Civil Tentative Rulings

May 5, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-25-003967 - HARRY, LARRY L vs VISTA DEL SOL POSTACUTE CARE - Defendant Main West's Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court is inclined to grant a discretionary stay as to this Defendant only but needs more information.

The stay does not apply to the remaining defendants and Plaintiff may serve and proceed with its case against the other defendants, who may separately request a stay in whole or in part. (See Reply Brief, 4 n.1.)

The Court wants to ensure that the scheduling concerns articulated by Plaintiffs are resolved.

1. What is the anticipated scheduling of the arbitration?
2. What is the anticipated additional discovery to the currently unserved non-Main West defendants?

The complaint in this case was filed by four Plaintiffs: (1) Larry L. Harry, by and through successor-in-interest Timothy Harry; (2) Timothy Harry (individually); (3) Michael Harry (individually); and (4) James Harry (individually). There are four causes of action: elder abuse, negligence, violation of resident’s rights, and wrongful death. There are six Defendants: Vista Del Sol Postacute Care dba Main West Postacute Care (“Main West”), RMG Capital Partners LLC, Reliant Management Group, LLC, Jagan N. Bansal, Maneesh A. Bansal, and Madhu Bansal. Only Main West has been served.

Earlier, Defendant Main West moved to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings. The Court granted the motion to compel arbitration as to Plaintiff Michael Harry’s individual wrongful death claim only and ordered additional briefing on the scope of a stay.

Defendant Main West now moves to stay the entirety of the case pending the arbitration of Plaintiff Michael Harry’s individual wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs submitted an opposition. Defendant Main West submitted a reply.

Whether the FAA mandates a stay

The Federal Arbitration Act requires that “the court . . ., upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had[.]” (9 U.S.C. § 3.)

Defendant Main West argues that because the Arbitration Agreement is governed by the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 3 requires a mandatory stay once issues have been referred to arbitration. Plaintiffs respond that (1) the FAA does not govern but instead that the California Arbitration Act applies by default and (2) even if the FAA governs, Section 3 does not authorize a mandatory stay as to the Plaintiffs and Defendants who never agreed to arbitration, namely Plaintiffs Larry Harry, Timothy Harry, and James Harry along with Defendants RMG Capital Partners LLC, Reliant Management Group, LLC, Jagan N. Bansal, Maneesh A. Bansal, and Madhu Bansal.

Here, the only cause of action that was referred to arbitration was Plaintiff Michael Harry’s individual wrongful death claim. The question presented is whether the remaining causes of action—i.e., the causes of actions for elder abuse, negligence, and violation of resident’s rights and Plaintiffs Larry Harry, Timothy Harry, and James Harry’s wrongful death causes of actions—should be stayed pending the arbitration of Plaintiff Michael Harry’s individual wrongful death claim.

Plaintiffs cite to Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove, LLC (2026) 119 Cal.App.5^th 267—published after the initial motion was filed—for the proposition that the language used in the contract in this case does not trigger the FAA. But Defendant observes accurately that the language in Wright was merely that it was “in accordance with” the FAA unlike this contract which requires procedural adherence and to be “governed by” the FAA. This is a small but vital difference.

Plaintiff also cites to Mendez v. Puerto Rican International Companies Inc. (2009) 553 F.3d 709 for the proposition that a stay does not apply to non-arbitrating parties.

Mendez and many similar cases control. The Court is not bound as to the non-arbitrating parties to grant a stay under the FAA.

Whether California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.4 mandates a stay

Section 1281.4 requires that "[i]f a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

“Section 1281.4 does not authorize the court to stay an action on the basis of an arbitration to which the plaintiff is not a party.” (Leenay v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 553, 562–64 [finding trial court erred by granting stay and rejecting argument that overlapping questions of law and fact mandate a stay].)

As Main West observes, the circumstances in Leenay were a much more troublesome execution of what might have been an indefinite stay.

Defendant cites Heritage Provider Network, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1146, where the court considered whether a single cause of action brought by a single plaintiff against multiple defendants was severable as to the different defendants. The court there did not address whether Section 1281.4 mandated a stay of separate causes of action that were not ordered to arbitration, nor did it address causes of action brought by plaintiffs other than the plaintiff who was ordered to arbitrate.

Section 1281.4 might require additional stays due to the lack of severability of the actions. The Court is unconvinced any of the causes of action are severable under the fact pattern alleged. Nonetheless, the Court does not decide this issue.

Whether the Court will exercise its discretion to stay the remainder of the case against Main West

The Court is inclined to grant a stay as to Main West in its entirety given that the arbitration and trial court paths will likely result in a disruption of the arbitration. A stay is likely to promote efficiency and will not adversely affect related proceedings.

Plaintiffs’ claims of needing to expeditiously resolve the case are sound, and the Court anticipates both sides will have plans to complete the arbitration in a timely manner.

“[A] court ordinarily has inherent power, in its discretion, to stay proceedings when such a stay will accommodate the ends of justice.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 141 [citation omitted].) “As the court in Landis v. North American Co. (1936) 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 explained, ‘the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.’” (Ibid.)

“[W]hen there is a severance of arbitrable from inarbitrable claims, the trial court has the discretion to stay proceedings on the inarbitrable claims pending resolution of the arbitration.” Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303, 320. “A stay is appropriate where [i]n the absence of a stay, the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court disrupts the arbitration proceedings and can render them ineffective.” (Ibid. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

The Court intends to exercise its discretion as noted above.

CV-25-012129 - STANISLAUS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS vs GARCIA, ANTONIO A - Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Prejudgment Possession – GRANTED and unopposed.

Plaintiff has discharged its burden of demonstrating it is entitled to prejudgment possession by eminent domain of a 5,985 sq. ft. fee acquisition of the real property identified as 501 Russell Road, Modesto, County of Stanislaus, California, and bearing Stanislaus County Assessor’s Parcel Number 012-047-009 for its planned State Route 132 West  Freeway/Expressway Project for the public benefit and for all uses necessary, incidental and convenient thereto pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.

Plaintiff has, based on an appraisal, deposited the sum of $4,800.00 into the State Treasury as probable compensation that will be awarded Defendants in the eminent domain proceeding. (California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1255.410 and 1255.010 et seq.).

Plaintiff is hereby authorized and empowered to enter upon and take prejudgment possession of the subject property. Plaintiff shall be entitled to take possession of the subject property within (30) days of service of this Order.

Service of this Order shall be made in the manner specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.450, subdivisions (d) and (f).  

If the owner(s) or occupant(s), if any, fail to deliver possession of the Property upon the demand of County pursuant to this Order, a Writ of Assistance may issue ex parte upon the affidavit of a representative of Plaintiff showing that such owner(s) or occupant(s), if any, have failed to deliver possession of the Property.

CV-25-012173 - STANISLAUS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS vs QUARESMA, RICHARD EUGENE - Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Prejudgment Possession - GRANTED

Plaintiff has discharged its burden of demonstrating it is entitled to prejudgment possession by eminent domain of a  532,736 square foot fee acquisition from a portion of the real property identified as 543 Butler Road, Modesto, County of Stanislaus, California, and bearing Stanislaus County Assessor’s Parcel Number 012-060-004 for its planned State Route 132 West  Freeway/Expressway Project for the public benefit and for all uses necessary, incidental and convenient thereto pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.

Plaintiff has, based on an appraisal, deposited the sum of $803,000.00 into the State Treasury as probable compensation that will be awarded Defendants in the eminent domain proceeding. (California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1255.410 and 1255.010 et seq.).

Plaintiff is hereby authorized and empowered to enter upon and take prejudgment possession of the subject property. Plaintiff shall be entitled to take possession of the subject property within (30) days of service of this Order.

Service of this Order shall be made in the manner specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.450, subdivisions (d) and (f).  

If the owner(s) or occupant(s), if any, fail to deliver possession of the Property upon the demand of County pursuant to this Order, a Writ of Assistance may issue ex parte upon the affidavit of a representative of Plaintiff showing that such owner(s) or occupant(s), if any, have failed to deliver possession of the Property.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-23-005993 - NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES INC vs ZAPIEN, MELISSA - Plaintiff's Motion for Order Setting Aside and Vacating its Prior Order of Dismissal and For Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation of the Parties – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff NCB Management Services Inc. (“NCB”) moves the Court to enforce the parties’ 2024 settlement agreement and requests that the Court vacate its prior order of dismissal and enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Melissa Zapien in the sum of $3,146.33. The motion is unopposed.

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate . . . for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.)

“If the Court . . . dismisses the case without prejudice pursuant to this section, the following shall apply:

(1) A party may file a motion or other document pertaining to the settlement, including . . ., if the terms of a settlement are not performed, a motion based upon such terms.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.) “Responsive filings and related documents may also be filed.” (Ibid.)

Here, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby Defendant Zapien agreed to pay the outstanding debt in installments. Defendant Zapien initially made payments according to the stipulated schedulebut subsequently defaulted. Defendant Zapien made payments in the sum of $2750.00. The last payment made by the Defendant was on September 5, 2025.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6, Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to set aside and vacate the order of dismissal and enter judgment pursuant to stipulation is GRANTED. The Court will grant judgment against Defendant Melissa Zapien in the principal amount of $5,282.29 and court costs in the amount of $311.78 pursuant to the terms of the parties’ Stipulation for Entry of Judgment that was submitted to the Court on December 13, 2024, post-stipulation court costs for the instant motion in the amount of $302.26, less $2750.00 in payments made, for a total judgment in the amount of $3,146.33.

The Court will sign the proposed order and proposed judgment that Plaintiff submitted with its motion.

CV-25-002092 - CORDONI , PAULETTE vs MIDWEST INSURANCE CO - Petitioner Paulette Cordoni's Motion for Protective Order and/or Order to Modify Deposition Subpoenas For Production of Business Records and For Sanctions – DENIED without prejudice, and unopposed.

Petitioner and Respondent are parties to an underinsured motorist arbitration proceeding pursuant

to California Insurance Code section 11580.2 et seq. Prior to the submission of the instant motion, Petitioner submitted a similar motion on March 24, 2025, which was ultimately dismissed without prejudice. On or about April 15, 2026, Petitioner submitted the instant motion seeking a protective order and/or to modify deposition subpoenas for the production of business records and for sanctions.

“A deposition subpoena that commands only the production of business records for copying shall designate the business records to be produced either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item, and shall specify the form in which any electronically stored information is to be produced, if a particular form is desired.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.410.) “An attorney at law who is the attorney of record in an action or proceeding, may sign and issue a subpoena duces tecum to require production of the matters or things described in the subpoena.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.)

“The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(a).) “The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person.” (Ibid.; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1985.3(g), 1987.1.) “This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(a).)

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020.)

Here, Respondents served a round of subpoenas for production of business records only on or about March 18, 2026. The subpoenas are directed to several medical providers and broadly seek the production of, e.g., any and all of Petitioner’s medical records without limitation.

Petitioner sent an electronic communication to Respondents on or about March 23, 2026, regarding limiting the scope of the subpoenas. Receiving no response, Petitioner submitted the instant motion.

Meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040

“A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.)

Here, the effort to meet and confer was insufficient. The only attempt to comply with Code of Civil Procedure § 2016.040 was electronic, written correspondence on March 23, 2026. (Declaration of Andrew S. Mendlin, ¶ 4.) Petitioner received no response. (Ibid., ¶ 5.)

The Court also notes that Petitioner’s prior March 24, 2025, motion was served on different counsel.

 

Communication sent by email is insufficient. The Legislature’s specification of the authorized methods for meeting and conferring reflects its belief that more personal forms of communication—beyond written exchanges—are better suited to resolving disputes informally, thereby reducing the burden on both the courts and the parties.

Motion for protective order under Section 2017.020(a)

“[I]n seeking recovery for physical and mental injuries plaintiffs have unquestionably waived their physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges as to all information concerning the medical conditions which they have put in issue, past cases make clear that such waiver extends only to information relating to the medical conditions in question, and does not automatically open all of a plaintiff's past medical history to scrutiny.” (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 849.)

The Court notes that Respondent’s subpoenas appear overbroad. The subpoenas, which are directed to several medical providers, request, e.g., “[a]ny and all documents and medical records and reports, and all writings . . . pertaining to the care, treatment, and examination of [Petitioner.]” There is no description of the specific medical conditions or injuries that are at issue in the case, nor is there a limitation on the dates of treatment. The Court further notes that Petitioner’s memorandum also does not include such information. Thus, procedural deficiencies aside, the Court is unable to fully consider Petitioner’s request to limit the scope of the discovery at this time.

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s motion is DENIED without prejudice.

PR-23-000109 – IN THE MATTER OF LEO LANDUCCI AND PATRICIA LANDUCCI REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST OF 2007 – a) Respondent Kathleen Landucci's Demurrer to Petition to Reopen Probate and Vacate Dismissal Due to Extrinsic Fraud Upon Court – GRANTED; b) Respondent Kathleen Landucci's Demurrer to Petition to Reopen Probate and Vacate Dismissal Due to Extrinsic Fraud Upon Court - OVERRULED as MOOT.

a) Anti-SLAPP Motion

For the reasons set forth below, the anti-SLAPP motion is GRANTED.

Governing Legal Framework

An anti‑SLAPP motion is evaluated under a two‑step process. First, the moving party must establish that the challenged claims arise from protected activity—i.e., acts in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition or free speech, including statements or writings made in judicial proceedings or in connection with issues under review by a court. If that burden is met, the analysis proceeds to step two, where the burden shifts to the plaintiff or petitioner to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits by presenting legally sufficient claims supported by admissible evidence. (See Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)

Courts construe protected activity broadly at step one. (See Brodeur v. Atlas Entertainment, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 [“[I}t is … beyond dispute that the anti-SLAPP statute, including the scope of the term “public interest,” is to be construed broadly.”].) Claims predicated on litigation conduct, declarations, discovery responses, and court rulings generally fall squarely within the statute. The “illegality exception” is narrow and applies only where the defendant’s conduct is conceded to be illegal or conclusively shown to be illegal as a matter of law.

Step One: Whether the Petition Arises from Protected Activity

Here, the gravamen of the Petition challenges conduct that occurred during the earlier trust contest action, including:

        - the submission of an estate‑planner declaration,

        - discovery responses and alleged discovery deficiencies, and

        - a court ruling permitting the trustee to use trust assets for litigation expenses.

These are statements, writings, and conduct undertaken in a judicial proceeding and in furtherance of the right to petition the court. On this record, Respondent has met the step‑one burden of showing the Petition arises from protected activity within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

Petitioner invokes the illegality/fraud exception, but the allegations presuppose disputed facts concerning discovery conduct and the accuracy or completeness of litigation filings. Where facts are contested and the alleged wrongdoing is not established as illegal as a matter of law, the exception does not apply at step one. (See Zucchet v. Galardi (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1478 [“Our Supreme Court has emphasized that the exception for illegal activity is very narrow and applies only in undisputed cases of illegality.”].)

Step Two: Probability of Prevailing

At step two, Petitioner must demonstrate that the Petition is legally sufficient and supported by admissible evidence establishing a prima facie case.

The Petition seeks equitable relief to reopen a dismissed probate proceeding following a court‑approved settlement entered during trial in May 2024. The settlement included a monetary payment and a broad release with a Civil Code section 1542 waiver. Petitioner testified under oath that he understood and voluntarily agreed to the settlement terms.

Petitioner’s current claims are premised on alleged fraud and concealment relating to matters that were discoverable, litigated, or known before settlement, or that could have been addressed through ordinary litigation remedies. Those allegations do not support reopening a final judgment or dismissal through an independent equitable action.

Additionally, Respondent raises multiple legal bars to Petitioner’s claims, including the litigation privilege, waiver and release, finality of judgments, and timeliness considerations. Petitioner has not returned, or alleged an ability to return, the settlement benefits received. Petitioner also relies heavily on argumentative characterizations of evidence and contested factual assertions rather than admissible proof sufficient to meet the anti‑SLAPP step‑two standard.

Based on the submissions, Petitioner has not carried the burden of showing a probability of prevailing on the merits.

Fee Entitlement

Respondent, as the prevailing party on the special motion to strike, is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c)(1). The amount of fees and costs shall be determined upon a properly noticed motion filed along with the memorandum of costs. The Court reserves jurisdiction to determine the amount.

Petitioner’s Late-Filed Declaration

The declaration that Petitioner late-filed on May 1, 2026, was filed without authorization and was disregarded.

Proposed Order

Respondent to submit a proposed order within 10 court days that is consistent with this ruling.

b) Demurrer

In light of the ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion, the demurrer is OVERRULED as MOOT.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-23-003591 - CARDENAS, ADAN vs CRYSTAL CREAMERY INC - Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement and Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Service Awards – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court is inclined to GRANT the motion. It appears that proper notice to the settlement class has been given in compliance with the law and as required by the Court’s order granting preliminary approval on 12-5-25.  Having considered the unopposed motion herein and the supporting declarations and evidence, the Court finds that the settlement was entered into good faith, is fair, reasonable and adequate, and satisfies the standards for final approval under California law.  (Civil Code § 1781; Code Civ. Proc. § 382; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.769.)  Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the proposed settlement and the associated fees and costs are approved as set forth in the motion and supporting papers, as follows:

Fees and costs of Settlement Administrator: $13,990

Payment to Class Representatives: $45,000

PAGA allocation to LWDA (75%) and class members (25%):  40,000

Class Counsel’s costs:  $56,969.51

Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees:  $624,387.00

In accordance with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 384, the Court sets a compliance hearing for January 8, 2027 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23 to confirm full administration of the settlement.  Class counsel shall submit a compliance report no later than 5 court days before the date of the hearing, which shall include the total amount that was actually paid to the class members pursuant to the subject settlement. 

Class Counsel shall submit a revised proposed order incorporating the above revisions for the Court’s signature.

CV-25-010105 - PRADO, JOSE LUIS VALENCIA vs PRO DRYWALL INC - Defendants Pro-Drywall, Inc. and Alberto Valdovinos' Motion to Consolidate Actions – DENIED, without prejudice.

No proof of service has been submitted. In addition, no notice of the instant motion has been filed in Case #CV25-10907, which defendants seek to consolidate herein.

CV-25-012198 - DIAZ, YOLANDA vs NATALE, ESTHER - Defendant's Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action [Lis Pendens] And for Fees and Costs - GRANTED.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating the probable validity of her real property claim in this matter. Specifically, Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue a real property claim on behalf of the estate in this context. (See, e.g. Wilson v. King (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 212.)

Therefore, Defendant is entitled to an order of expungement herein. (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.32.)

The Court further finds that Defendant is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs herein pursuant Code Civ. Proc. § 405.38. As no details with regard to the reasonable amount of such an award have been provided at this juncture, Defendant may file a separate motion in that regard.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-21-000749 - SCHMIDT, JON vs TRINUT FARM MANAGEMENT INC - Defendant's General and Special Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The applicability or otherwise of the relation back doctrine is of substantial importance to the outcome of this demurrer.

The Court therefore requires further briefing on the applicability of the Relation Back Doctrine to this matter. The parties shall address in particular (1) whether the relation back doctrine is applicable to a non-fictitiously named Doe Defendant such as Sarbjit Athwal,  (2) the applicability of the requirements that the claim against the new party must arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original complaint and that the new party must have received notice of the original action in time to avoid prejudice in defending on the merits and (3) whether a mistake in omitting Sarbjit Athwal justifies the application of the relation back doctrine.

Accordingly, this matter is continued to June 10, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

The parties shall each file briefs no longer five pages no later than June 1, 2026.

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order conforming to the Court’s ruling within five court days.

CV-23-001227 - CARSON HYBRID ENERGY STORAGE LLC vs TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT - Defendant's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Demands for Inspection and for Sanctions – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

Plaintiff’s Statement of Compliance in response to Defendant’s Requests for Production Set Two, Numbers 1 and 2 appears facially Code compliant. However, the Court notes that Plaintiff did not state that it would produce the requested documents within the stated deadline. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.220).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s production appears to raise questions about documents that Plaintiff should have but has not produced. To the extent that Plaintiff’s responses to the requests at issue do not indicate whether or what responsive items are being withheld under a claim of privilege. then Plaintiff’s response should be more precise as to what Plaintiff cannot produce. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.230).

The court is confident that the parties can address these issues in further good faith meet and confer without judicial intervention, bearing in mind the generally broad right to discovery and that discovery is meant to be self-executing. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2017.010; Clement v. Alegre, (2009)177 Cal. App. 4th 1277).

This matter is accordingly continued to June 4, 2026,  at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

The parties shall file a Joint Status Statement no later than May 27, 2026.

The court will address the award of monetary sanctions, if any, at that time.

CV-23-006303 - HILMAR CHEESE COMPANY INC vs FERREIRA, TIMOTHY - Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 664.6 - DENIED.

Background and Findings

1.  On September 5, 2025, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement and Limited Release that, among other terms, (a) required Hilmar to provide specified “Agreed Books and Records,” (b) permitted the Trustee, within fifteen days after receipt, to make a further request for books and records if the Agreed Books and Records did not suffice for his needs, and (c) provided that if the parties were not able to reach agreement on further books and records that satisfied the Trustee, the Trustee could declare the Agreement null and void.
2. Hilmar provided an initial production on September 6, 2025, and a supplemental production on September 23, 2025.
3. On September 19, 2025, the Trustee expressly invoked Section 1(b) of the Settlement Agreement and made a further request for books and records, identifying categories of missing documents and insufficient data.
4. On September 22, 2025, Hilmar responded that certain requested materials did not exist and addressed other items, and on September 23, 2025, provided a supplemental production.
5. Also on September 23, 2025, the Trustee’s expert, Kyle TenHuisen, submitted a declaration stating that, Hilmar had provided some but not all requested information and that the documents and information provided to date were insufficient to allow completion of an accurate appraisal absent an inspection consistent with “Site Inspection Option No. 2.”
6. On September 26, 2025, Trustee’s counsel referenced the TenHuisen declaration in correspondence with Hilmar’s counsel as stating the Trustee’s position regarding additional missing documents necessary to meet the Trustee’s needs.
7.  On March 4, 2026, after further exchanges and following Hilmar’s filing of the instant motion, Trustee’s counsel stated that the parties were not able to reach an agreement for the production of further books and records which satisfied the Trustee and declared the September 5, 2025, Settlement Agreement null and void.

Legal Conclusion

The Court finds that the parties’ Settlement Agreement and Limited Release gives Defendant the discretion to determine the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s production of Agreed Books and Records (Settlement Agreement and Limited Release Sections 1 (b) and (c)).

Under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6, the Court may enter judgment only pursuant to the terms of a settlement. On this record, the Court finds:

1. The Trustee timely invoked Section 1(b) of the Settlement Agreement and made a further request for additional books and records.
2. The parties thereafter were unable to reach agreement on further production sufficient to satisfy the Trustee, as reflected in Mr. TenHuisen’s September 23, 2025, declaration, the September 26, 2025, correspondence, and the continued disagreement over the availability and sufficiency of requested materials.
3. The Trustee ultimately declared the Settlement Agreement null and void pursuant to Section 1(b) after the parties were unable to reach agreement on further production.  Notwithstanding that Defendant did not expressly declare said Agreement null and void till March 2026, to the extent that Defendant had previously expressed said insufficiency and that the Agreement provides for the requested relief upon the sufficient production of books and records, Plaintiff may not obtain the requested relief.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Hilmar argues that the Trustee’s actions violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the Settlement Agreement. However, the implied covenant cannot be used to impose obligations beyond those expressly agreed upon in the contract. (Bevis v. Terrace View Partners, LP, (2019), 33 Cal. App. 5th 230 as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 21, 2019); Carma Devs. (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California, Inc., (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 342).

The Settlement Agreement explicitly provided a mechanism for the Trustee to declare the Agreement null and void if further production did not satisfy his needs. The Trustee’s invocation of this provision was consistent with the express terms of the Agreement and does not constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract, which allowed the Trustee to declare the Agreement null and void under the specified conditions.

Because the Agreement was declared null and void by its own terms following the parties’ inability to reach agreement on further production that would satisfy the Trustee, there is no enforceable settlement to reduce to judgment under § 664.6.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is hereby denied.  No judgment shall be entered under § 664.6 based on the September 5, 2025, Settlement Agreement, and the books-and-records claims remain unresolved for purposes of further proceedings consistent with this Court’s docket and the parties’ pleadings.

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order conforming to the Court’s ruling within five court days.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000323 - MENDOZA, ADAN REYES vs MAGALLON, REBECA VICTORIA – Defendant’s Demurrer – HEARING REQUIRED.