February 27, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 21***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

2014212 - VILLEGAS, TERESA E MENDEZ VS DUARTE NURSERY INC - Compliance Hearing - CONTINUED to April 17, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

Having reviewed the compliance statement that was filed on February 13, 2026, the Court approves the Settlement Administrator’s request to distribute the remaining $25,001.73 to the cy pres recipient, the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 384(b), Class Counsel is directed to submit to the Court within five court days a proposed amended judgment that reflects the cy pres distribution. (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 384.5.)

The hearing on this matter is CONTINUED to April 17, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22 to check for the amended judgment and for a final declaration from the Settlement Administrator confirming the cy pres distribution and the lack of any remaining funds.

The Settlement Administrator’s final declaration is to be filed at least five court days before the continued hearing date.

CV-24-006033 - THREFALL RANCH LP vs OAKDALE IRRIGATION DISTRICT - Defendants, Oakdale Irrigation District and South San Joaquin Irrigation District's Motion for Summary Judgment - DENIED.

Background

Plaintiff Threfall Ranch, L.P. filed this action on July 31, 2024, asserting a single cause of action for breach of written contract arising out of a May 6, 1896 water agreement between Plaintiff’s predecessor, W.A. Threlfall, and the Stanislaus and San Joaquin Water Company (“SSJWC”), as partially cancelled and modified by a May 23, 1898 agreement. (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 4, 8–9; Pl.’s UMF Nos. 4, 8–9.)

Defendants Oakdale Irrigation District (“OID”) and South San Joaquin Irrigation District (“SSJID”) jointly moved for summary judgment. On February 20, 2026, Plaintiff and SSJID stipulated to dismissal following settlement, with the Court retaining jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Accordingly, OID is the sole moving party for purposes of the instant motion.

OID contends summary judgment is warranted because (1) neither Plaintiff nor its predecessors performed under the contract; (2) any contractual obligation to deliver water expired after twenty years; and (3) Plaintiff’s claim is time‑barred. (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 11–14, 17–20, 21–33.)

Plaintiff opposes, asserting that performance occurred through accepted substitute performance via construction and use of the Threlfall Lateral, that the contract created a covenant running with the land in perpetuity, and that limitations defenses raise triable issues of fact. (Pl.’s UMF Nos. 34–45.)

Governing Standards

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of producing evidence showing that a cause of action has no merit or that a complete defense applies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850–851.) Once that burden is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.)

Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, the moving party’s evidence is strictly construed and the opposing party’s evidence is liberally construed, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the non‑moving party. (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038; Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Summary judgment is improper where the evidence permits conflicting reasonable inferences. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the transcript on appeal in Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman (1908) 152 Cal. 716 (Bachman) pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). (Pl.’s RJN.)

OID objects, arguing the Bachman transcript concerns a different contract and different parties and that Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of disputed facts. (Defs.’ Obj. to RJN.)

The Court GRANTS the Request for Judicial Notice for the limited purpose of recognizing the existence and contents of the appellate record, not for the truth of all factual assertions contained therein. (Evid. Code, § 452(d); cf. Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.) The relevance of the Bachman record is addressed below.

Evidentiary Objections

Both parties submitted extensive evidentiary objections challenging relevance, foundation, hearsay, improper opinion, and personal knowledge, particularly with respect to historical documents and expert testimony addressing events occurring more than a century ago. (Defs.’ Objs. to Evidence; Pl.’s Objs. to Evidence.)

At the summary‑judgment stage, the Court need not resolve every evidentiary objection where the challenged evidence, even if limited or excluded, would not eliminate the existence of triable issues of material fact. Many of the objections raised by both sides go to weight, credibility, and competing historical inferences, which are matters for the trier of fact. Accordingly, the Court declines to rule individually on each objection, except as noted above regarding the Request for Judicial Notice. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).)

Discussion

        A. Performance

OID’s primary factual showing is that there is no documentary evidence that W.A. Threlfall or his successors paid the $10‑per‑acre charge or the annual $1.50‑per‑acre water rental required by the 1896/1898 agreements. (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 11–14, 16.) Plaintiff does not dispute the absence of direct evidence of monetary payment.

Plaintiff, however, presents evidence that performance occurred through accepted substitute performance—namely, the construction and use of the Threlfall Lateral supplying water from the Tulloch system—and that SSJWC accepted that construction and incorporated the lateral into its system. (Pl.’s UMF Nos. 34–36, 40.) Plaintiff relies on historical maps, district records, and the appellate record in Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman, which addresses materially identical contract language and recognizes that construction of the lateral constituted accepted performance of the initial $10‑per‑acre obligation. (Pl.’s UMF Nos. 34–36; see also Bachman, 152 Cal. at pp. 720–725.)

OID disputes that Bachman applies to W.A. Threlfall’s contract and argues the evidence shows no performance as a matter of law. (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 11–16.) However, whether SSJWC accepted construction and use of the Threlfall Lateral as performance under W.A. Threlfall’s contract, and whether water was in fact delivered to the lands now owned by Plaintiff pursuant to that acceptance, are questions that turn on disputed historical evidence and competing reasonable inferences. (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 11–14; Pl.’s UMF Nos. 34–40.)

Because resolving these issues would require weighing evidence and assessing credibility, summary judgment is improper on the issue of performance.

        B. Contract Term

OID contends the obligation to deliver water expired after twenty years based on language in the May 23, 1898 agreement stating water would be furnished “for twenty years.” (Defs.’ UMF No. 19.) Plaintiff responds that this language appears as a recital and does not override the operative provisions of the 1896 contract, which Plaintiff contends created a perpetual covenant running with the land. (Pl.’s UMF Nos. 37–39.)

The 1896 contract references a twenty‑year period only in connection with the installment structure for payment of the $10‑per‑acre charge. (Defs.’ UMF No. 10; Complaint, Ex. A-2.) By contrast, the separate provision requiring payment of an annual $1.50‑per‑acre water rental contains no temporal limitation, and the contract further provides that it “shall have the force and effect of a covenant running to and with the land.” (Pl.’s UMF Nos. 37–38; Complaint, Ex. A-2.)

Read as a whole, the contract is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation regarding duration. This ambiguity is reinforced by evidence that Defendants or their predecessors acknowledged the obligation as perpetual decades after execution of the contract. (Pl.’s UMF Nos. 42–43.) OID disputes the significance of those statements and contends the 1898 agreement conclusively limited the term. (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 8–9, 19.)

Whether the 1898 agreement constituted a novation or merely a partial cancellation, and whether the obligation to deliver water was intended to terminate after twenty years, present questions of fact dependent on extrinsic evidence and credibility determinations. Summary judgment is therefore improper on this ground.

        C. Statute of Limitations

OID further argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred because water claims were asserted or known in 1911 and again in 1992, yet no enforcement action was taken until 2024. (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 21–33.)

Plaintiff disputes that these historical events triggered the statute of limitations or constituted abandonment. Plaintiff presents evidence that the 1911 materials reflect internal district assessments rather than repudiation of contractual rights, and that Plaintiff’s predecessors lacked knowledge of any adverse position requiring suit. (Pl.’s UMF Nos. 44–45.) Plaintiff further disputes that the 1992 correspondence concerned the W.A. Threlfall contract, asserting it related to different agreements and acreage, and that the W.A. Threlfall contract was not discovered until December 2023 due to how it was recorded and indexed. (Pl.’s UMF Nos. 44–45.)

Whether Plaintiff or its predecessors had sufficient notice of an alleged breach or repudiation, and whether their conduct reflects abandonment of a covenant running with the land, are inherently fact‑intensive inquiries that cannot be resolved as a matter of law. (Defs.’ UMF Nos. 21–33; Pl.’s UMF Nos. 44–45.)

Conclusion

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record demonstrates triable issues of material fact regarding (1) performance or accepted substitute performance, (2) the duration of the contractual obligation, and (3) the applicability of time‑based defenses. Competing historical evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom cannot be resolved on summary judgment.

For the above reasons, Defendant Oakdale Irrigation District’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

CV-25-003793 - SYNCHRONY BANK vs MARTINON, TERESA - Plaintiff's Motion for Order Admitting Truth of the Matters Specified - GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff’s unopposed Motion for Order Deeming Requests for Admission Admitted is GRANTED.

The Court finds that Plaintiff properly served Requests for Admission, Set One, on Defendant and that Defendant failed to serve any responses within the time permitted by law. Plaintiff also properly served the instant motion. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280(b) and (c), the truth of the matters specified in Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission, Set One, is deemed admitted.

The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion.

CV-25-012211 - NORRIS, PAUL vs BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY - Defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University's Verified Application of Brian Willett to Appear as Counsel Pro Hac Vice - DROPPED.

Pursuant to the Notice of Withdrawal filed on February 23, 2026, the hearing on this motion is DROPPED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Marie Silveria sitting on assignment in Department 23:

2024004 - WELLS, TINA VS KEMP, HIRAM E - Defendant’s Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action - HEARING REQUIRED.

CV-24-010321 - VAZQUEZ, GRISELDA vs CREATIVE ALTERNATIVES - Defendant Creative Alternatives’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to March 13, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court requires more time to review the materials submitted in connection with this motion, and therefore finds good cause to set the hearing within the 30-day period before trial. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a)(3).)

CV-25-006557 - TESLUK, GREGORY vs THOMPSON, JANET - Plaintiff’s Motion to Request an Amendment to the Complaint - DROPPED, at the request of the moving party.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-23-001227 - CARSON HYBRID ENERGY STORAGE LLC vs TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT - a) Defendant’s Demurrer and Brief in Support Thereof - CONTINUED, on the Court’s motion. b) Defendant’s Motion to Strike and Brief in Support Thereof - CONTINUED, on the Court’s motion.

a-b) This matter is continued on the court’s own motion to March 10, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

 CV-23-002153 - WILKINS, JANENE R vs YOSEMITE COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT - Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses, Without Objections, to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Yosemite Community College District, Set No. Two, and Request for an Order Awarding Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant and Defense Counsel in the Sum of $4,550 - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

On the Court’s own motion, this matter is continued to April 2, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

CV-24-009288 - SCOTT, DARRYL vs LA CLINICA DE LA RAZA INC - Compliance Hearing - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court notes that the Compliance Declaration of Tiffany Sugrum of Angeion Group does not address disbursement of the remaining funds of $10,125.61.

The Court would like clarification in that respect.

The following are the tentative ruling for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***