Civil Tentative Rulings

April 23, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-25-004427 - DHILLON, VIJAYPAL SINGH vs STATE BANK OF TEXAS - Defendant State Bank of Texas Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint - SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Procedural note: Defendant raises the timing of the Code Civ. Proc. section 170.6 challenge to Judge Clifford Tong in a filing in the companion case. This Court rejects any argument that it should consider the timing of the challenge for any purpose. The case is now assigned to me, and I am required to rule on the merits. While I am aware of Judge Tong’s tentative ruling, I did not consider it at all in my ruling.

Procedural history: On December 19, 2025, Judge John Freeland ruled on the State Bank of Texas’s original demurrer, finding that the allegations arguing that the deed of trust was void were insufficient to show its voidness and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. 

On January 7, 2026, I ruled that Defendant Thyne Bergland’s Demurrer to the case was sustained with leave to amend, and I indicated that I believed I was likely bound by Judge Freeland’s ruling.

Because at this point there is a First Amended Complaint, I am bound by no prior judge’s ruling, inclusive of my own.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that State Bank of Texas (SBT) and Thyne Berglund & Co.(Thyne) were involved in a wrongful foreclosure of his house. Plaintiff owns a 45% interest in Thornco Hospitality LLC, which executed a promissory note in the amount of $12,500,000 to SBT on September 30, 2021.

SBT prepared a Deed of Trust encumbering Plaintiff’s primary residence on March 16, 2023 and signed by Plaintiff on that date. The Deed of Trust was recorded on April 12, 2023.

Plaintiff avers that SBT did not tell him that the Deed of Trust was intended to secure the commercial loan.

Thornco went bankrupt. Thyne was substituted in as the trustee on January 13, 2025, and immediately initiated foreclosure proceedings.

A Notice of Trustee’s sale was issued on April 16, 2025, with a May 13, 2025 sales date. The Notice inaccurately claimed that the amount due was over $30,000,000. On May 6, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action. The trustee’s sale occurred and SBT bought the property for an unstated amount.

Plaintiff does not state in the Complaint what he intended to accomplish by signing the Deed of Trust. Plaintiff asserts he was not informed of the nature of the Deed of Trust.

OTHER RELATED ISSUES

Defendant alleges judicial estoppel from a brief and failed attempt by Plaintiff to declare bankruptcy.

ANALYSIS

Demurrer standards: “[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) “The complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.” (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.)

The question is whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to deem the initial Deed of Trust as void. If it were merely voidable, Plaintiff would have to show tender. Lona v. Citibank (2011) 202 Cal.App.4^th 89 controls on both issues.

In Lona, cited by Defendant, the appellate court found that summary judgment in favor of the debt-holder was improper because Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to show that the initial debt might be void for unconscionability.

In this case, Plaintiff, who held a 45% stake in a corporation obtaining millions of dollars in loans fails to assert what it was that the deed of trust was designed to do. One assumes he believed it was to secure some debt, but fails to assert what debt it was expected to secure.

When pleading fraud, “a plaintiff must plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made.” (Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1, 20 [internal citations and quotations omitted], disapproved of on other grounds by Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310.) “When the defendant is a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must further allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.” (Id.) “There are certain exceptions to the particularity requirement. (Id.) “Less specificity is required when it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.” (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has information specifically in its possession, but provides no surrounding circumstances around the failure to disclose what the Deed of Trust was for, or any conversations whatsoever that led to the signing of the document.

Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently allege fraud requires sustaining the demurrer on the first and second causes of action, and the remaining causes of action are either entirely derivative or fail for the same reasons.

Other defects alleged would require tender, which did not occur.

Defendant’s appeal to judicial estoppel is sufficiently procedurally flawed as to fail without further discussion. No judicial notice of the claims made at bankruptcy has been made. Further, nondisclosure in bankruptcy filings, standing alone, is insufficient to support the finding of bad faith necessary. (Myahara v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5^th 687.)

Leave to amend: The Court has given Plaintiff ample opportunity to state a claim, or argue that a claim can be made via amendment. No such showing has been made. The bare assertion of failing to be told what the document was, without more detail, is legally insufficient on its face. Plainitiff does not propound a theory even at this time which would demonstrate a viable cause of action.

UD-25-000784 - STATE BANK OF TEXAS vs DHILLON, VIJAYPAL SINGH - a) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment - HEARING REQUIRED; b) Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration - HEARING REQUIRED; c) Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs’ Counsel - HEARING REQUIRED.

a) The Court must determine the motion to disqualify first. This motion may be affected by the ruling in the related case.

b) The Court must determine the motion to disqualify first. This motion may be affected by the ruling in the related case.

c) At one point, Plaintiff averred that service of the motion had not been accomplished. Counsel for Defendant shall provide copies of the sent email to Plaintiff prior to the hearing for that motion and the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court is confused by the “eFiling System/Mail” designation.”

There does not appear to be a conflict unless a trial is necessary, and any order would likely be made as to a trial only under the advocate/attorney rule.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-18-004567 - BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE vs CRIST, KATHLEEN - Plaintiff's Motion for Order Setting Aside and Vacating its Prior Order of Dismissal and for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation of the Parties - DENIED without prejudice.

The Court initially heard this motion on March 5, 2026, and continued the matter to April 23, 2026, for a supplemental brief, supplemental declaration, and a notice of ruling to be served. These documents were required to be filed at least five court days before the continued hearing date. A review of the court file fails to show compliance with the Court’s instructions; no documents have been filed since the last hearing. Consequently, the motion is DENIED without prejudice.

CV-23-007620 - WRIGHT, ERIKA vs VALLEY INDUSTRIAL PARK LP - Cross-Defendant Top 1 Collision Repair, Inc. DBA Fix Auto Modesto’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication - DENIED.

Procedural Issues

The operative notice is the Second Amended Notice of Motion and Motion filed on December 29, 2025. This notice does not comply with the mandatory filing and service requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it was filed fewer than 81 days before the March 19, 2026 hearing (see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(a)(2)), and it was served electronically fewer than 83 days before the hearing (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1005(b)). The Court may not shorten the notice period unless all parties stipulate otherwise. (See McMahon v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 112, 115; Urshan v. Musicians' Credit Union (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 764.) A continuance cannot cure the defect in the length of notice. (See Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267-1268.)

In addition, the request for summary adjudication fails to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b), because neither the Second Amended Notice of Motion and Motion nor the Moving Party’s separate statement identify “the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty” to be summarily adjudicated.

Merits

In any case, the motion also fails on the merits. Top 1’s showing relies substantially on counsel’s declaration summarizing deposition testimony and drawing conclusions about causation and contractual scope. To the extent disputed inferences are required—particularly concerning the scope of “use and occupancy”—Top 1 has not eliminated triable issues. On summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. (See Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 575.) Because the Moving Party has failed to show that there are no issues of triable fact, it did not meet its initial burden on summary judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)

Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the initial burden was met, the motion must still be denied because there are triable issues of material fact. (See, e.g., Valley Industrial’s Opp. Sep. Stmt., SUF Nos. 8, 21.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Moving Party’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to Exhibits 1 and 2 (complaint and cross-complaint) but DENIED as to Exhibit 3 (lease agreement). A lease agreement is not the type of document that typically falls within the categories of matters that may be judicially noticed under Evidence Code § 452.

Objections

Because the parties’ objections were immaterial to the Court’s disposition of this motion, the Court disregards them. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).)

CV-24-004072 - ZOLLIN, TIMOTHY vs BORRAYES, ALBIN HELVIE DE LEON - Defendants Albin Helvie De Leon Borrayes and Pacific Agri-Products Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment or in Alternative for Summary Adjudication - CONTINUED to July 30, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 22.

Pursuant to the Court’s April 15, 2026 Minute Order, the hearing on this matter is CONTINUED to July 30, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 22.

CV-25-004358 - TOSTADO, ANTONIO, Jr vs PEREZ, URIEL - a) Defendant Uriel Perez’s Motion for an Order that Defendant’s Requests for Admission be Deemed Admitted and for Monetary Sanctions to Antonio Tostado Jr. - GRANTED-in-part; b) Defendant Uriel Perez’s Motion to Compel Verifications to Special Interrogatories, Set One and Request for Monetary Sanctions to Antonio Tostado, Jr. - GRANTED; c) Defendant Uriel Perez’s Motion to Compel Verifications to Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Monetary Sanctions to Antonio Tostado Jr. - GRANTED; d) Defendant Uriel Perez’s Motion to Compel Verifications to Responses to Requests for Production, Set One, and Request for Monetary Sanctions to Antonio Tostado Jr. - GRANTED.

a) Requests for Admission

Defendant Perez moves for an order that his Requests for Admission, Set One be deemed admitted and also for monetary sanctions in the amount of $1395 against Plaintiff Tostado and Plaintiff’s attorney of record, jointly and severally.

“The party to whom the requests for admission are directed shall sign the response under oath, unless the response contains only objections.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.240.) “Untimely or unsworn statements are tantamount to no response at all.” (Zorro Inv. Co. v. Great Pacific Securities Corp. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 907, 914.)

“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response . . . [t]he party to whom the requests for admission are directed waives any objection to the requests[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) “The requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(b).) “The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(c).) “It is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion.” (Ibid.) There is no requirement to meet and confer before submitting a motion under Section 2033.280.
 

Here, after requesting and receiving numerous extensions, Plaintiff served unverified responses on November 21, 2025. The unverified responses admitted or denied the requests in a straightforward manner and did not contain objections. Subsequently, Defendant requested a verification and Plaintiff repeatedly promised a verification was forthcoming. As of the time the instant motion was filed on March 9, 2026, Plaintiff still had not complied with his discovery obligations.

On April 2, 2026, Plaintiff served verified responses that differed from the November 21, 2025 unverified responses he had previously served. The April 2, 2026 verified responses also contain objections. On April 9, 2026, Plaintiff submitted an Opposition, but did not attach his own belated April 2, 2026 verified responses. On April 15, 2026, Defendant submitted a Reply, attaching Plaintiff’s belated April 2, 2026 responses.

The Court finds that aside from Plaintiff’s Response to Request for Admission No. 10, the remainder of Plaintiff’s belated April 2, 2026 verified responses comply with section 2033.220. Because Plaintiff’s initial November 21, 2025 responses were unverified, Plaintiff failed to serve a timely response. (Zorro Inv. Co. v. Great Pacific Securities Corp. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 907, 914.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s objections are waived. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) Yet, Plaintiff’s Response to Request For Admission No. 10 states that Plaintiff denies the request because it is vague and ambiguous as to the terms “individuals for the BUSINESS.” (April 15, 2026 Infante Decl., Ex. A at 3.) Because objections were waived, the response is deficient. Defendant’s Motion for an Order that Defendant’s Requests for Admission be Deemed Admitted is GRANTED-in-part as to Request for Admission No. 10 only.

Sanctions are mandatory. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) Therefore, the Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $1395 against Plaintiff and his attorney of record, jointly and severally. Plaintiff and his attorney shall pay the sanctions to Berliner Cohen, LLP.

Defendant to submit a proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

b) Special Interrogatories

Defendant Perez moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to verify his original and amended responses to Defendant’s Special Interrogatories, Set One and also for monetary sanctions in the amount of $1395 against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s attorney of record, jointly and severally.

“If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response . . . [t]he party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290.) “The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290(c).) There is no requirement to meet and confer before submitting a motion under Section 2030.290.

Here, Plaintiff argues that the instant motion is moot because he served verified responses after Defendant submitted the instant motion. Plaintiff did not include the belated verifications with his submission. Defendant replies that the issue of sanctions must still be resolved.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.290(c), the Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $960 against Plaintiff and his attorney of record, jointly and severally. Plaintiff and his attorney shall pay the sanctions to Berliner Cohen, LLP.

Defendant to submit a proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

c) Form Interrogatories

Defendant Perez moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to verify his original and amended responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set One and also for monetary sanctions in the amount of $1395 against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s attorney of record, jointly and severally.

Here, Plaintiff argues that the instant motion is moot because he served verified responses after Defendant submitted the instant motion. Plaintiff did not include the belated verifications with his submission. Defendant replies that the issue of sanctions must still be resolved.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.290(c), the Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $380 against Plaintiff and his attorney of record, jointly and severally, in conjunction with the instant motion. Plaintiff and his attorney shall pay the sanctions to Berliner Cohen, LLP.

Defendant to submit a proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

d) Requests for Production

Defendant Perez moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to verify his original and amended responses to Defendant’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One and also for monetary sanctions in the amount of $2395 against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s attorney of record, jointly and severally.

"If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it . . . [t]he party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300.) “[T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) . . . unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300(c).) “In lieu of or in addition to this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (Ibid.) There is no requirement to meet and confer before submitting a motion under Section 2031.300.
 

Here, Plaintiff argues that the instant motion is moot because he served verified responses after Defendant submitted the instant motion. Plaintiff did not include the belated verifications with his submission. Defendant replies that the issue of sanctions must still be resolved. Defendant also contends that a $1000 sanction must be imposed under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.050.

The Court does not agree that Plaintiff’s actions in this matter, or lack thereof, amount to a good faith violation under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.050.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.300(c), the Court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the amount of $960 against Plaintiff and his attorney of record, jointly and severally. Plaintiff and his attorney shall pay the sanctions to Berliner Cohen, LLP.

Defendant to submit a proposed order within five court days that is consistent with this ruling.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-25-003525 - ANDERSON, DERRICK vs DELMONTE FOODS INC - Defendant Sedgwick Claims Management Services Inc.’s Motion to Strike and Dismiss (Code of Civil Procedure 436(B) & 581(F)(2)) - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court is inclined to exercise its discretion herein in favor of DENIAL of the instant request. Plaintiff submits evidence that the delay in filing the amended pleading was attributable, at least in part, to a lack of communication from his filing service with regard to the initial rejection of the document rather than a refusal to comply with the Court’s order. In addition, it appears that Plaintiff acted reasonably promptly to cure the problem once notified. Lastly, the defense concedes service of the amended pleading in November 2025.

In any case, the Court intends to hear from the parties on this matter at the time of the hearing.

CV-25-008885 - DURAN, AMANDA vs PACIFIC MATERIAL HANDLING SOLUTIONS INC - Defendant Pacific Material Handling Solutions, Inc.’s Petition to Compel Arbitration - DENIED.

Based on review of the papers and evidence submitted by the parties, the Court finds that Defendant, as the moving party, has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the arbitration agreement is subject to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, due to Defendant’s failure to submit admissible evidence that the subject agreement involves interstate commerce.  (9 U.S.C. § 2.)

As a result, the application of the agreement at issue herein is determined by California law, and the Court finds that the provisions of Lab. Code §§ 229 and 432.6 operate to prevent Plaintiff’s subject claims from being compelled to arbitration.

In addition, the Court finds that the agreement is permeated with unconscionability.  In that regard, the Court finds a moderate degree of procedural unconscionability, based on the adhesive nature of the agreement as a condition of Plaintiff’s employment coupled with the circumstances under which it was presented, as set forth in Plaintiff’s uncontroverted declaration testimony herein.  The Court further finds a high degree of substantive unconscionability, based on the significant limitation of Plaintiff’s time in which to submit a claim to arbitration or else waive the right to assert it in any forum, which is substantially reduced from the limitations period for such claims prescribed by California law, coupled with the further restrictive effect of the anti-tolling provision contained in the agreement.

CV-25-009498 - VARGAS, JOSE BALTAZAR vs SPINNATO, AMANDA MELISSA - Defendant's Motion to Strike the First Amended Complaint's Prayer and Claims for Punitive Damages - DENIED.

The Court finds that the Complaint states sufficient facts to sustain a claim for punitive damages against Defendant Spinnato at the pleading stage. (Civ. Code § 3294.)

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-22-005496 - GODINEZ, JESUS vs PLANASA LLC - Final Fairness Hearing - CONTINUED, on the Plaintiff’s motion.

On account of delays in obtaining Class Data and reviewing same and its attendant impact on the dissemination of the Class Notice and on other related duties of the Class Administrator under the Settlement Agreement, the final fairness hearing is continued to June 26, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

If all is in order, the Final Approval Motion shall be filed no later than June 4, 2026. Otherwise, the parties shall file a status statement no later than June 4, 2026.

CV-23-004665 - PAULEEN BAJWA & MCKELLAR ENTERPRISES vs RAS AUTOMOTIVE INC - Defendant's Motion for Order Granting Leave to File Supplemental Answer to Complaint - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

In view of the potentially dispositive/mooting effect of Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Supplementary Answer to Complaint, and of Defendant’s Motion for Order pursuant to CCP 664.6 for an order that the case has settled and directing execution of the settlement agreement on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication, this matter is continued to June 9, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court. 

CV-24-009500 - STAN BOYETT & SON INC vs JIZRAWI, SOUHAIL - a) Cross Defendant’s Motion to Strike - DENIED; b) Cross Defendant’s Demurrer to Second Amended Cross-Complaint - OVERRULED.

a) The court finds that the contents of the challenged paragraph 20 of the Second Amended Cross Complaint while not an asserted basis for liability, are relevant to provide background and context to Cross Complainants’ allegations therein.

The court declines to exercise its jurisdiction to strike said paragraph.  (Evidence Code §§ 452 and 453; Code of Civil Procedure Sections 435, 436 and 437; CLD Const., Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141; Colden v. Broadway State Bank (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 428).

Cross Defendants Request for Judicial Notice is again granted only for the existence of the transcript but not for the truth of its contents. (Evidence. Code §§ 452 and 453). 

b) Cross Complainants have capacity to bring the present action. (Corporations Code section 2010)

Cross Defendant’s claims of criminal conduct and perjury would require the court to delve into factual issues impermissible and beyond the scope of a demurrer. (Garcia v. Garcia, (1957)148 Cal. App. 2d 147; State of California ex rel. Bowen v. Bank of Am. Corp., (2005)126 Cal. App. 4th 225).

Cross Defendant Union 76 of Marin is properly joined to this action based on Cross Complainant’s assertion of alter ego liability. (Baize v. Eastridge Companies, LLC, (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 293)

California permits alternative and inconsistent pleadings. (Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co., (2006)140 Cal.App.4th 1395). The Second Amended Cross Complaint is not vulnerable to a demurrer on that basis.

Being based on a different primary right from the Marin cases, the Second Amended Cross Complaint is not subject to demurrer on grounds of Res Judicata  Res Judicata is inapplicable to bar the first, second, third, fourth fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth causes of action in the Second Amended Cross Complaint as the as the Marin cases and the Second Amended Cross Complaint present case are based on the assertion of different primary rights.  (Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. Dep't of Conservation, (2017)11 Cal. App. 5th 1202; Fed. Home Loan Bank of San Francisco v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., (2013)214 Cal. App. 4th 1520; Brenelli Amedeo, S.P.A. v. Bakara Furniture, Inc., (1994) 29 Cal. App. 4th 1828),

As to collateral estoppel, the issues of tortious interference and unjust enrichment though voluntarily dismissed and constituting a judgment on the merits, are not the same as those raised in the prior Marin proceedings. (Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., (2008), 166 Cal. App. 4th 1497, as modified on denial of reh'g (Oct. 14, 2008); Patel v. Crown Diamonds, Inc., (2016), 247 Cal. App. 4th 29 as modified (Apr. 29, 2016; Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., (2010) 48 Cal. 4th 788), to the extent that the issues of tortious interference.

It is not evident from the face of the Second Amended Cross Complaint that the causes of action asserted therein are barred by the Statute of Limitations given the potential application of the Continuing Violation Doctrine and the Delayed Discovery Rule. (Doe v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Sacramento, (2010)189 Cal. App. 4th 1423; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of La Habra, ((2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 821, as modified (July 18, 2001)). Any consideration in this regard would require a factual determination not permissible on demurrer.

Based on the foregoing, Cross Defendant’s Demurrer to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eight causes of action asserted in the Second Amended Cross Complaint are hereby overruled.

Cross Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted to the extent that the Court takes judicial notice of the existence and legal effect of the documents but not the truth of their contents. (Evidence Code sections 452 and 453; Steed v. Dep't of Consumer Affs., (2012). 204 Cal. App. 4th 112

CV-25-011011 - STANISLAUS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS vs RAYA, JESSICA S MARISCAL - Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Prejudgment Possession - GRANTED, unopposed.

The Court finds Plaintiff has discharged its burden of demonstrating it is entitled to the real property identified as 835 N. Hart Road, Modesto, County of Stanislaus, California, and bearing Stanislaus County Assessor’s Parcel Numbers 012-040-004, by eminent domain for its planned State Route 132 West  Freeway/Expressway Project for the public benefit and for all uses necessary, incidental and convenient thereto pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.

The Court further finds Plaintiff has, based on an appraisal, deposited the sum of $920, 000.00 into the State Treasury as probable compensation that will be awarded Defendants in the eminent domain proceeding. (California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1255.410 and 1255.010 et seq.).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff is hereby authorized and empowered to enter upon and take prejudgment possession of

the subject property. Plaintiff shall be entitled to take possession of the subject property within (30) days of service of this Order.

Service of this Order shall be made in the manner specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.450, subdivisions (d) and (f).  

If the owner(s) or occupant(s), if any, fail to deliver possession of the Property upon the demand of County pursuant to this Order, a Writ of Assistance may issue ex parte upon the affidavit of a representative of Plaintiff showing that such owner(s) or occupant(s), if any, have failed to deliver possession of the Property.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings for Department 19***