regarding the above issues no later than 5 court days before the continued hearing date.

CV-25-004162 - BECK, ERIC vs ALDERWOODS GROUP CALIFORNIA INC - Defendant Rudy Gutierrez's Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication - Summary Judgment GRANTED.

The Court finds that Defendant, as the moving party, met the initial burden of establishing prima facie entitlement to judgment based on the submitted evidence.  The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to produce admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2).)  The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in that regard. Specifically, in the context of the parties’ agreement that the claim against Defendant Gutierrez herein turns on one isolated interaction, and taking Plaintiff’s version of that interaction at face value, the Court finds that the evidence fails to demonstrate Plaintiff’s ability to maintain an actionable claim for race/national origin harassment under California law.

Defendant’s objection to Exhibit 4 to Ms. Begakis’ declaration is SUSTAINED on the grounds asserted. The Court will sign the proposed order on Defendant’s evidentiary objections.

Defendant shall serve and submit a revised form of proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

CV-25-007409 - ARELLANO, REBECCA vs MEDRANO, GADY - Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Complaint (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16) - GRANTED.

Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as to the existence and contents of the court records filed in the related action, but not as to the truth of disputed factual allegations contained therein.

Anti-SLAPP Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 requires the Court to engage in a two-step analysis. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claims arise from activity protected by the statute. If that burden is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits by demonstrating that the claims are legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts which, if credited, would sustain a favorable judgment. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88-89; Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384; Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)

Prong One: Protected Activity

Defendant has satisfied her burden under the first prong.

The gravamen of each cause of action is Defendant's May 23, 2025 report to law enforcement concerning Plaintiff's entry into the business premises. The Complaint alleges no independently actionable conduct apart from Defendant's communication to police and the resulting law-enforcement response. Communications to law enforcement intended to prompt an official investigation or response constitute protected petitioning activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (e)(2). (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115-1116; Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 941-942; Walker v. Kiousis (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1439.)

Plaintiff contends the communication falls outside the anti-SLAPP statute pursuant to Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299. However, the Flatley exception applies only where the defendant concedes the illegality of the conduct or the evidence conclusively establishes illegality as a matter of law. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 316-320; City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424.) Where the alleged illegality depends upon disputed facts, the conduct remains protected for purposes of the first prong. (Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 967; Dwight R. v. Christy B. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 697, 712; Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1569-1570.)

Here, Defendant does not concede that her report was false, and the evidence does not conclusively establish falsity or illegality as a matter of law. At most, the evidence demonstrates a disputed characterization of the parties' business and ownership dispute and the events occurring on May 23, 2025. Accordingly, Defendant has satisfied the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Prong Two: Probability of Prevailing

Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden under the second prong.

At this stage, the Court does not weigh credibility, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or determine the ultimate truth of the parties' competing factual contentions. Rather, the Court accepts Plaintiff's evidence as true and considers Defendant's evidence only to determine whether it defeats Plaintiff's showing as a matter of law. (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940-941, 948-949.) Nevertheless, even applying that plaintiff-favorable standard, Plaintiff has not presented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie showing that Defendant made a knowingly false report to law enforcement or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.

The parties correctly recognize that this case is governed not only by Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, but also by the Legislature's subsequent enactment of Civil Code section 47(b)(5), which removes the litigation privilege for communications making a false report to law enforcement when made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.

To avoid the privilege, Plaintiff was therefore required to make a prima facie showing that: (1) Defendant's report was false; and (2) Defendant knew it was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)(5).)

Plaintiff has not made that showing. Plaintiff expressly acknowledges she has not personally listened to the 911 recording and therefore has no personal knowledge regarding Defendant's actual statements to dispatch. Further, the evidence submitted by Plaintiff primarily concerns her claimed ownership interests, governance rights, and access to the premises. While that evidence may support Plaintiff's position regarding the underlying business dispute, it does not constitute prima facie evidence that Defendant knowingly made a false report to law enforcement.

Conversely, the evidence before the Court reflects that Plaintiff entered premises after her access had allegedly been revoked and the locks changed, and that she was accompanied by a locksmith. The responding officer's subsequent conclusion that the dispute was civil in nature, and his notation that Plaintiff possessed ownership interests in the businesses, do not establish that Defendant knowingly or recklessly made a false report at the time the call was made. At most, the evidence supports competing interpretations of the underlying events. Such a showing is insufficient to bring the communication within the exception set forth in Civil Code section 47(b)(5).

Because Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing sufficient to overcome the litigation privilege, the privilege bars all three causes of action, each of which is premised entirely upon Defendant's communication to law enforcement. (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360-372.)

The abuse of process claim independently fails because Plaintiff has not identified any judicial process that Defendant procured or misused. A report to law enforcement, detention, or police investigation does not constitute "process" for purposes of the tort. (Adams v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 521, 530-531; S.A. v. Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 41.)

Discovery Request

Plaintiff's request for discovery pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (g), is DENIED. Plaintiff did not file the noticed motion and supporting showing of good cause contemplated by the statute. Moreover, the record reflects that Plaintiff's counsel already possesses the 911 recording that Plaintiff contends is necessary to oppose the motion.

Disposition

Defendant's Special Motion to Strike is GRANTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. The Complaint is ordered stricken.

Defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs. The amount of any fee award shall be determined upon a timely noticed motion.

Defendant shall prepare an order consistent with this ruling.

CV-25-009663 - CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY vs OMARI, AHMAD RESHAD - Plaintiff's Motion to Discharge & Dismiss Stakeholder Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §§ 386(b) and 386.5 - GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff has demonstrated compliance with the statutory requirements and is entitled to the requested order. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 386, 386.5.)

The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel. 

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-24-003269 - KEYSTONE RANCH LLC vs CITY OF PATTERSON - Respondents' Motion to Stay Enforcement of Peremptory Writ of Mandate - DENIED, in part, GRANTED, in part.

The Court issued a Statement of Decision on June 26, 2026, granting relief on the writ causes of action and directing issuance of a peremptory writ requiring Respondents to set aside their April 1, 2025, denial of Petitioner's vesting tentative map application and reconsider the application in compliance with the Housing Accountability Act ("HAA"), Housing Crisis Act, CEQA, and other applicable law. On July 27, 2026, the Court issued an Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandate and a Peremptory Writ of Administrative Mandate requiring Respondents to complete reconsideration and file a return demonstrating compliance within 90 days. The parties do not dispute that the remaining damages causes of action have not yet been adjudicated and that no final judgment disposing of all claims has been entered.

Respondents' principal argument is based upon Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (f), which provides that "[t]he court shall enter judgment either commanding respondent to set aside the order or decision, or denying the writ." Respondents contend that because no final judgment has yet been entered, enforcement of the writ should be stayed until conclusion of Phase Two. Petitioners respond that the HAA requires expedited review, that Respondents waived or forfeited their objections, and that further delay would prejudice development of a 719-unit housing project.

The Court agrees with Respondents that section 1094.5(f) raises a substantial procedural issue. The statute expressly contemplates that administrative mandamus relief is affected through entry of a judgment commanding the respondent agency to set aside its decision. In addition, Respondents' concern that compliance with the writ could impair or potentially moot later appellate review is not frivolous. Cases such as MHC Operating Ltd. Partnership v. City of San Jose recognize that subsequent compliance with a writ may, in some circumstances, affect the availability of effective appellate relief. The Court also notes other cases have held that voluntary compliance with the writ of mandate without an attempt to seek a stay of enforcement or appellate review may render an appeal moot. (Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852; Santa Rita Union School Dist. v. City of Salinas (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 298, as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 7, 2023). It has also been held that forced compliance does not constitute a waiver of the right to appeal. (Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1033).

Nevertheless, the Court is not persuaded that these considerations justify an indefinite stay through completion of Phase Two litigation. Section 1094.5 does not expressly require that enforcement of a writ be suspended whenever non-writ claims remain pending. Nor have Respondents cited controlling authority holding that a writ issued following adjudication of a bifurcated mandamus phase must be stayed until all remaining damages claims are resolved. The Court further notes the significant public interests underlying the HAA and the Legislature's policy favoring prompt resolution of disputes affecting housing development projects. Petitioner's evidence demonstrates that the project has already experienced substantial delay and that continued postponement would result in additional prejudice.

At the same time, the Court finds that Respondents have demonstrated sufficient concern regarding preservation of appellate review to warrant limited interim relief. Respondents represent that they intend to challenge aspects of the Court's CEQA and SGMA rulings through a petition for extraordinary writ relief and that they remain within the period generally applied to such petitions. A short stay will preserve the status quo and permit the Court of Appeal to determine whether further relief is warranted without materially delaying implementation of the Court's writ.

The Court therefore concludes that a narrowly tailored stay, rather than an open-ended stay pending final judgment, best balances the competing interests at issue.

Accordingly, the Court orders:

1. Respondents' request to stay enforcement of the Peremptory Writ of Mandate until entry of final judgment is DENIED.
2. Respondents' alternative request for a temporary stay is GRANTED IN PART.
3. Enforcement of the Peremptory Writ of Mandate is stayed through November 27, 2026, solely to permit Respondents to file a petition for extraordinary writ relief and seek a stay from the Court of Appeal.
4. Unless the Court of Appeal orders otherwise, the stay shall automatically dissolve on November 27, 2026.
5. The period during which this stay remains in effect shall be excluded from calculation of the 90-day period for Respondents' compliance with the writ and filing of their return.
6. No further stay shall be granted absent an order by the Court of Appeal or a showing of good cause supported by competent evidence.

CV-24-007913 - GUTIERREZ, HOMAR vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC - Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The Court notes that both Counsel herein have substantial experience with these types of matters and are presumably well-acquainted with the law governing the determination of reasonable fees and expenses pursuant to the statute.  Nevertheless, these types of fee disputes are commonplace and appear to reflect a default pattern of refusing to compromise in favor of “trying their luck” before the court, thus wasting judicial resources in the hopes of obtaining a ruling favoring their side.

The Court notes assertions by Plaintiff that informal resolution of this issue was unsuccessful. However, in the absence of any meaningful description of efforts to reach a resolution or any attempts at compromise, the Court believes that potential exists for the parties to informally resolve the issues presented herein if genuine efforts to meet and confer as to such issues are undertaken in good faith. Therefore, the hearing is continued to October 28, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court for that purpose.  The parties are ordered to meet and confer in person or by online video conference to discuss the issues herein. The parties are further ordered to submit a Joint Status Statement by October 21, 2026, describing their efforts to meet-and-confer and any resolution or narrowing of the issues they were able to achieve.

The Court strongly encourages the parties to make genuine efforts to informally resolve their differences with due civility to one another. Should counsel for the parties be unable to reach a reasonable compromise of any of the issues presented by the instant motion, the Court may require personal appearances at the time of the continued hearing to further address the issues herein.

CV-25-010637 - RAMIREZ, DAVID L vs PACKNIT, DARRIN - a) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant Darrin Packnit to Respond to Plaintiff's Form Interrogatories (Set One) and for Sanctions - GRANTED; b) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant JDP Investment/Holding, a California Corporation to Further Respond to Plaintiff's Demand for Production of Documents (Set One) and for Sanctions - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion; c) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant Darrin Packnit to Further Respond to Plaintiff's Demand for Production of Documents (Set One) and for Sanctions - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion; d) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant JDP Investment/Holding, a California Corporation to Respond to Plaintiff's Form Interrogatories (Set One) and for Sanctions - GRANTED.

a) The Court notes Defendant’s service on Plaintiff of verified responses to the discovery at issue rendering the motion partially moot.

Defendant waited over 6 months to serve the requested discovery, and only after Plaintiff filed the present motion. Defendant also failed to respond to Plaintiff’s meet and confer correspondence, which Plaintiff was not required to submit given that this is not a motion to compel further responses.

Notwithstanding the service of said responses, Plaintiff is still entitled to monetary sanctions.  California Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a);  Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants, (2007)148 Cal.App.4th 390;Deck v. Developers Investment Co., Inc., (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 808.  Plaintiff is therefore awarded monetary sanctions of $460 for his reasonable attorney fees and expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of this motion. Said sanctions are payable to Plaintiff’s Counsel within fifteen (15) days of the date of service of this order. (Code of Civ. Proc.§§2030.210, 2030.290(c); 2023.030(a); CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1348 (a)).

b) The Court notes Defendant’s service of the missing verification by Defendant’s authorized agent on Plaintiff on September 1, 2026, with this Opposition, which Plaintiff acknowledges.  The Court also notes Plaintiff’s request for 30 days from service of the Court’s order to provide any further responses the Court deems necessary.

In light of the Court’s approach regarding the related motions in this matter and the absence of meet and confer herein, the Court is of the view that those 30 days would be well spent by the parties engaging in meet and confer to address and or narrow down any disputed issues regarding Defendant’s responses.

Accordingly, the parties are hereby ordered to engage in meet and confer “either in person, by telephone or by videoconference” to address and or narrow down the issues in dispute, bearing in mind that parties have a broad right to discovery.  ((Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2016.040; 2017.010)

Parties are also reminded that civil discovery is intended to be self-executing, and that argument is not the same as informal negotiation. Furthermore, a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with opposing counsel; rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 1277). Good faith meet and confer communication should involve serious efforts at informal negotiation and resolution, including a meaningful assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party’s position in light of all available information. (Townsend v. Superior Court(EMC Mortgage Co.) (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431; Obregon v. Superior Court(Cimm’s, Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424).

This matter is accordingly continued to October 7^th, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court. No later than September 30^th, 2026,  the parties shall submit a joint status statement regarding the meet and confer, identifying issues that have been resolved or narrowed down or that remain to be addressed by the Court.

c) The Court notes Defendant’s claims of Plaintiff’s failure to meet and confer in good faith as well as Defendant’s request for the parties to be ordered to  “engage in a meaningful, issue-specific meet-and-confer process”. The Court also notes Defendant’s failure to respond to Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter. Therefore, the Court is of the view that the parties would benefit from good faith meet and confer.

Accordingly, parties are hereby ordered to engage in meet and confer “either in person, by telephone or by videoconference” to address and or narrow down the issues in dispute, bearing in mind that parties have a broad right to discovery.  Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2016.040; 2017.010.

Parties are also reminded that civil discovery is intended to be self-executing, and that argument is not the same as informal negotiation. Furthermore, a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with opposing counsel; rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 1277. Good faith meet and confer communication should involve serious efforts at informal negotiation and resolution, including a meaningful assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party’s position in light of all available information. Townsend v. Superior Court(EMC Mortgage Co.) (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431; Obregon v. Superior Court(Cimm’s, Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424.

This matter is accordingly continued to October 7^th, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court. No later than September 30^th, 2026,  the parties shall submit a joint status statement regarding the meet and confer,  identifying issues that have been resolved or narrowed down or that remain to be addressed by the Court.

d) The Court finds that Defendant has failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s properly propounded Form Interrogatories served on Defendant on February 27, 2026, or at all. The Court further finds that Plaintiff is entitled to responses to said discovery. Code of Civ. Proc., §§2017.010, 2030.290(b).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is hereby granted. Any objections by Defendant to said discovery are hereby waived. Defendant is hereby ordered to provide verified, code compliant, objection-free responses to said Form Interrogatories, Set One, within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this order. Code of Civil Procedure §§2030.290(a) and (b); 2031.300(a)

The Court also finds that said failure to respond is without substantial justification and accordingly finds that Plaintiff is entitled to monetary sanctions of $260 for attorney’s fees and costs reasonably incurred in bringing this motion Said sanctions are payable to Plaintiff’s Counsel within fifteen (15) days of the date of service of this order. Code of Civ. Proc.§§2030.210, 2030.290(c); 2023.030(a); CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1348 (a).

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000643 - SC & P vs AHMAD, KHALIDA MANSOORE - Motion to Set Aside Default & Default Judgment - HEARING REQUIRED.