Civil Tentative Rulings

September 11, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-22-004133 – BRITT, HONEY vs CENTRAL VALLEY DINER INC – Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court is confused about the February 5, 2026 joint status report indicating that a settlement had been reached. Further, the Court has questions of notice to the successors in interest.

CV-26-000861 – CASTRO, VINCENT vs ADVANTAGE SALES & MARKETING LLC – Defendant Advantage Sales & Marketing LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of Individual and Individual PAGA Claims, Strike Putative Class Claims, and Stay Non-Individual Paga Claims Pending Arbitration – GRANTED in part, with the representative PAGA claim stayed. Individual wage claims may be tried in this matter under Labor Code section 229.

FACTUAL SUMMARY:

On January 28, 2026, Plaintiff Castro filed this wage and hour class action and PAGA claim against Defendant Advantage Sales. Defendant has moved to compel arbitration, strike the class claims, and stay the non-individual PAGA claims.

PLAINTIFF ENTERED INTO THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

Plaintiff does not appear to seriously challenge the entrance of an agreement to arbitrate.

THE FAA DOES NOT APPLY

The arbitration agreement itself contains an express provision that the Federal Arbitration Act applies. Defendant argues that the provision controls even if interstate commerce is not implicated, and that in any case, interstate commerce is implicated.

Whether an express provision requiring the FAA to be used is currently under review by the state Supreme Court in Barbosa v. Sierra Pacific Orthopedic Center Medical Group, Inc. (S294710). California’s current precedent appears to require a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. Hoover v. American Income Life Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193  found that a California resident who sold life insurance policies in Texas was not covered by FAA. Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App. 4th 227 requires “a substantial relationship to interstate commerce” for FAA preemption to apply, and emphasizes that the particular employment must bear a substantial connection to interstate commerce.

Plaintiff’s local job duties in California control the question. Because Plaintiff worked exclusively in California, assembled merchandise already located in California stores, never transported goods across state lines, and did not engage in interstate shipping he argues that Defendant’s evidence proves only that Defendant is a nationwide company, not that Plaintiff’s work substantially affected interstate commerce. 

Defendant cites to Citizens Bank v. Alafabco (2003) 539 US 52, 54-58 to focus on the broader nationwide commercial relationship between Defendant and its clients. But Hoover cites to that case, and this court is bound by appellate court interpretations of the law. (Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450).

LABOR CODE SECTION 229 APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL WAGE CLAIMS ONLY

By its terms, Labor Code section 229 applies to individual claims for unpaid wages. The individual claims for wages are not ordered into arbitration. Section 432.6 does not apply due to its effective date.

PORTIONS OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT ARE UNCONSCIONABLE, BUT SEVERABLE

There is a mild to moderate level of procedural unconscionability given the somewhat adhesive nature of the contract. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114-115)

Plaintiff raises several issues as to substantive unconscionability.

As to infinite duration Ayala-Ventura v. Superior Court (2026) 119 Cal.App.5^th 241 noted that a broad scope and infinite duration were not necessarily unconscionable. Ayala-Ventura considered issues very similar to this case, where the scope of the agreement ostensibly covered both an infinite duration and non-employment claims.

The Ayala-Ventura Court found it unlikely that non-employment claims would occur.

The contract, read as a whole, is designed entirely to address employment issues and lacks some of the extraordinary wording in Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312 and Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 91. The contractual term to the officers or directors “in their capacity as such or otherwise,” does appear to be overbroad and offers some amount of procedural unconscionability.

The lack of mutuality in the companion confidentiality agreement, which permits only the Defendant to try to get a no-bond injunction, is also unconscionable. Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482 had this type of lack of mutuality, plus other features which rendered the arbitration clause as a whole unconscionable.

The next question is severability.

As articulated in Ramirez v. Charter Communications (2024) 16 Cal.5^th 478, 516

• At the outset, a court should ask whether 'the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality.' [Citation.] If so, the contract cannot be cured, and the court should refuse to enforce it.
• If that is not the case, the court should go on to ask first, whether the contract's unconscionability can be cured purely through severance or restriction of its terms, or whether reformation by augmentation is necessary.
• Even if a contract can be cured, the court should also ask whether the unconscionability should be cured through severance or restriction because the interests of justice would be furthered by such actions.

Here, the central purpose of the contract is not tainted with illegality. The contract is not unconscionable throughout but instead has elements of unconscionability. Because the unconscionable clause is not crucial to the determination of these issues, the Court severs the no-bond injunction terms of the confidentiality contract.

THE CLASS ACTION WAIVER IS VALID

In Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443 – the Court considered a class action waiver and an arbitration agreement and focused on whether the class action waiver would “undermine the vindication of the employees’ unwaivable statutory rights”. Gentry identified the four factors that a court must consider: 1) the modest size of the potential individual recovery, 2) the potential for retaliation against members of the class, 3) the fact that absent members of the class may be ill informed about their rights, and 4) other real-world obstacles to the vindication of class members rights to overtime pay through individual arbitration.

Defendant notes that Plaintiff has failed to show what the damages are. Plaintiff observes that a potential award of as much as $37,000 can meet the first prong, but does not assert an amount of damages, leaving it to the reader. Is it less than $37,000? More?

Plaintiff also fails to bring sufficient information to find the potential for retaliation, even though the Court presumes some fear of retaliation for suing the workplace.

Without the amount of the financial claim, the Court cannot find the class action waiver void under Gentry.

THE INDIVIDUAL PAGA CLAIM MUST BE ARBITRATED; THE REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM IS STAYED

PAGA claims outside of the individual wage and hour claims are covered by existing case law.

California law “prohibit[s] wholesale waiver of PAGA claims.”  Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1114.

But Defendant’s request is simply to compel arbitration of the individual PAGA component and stay the rest, which is the procedure outlined in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 and Adolph. The representative claim is stayed.

All future dates are vacated and the case is set for a Case Status Review on November 12, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21.

CV-26-001757 – AHMADI, MOHAMMAD N vs ARNAUD, DOROTHY M – Defendant Filbin Land & Cattle Co. Inc.’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment – GRANTED. 

The Court declines to take judicial notice of the filings in the instant case, as that is likely unnecessary. The Court takes judicial notice of the Secretary of State information for Filbin, the order authorizing service via Secretary of State in case CV-25-2875, and the service of process in that case via the Secretary of State.

In this case, Filbin was aware of the case on or before June 29, 2026 and filed this motion on August 12, 2026. Because Filbin was not represented by counsel in this case as of June 29, it could not appear at the hearing that day.

Filbin challenges the service of process as improper substituted service. There are a number of irregularities in the service:

1. The person who mailed the documents is asserted to be both Choudry and Bailey.
2. The substituted service is not clearly authorized by Code Civ. Proc. section 416.10.

Plaintiff argues that it was likely the person served was the agent, Jeffrey Arambel.

At this point, even assuming it was Arambel, the time between the service and the filing of this motion is less than three months, and the motion would likely be granted, though with payment for the costs of the motion as a condition. Defendant to file an answer within seven days.

The matter is set for a Case Status Review on October 27, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-26-001469 – AARZA GROUP INC vs MARTIN, ROBERT – Defendant’s CCTMO LLC & T-Mobile West Tower LLC’s, Application of Davon F. Harris to Appear Pro Hac Vice – CONTINUED to September 29, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

The memorandum states that moving party has submitted the required fifty-dollar application fee on behalf of Attorney Devon F. Ferris, but it appears the applicable fee is $600.00. (See Rules of the State Bar of California, Appendix A: Schedule of Charges and Deadlines, Title 3, Division 3, Chapter 3.)

Accordingly, the hearing is CONTINUED to September 29, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22. Moving party to submit a declaration and receipt(s) no later than five court days before the hearing regarding payment of the appropriate fee.

CV-26-007801 – In Re GONZALEZ, MICHEL – Petitioner’s Petition for Approval for Transfer of Structured Settlement Payment Rights by and between Michael Gonzalez and MIC-BRY8, LLC Pursuant to California Insurance Code 10134, Et Seq. – CONTINUED to September 29, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

The Petition does not include copies of the annuity contract or any qualified assignment agreement or the underlying structured settlement agreement. (Ins. Code, § 10139.5(f)(2).) Petitioner’s declaration states that they requested the underlying documents via fax from American General Life Insurance Company. But Petitioner did not submit the underlying documents nor any copies of correspondence demonstrating its reasonable efforts to locate and secure the copies of the underlying documents. The Court is unable to determine the full terms of the transaction, e.g., whether the payee is transferring all or a portion of her future payments. (Ins. Code, § 10139.5(b)(4).)

Accordingly, the hearing is CONTINUED to September 29, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22. Petitioner to make additional reasonable efforts to locate and secure a copy of the underlying documents. (Ins. Code, § 10139.5(f)(2).) Petitioner to submit a declaration no later than five court days before the hearing regarding such efforts, including as necessary copies of the underlying documents or copies of requests for the underlying documents.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-25-003541 – GLORIA, ESTEBAN vs FINNEGAN, CHERYL LYNN – Defendant Motion for Fees and Costs Pursuant to CCP Section 1038 – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The Court finds that, at a minimum, Plaintiff maintained this matter without reasonable cause despite repeated acknowledgement that he was aware of no evidence which would remove this matter from the requirements of the Government Claims Act. As a result, Defendant, as the prevailing party on summary judgment, is entitled to recover her defense costs pursuant to Code Civ. Proc.§ 338.  Based on the moving papers and supporting evidence, and in the absence of opposition, the Court finds that the time expended, the hourly fees incurred, and the expenses claimed are reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to recover $15,895.01 from Plaintiff herein.

Defendant shall serve and submit a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.) 

CV-25-007643 – PITRE, TERENCE vs TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY – a) Defendants Board of Trustees of California State University, Alfred Petrosky and Jarrett Kotrozo’s Motion for Protective Order – HEARING REQUIRED. b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Documents – HEARING REQUIRED.

a-b) Based on the parties Joint Status Statement submitted on 9-1-26, Counsel shall appear to advise the Court of the status of their continued meet and confer efforts on these matters.

CV-26-001040 – LVNV FUNDING LLC vs MAREZ, ROBERT – Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on the moving papers, the Court finds that the Complaint states facts sufficient to constitute the stated cause of action against the Defendant, and the Answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1)(A).) Therefore, the motion is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered on the underlying debt in the amount of $2,277.72.

Plaintiff has also demonstrated entitlement to costs in the amount of $357.90, which shall be added to the judgment.

Plaintiff shall serve and submit a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)  The Court will sign the proposed judgment submitted by Plaintiff.

CV-26-001417 – KUMAR, SUSHMA vs A&M ADMINISTRATION LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave for File Amended Complaint – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff shall submit her amended pleading within 10 days. The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

 

CV-22-003941 – SANCHEZ, ALEJANDRA vs ROBLES, CESAR – Defendant San Gabriel Temporary Staffing Services LLC’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The Court notes the attempted filing by the parties of the attempted filing of a Notice of Settlement herein which was rejected on technical grounds and continues the matter briefly pending the refiling of the Notice of Settlement.

Accordingly. This matter is continued to September 18, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court. 

CV-23-003668 – RHINEY, TIMOTHY LAMONTE, Jr vs RAMIREZ, JOSE MIGUEL – a) Defendant’s Motion for Order Compelling Responses to Supplemental Demand for Admissions and Production of Documents and for an Order Imposing Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED, unopposed. b) Defendant’s Motion Compelling Responses to Supplemental Interrogatories and for an Order Imposing Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED, unopposed.

a) The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to timely respond to Defendant’s properly propounded Special Interrogatories served on Plaintiff on November 6, 2025 or at all. The Court further finds that Defendant is entitled to responses to said discovery. Code of Civ. Proc., §§2017.010, 2030.290(b).

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is hereby granted. Any objections by Plaintiff to said discovery are hereby waived. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to provide verified, code compliant, objection-free responses to said Supplemental Interrogatories, Set One without objections within fifteen (15) days of the date of service of this order. (CCP §§2030.290(a) and (b); 2031.300(a).)

The Court also finds that said failure to respond is without substantial justification and accordingly finds that Defendant is entitled to monetary sanctions of $33.00 for attorney’s fees and costs reasonably incurred in bringing this motion. Said sanctions are payable to Defendant’s Counsel within fifteen (15) days of the date of service of this order. Code of Civ. Proc.§§2030.210, 2030.290(c); 2023.030(a); CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1348 (a).

b) The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to timely respond to Defendant’s properly propounded Request for Production served on Plaintiff on November 6, 2025, or at all. The Court further finds that Defendant is entitled to responses to said discovery. Code of Civ. Proc., §§2017.010, 2031.300(a).

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is hereby granted. Any objections by Plaintiff to said discovery are hereby waived. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2031.300(a) and (b)). Plaintiff is hereby ordered to provide verified, code compliant, objection-free responses to said Supplemental Requests for Production, Set One, within fifteen (15) days of the date of service of this order.

The Court also finds that said failure to respond is without substantial justification and accordingly finds that Defendant is entitled to monetary sanctions of $330.00 for attorney’s fees and costs reasonably incurred in bringing this motion. Said sanctions are payable to Defendant’s Counsel within fifteen (15) days of the date of service of this order.  Civ Proc. Code §§2031.300(c), 2023.010 (h); 2023.030(a); CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1348 (a). 

CV-23-005108 – ESQUIVEL, JUDY vs MONTUY, POLLY – Consideration of Reasonable Fees and Costs Incurred by Plaintiff as a Result of Defendant’s Actions – GRANTED, unopposed. 

An award of attorney fees and costs generally requires the requested attorney fees and costs to be reasonable. 

The “reasonable hourly rate,” for purposes of calculating an attorney's fee award, is that prevailing in the community for similar work. The relevant “community,” for purposes of calculating an attorney fee award, is generally based on where the services are rendered, i.e., where the court is located. (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC, (2025)112 Cal. App. 5th 1147). 

The lodestar method is the typical approach for determining the reasonableness of the attorney fee award requested. Nicholas v Taft, (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4^th 1233)

The Court notes Counsel’s declaration notably provides a block-billed aggregate request rather than contemporaneous time records to support the attorney fee claim.  In Guillory v. Hill, the court held in determining attorney fee's reasonableness, that counsel should maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims and that Counsel may not submit a plethora of noncompensable, vague, block-billed attorney time entries, to support request for attorney's fees, and expect particularized, individual deletions as the only consequence; rather, counsel must prune the fee request to comply with the law instead of trying to transfer that responsibility onto the trial court. (Guillory v. Hill, (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 802 as modified (June 26, 2019).

It has been held that in a proper case where a threshold showing has been made that obtaining local counsel was impracticable, a trial court should consider the need to hire more expensive out-of-town counsel as a factor in determining the base fee used in the lodestar figure or in evaluating whether to apply a lodestar enhancement. (Nichols v. City of Taft, supra citing Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005), 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 394). No such threshold showing has been made here.  Accordingly, the court applies an hourly rate of $350.00 for Mr. Partiyelli, and $200.00 for his associate. The Court also finds the reasonable attorney hours expended on this matter, bearing in mind the continuances and lack of meet and confer, to be 16 hours for Mr. Partiyelli’s Associate and 10 hours for Mr. Partiyelli,  totaling $7,700.00.

Notably, the experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court, and while his or her judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court, reviewing the attorney's fee award, is convinced that it is clearly wrong. (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC, (2025)112 Cal. App. 5th 1147).

Regarding litigation costs and expenses, the Court is guided by Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5  and finds the claimed hotel charges for accommodation at the St. Regis in San Francisco, for witness interviews, including bar charges to be unreasonable, and finds the sum of $1,500 a reasonable sum for accommodation for both attorneys for the witness interviews.  In addition, car rental charges of $350.00, and exhibit costs of $350.00 appear reasonable to the Court.

In similar vein, the court finds accommodation charges at the St Regis in San Francisco for a trial in Modesto to be unreasonable and finds $700.00 to be a more reasonable accommodation charge, noting that witnesses were put up at the Springhill Suites in Turlock for the trial. 

Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs in the sum of $15,161.70.

Plaintiff is accordingly granted reasonable attorney fees and costs in the sum of $15,161.70.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***