Civil Tentative Rulings

May 21, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-22-001871 - STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY vs PETERS, DARRIN KEITH - Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's Motion to Vacate the Dismissal and Enforce a Settlement Agreement and Enter Judgment - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court notes a discrepancy between Defendant’s mailing address as indicated in the underlying Settlement Agreement (Renee Drive) and the address indicated for Defendant on Plaintiff’s Notices of Default and the Proof of Service for the instant motion (Maple Street). Counsel shall appear to advise the Court in this regard.

CV-23-004719 - WELLS FARGO BANK NA vs SCOTT, MOSES - Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Dismissal Under CCP 664.6 & Enter Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation - DENIED with prejudice.

Plaintiff appears to be seeking about ten times the amount owed. The Court has an affirmative duty under the canons to prevent future efforts of this sort and assumes this note will be effective prevention.

CV-24-008540 - TESORO HOMES INC vs BELSERA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION - Defendant Belsera Homeowners Association's Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted (CCP 2033.280) - DENIED.

Defendant did not seek sanctions and has now received responses. The Court cannot grant the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c); see, e.g. St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4^th 762, 779-780.)

Tesoro’s choices concern the Court and I anticipate that the parties will substantially or completely resolve other discovery issues without its assistance. 

CV-24-009801 - GAUSTON CORP vs VEC PARTNERS INC - Plaintiff Gauston Corp's Motion to Compel Further Responses and Production re: Request for Production, Set One, and Request for Sanctions - HEARING REQUIRED.

No sanctions will be issued in this matter. The Court appreciates the parties’ efforts to narrow the issues, and needs further assistance on the scope and nature of the documents MD opposes production of.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-21-005754 - GAVERT, JAMES vs CF MODESTO LLC - a) Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings - GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; b) Defendant, The Estate of Michael Brodie’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint - SUSTAINED in part, OVERRULED in part; c) Defendant, The Estate of Michael Brodie’s Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint - GRANTED in part, DENIED in part.

a) On April 15, 2026, Defendant Andreh Saralou M.D. submitted the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings, accompanied by a Memorandum, a Request for Judicial Notice, and two declarations. On May 6, 2026, Plaintiffs submitted an Opposition. On May 12, 2026, Defendant Saralou submitted a Reply.

For the reasons below, the motion as to the fourth cause of action for elder abuse is GRANTED with leave to amend;

     the motion as to the seventh cause of action for negligence is DENIED;

     the motion as to the eighth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED without leave to amend;

     the motion as to the tenth cause of action for negligence per se is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Moving Party to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling. Plaintiff shall serve and file any amended complaint no later than 30 days after service of the signed order.

Dr. Saralou’s Request for Judicial Notice

Dr. Saralou’s unopposed Request for Judicial Notice is granted.

Whether the FAC fails to state sufficient facts to state a cause of action for elder abuse

Dr. Saralou argues that the fourth cause of action fails to state a claim fails because Dr. Saralou did not have the requisite care or custody relationship required to state a claim of neglect under the Elder Abuse Act.

“[T]he Act does not apply unless the defendant health care provider had a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship, involving ongoing responsibility for one or more basic needs, with the elder patient.” (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 152.) “It is the nature of the elder or dependent adult's relationship with the defendant—not the defendant's professional standing—that makes the defendant potentially liable for neglect.” (Ibid.)

Here, the First Amended Complaint does not plead sufficient facts showing that Dr. Saralou himself was a care custodian—i.e., it does not plead facts showing that Dr. Saralou had an ongoing responsibility for one or more of Mr. Gavert’s basic needs—as required by the Elder Abuse Act. Rather, the facts (as opposed to mere legal conclusions) pleaded merely allege that Dr. Saralou was negligent by failing to provide adequate wound care and treatment and by failing to monitor and recognize Mr. Gavert’s deteriorating condition. Such facts are insufficient to state a claim of neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. (Winn, 63 Cal.4th 148, 152 [“Because defendants did not have a caretaking or custodial relationship with the decedent, . . . plaintiffs cannot adequately allege neglect under the Elder Abuse Act.”]; Frankland v. Etehad (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 503, 516, review denied (Nov. 19, 2025) ["a physician [does not] automatically assume the requisite caretaking or custodial relationship simply because the elderly patient happens to reside in a skilled nursing facility and the physician provides services to patients in that facility"].)

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS with leave to amend Dr. Saralou’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fourth cause of action for elder abuse.

Whether the FAC fails to state sufficient facts to state a cause of action for negligence

Dr. Saralou argues that the seventh cause of action for negligence is duplicative of the first cause of action for professional negligence.

The California Supreme Court has held that there cannot be “distinct causes of action for ‘ordinary’ as well as ‘professional’ negligence.” (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 995.) But the Flowers case was decided on a motion for summary judgment, not a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Dr. Saralou cites no case in which a motion for judgment on the pleadings to a negligence claim was granted on the basis that it was duplicative of a professional negligence claim. At the pleading stage, it appears prudent to allow the negligence causes of action to remain. Any asserted duplicativeness can be addressed at a later stage, once the parties have addressed which standard applies here.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Dr. Saralou’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the seventh cause of action for negligence.

Whether the FAC fails to state sufficient facts to state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress

Dr. Saralou argues that the eighth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is duplicative of the causes of action for professional negligence and/or negligence.

“[T]here is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984.) “The tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element.” (Ibid.; Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1377 [“A claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort but the tort of negligence to which the traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.”].) Courts may treat claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress as a single cause of action. (Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1016 [“negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort but simply the tort of negligence, with the traditional elements of duty, breach and causation. Our discussion of [plaintiff’s] negligence claim therefore includes her causes of action for both simple negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress”].)

Here, the First Amended Complaint pleads a cause of action for negligence by Mr. Gavert. There is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS without leave to amend Dr. Saralou’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the eighth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Whether the FAC fails to state sufficient facts to state a cause of action for negligence per se

Dr. Saralou argues that the tenth cause of action for tort per se is duplicative of the causes of action for professional negligence and negligence.

“[T]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.” (Turner v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 534 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)
 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS without leave to amend Dr. Saralou’s motion for judgment on the pleadings to the tenth cause of action for negligence per se.

b-c) On February 27, 2026, Defendant The Estate of Michael Brodie submitted the instant demurrer to and motion to strike Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. On April 3, 2026, Plaintiffs submitted Oppositions to both motions. On April 9, 2026, Defendant submitted Replies to both motions. On May 4, 2026, Defendant submitted a declaration of compliance with the meet and confer requirement.

The Estate of Michael Brodie’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike

For the reasons below, the demurrer to the second cause of action for loss of consortium is OVERRULED;

     the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for elder abuse is SUSTAINED with leave to amend;

     the demurrer to the seventh cause of action for negligence is OVERRULED;

     the demurrer to the tenth cause of action for negligence per se is SUSTAINED without leave to amend;

     the motion to strike paragraphs 54 and 55 of the First Amended Complaint is DENIED;

     the motion to strike attorney’s fees and costs and punitive damages pursuant to the Elder Abuse Act is GRANTED;

     the motion to strike exemplary damages is DENIED;

     and the motion to strike statutory damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1430(b) is DENIED.

Moving Party to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling. Plaintiff shall serve and file any amended complaint no later than 30 days after service of the signed order.

Second cause of action for loss of consortium

Defendant argues that Mrs. Gavert’s loss of consortium cause of action is duplicative of Mrs. Gavert’s cause of action for wrongful death.

“[A] cause of action for wrongful death (and the right to recover loss of consortium damages as part of that action) [is] purely a creature of statute.” (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 796 [emphasis in original].) “[A] common law action for loss of consortium is a civil action sounding in tort, and therefore punitive damages are available.” (Ibid.) “Punitive damages are not available, however, in a statutory wrongful death action.” (Ibid.) “As the Supreme Court itself has pointed out, the cause of action for loss of consortium does not resemble wrongful death because it has no statutory foundation but is entirely of judicial origin. [Citation.]” (Lantis v. Condon (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 152, 158.)”

Loss of consortium and wrongful death are two distinct causes of action. The First Amended Complaint pleads harm both subsequent to Mr. Gavert’s injuries and subsequent to Mr. Gavert’s death. Mrs. Gavert may ultimately be unable to recover damages for the same alleged harms under more than one cause of action. (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal.4th at 804 [“We conclude that the primary right at issue in plaintiff's current wrongful death action for loss of consortium is the same as the primary right at issue in her previous common law action for loss of consortium, and therefore the res judicata doctrine bars the wrongful death action insofar as it concerns loss of consortium.”].) However, at this stage of the litigation, the First Amended Complaint sufficiently states a claim for loss of consortium. The claim is not uncertain as the heading clearly states that it is brought by Mrs. Gavert only, despite the minor typographical error of plural “Plaintiffs” instead of using the singular “Plaintiff.”

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the second cause of action for loss of consortium; DENIES the motion to strike paragraphs 54 and 55 of the First Amended Complaint; and DENIES the motion to strike exemplary damages.

Fourth cause of action for elder abuse

Defendant argues that the fourth cause of action for elder abuse fails because Dr. Brodie did not have the requisite care or custody relationship required to state a claim of neglect under the Elder Abuse Act.

“[T]he Act does not apply unless the defendant health care provider had a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship, involving ongoing responsibility for one or more basic needs, with the elder patient.” (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 152.) “It is the nature of the elder or dependent adult's relationship with the defendant—not the defendant's professional standing—that makes the defendant potentially liable for neglect.” (Ibid.)

Here, the First Amended Complaint does not plead sufficient facts showing that Dr. Brodie himself was a care custodian as required by the Elder Abuse Act. Rather, the facts (as opposed to mere legal conclusions) pleaded merely allege that Dr. Brodie was negligent in his duties as the attending physician. Such facts are insufficient to state a claim of neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. (Winn, 63 Cal.4^th at 152 [“Because defendants did not have a caretaking or custodial relationship with the decedent, . . . plaintiffs cannot adequately allege neglect under the Elder Abuse Act.”].; Frankland v. Etehad (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 503, 516, review denied (Nov. 19, 2025) ["a physician [does not] automatically assume the requisite caretaking or custodial relationship simply because the elderly patient happens to reside in a skilled nursing facility and the physician provides services to patients in that facility"].)

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS with leave to amend the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for elder abuse; and GRANTS the Motion to Strike attorney’s fees and costs and punitive damages pursuant to the Elder Abuse Act.

Seventh cause of action for negligence

Defendant argues that the seventh cause of action for negligence is duplicative of the first cause of action for professional negligence.

The California Supreme Court has held that there cannot be “distinct causes of action for ‘ordinary’ as well as ‘professional’ negligence.” (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 995.) But the Flowers case was decided on a motion for summary judgment, not a motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the pleading stage, it appears prudent to allow the negligence causes of action to remain. Any asserted duplicativeness can be addressed at a later stage, once the parties have addressed which standard applies here.

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the seventh cause of action for negligence.

Eighth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress

Defendant argues that the eighth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is duplicative of the professional negligence and/or negligence causes of action.

“[T]here is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984.) “The tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element.” (Ibid.; Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1377 [“A claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort but the tort of negligence to which the traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.”].) Courts may treat claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress as a single cause of action. (Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1016 [“negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort but simply the tort of negligence, with the traditional elements of duty, breach and causation. Our discussion of [plaintiff’s] negligence claim therefore includes her causes of action for both simple negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress”].)

 

Here, the First Amended Complaint pleads a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress by Mr. Gavert only. Mr. Gavert may claim damages due to emotional distress under a cause of action for negligence.

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS without leave to amend the demurrer to the eighth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Ninth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress

Plaintiffs agree to dismiss the tenth cause of action against Defendant The Estate of Michael Brodie. (Opposition, 16.) Plaintiffs should submit a notice of dismissal.

Tenth cause of action for tort per se

Defendant argues that the tenth cause of action for tort per se is duplicative of the causes of action for professional negligence and negligence.

“[T]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.” (Turner v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 534 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)
 

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS without leave to amend the demurrer to the tenth cause of action for negligence per se.

Statutory Remedies under Health & Safety Code § 1430(b)

The fifth cause of action for violation of resident rights is not asserted against The Estate of Michael Brodie. According, the Court DENIES the motion to strike statutory damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1430(b).

CV-26-002065 - VELASCO, IRINIEO vs PIERCE, JOSEPH STANLEY - Defendant's Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint - GRANTED, and unopposed.

On May 6, 2026, Defendants submitted the instant Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint on the basis that the summons and complaint were served at a residence that is not the home or usual place of abode of Defendants and also on the basis that the individual defendant passed away before service was purportedly effectuated. The motion is unopposed.

Here, the proof of service indicates substituted service on a residential address that is not the dwelling house or usual place of abode of Defendant Joseph Stanley Pierce dba Mi Valley Dairy. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20.) In addition, Defendant Joseph Stanley passed away on March 10, 2026, which is before service was purportedly effectuated on March 23, 2026.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 418.10, the unopposed motion is GRANTED. The proposed order submitted by Defendants inaccurately references opposing papers (and oral argument). Moving party to submit a corrected proposed order that conforms to this ruling within five court days.

PR-24-000883 - IN THE MATTER OF KENNETH J OCKEY TRUST - Respondent Roxanne Ockey's Motion to Require Trustee/Petitioner Daryn A. Ockey to Give Bond - DENIED.

Respondent Roxanne Ockey’s motion to require Petitioner Daryn A. Ockey to post a bond is DENIED.

The Court finds that Probate Code section 15602 does not provide authority to require a beneficiary or co-trustee to post a bond as a condition of prosecuting a petition challenging a trust amendment. The bond provision contained in the contested April 18, 2023 amendment is not a traditional trustee bond provision securing performance of fiduciary duties and, at this stage, will not be enforced as a litigation prerequisite.

The Court declines to impose a bond in the absence of a showing that such relief is necessary to protect the trust estate or beneficiaries.

Respondent’s objections to Petitioner’s supplemental memorandum are SUSTAINED. The Court declines to consider the supplemental filing as unauthorized and untimely.

UD-26-000388 -  LAL, RONALD vs POWELL, JAYMI - Defendant’s Demurrer - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court is inclined to overrule the Demurrer.

The three-day notice begins on the date of service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1170.)  Here, the notice was served on April 9, 2026. The instant matter is unlike the notice in Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025) 112 Cal.App.5^th 433 because here the service date listed on the notice is the same date the notice was served. Next, Plaintiff waited until after the expiration of the three-day notice period before filing the complaint. Nothing in section 1170 requires a 30 day notice period.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 23***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-22-000411 - PEREZ, AMALIA vs KAUR, BALJINDER - Plaintiff's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

Notwithstanding Counsel’s attestation to his client having fled to Mexico without knowledge of his whereabouts, the Court requires that Counsel mail the moving papers to the client’s last known address. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1362).

Accordingly, this matter is continued to June 3, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court for Counsel to accomplish said service.

CV-23-002153 - WILKINS, JANENE R vs YOSEMITE COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT - Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses, Without Objections, to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Yosemite Community College District, Set No. Two, and Request for an Order Awarding Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant and Defense Counsel in the Sum Of $4,550 - GRANTED, in part. DENIED, in part.

The Court finds that Defendant’s responses to Requests for Production Nos. 106, 107, 108 are not Code Compliant for failing to  “specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party.”  Defendants response also failed to “set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.” (Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.230)

Defendants’ response to Request for Production No. 117 fails to  “affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand”,  fails to “state whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen” and fails to  “set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.” (Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.230). 

Accordingly, Defendant shall provide further, verified Code compliant responses to Requests for Production Nos 106, 107, 108 and 117.

A prelitigation factual investigation conducted by outside counsel retained by city into Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint filed by former employee, who worked for city as firefighter and paramedic, was protected by attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine in employee's suit against city under Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for harassment, discrimination based on sex, and retaliation, even though counsel's role was limited to factual investigation and did not extend to providing legal advice; dominant purpose of counsel's representation was to provide professional legal services to city attorney so that he, in turn, was able to advise city on appropriate course of action.  (City of Petaluma v. Superior Court (2016) 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 196, 248 Cal.App.4th 1023, review filed, review denied. 

“If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” (Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.240; Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court (2015), 242 Cal.App.4th 1116).

The purpose of a “privilege log” is to provide a specific factual description of documents in aid of substantiating a claim of privilege in connection with a request for document production to permit a judicial evaluation of the claim of privilege. (Hernandez v. Superior Ct., (2003), 112 Cal. App. 4th 285, as modified (Oct. 23, 2003). A privilege log typically should provide the identity and capacity of all individuals who authored, sent, or received each allegedly privileged document, the document's date, a brief description of the document and its contents or subject matter sufficient to determine whether the privilege applies, and the precise privilege or protection asserted.  (Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court, supra). Defendant’s privilege log does not meet these requirements and is deficient.

Plaintiff makes unsubstantiated claims of the waiver of Defendants attorney client privilege to support a request for the investigative report at issue without providing support for those claims. Therefore, the court cannot presently compel the production of the documents sought in Request for Production No. 116.  (Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Ct., (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 110).

Defendant shall provide a further Code compliant privilege log. (Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court (2015), 242 Cal.App.4th 1116). All further responses shall be provided within ten days of the date of this order. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.310).

Based on the Joint Status Report submitted by the parties and the attached correspondence, the Court understands that sanctions are no longer sought by Plaintiff and therefore makes no award regarding monetary sanctions.

CV-24-000171 - HERNANDEZ, JOSE V vs SCHNITZER STEEL INDUSTRIES INC - Final Fairness - HEARING REQUIRED.

Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court finds the payment to the Class Representative, to the Class Members and the Class Administrator to be appropriate given all relevant factors of the settlement. The Court also finds Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees and costs to be reasonable and comparable to the award of fees generally issued by California Courts. The Court is therefore inclined to grant final approval of the Class Action Settlement herein. 

In accordance with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. §384, the Court sets a compliance hearing for Friday, December 11, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 to confirm full administration of the settlement. 

Class counsel shall submit a compliance report no later than five (5) court days before the date of the hearing, which shall include the total amount that was actually paid to the class members pursuant to the subject settlement.  At the time of the compliance hearing, the Court shall amend the judgment to direct that the sum of the unpaid funds, plus interest as required by the statute, be distributed as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

In addition, the Court orders that Notice of the Court’s Order Granting Final Approval and Judgment shall be posted on the Settlement Administrator’s website for a period of at least 90 days.  (Civ. Code §1781(g); Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.771(b).

CV-24-008960 - RODRIGUEZ, OSCAR vs CUPCAKE BOUTIQUE LLC - Defendant's Motion to Reclassify Action from Unlimited to Limited Civil Jurisdiction - DENIED, without prejudice.

The Court notes that the motion does not demonstrate proof of service on Plaintiff. (Code of Civil Procedure section 1005)

Accordingly, the motion is denied without prejudice.

CV-25-008787 - GHAI, CHARANJIT vs CITY OF CERES CITY COUNCIL - Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Mandate -  CONTINUED to June 5, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24.

This matter is CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to June 5, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 for further review and consideration. In addition, the Court on its own motion VACATES the Case Management Conference set for May 21, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 and RE-SETS it to June 5, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24.

CV-25-012483 - JACKSON, NICHOLAS TYLER vs GEORGE HILLS COMPANY INC - Defendant George Hills' General and Special Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint - SUSTAINED, in part, OVERRULED, in part, with leave to amend

The First Amended Complaint asserts causes of action for negligence arising from Defendant’s administration of Plaintiff’s Government Claims Act claim and alleged mishandling of confidential information.

As to the first cause of action (negligence—claims administration), the First Amended Complaint fails to allege facts establishing that Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s allegations arise from Defendant’s role as a third‑party administrator for the City of Modesto in processing a government tort claim. The First Amended Complaint does not allege facts showing Plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of that relationship or otherwise within a class of persons to whom Defendant owed a duty. The First Amended Complaint further fails to allege non‑speculative damages caused by Defendant’s conduct, as Plaintiff’s claim was rejected and he pursued litigation against the public entity.

As to the second cause of action (negligence—mishandling of confidential information), the First Amended Complaint similarly fails to allege facts establishing duty, standing, or cognizable damages. The alleged injury arises from Plaintiff’s receipt of documents pertaining to another claimant. The First Amended Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff’s own confidential information was disclosed or facts establishing a legally protected interest or resulting injury.

Accordingly, the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute either cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

Therefore, Defendant George Hills Company, Inc.’s general demurrer to the First

Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED as to both causes of action.

Defendant’s Special Demurrer on grounds of uncertainty is overruled.

Defendants Request for Judicial Notice is granted for the limited purposes of the existence/filing/procedural posture of the identified filings but denied for the truth of allegations or to resolve disputed facts. (Evidence Code Section 452).

The Court cannot conclude at this stage that the defects cannot be cured by amendment.

Leave to amend is therefore granted. Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of the date of this order.

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order that conforms to this ruling within five court days.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***