Civil Tentative Rulings

October 01, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-009799 – GUTZLER, REBECCA vs DOE, JOHN – Defendant Lowe’s Home Centers, Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, Summary Adjudication of Issues – HEARING REQUIRED.

Plaintiff has requested an ex parte hearing on a request for more time for discovery. The ex parte hearing was denied for untimeliness but the Court will hear the request for continuance at the hearing.

CV-25-012786 – IONESCU, DELIA vs NEWPORT LLC – Defendant’s Petition to Compel Binding Arbitration and to Stay the Superior Court Matter Pending the Hearing on the Petition – DENIED.

The threshold question is whether Defendant has adequately demonstrated that an agreement exists. It has not.

Background

On August 28, 2026, Defendants Newport, LLC dba Almond Vista Healthcare and Kalesta Healthcare Group, LLC, filed the instant petition. Plaintiffs timely opposed and Defendants timely replied.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should be required to arbitrate all causes of action and seek a stay of all proceedings. The instant matter is an elder neglect and wrongful death action against a skilled nursing facility brought by the estate and heirs of Decedent Ms. Viorica Jerrick.

The Complaint alleges four causes of action. Plaintiff Viorica Jerrick, by and through successor-in-interest Delia Ionescu, asserts the first cause of action for elder abuse & neglect, the second cause of action for violation of resident rights, and the third cause of action for negligence. Plaintiff Delia Ionescu asserts the fourth cause of action for wrongful death.

Arbitration Agreement

“In a motion to compel arbitration, ‘the party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any defense, such as unconscionability. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 172–173.)

There are two alleged arbitration agreements, one on July 2, 2024 and a second on September 18, 2024.

The first comes with a declaration by Saina Javan, which contains the following language:

Paragraph 4: “The attached arbitration agreement contains the signature of former resident Viorica Jerrick.”

Paragraph 5: “The attached arbitration agreement was verbally agreed to and signed by former resident Viorica Jerrick.”

These sworn assertions do not appear to be true. The Court requires accurate information to make good decisions, and this is not accurate information. The Court disregards the Javan declaration except to note that language in this declaration and the second declaration are similar.

The second declaration by Defendants’ employee Terri Ann Kuhn, the September 18, 2024 Arbitration Agreement which was allegedly signed with an “X” by Plaintiff.

The mark itself is not accompanied by the name nor a witness attestation, in apparent violation of Civil Code section 14. Defendants try to escape this by asserting that the rule applies only to sworn statements and asserts Respondent could in fact write. If she could write, the mark was not authorized. If she could only make a mark, the document is deficient.

In In re Edwardson’s Estate (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 122, the testators name was on the first page, not on the marked page, and the trial court excluded the alleged will and the appellate court confirmed it. Exceptions to the rule do exist (See: Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco vs. All Person Claiming (1920) 183 Cal. 369) but no such exception is noted here.

Finally, Ms. Kuhn avers specific recollections but also that “I do not recall Ms. Jerrick or having any questions about the arbitration agreement.” This disclaimer of independent recollection defeats her other claims. 

DEFENDANTS’ OTHER BRIEFING ISSUE

Defendants assert in reply that once they have asserted an agreement, that is sufficient. The quote they used from Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4^th 215, 218-219:

[“]Petitioner need only allege the existence of an agreement… Once the petitioners had alleged that the agreement exists the burden shifted to respondents to prove the falsity of the purported agreement.” [bolded in motion]

The complete quote is: “The petitioner need only allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation. Defendants met this requirement. Once they had alleged that the agreement existed, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to prove the falsity of the purported agreement.” [Emphasis added.]

The Court needs accurate information to make good decisions. Defendants excised a key portion of the ruling. The Court has an affirmative duty to prevent this behavior and is hopeful that this portion of my ruling does so.

Because the Court finds insufficient evidence of an agreement, the other issues are not reached.

CV-26-002847 – SOTO, JENNIFER SARAHI vs GAWFCO ENTERPRISES INC – Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – CONTINUED to October 8, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21.

The hearing is CONTINUED to October 8, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 21.

On July 27, 2026, Attorney Sanandaji filed the instant motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff. There is no opposition in the Court file.

The proposed order does not comply California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362 as it is incomplete.

CV-26-006337 – AVILES, JOSUE vs SMOLINSKIY, YURIY – Defendant Yuriy Smolinkiy’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint - CONTINUED to November 19, 2026 in Dept. 23.

Pursuant to the order of Judge Clifford Tong and Rule 3.300, the case is reassigned to his department as a related case to the underlying claim.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-010714 – CERVANTEZ. YENI ALEJANDRA CORTEZ vs CITY OF TURLOCK – Defendant, City of Turlock’s Motion for Summary Judgment – CONTINUED to October 9, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

This matter is CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to October 9, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22 for further review and consideration.

CV-26-003505 – TOVAR, MARK A vs FCA US LLC – a) Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint – SUSTAINED, without leave to amend, and unopposed; b) Defendant’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from Plaintiff’s Complaint - GRANTED, and unopposed.

a) Having considered the moving papers and Plaintiff’s non-opposition thereto, the Court finds that Defendants’ demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

b) Having considered the moving papers, and in view of the lack of opposition thereto, the Court GRANTS the motion and orders that the reference to punitive damages shall be stricken from the Complaint.

Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-23-003344 – IN RE 2206 ORCHARD CREEK DRIVE, NEWMAN, CA 95360 – Petitioner’s Petition and Declaration Regarding Unresolved Claims and Deposit of Undistributed Surplus Proceeds of Trustee’s Sale – DROPPED; publication ordered pursuant to Gov. Code § 68084.1.

The Court finds that the three-year escheatment period prescribed by Gov. Code §68084.1(a) has now expired. As no claims have been submitted, it appears no further hearing is required.

Therefore, the Court orders the Executive Officer to cause the notice required by Gov. Code § 68084.1(b) to be published in a newspaper of general circulation within Stanislaus County once a week for 2 consecutive weeks.  Such notice shall contain the information described in the above-referenced section and shall assign a final escheatment date within 45-60 days of the first publication as required therein.  The Executive Officer may delegate these duties to appropriate court staff as he deems necessary. (Gov. Code §68084.1(h).)

CV-25-008532 – LANE, JEFFREY vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO INC – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses from Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. D/B/A Doctors Medical Center of Modesto and D/B/A Doctors Medical Center Modesto to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One; and Request for Monetary Sanctions – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 10, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further First Amended Responses from Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. D/B/A Doctors Medical Center of Modesto and D/B/A Doctors Medical Center Modesto to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One; and Request for Monetary Sanctions – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 10, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23; c) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Second Amended Responses from Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. D/B/A Doctors Medical Center of Modesto and D/B/A Doctors Medical Center Modesto to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One; and Request for Monetary Sanctions – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 10, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

a-c) CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 10, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated insufficient efforts to informally resolve the issues presented herein before filing the instant motions. Plaintiff demonstrates no additional meet and confer efforts following Defendant’s service of its second set of amended responses to the subject discovery. Moreover, it appears to the Court that many, if not all, of the disputes described herein should be amenable to informal resolution if counsel makes genuine efforts to meet and confer in good faith.

Therefore, the hearings are continued, as above, for that purpose, and the parties are ordered to meet and confer in person or by online video conference to discuss the issues herein. The parties are further ordered to submit a Joint Status Statement by December 1, 2026, describing their efforts to meet-and-confer and any resolution or narrowing of the issues they were able to achieve.

The parties are reminded that discovery is intended to be self-executing, and good faith communication should involve serious efforts at informal negotiation and resolution, not mere bickering between counsel. (See, e.g., Townsend v. Superior Court (EMC Mortgage Co.) (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431; Obregon v. Superior Court (Cimm’s, Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424.) Therefore, the Court expects the parties to make genuine efforts to informally resolve their differences with due civility to one another and to demonstrate their best efforts in this regard.

Lastly, the parties are advised that, in view of the number of motions pending and discovery requests currently in dispute in this matter, the Court may consider the appointment of a discovery referee to manage discovery and reduce the burden on the Court and the parties if significant progress toward resolution is not demonstrated at the time of the continued hearings.

CV-26-005048 – I TO I LLC vs M&D OPTICAL FRANCHISE LLC – Defendant’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint - OVERRULED, in part; SUSTAINED, in part, with leave to amend.

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

The Court finds that the First and Fifth Causes of Action in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint allege sufficient facts to support the stated claims at the pleading stage, as against Defendants M&D OPTICAL and STANTON; the demurrer is OVERRULED in that regard.

However, the Court also finds that the allegations of the First Amended Complaint as a whole are insufficient to support any of the stated claims against Defendant NOW OPTICS, LLC, and that party’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

Lastly, the Court notes that Plaintiff concedes deficiencies in the allegations supporting the Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action and seeks leave to amend the same.  Therefore,, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to those claims, with leave to amend.

Plaintiff shall submit his Second Amended Complaint within 20 days.

Further, in view of Plaintiff’s concession that certain claims herein require amendment, it appears that such issues could and should have been resolved by the parties during the meet and confer process conducted pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41.  The fact that such issues were submitted to the Court for determination herein suggests that the parties failed to make genuine efforts to informally resolve or narrow the disputed issues by way of agreement to allow Plaintiff to submit an amended pleading herein. The parties are cautioned that genuine efforts in this regard should be made in advance of any formal challenge to the further amended pleading to be submitted by Plaintiff pursuant to this ruling.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-25-007853 – SALGADO, TERESA JESUS vs HOME DEPOT USA INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Trial Preference – Withdrawn by the moving party.

CV-25-009803 – DOLZADELLI, CHELSEA vs SALAS, OSCAR – a) Defendant the Frontier LLC’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set Two – GRANTED in part, DENIED, in part, with monetary sanctions awarded in favor of the defendant; b) Defendant the Frontier LLC’s Motion to Requests that Admissions be Deemed Admitted and Request for Sanctions Against Plaintiff and her Counsel in the Amount of $1,297.50 - DENIED, with monetary sanctions awarded in favor of the defendant.

a) GRANTED in part, DENIED, in part, with monetary sanctions awarded in favor of the defendant.

Defendant The Frontier, LLC served Plaintiff Chelsea Dolzadelli with Form Interrogatories, Set Two, limited to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1, on July 17, 2026. Responses were due August 19, 2026. Plaintiff did not timely respond. Defendant moved to compel responses on September 1, 2026. Plaintiff thereafter served verified responses on September 2, 2026. Following Defendant’s September 5, 2026 meet-and-confer correspondence identifying asserted deficiencies in those responses, Plaintiff served verified amended responses on September 10, 2026.

Due to the intertwined nature of Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions and Requests for Form Interrogatories and the surrounding facts and circumstances, the Court proceeds to address the identified deficiencies. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390).

Waiver of Objections

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a) provides that a party who fails to timely respond to interrogatories waives the right to exercise the option to produce writings under section 2030.230, as well as any objections to the interrogatories, including objections based upon privilege and work product. The Court may relieve a responding party from such waiver upon the statutory showing prescribed by section 2030.290(a).

Plaintiff concededly failed to timely respond. Nevertheless, both her September 2 and September 10 responses assert general objections, including attorney-client privilege, work product, burden and oppression, and purport to incorporate those objections into each individual interrogatory response.

The present record does not establish that Plaintiff sought or obtained relief from the statutory waiver of objections pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objections to Form Interrogatories, Set Two are WAIVED. Any further responses ordered herein shall be served without objections.

The Court previously considered whether Plaintiff’s service of verified responses and amended responses rendered Defendant’s motion moot. Having considered Defendant’s supplemental Reply and the responses attached thereto, the Court concludes that further relief remains appropriate. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390).

Here, Defendant did not merely continue to seek responses after responses had been provided. Defendant sent Plaintiff a September 5, 2026, meet-and-confer letter identifying asserted deficiencies in the September 2 responses, including the failure to provide requested addresses and telephone numbers for persons identified under Form Interrogatory No. 17.1(c) and complete information regarding documents and custodians under subpart (d). Plaintiff thereafter served amended responses on September 10, 2026.

The amended responses provide additional information but do not fully cure the deficiencies identified by Defendant.

Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 requires, as to each response to a request for admission that is not an unqualified admission, identification of the request; all facts supporting the response; the names, addresses and telephone numbers of persons having knowledge of those facts; and identification of supporting documents and tangible things together with the name, address and telephone number of the person possessing each such item.

Plaintiff’s September 10 amended responses provide substantially greater factual and identifying information than her September 2 responses. Nevertheless, certain responses identify persons merely as, for example, “Defendant Murillo” or “Defendant Oscar Salas,” without supplying all of the contact information requested by subpart (c). In addition, many responses identify supporting documents and then state generally that “[a]ll documents have been produced by Plaintiff in Request for Production in this case thus far,” without supplying all of the document-custodian information requested by subpart (d).

Defendant further observes that the amended responses contain no separately numbered Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 responses corresponding to RFAs Nos. 1, 5, 6, 22, 23, 26, 27 and 33.

However, Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 requires additional information only as to an RFA response that is not an unqualified admission. Accordingly, the omission of a separate Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 response concerning a particular RFA does not itself establish a deficiency if Plaintiff’s legally operative response to that RFA is an unqualified admission.

The Court therefore declines to order a Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 response for every omitted number without regard to the legal effect of the corresponding RFA response.

Effect of Plaintiff’s Amended Responses

Defendant also contends Plaintiff’s September 10 amended interrogatory responses are improper because certain answers support amended RFA denials that differ from admissions or qualified responses contained in Plaintiff’s September 2 discovery responses. Defendant requests that the amended interrogatory responses be disregarded and stricken and that Plaintiff’s September 2 answers be held binding to the extent they differ from the September 10 answers.

The Court declines to grant that requested relief on a blanket basis.

The September 2 and September 10 Form Interrogatory responses do contain material factual differences. For example, the September 2 response concerning RFA No. 15 stated that a vehicle was “in the general area” but Plaintiff did not have immediate and safe access to it; the amended response states that the vehicle was parked a block away at Johnny’s bar and “was not parked nearby.” The September 2 answers concerning RFAs Nos. 17 and 18 stated that Plaintiff did not know whether the measured distance from The Frontier’s door was at least 30 feet; the amended responses affirmatively state that Plaintiff was not 30 feet from the door

Likewise, Plaintiff’s September 2 response concerning RFA No. 42 stated that the available information did not establish whether Araceli Duarte or Janessa Cruz threw the beer bottle, whereas the September 10 response states that Araceli Duarte threw the bottle. Plaintiff’s September 2 response concerning RFA No. 53 stated that Plaintiff lacked sufficient information regarding the precise time the establishment was legally or operationally closed; the amended response affirmatively states that “[t]he bar was not closed.”

Those differences do not, however, require the Court to strike the amended interrogatory responses in their entirety. The Discovery Act expressly recognizes amended interrogatory answers. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.310).

Moreover, amendments to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 answers do not themselves determine whether an admission contained in Plaintiff’s earlier RFA responses has been effectively withdrawn. The legal effect of Plaintiff’s September 2 and September 10 RFA responses is addressed in connection with Defendant’s separate motion concerning Requests for Admission, Set One.

Accordingly, Defendant’s request that the September 10, 2026 amended Form Interrogatory responses be stricken or disregarded in their entirety is DENIED. Defendant’s request for a blanket order declaring all differing September 2 Form Interrogatory responses binding is also DENIED.

Defendant has demonstrated that Plaintiff’s amended Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 responses remain incomplete in certain respects. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED IN PART.

Plaintiff shall serve a further verified response within 14 days to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1, without objections, as follows:

1.             Plaintiff shall respond to each Request for Admission for which Plaintiff’s legally operative response is not an unqualified admission.

2.             Under subpart (b), Plaintiff shall state all facts upon which the applicable RFA response is based, as required by Form Interrogatory No. 17.1.

3.             Under subpart (c), Plaintiff shall state the name, address and telephone number of each person identified as having knowledge of those facts, to the extent such information is known or reasonably available to Plaintiff.

4.             Under subpart (d), Plaintiff shall identify the documents and tangible things supporting the applicable response and provide the requested name, address and telephone number of the person having each document or thing, rather than relying solely upon a generalized statement that responsive documents previously have been produced.

5.             The further responses shall be consistent with the Court’s ruling concerning the legal effect of Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s Requests for Admission, Set One.

Monetary Sanctions

Plaintiff admittedly failed to serve timely responses, and Defendant filed the present motion before Plaintiff served her September 2 responses. Defendant subsequently identified asserted deficiencies in the responses, and the amended responses did not completely eliminate the dispute.

Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(c) and 2030.300(d) provide for monetary sanctions in connection with motions to compel responses and further responses, subject to their respective statutory exceptions.

The Court finds a monetary sanction warranted but concludes that the reasonable amount attributable to this motion should account for the substantial overlap between the Form Interrogatory and RFA disputes but also account for the additional work involved in the reply

Monetary sanctions in the amount of $650.00 are imposed jointly and severally against Plaintiff Chelsea Dolzadelli and her counsel of record, payable to Defendant The Frontier, LLC through counsel within 15 days of notice of this order.

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendant and Defendant’s counsel is DENIED.

b) DENIED, with monetary sanctions awarded in favor of the defendant.

Defendant served Plaintiff with Requests for Admission, Set One, on July 17, 2026. Plaintiff’s responses were due August 19, 2026. Plaintiff did not timely respond. On September 2, 2026, after Defendant had moved to have the requests deemed admitted, Plaintiff served verified responses. On September 10, 2026, Plaintiff served verified amended responses. Defendant contends the responses do not substantially comply with the Discovery Act because they continue to assert objections that were waived by Plaintiff’s failure timely to respond and because Plaintiff’s September 10 amended responses purport to withdraw admissions contained in the September 2 verified responses without obtaining leave of court.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 provides that a party who fails timely to respond to requests for admission waives any objection to the requests. (§ 2033.280, subd. (a).) The requesting party may move for an order deeming the matters admitted. (§ 2033.280, subd. (b).) However, the Court shall not make such an order where, before the hearing, the responding party serves a proposed response substantially complying with section 2033.220. (§ 2033.280, subd. (c).) Katayama v. Continental Investment Group (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 898 holds that the inclusion of objections waived by reason of an untimely response does not necessarily prevent a proposed response from substantially complying with section 2033.220.

Here, Plaintiff’s September 2 responses were untimely but verified and contained substantive responses to the requests, including admissions, denials, qualified admissions or denials, and statements that Plaintiff lacked sufficient information after reasonable inquiry to admit or deny certain matters. Defendant itself submits the September 2 responses as Exhibit D to its supplemental reply.

The Court finds the September 2 verified responses, considered as a whole, substantially comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220 for purposes of section 2033.280(c). Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to an order deeming all matters specified in Requests for Admission, Set One, admitted merely because Plaintiff failed to serve timely responses. The objections asserted in Plaintiff’s responses were waived by the failure to timely respond, but their inclusion does not, by itself, require a finding that the substantive responses fail to substantially comply with section 2033.220. See Katayama, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th 898.

Defendant nevertheless correctly identifies a separate issue concerning Plaintiff’s September 10 amended responses.

Several of Plaintiff’s September 2 verified responses contain express admissions of particular facts accompanied by qualifications or denials of other portions of the request. Defendant identifies Requests for Admission Nos. 10, 15, 17, 18, 20, 36, 52 and 53 as responses in which Plaintiff subsequently replaced a partial admission with an unqualified denial.

For example, Plaintiff’s September 2 response to Request No. 10 admitted that Plaintiff moved away from The Frontier’s front door after Poncho Murillo closed the door and prevented Plaintiff’s entry, while declining to admit that the distance was at least 30 feet. The September 10 amended response simply states, “Deny.”

Similarly, Plaintiff’s original response to Request No. 36 admitted that, after Plaintiff allegedly had been stabbed approximately fourteen times, a bartender eventually intervened to stop Araceli Duarte from continuing to attack Plaintiff, while denying that an employee made a reasonable or timely effort to intervene beforehand. The September 10 response replaces that answer with an unqualified denial. Dolzadelli v Salas Reply Motion to Deem Admitted.pdf

Likewise, Plaintiff’s September 2 response to Request No. 52 expressly admitted that Plaintiff did not call 911 immediately after Poncho Murillo prevented Plaintiff from entering The Frontier, while disputing whether Plaintiff had a reasonable and safe opportunity to do so before the attack. The September 10 amended response states simply, “Deny.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300 provides that a party may withdraw or amend an admission made in response to a request for admission “only on leave of court granted after notice to all parties.” The Court may permit withdrawal or amendment only upon determining that the admission resulted from mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining its action or defense on the merits. (§ 2033.300, subds. (a)-(b).)

The record presently before the Court does not establish that Plaintiff sought or obtained leave of court under section 2033.300 before serving the September 10 amended responses. Defendant expressly raises that absence in its supplemental reply.

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s September 2 verified responses constitute admissions of particular factual matters, the Court finds Plaintiff could not withdraw those admissions merely by serving amended responses containing denials on September 10, 2026. Therefore, such admissions remain effective unless and until Plaintiff obtains relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300.

This does not, however, entitle Defendant to the broader relief requested.

The question whether Plaintiff may withdraw particular admissions previously made in her September 2 responses is analytically distinct from whether Plaintiff served a substantially compliant response before the hearing for purposes of section 2033.280(c). Plaintiff’s improper attempt to withdraw particular admissions does not convert the September 2 verified substantive responses into a complete failure to respond and does not require the Court to deem the entirety of Requests for Admission, Set One, admitted.

Nor does the Court determine on this motion that Plaintiff admitted every proposition contained in Requests Nos. 10, 15, 17, 18, 20, 36, 52 and 53. Several of the September 2 responses admitted only a portion of the matter requested while expressly denying or qualifying the remainder. The continuing effect of section 2033.300 extends to the matters actually admitted, rather than converting a partial or qualified admission into an admission of the entire request.

Defendant’s motion to deem Requests for Admission, Set One, admitted is therefore DENIED without prejudice to the continuing effect of admissions actually contained in Plaintiff’s September 2, 2026, verified responses in which Plaintiff subsequently replaced a partial admission with an unqualified denial. Thus the September 2, 2006, responses to Requests for Admission Nos. 10, 15, 17, 18, 20, 36, 52 and 53 are the operative responses, not the denials in the September 10, 2026, Amended Responses.  This order is without prejudice to Plaintiff seeking appropriate relief from those admissions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300.

The Court’s denial of the requested deemed-admissions order does not excuse Plaintiff’s failure to timely respond.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280(c) makes monetary sanctions mandatory against the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response necessitated the motion. The statute expressly requires a monetary sanction even where responses are served before the hearing and thereby prevent the matters from being deemed admitted

Plaintiff acknowledges that the responses were untimely. Plaintiff did not serve verified responses until September 2, 2026, after Defendant brought the motion. Defendant therefore was entitled to seek relief when the motion was initiated.

Defendant requests sanctions of $1,297.50. The Court finds the sum of $1075.00 appropriate for the reasonable expenses attributable to Plaintiff’s failure to timely respond, including additional work on the Reply. The Court awards Defendant monetary sanctions in the reduced amount of $1075.00, jointly and severally against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel of record, payable within 15 days of notice of this order.

 

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendant and Defendant’s counsel is DENIED.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections

Defendant objects to portions of the declaration of Karen Juarez concerning Defendant’s alleged failure to meet and confer, Defendant’s unrelated discovery extensions, video production, and separate requests for production.

The Court need not rule on objections to evidence that is immaterial to disposition of the motion. Defendant was not required to meet and confer before moving under section 2033.280 based upon Plaintiff’s failure to serve timely responses, and disputes concerning other discovery do not determine whether Plaintiff timely responded to the RFAs. Moreover, Defendant itself acknowledges that Plaintiff served verified responses on September 2 and verified amended responses on September 10.

Accordingly, Defendant’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED AS MOOT to the extent the challenged evidence is unnecessary to the Court’s determination of the motion.

CV-26-003806 – GRADFORD, ALONZO vs FORD MOTOR COMPANY – a) Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint – SUSTAINED, in part, OVERRULED, in part, with leave to amend; b) Defendant Ford Motor Company’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint - MOOT.

a) SUSTAINED, in part, OVERRULED, in part, with leave to amend.

Defendant Ford Motor Company's demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the First through Fifth Causes of Action for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Code of Civil Procedure CCP § 430.10(e).

The demurrer is OVERRULED insofar as Defendant contends that the First and Second Causes of Action are barred by the statute of limitations, that Plaintiff lacks UCL standing for failure to allege economic injury, or that the Complaint is uncertain under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(f).

Regarding the Statute of Limitations Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d) provides the three-year limitations period applicable to fraud and incorporates the discovery rule. A limitations defense may be determined on demurrer only where the bar appears clearly and affirmatively from the face of the complaint; it is insufficient that the claim merely might be time-barred. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal App.  4th 32, 42; Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal. App.4th 303, 321).

According to Plaintiff's pleading, the particular recall did not exist in August 2021. It was issued December 20, 2024, and Plaintiff alleges he did not discover it until approximately April 23, 2025. The Complaint was filed April 13, 2026.

Thus, accepting the Complaint's allegations as true, as required on demurrer, the pleaded dates do not establish that a fraud claim concerning concealment or misrepresentation of the December 2024 recall accrued in August 2021.

As to UCL standing, the Complaint sufficiently alleges the vehicle became inoperable, Plaintiff was quoted approximately $12,000 for repairs, suffered diminution in value, and lost use of the vehicle. This expressly alleges “economic injury” resulting from Ford's conduct. At the pleading stage, Ford's contention that Plaintiff has not alleged any loss of money or property overlooks those allegations.

As to the allegation of uncertainty, California courts rarely sustain uncertainty demurrers unless the defendant cannot reasonably determine what allegations must be admitted or denied. Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, uncertain also means “ambiguous” and “unintelligible”.

A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a contract is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.
(Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612). Here, Ford's detailed, claim-by-claim memorandum itself demonstrates that it understands the factual and legal theories asserted. The Complaint is not so unintelligible that Ford cannot determine what claims it must meet. Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10 (e)).

Plaintiff shall have 10 days after service of the notice of this ruling to file an amended complaint.

b) MOOT.

Based on the Court’s ruling on the companion demurrer, this motion is rendered moot.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000537 – US BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOSICATION vs MONTAGUE, GLORIA J – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Deeming Requests for Admission Admitted – HEARING REQUIRED.