Civil Tentative Rulings

July 10, 2026

The following are the tentative ruling for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 21***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-22-004091 – DISCOVER BANK vs SEPULVEDA, ANASTASIA – Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default & Judgment – DENIED without prejudice, and unopposed.

On June 12, 2026, Defendant filed the instant motion seeking relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5.

“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) “Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Id.)

The motion is procedurally defective. There is no proof of service on the Plaintiff. Even if the motion was served on Plaintiff, the motion is likely untimely. Section 473(b) requires that motions for relief “shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment . . . was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) The default and default judgment were entered on December 6, 2022. Defendant knew about the case at least as of June 2025 when Plaintiff attempted to garnish her wages but did not file the instant motion until a year later.

Accordingly, the motion is denied without prejudice.

CV-26-000923 – WELLS FARGO BANK NA vs MARTINEZ, AARON – Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions Admitted and of Nonappearance – GRANTED, and unopposed.

On May 28, 2026, Plaintiff submitted a motion to deem requests for admissions admitted and for nonappearance. Plaintiff’s notice of motion states that Plaintiff submits the motion on the moving papers pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1304(c) and will not appear at the hearing in open court. The motion is unopposed.

“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response . . . [t]he requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) “The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(c).)

Plaintiff’s declaration states that Plaintiff propounded Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions, Set One, on Defendant and received no response. Plaintiff requests that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified be deemed admitted.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280, Plaintiff’s unopposed motion is GRANTED. The Court intends to sign the proposed order Plaintiff submitted in connection with its motion.

CV-26-001914 – STANISLAUS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS vs COOPER, BRANDON W – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order of Prejudgment Possession - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court notes that Defendant’s Opposition was untimely filed but exercises its broad discretion to consider same.  (Jack v. Ring LLC, (2023); 91 Cal. App. 5th 1186; Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc., (2010)186 Cal. App. 4th 755).

The Court is inclined to grant the motion subject to the required hearing, based on its initial finding that  Plaintiff has discharged its burden of demonstrating it is entitled prejudgment possession by eminent domain of (1) a fee interest of 7,758 square feet, (2) an access easement 9,576 square feet and (3) a drainage easement of 18,569 square feet via eminent domain over portions of the real property located at 531 N. Hart Road, Modesto, County of Stanislaus, California, and bearing Stanislaus County Assessor’s Parcel Number 012-042-018 (“Larger Property”), for its planned State Route 132 West  Freeway/Expressway Project for the public benefit and for all uses necessary, incidental and convenient thereto pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.

The Court further finds Plaintiff has, based on an appraisal, deposited the sum of $122,000.00 into the State Treasury as probable compensation that will be awarded Defendants in the eminent domain proceeding. (California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1255.410 and 1255.010 et seq.).

The Court also finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated an overriding need to possess the property prior to the issuance of final judgment in herein, and that Plaintiff will suffer a substantial hardship if the application for possession is denied or limited. Further, the hardship to the Plaintiff of denying immediate possession outweighs the hardship to the Defendant of granting immediate possession. (Robinson v. Superior Ct., (2023) 88 Cal. App. 5th 1144).

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-008326 – PAYNE, KELLIE vs MOCSE CREDIT UNION – Defendant Mocse Credit Union’s Motion to Stay Proceedings – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Despite the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 1294, as amended, the Court retains discretion to stay further proceedings in the interest of justice. (See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Amerisourcebergen Corp. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1, 13-14).

Therefore, based on the moving papers, and in view of the lack of opposition herein, the Court finds, in the interest of justice, that further proceedings in the instant action should be STAYED pending the determination of the appeal of the Court’s previous order denying arbitration.

CV-25-003490 – KEITH, KRISTIE ANN vs ALDEN PETERSON & SONS INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Substitution of Successor in Interest for Deceased Plaintiff – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel.

CV-24-009764 – CISNEROS, FRANK vs RIVETS AMERICAN GRILL INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The Court finds the proposed settlement is within the range or reasonableness and deemed to be presumptively valid, subject to any objections that may be heard at the final fairness hearing and final approval by this Court, and subject to clarification of the following issues by the parties:

1. The Court notes the designation of “Without Permission” as the cy pres recipient of unclaimed settlement funds herein; however, the motion fails to provide sufficient information for the Court to conclude that its designation complies with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 384, which specifies that the unclaimed residual should be distributed “to nonprofit organizations or foundations to support projects that will benefit the class or similarly situated persons, or that promote the law consistent with the objectives and purposes of the underlying cause of action, to child advocacy programs, or to nonprofit organizations providing civil legal services to the indigent.”  Counsel shall ensure that the proper information is presented to the Court in this regard at the time of the final approval motion.

2. The Court notes that the parties’ agreement calls for funding of the settlement in 2 separate installment payments, with the provision that the administrator will disburse settlement funds after each payment. This requirement seems to be at odds with the information provided in the Class Notice, which advises class members that their respective portions of the settlement will be disbursed in “a single check.”  This language may be misleading in the event that a class member receives multiple settlement disbursements in connection with the defense’s installment payments. Counsel shall meet and confer to resolve this issue and shall be prepared to demonstrate the same to the Court at the time of the final approval motion.

3.  

Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the class is certified for settlement purposes only in accordance with Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.769(c).  The class counsel, class representative, and claims administrator are hereby preliminarily approved and appointed as set forth in the motion.

The Court sets the following deadlines relative to this matter:

8-10-26  Defendant shall provide Class List and Data Report to Administrator

8-24-26  Administrator shall mail Class Notice to Class Members.

10-23-26               Deadline for submission of Opt-Out Notice, Objections, or dispute their share of the settlement proceeds

5-14-27  Deadline for counsel to file motion for order of final approval

A final fairness hearing in this matter shall be set for June 8, 2027 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23 of this court.  The Class Notice and proposed order shall be revised to reflect the information reflected herein, including the date of the final fairness hearing and the corresponding deadlines.

CV-25-009269 – EVITT, KENNETH BRYAN vs CITY OF MODESTO – Defendant County of Stanislaus’s Demurrer to Each Cause of Action of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint – DENIED, without prejudice.

Defendant failed to submit proof of service of the instant motion on Defendants City of Modesto and Sam Cullom.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1014.)

CV-23-004326 – WIGGINS, JOSHUA vs COLEMAN, TIMOTHY – a) Defendant’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Civil Subpoena for Personal Appearance of Kelly Garner and/or for a Protective Order Against Plaintiff’s Civil Subpoena of Personal Appearance of Kelly Garner – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to July 31, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23; b) Defendant’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Civil Subpoena for Personal Appearance of Angelo Gonzalez and/or for a Protective Order Against Plaintiff’s Civil Subpoena for Personal Appearance – GRANTED, and unopposed.

a) Due to the parties’ late submission of the required Joint Status Statement, together with the parties’ representation that no compromise has been reached on any of the issues described in the instant motion, the Court requires more time to review the papers in this matter.

b) In view of the lack of opposition to the defense’s evidence that Mr. Gonzalez is not a resident of the state of California, it appears that he cannot be compelled to testify at the trial of this matter. (See, e.g. Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107.)

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David Hood in Department 24:

CV-24-007633 – HEITZER, MURRAY vs LIU, ANNA YAN – Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Order #1 – DENIED.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s 3/20/26 Motion for Sanctions for Misuse of the Discovery Process Against Zen and Attorney of Record, Jointly and Severally, which resulted in the issuance of the challenged 5/20/26 ruling, was based on substantially the same conduct by Defendant and their Counsel as alleged in Plaintiff’s 1/8/26 Renewed Motion to Compel Production of Documents on Defendant and Request for Monetary Sanctions Against Zen and its Attorney Jointly and Severally and to Hold Attorney Kallis in Contempt of Court; and Defendant’s failure to comply with the Court’s Order of 11/14/25 to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One.  Additionally, both motions sought monetary sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees and costs.

Therefore, regardless of the fact that Plaintiff’s 1/8/26 motion was brought pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2031.310 (h) and 1008 (b), and Plaintiff’s 3/20/26 motion was brought pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code § 2023.010, the Court properly considered the 3/20/26 motion a rehash of the 1/8/26 motion and declined to reconsider its prior 3/12/26 ruling and award the requested sanctions. 

Notably, a court may invoke its independent authority to impose sanctions under the general sanctions provisions of the Civil Discovery Act only when confronted with an unusual form of discovery abuse, or a pattern of abuse, not already addressed by a relevant sanctions provision of the Act. City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal. 5th 46.  Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant engaged in an unusual form of discovery abuse or a pattern of abuse not already addressed by a relevant provision of the Act that required the invocation of the Court’s independent authority to impose sanctions under different considerations than those previously undertaken by the Court.

A trial court abuses its discretion when it exceeds the bounds of reason in exercising it, having considered all the circumstances before it.  The Court of Appeal evaluates abuse of discretion relative to the legal principles governing the subject of the action.  In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal. App. 5th 481.

On this record, and relative to the principles expressed in the provisions of the Discovery Act governing the imposition of (monetary) sanctions, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any conduct by the Court exceeding the bounds of reason in the exercise thereof.

The record also does not show a defect in notice or opportunity to be heard regarding the 5/20/26 decision. Rather, it shows no appearances and no hearing request when the matter was called, and confirmation of a tentative ruling.   Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s characterization of the motion as a rehash does not, on this record, demonstrate that the order was void or entered in excess of jurisdiction that would support vacating the said ruling.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s arguments in support of vacatur are premised on a mistaken belief that Defendant did not oppose the 3/20/26 motion. The Court file shows that Defendant filed their opposition to the motion on 4/29/26 with proof of service on file dated 4/29/26, demonstrating service on Plaintiff by USPS mail. Notably Plaintiff did not assert any lack of any opposition by requesting a hearing after the tentative ruling was issued. The Court finds it surprising that Plaintiff is seemingly raising this issue now, apparently without foundation.

Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff’s contentions of judicial bias and lack of judicial integrity are also based on this mistaken belief that the motion on which the challenged order is based was unopposed, Plaintiff’s arguments in that regard are heavily discredited.

The Court therefore finds that the Court’s 5/20/26 ruling is supported and well-reasoned and demonstrates the proper exercise of the Court’s discretion herein.  In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal. App. 5th 481; Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2023.010 and 2023.030; City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal. 5th 46; Civ. Proc. Code § 473 (d).

“Submission on a tentative ruling is neutral; it conveys neither agreement nor disagreement with the analysis.” Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bay Area Toll Auth. (2020) 51 Cal. App. 5th 435, 446, citing to Mundy v. Lenc (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 1401.   Plaintiff cannot be held to have waived his right to seek relief from the 5/20/26 order. However, Plaintiff has also not identified any new facts or a procedural irregularity in the 5/20/26 proceedings.  The docketed sequence shows the Court’s discretion was properly exercised against repetitive motion practice and lack of diligence by Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to vacate and set aside the Court’s order dated 5/20/26 as void as a matter of law and also denies Plaintiff’s alternative request to modify the 5/20/26 order and grant Plaintiff’s attorney fees against Defendant Zen and his attorney of record jointly and severally.

CV-25-001020 – LC, JANE DOE vs MODESTO CITY SCHOOLS – Defendant’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – GRANTED.

Good cause existing, the Court hereby GRANTS Counsel Steven Derby leave to withdraw as Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Aguirre.

The Court’s order relieving Counsel shall take effect upon proof of service of same on Defendant. (CRC 3.1362).

The Court will sign the Proposed Order.

CV-25-009803 – DOLZADELLI, CHELSEA vs SALAS, OSCAR – a) Defendants the Frontier, LLC and Oscar Salas Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First-Amended Complaint – SUSTAINED, in part, OVERRULED, in part, with leave to amend; b) Defendant the Frontier, LLC and Oscar Salas Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First-Amended Complaint - DENIED.

a) SUSTAINED, in part, OVERRULED, in part, with leave to amend.

The Court has considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.

Defendants The Frontier, LLC and Oscar Salas demur to the First Cause of Action (Negligence), Second Cause of Action (Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention), and Fourth Cause of Action (Premises Liability) of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. Defendants also assert uncertainty.

First Cause of Action – Negligence

The demurrer is OVERRULED.

Liberally construed, the First Amended Complaint alleges Defendants' security personnel witnessed an escalating confrontation, had actual notice of a potential threat to Plaintiff, and failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the ensuing assault. Whether Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff under the circumstances, whether the assault was foreseeable, and whether Defendants' alleged omissions were a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's injuries present factual questions not appropriately resolved on demurrer. The First Amended Complaint sufficiently states a negligence claim at the pleading stage. Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10; Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 224; Morris v. De La Torre (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 260; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal. App.4th 994; McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC, (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664.

Second Cause of Action – Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention

The demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

The First Amended Complaint does not allege sufficient facts showing that Defendants knew or should have known an employee was unfit or incompetent; nor does it allege facts supporting the essential elements of a negligent hiring, supervision, or retention claim. The allegations focus primarily on the employee's conduct during the incident itself rather than facts demonstrating negligent hiring, training, supervision, or retention. Plaintiff has not adequately pled this cause of action as currently framed. However, there is a reasonable possibility the defect may be cured by amendment.  Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc. (2006) 145 Cal. App. 4th 790; Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal. App. 4th 828.

Fourth Cause of Action – Premises Liability

The demurrer is OVERRULED.

The First Amended Complaint alleges Defendants failed to maintain reasonably safe premises, failed to provide adequate security, and failed to take reasonable protective measures despite notice of a dangerous situation. The allegations are sufficient to plead a premises liability theory. Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 1132.  Defendants' arguments regarding foreseeability, causation, control, and the precise location of the assault raise issues more appropriately resolved through discovery and on a developed factual record

.

Uncertainty

The demurrer on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED.

The First Amended Complaint adequately apprises Defendants of the nature of the claims being asserted. Any lack of detail regarding the exact location of the incident or other factual particulars may be addressed through discovery. Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are not warranted here.  A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677; Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10.

Disposition

1. Demurrer to the First Cause of Action (Negligence): OVERRULED.
2. Demurrer to the Second Cause of Action (Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention): SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
3. Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action (Premises Liability): OVERRULED.
4. Demurrer on grounds of uncertainty: OVERRULED.

If plaintiff wishes to file a Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff must do so by no later than July 31, 2026.

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is Granted in part and DENIED in part.  Evidence Code section 452(d)(1).  Granted as to the existence and procedural content of court records in CR-25-000614 and CR-25-000616 and as to the address of The Frontier Club but denied to the extent offered for the truth of factual allegations within criminal complaints/minutes.

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order by no later than July 17, 2026, that conforms to the Court’s ruling.

b) DENIED.

The Court finds, in view of the allegations of the First Amended Complaint, of Defendant  Murillo’s awareness of the bottle throwing incident at Plaintiff, Murillo’s status as a security guard for The Frontier, Defendants alleged duty to Plaintiff as an invitee, licensee or patron, as addressed in the related Demurrer, and Defendant Murillo’s failure to call 911 or request another to do so in the face of the ongoing knife attack on Plaintiff, that the First Amended Complaint alleges facts that demonstrate conduct by Defendant Murillo that constitute malice, a conscious disregard of the safety of others, or that demonstrate “despicable conduct” (conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched, or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people), which are sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.  Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1) Code of Civil Procedure § 436; College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994), 8 Cal. 4th 704, as modified; King v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 675, as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 24, 2020); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal. App. 4th 1017.

Additionally, the First Amended Complaint, based on allegations of Defendant Salas’ knowledge of Defendant Murillo’s unfitness to function as a security guard arising from  the 31^st October 2024 fight outside The Frontier in which Murillo was involved, and of The Frontier’s general policy not to call 911 in the face of Murillo’s continued employment by the Frontier as a security guard after the 31^ST October 2024 incident and the incident at issue, are sufficient to support the conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others by Salas, and/or the ratification of Murillo’s alleged wrongful conduct, in view of Salas’ position as CEO possessing the required influence on corporate policy as would make the alleged conduct attributable to The Frontier. Civ. Code § 3294(b); White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 563; Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2007)148 Cal. App. 4th 1403.  These allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to support a claim for punitive damages.

Additionally, the portions of the First Amended Complaint that relate to descriptions of the location of the attack on Plaintiff as “adjacent to” the premises etc., are factually descriptive allegations and not conclusory allegations and are not subject to being stricken. Code of Civil Procedure section 430.30(a).

Defendants’ motion is accordingly DENIED.

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order by no later than July 17, 2026, that conforms to the Court’s ruling.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***