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Civil Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings Announcement

CIVIL TENTATIVE RULING ANNOUNCEMENT

If the Tentative Ruling in your case is satisfactory, you need not appear at the scheduled time, the ruling becomes final, and the prevailing party prepares the order.

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Please refer to Local Rule of Court 3.12 concerning Court reporter fees.

 If a Hearing is required or you have requested a Hearing for a Law and Motion Matter Scheduled in Department 21, 22, 23 or 24 in Modesto, please contact the Court Reporter Coordinator at (209) 530-3105 or ctreport@stanct.org to request a reporter and determine availability. If a Staff Reporter is not available, you may need to provide your own.

 Effective April 2, 2012

Staff Court Reporters may be available, though it is not guaranteed, to report law and motion matters on the following schedule:

Department 21 - Wednesdays and Fridays only. Staff Reporters may be available on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Please call to confirm.

Department 22 - Tuesdays and Thursdays only. Staff Reporters may be available on Wednesdays and Fridays. Please call to confirm.

Department 23 - Wednesdays and Fridays only. Staff Reporters may be available on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Please call to confirm.

Department 24 - Tuesdays and Thursdays only. Staff Reporters may be available on Wednesdays or Fridays. Please call to confirm.

If a Staff Reporter is not available, counsel can make arrangements to have their hearing reported by a private CSR. Please contact the Court Reporter Coordinator at (209)530-3105 to request a Staff Reporter and to determine if a Staff Reporter will be available for your hearing

November 20, 2026

                           

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-007642 - PEREZ, CHRISTINA vs CARSWELL GROUP INC – Compliance Hearing – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court has a question about the form of the proposed amended judgment, as it appears the judgment provided does not contain the earlier terms.

CV-26-009628 - NEWTON, JOHN vs SANCTUARY METALS LLC - Petitioner's Petition to Compel Arbitration Against Sanctuary Metals LLC –GRANTED.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, the petition to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The parties are ordered to arbitrate the dispute before JAMS in the Sacramento office. The Court was unable to locate a proposed order in the Court file. Moving party to serve and submit a proposed order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

On September 24, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition to compel arbitration. There is no opposition in the Court file

 

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists . . . [.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

A party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [moving party must establish agreement to arbitrate].) If that burden is met, the opposing party bears the burden of proving a defense to enforcement, such as unconscionability. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [burden shifts to opposing party to prove defense].)

Here, Petitioner has established that the parties entered an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising out of their written agreement governing all precious metals transactions between the parties. The parties signed an agreement on May 5, 2026. The agreement states that “[a]ny dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of this Agreement, any Precious Metals transaction, or otherwise between Sanctuary Metals and the Customer . . . shall be determined by arbitration before the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service (‘JAMS’) office closest to the Customer’s principal place of residence . . . [.]” (Agreement, 6.)

Petitioner mailed a letter to Respondent on August 14, 2026, (and again via email on August 18, 2026) demanding arbitration at JAMS Sacramento office but received no reply.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-20-001778 - LOPEZ, THERESA SUZANNE vs CENTRAL VALLEY SPECIALTY – Compliance Hearing -CONTINUED to January 29, 2027, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

Having reviewed and considered the declarations of the Settlement Administrator filed on October 21, 2026, and November 12, 2026, the Court CONTINUES the compliance hearing to January 29, 2027, at 8:30 am in Department 22. According to the Settlement Administrator’s declarations, the check-cashing period will not close until December 7, 2026. For the next hearing on this matter, the Court expects a report from the Settlement Administrator to be filed and served no later than January 15, 2027, stating the number of checks that remain uncashed, the total sum of those checks, and the timeline for turning over the remaining funds to the State Controller’s Unclaimed Property Division.

CV-26-008879 - In Re STEHLE, JULIAN - Petitioner's Verified Petition for Approval for Transfer of Payment Rights – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court previously continued the petition to permit Julian Stehle to supplement the record concerning his household finances, automobile debt, unemployment, alternatives to the proposed transfer, and prior structured-settlement transactions. The supplemental declaration establishes that Mr. Stehle is unemployed and attending Modesto Junior College; his spouse earns approximately $3,800 per month; the household incurs approximately $5,500 in monthly expenses; and Mr. Stehle owes approximately $11,300 on an automobile loan bearing 10 percent interest with monthly payments of $582.

The proposed transfer would assign $20,000 payable to Mr. Stehle on January 12, 2030, in exchange for $8,000. The transferred payment has a disclosed present value of $16,829.66. The $8,000 purchase price represents 47.53 percent of that present value and reflects an effective annual discount rate of 30.88 percent.

Mr. Stehle states that he intends to use the proceeds to pay off his automobile loan. Thus, the proposed transaction would effectively incur a 30.88 percent annual discount principally to address debt bearing a substantially lower interest rate, while providing only $8,000 toward the stated $11,300 balance. In addition, the removal of $582 from the family’s monthly expenses would not come close to curing the monthly expense deficit.

The Court is also concerned that Mr. Stehle previously transferred $95,141.53 of the original $115,141.53 annuity payment due January 12, 2030. The present transfer of the remaining $20,000 would therefore exhaust that payment in its entirety.

The supplemental declaration also does not fully address the matters identified in the Court's October 23, 2026 order concerning Mr. Stehle’s job-search efforts and anticipated period of unemployment, alternatives considered before entering the proposed transaction, and the identity of the transferee and circumstances associated with the structured-settlement transfer petition denied in September 2021.

Accordingly, the Court is inclined to find that, considering the totality of the circumstances and the factors set forth in Insurance Code section 10139.5, the proposed transfer is NOT fair, reasonable, and in Mr. Stehle’s best interest. However, the Court intends to hear from Mr. Stehle concerning these matters before ruling on the petition.

PR-25-000841 - Estate of HUTSELL, DANIEL R - Petitioner's Motion to Compel Nonparty, Guadalupe Madrigal, Doing Business as Lupe's Tax Services to Comply with Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records; Request for Monetary Sanctions - CONTINUED to January 15, 2027, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22.

The Court rejects Guadalupe Madrigal’s argument that the motion is governed by the 45-day deadline in Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(c). Because the discovery at issue was directed to a nonparty through a deposition subpoena for production of business records, the applicable provision is Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subdivision (b). (Unzipped Apparel, LLC v. Bader (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 123, 131; Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1033.) The October 7, 2026 motion was filed within 60 days of the subpoena’s August 13, 2026 production date.

However, Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480(b) requires a motion to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena to be accompanied by a meet-and-confer declaration under Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040. As amended effective January 1, 2026, section 2016.040 requires a reasonable and good-faith attempt, in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion. The declaration must also address whether the moving party met and conferred regarding retention of a certified shorthand reporter for the hearing.

The declaration accompanying the motion identifies an August 28, 2026 email exchange concerning compliance with the subpoena but does not establish the meet-and-confer effort contemplated by section 2016.040 or address consultation regarding retention of a certified shorthand reporter. Although the reply declaration identifies an earlier telephone conversation between counsel on May 18, 2026 concerning production of the decedent’s tax records, that conversation occurred before issuance and personal service of the deposition subpoena and does not establish an effort to resolve each of the issues now presented by the motion.

In addition, since the filing of the motion, Guadalupe Madrigal has made a further production to Palermo Reporting Services, while Cynthia Hutsell contends that the production remains incomplete. The reply identifies several categories of documents that allegedly remain outstanding. Under these circumstances, further meet-and-confer efforts may narrow or resolve some or all of the remaining issues without further Court intervention.

Accordingly, the parties and their counsel are ordered to engage in further meaningful meet-and-confer efforts, in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040, concerning each remaining issue raised by the motion, including the specific categories of documents the moving party contends remain outstanding and whether those documents exist and are within the possession, custody, or control of Guadalupe Madrigal.

No later than January 5, 2027, the parties shall file a joint status report summarizing their additional meet-and-confer efforts, identifying any issues that have been resolved or narrowed, and specifically identifying each issue that remains for determination by the Court.

The Court defers ruling on the merits of the motion and the request for monetary sanctions pending completion of the additional meet-and-confer process and consideration of the parties’ joint status report.

The motion is CONTINUED to January 15, 2027, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-25-005759 - SORIANO, ANGEL MANUEL VS. ASPIRE PUBLIC SCHOOLS – a) Plaintiff's Motion to Have Requests for Admissions, Set One, Deemed Admitted, Against Defendant Modesto City Schools and Request for Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED, in part, as to sanctions; DENIED, in part, as MOOT; b) Plaintiff's Motion to Have Requests for Admissions, Set One, Deemed Admitted, Against Defendant Aspire Public Schools and Request for Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED, in part, as to sanctions; DENIED, in part, as MOOT; c) Plaintiff's Motion to Have Requests for Admissions, Set One, Deemed Admitted, Against Defendant Vanguard College Preparatory Academy Community Council and Request for Monetary Sanctions - GRANTED, in part, as to sanctions; DENIED, in part, as MOOT.

a)   The Court finds that Defendant failed to timely respond to the subject discovery and all objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(a).) Of note, the “objection only” responses served on 3-16-26 were of no legal effect, as such objections had already been waived due to Defendant’s lack of timely response. However, the Court notes that the request for an order compelling responses appears to be MOOT due to Defendant’s service of verified responses on 10-30-26.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with this motion, which it appears was necessary in order to elicit Defendant’s service of the subject responses. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2033.280(c), 2023.010, 2030.030 et seq.) Therefore, monetary sanctions in the amount of $300 are awarded against Defendant, payable to Plaintiff’s counsel.

Plaintiff shall serve and submit a revised order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1312.)

b) The Court finds that Defendant failed to timely respond to the subject discovery and all objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(a).) Of note, the “objection only” responses served on 3-16-26 were of no legal effect, as such objections had already been waived due to Defendant’s lack of timely response. However, the Court notes that the request for an order compelling responses appears to be MOOT due to Defendant’s service of verified responses on 10-30-26.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with this motion, which it appears was necessary in order to elicit Defendant’s service of the subject responses. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2033.280(c), 2023.010, 2030.030 et seq.) Therefore, monetary sanctions in the amount of $300 are awarded against Defendant, payable to Plaintiff’s counsel.

Plaintiff shall serve and submit a revised order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1312.)

c) The Court finds that Defendant failed to timely respond to the subject discovery and all objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(a).) Of note, the “objection only” responses served on 3-16-26 were of no legal effect, as such objections had already been waived due to Defendant’s lack of timely response. However, the Court notes that the request for an order compelling responses appears to be MOOT due to Defendant’s service of verified responses on 10-30-26.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with this motion, which it appears was necessary in order to elicit Defendant’s service of the subject responses. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2033.280(c), 2023.010, 2030.030 et seq.) Therefore, monetary sanctions in the amount of $300 are awarded against Defendant, payable to Plaintiff’s counsel.

Plaintiff shall serve and submit a revised order consistent with the Court’s ruling herein. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1312.)

CV-26-001432 - CARLOS, JUAN vs TEEPLES PLUMBING & DRILLING INC - Defendant's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint – OVERRULED.

The Court finds the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint sufficient at the pleading stage to support the stated claim.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-25-005894 - HUNTSMAN, ROBERT vs SAVE MART SUPERMARKETS LLC - Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Venue – GRANTED, unopposed.

The Court finds that Defendant operates in Alameda County, that Plaintiff resides there, and that the alleged incident took place there. Therefore proper venue for this action is Alameda County. Code of Civil Procedure §§395 (a), 396 and 397.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue is granted.

The Court hereby orders this matter transferred to the Superior Court of Alameda County, California, for all purposes.

CV-25-009803 - DOLZADELLI, CHELSEA vs SALAS, OSCAR – a) Defendant's Demurrer of Defendants The Frontier, LLC and Oscar Salas to Plaintiff’s Second-Amended Complaint - OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part without leave to amend; b) Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Second-Amended Complaint by Defendants The Frontier, LLC, Oscar Salas and Poncho Murillo - GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

a)     Defendants The Frontier, LLC, and Oscar Salas demur to the first cause of action for negligence, second cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention, and fourth cause of action for premises liability.

Request for Judicial Notice

The request for judicial notice is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

The Court takes judicial notice of the existence and facial contents of the preliminary-hearing transcript and the pleadings filed in this action. [Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).] The Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of disputed factual assertions contained in those records. [Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548; Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875; and Kumaraperu v. Feldsted (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 60, 65.] The fact that Plaintiff's testimony may constitute a party admission under Evidence Code section 1220 does not make the testimony conclusively true for purposes of demurrer.

Sham Pleading

The Court may consider allegations contained in Plaintiff's prior pleadings and disregard materially inconsistent allegations for which no satisfactory explanation is provided. [Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857; Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408.] The Court therefore need not accept an unexplained allegation that Plaintiff was inside the establishment when that allegation materially conflicts with her original pleading. The prior pleadings reflect differences concerning whether Plaintiff crossed the threshold and the asserted source of the knife.

Those discrepancies, however, do not defeat the negligence or premises-liability claims because plaintiff alleged in the original pleading that the confrontation occurred at or immediately outside the entrance, that security witnessed the developing confrontation, and that the ensuing attack occurred outside the establishment.

First Cause of Action: Negligence

The demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

A business proprietor may have a duty to undertake reasonable, minimally burdensome measures to protect a patron where its employees have actual notice of an imminent assault. [Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224; Morris v. De La Torre (2005) 36 Cal.4th 260.]

Liberally construed, the SAC alleges that security had actual notice of an escalating confrontation involving Plaintiff but failed adequately to maintain separation, intervene, or summon assistance. Plaintiff alleges those omissions were a substantial factor in causing her injuries.

Defendants' arguments that security reasonably intervened and that Plaintiff's own conduct constituted a superseding cause depend substantially upon their interpretation of the preliminary-hearing testimony. Those matters raise factual issues concerning breach, causation, and comparative fault that cannot be resolved on demurrer. The Court reached a similar conclusion in ruling on the demurrer to the FAC.

Second Cause of Action: Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention

The demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Liability for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention requires facts showing the employer knew or should have known of an employee's unfitness and that the particular unfitness created a foreseeable risk of the harm that occurred. [Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 815; Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139.]

The Court previously sustained the demurrer to this cause of action because the FAC did not sufficiently allege that the employer had prior knowledge of Poncho Murillo's relevant unfitness. The SAC adds allegations concerning prior fights at the establishment and an October 31, 2024, altercation involving Poncho Murillo. These allegations do not sufficiently establish that The Frontier, LLC or Oscar Salas knew or should have known that Poncho Murillo was unfit in a manner creating the particular risk alleged here: namely that he would fail to protect Plaintiff, maintain separation, intervene, or summon assistance.

The allegations concerning Araceli Duarte likewise do not sufficiently plead an employment relationship and prior employer notice of a relevant unfitness. Plaintiff has already been afforded leave to amend and has not demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured. Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311.

Fourth Cause of Action: Premises Liability

The demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Premises liability is a form of negligence requiring duty, breach, causation, and damages and ordinarily depends upon ownership, possession, or control of the property. Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.

The SAC alleges that the confrontation began at or near the entrance, Defendants exercised control over the entrance area, and the assault followed Defendants' alleged failure to protect Plaintiff from an escalating danger. Whether Defendants exercised sufficient control over the location of the assault, and whether their alleged omissions caused Plaintiff's injuries, present factual issues not appropriately determined on demurrer. The Court previously reached the same conclusion as to the premises-liability claim.

Uncertainty

To the extent Defendants demur for uncertainty, the demurrer is OVERRULED. A demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored unless the pleading is so unintelligible that the defendant cannot reasonably determine what must be admitted or denied. Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612. The SAC sufficiently apprises Defendants of the claims and the conduct alleged against them.

b) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 436, the Court may strike irrelevant, false, or improper matter from a pleading. The Court may consider allegations in prior pleadings and disregard materially inconsistent allegations for which no satisfactory explanation is provided. [Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857; Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408; Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929.]

The motion is GRANTED as to allegations that Plaintiff entered the establishment or was initially assaulted inside. Those allegations materially conflict with Plaintiff’s prior pleading concerning facts within her personal knowledge, and Plaintiff has not adequately explained the inconsistency.

The motion is also GRANTED as to allegations asserting as an established fact that the knife used in the assault was obtained from behind the bar. Plaintiff may allege the underlying facts concerning the knife’s alleged similarity to knives used at the establishment, but those facts do not establish its provenance. The allegations that employees collected items for the purpose of concealing evidence and moved fights away from the premises so Defendants could “wash their hands” of responsibility are likewise STRICKEN as unsupported and argumentative.

The motion is otherwise DENIED as to the remaining challenged factual allegations. Although the Court may judicially notice that Plaintiff gave particular testimony at the preliminary hearing, judicial notice of a court record does not establish the truth of disputed factual assertions contained therein. [Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548; Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875.] An inconsistency between Plaintiff’s testimony and the SAC establishes that the statements differ, but does not, without resolving their truth, establish that the SAC allegations are “false” under Code of Civil Procedure section 436. Defendants’ reply confirms that their broader request rests substantially upon such comparisons.

Punitive Damages

The motion to strike punitive damages against Poncho Murillo is DENIED.

Punitive damages may be recovered upon proof of malice, oppression, or fraud. Civ. Code § 3294, subds. (a), (c). Conclusory allegations are insufficient. Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159. Here, however, the SAC alleges that Poncho Murillo, while employed as security and with actual knowledge of an escalating and ultimately deadly assault, deliberately failed to intervene or summon assistance despite having the ability to do so. Accepting the properly pleaded allegations as true, the allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to support an inference of conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s safety. Whether Plaintiff can prove those allegations, particularly in light of her preliminary-hearing testimony, is not appropriately resolved on a motion to strike. Defendants’ reply relies on that testimony to argue that Poncho Murillo instead attempted to contain the attackers and recover Plaintiff’s belongings.

The motion to strike punitive damages against Oscar Salas and The Frontier, LLC is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

An employer is liable for punitive damages based upon an employee’s conduct only upon the showing required by Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), including advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, or ratification by an officer, director, or managing agent. [College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704; White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563.] Ratification requires actual knowledge of the conduct and its malicious character followed by adoption or approval of that conduct. Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160. The SAC’s allegations of continued employment, failure to discipline, and generalized ratification do not sufficiently allege that Oscar Salas actually knew of and adopted malicious conduct by Poncho Murillo.

Plaintiff has already amended the pleading to add allegations concerning prior knowledge, discipline, employment, and ratification and has not identified additional facts establishing a reasonable possibility of curing this defect. Further leave to amend is therefore denied. Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth above.

Defendants are ordered to file and electronically serve an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint by no later than Thursday, December 10, 2026.

The following are the tentative rulings for the cases calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***