Civil Tentative Rulings

May 14, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-004875 – HINDS, GIB vs GLECASHMAN ALMOND RANCH ONE LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Assignment Order – DENIED without prejudice.

The Court does not appear to have proof of service of the supplemental declaration, and therefore cannot consider it.

CV-25-009923 – BUSTOS, ERNESTO RAMIREZ vs CORTEZ GROWERS ASSOCIATION – Defendant Cortez Growers Association’s Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint per CCP 425.16 (Anti-Slapp) – DENIED. No fees are awarded.

The alleged facts of the case are that Plaintiff was subjected to sexual harassment and anti-gay comments. Plaintiff, at some point, left the employment after a mediation which did not result in an agreement.

In a proposed First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff included statements made during that mediation. After a meet and confer, those statements were removed, and the First Amended Complaint added an unlawful retaliation claim as the Fourth Cause of Action. This includes a paragraph saying that “Plaintiff was disciplined, constructively terminated, wrongfully terminated, and/or forced to resign by Defendants because Plaintiff engaged in the conduct described above.

ANTI-SLAPP

Special Motion to Strike the Complaint or Portions Thereof: Code Civ. Proc. section 425.16 permits the striking of an entire complaint or portions thereof if protected activity is implicated. This is a two-step process. First the Court decides whether the challenged claims arise from protected activity. At that point, the Court must determine whether the merits of the claims survive. (Equillon Enterprices v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4^th 53, 67.)

In this case, Plaintiff is correct that filed First Amended Complaint does not contain statements subject to striking via anti-SLAPP standards. The Court did not find, and the parties did not cite, to any cases indicating that reliance of prior unfiled complaints was proper.

The Court agrees that statements from an EEOC mediation are protected speech and subject to anti-SLAPP analysis. But none of these statements made into the eventual filing, and it is insufficient to allege that the triggering mechanism was the protected speech; instead the strikable matter itself must arise directly from the protected speech. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 C4th 69)

Defendant argues in Reply that the gravamen of its motion is that the termination claim is based on protected activity because Plaintiff clearly left based on statements made in the mediation. Plaintiff’s declaration indicates otherwise, and has sufficient reference to medical care to at minimum raise a competing inference that his leaving was pre-determined. Further, given the lack of an agreement prior to the departure, there is an inference that the proposal was not a dispositive factor.

ATTORNEY FEES

This motion was not frivolous or intended for delay. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c))  The filing of the motion was likely after Plaintiff proposed including privileged statements in its First Amended Complaint.

CV-25-011123 – PEREZ, VELIA vs RUSHMORE SERVICING – Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint – OVERRULED. Plaintiff’s counsel is sanctioned $450 for the unjustifiably late opposition.

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request judicial notice of two recorded documents: (1) Substitution of Trustee dated June 25, 2024, and (2) Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale recorded December 4, 2025. Pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452 and 453, the Court GRANTS the unopposed request.

For the reasons set forth below, the Demurrer to First Cause of Action (Civ. Code § 2923.5) is OVERRULED; the Demurrer to Second Cause of Action (Civ. Code § 2923.7) is OVERRULED; the Demurrer to Third Cause of Action (Civ. Code § 2924.9) is OVERRULED; the Demurrer to Fourth Cause of Action (Civ. Code § 2923.6(c)/(e)) is OVERRULED; the Demurrer to Fifth Cause of Action (UCL) is OVERRULED and the Demurrer to Sixth Cause of Action (Wrongful Foreclosure) is OVERRULED.

Moving Party to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling. Defendants to file and serve their Answer within 20 days of service of the final order.

First Cause of Action – Civil Code § 2923.5(a)

“A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the borrower's financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the initial contact, the mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that the borrower has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if requested, the mortgage servicer shall schedule the meeting to occur within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower's financial situation and discussion of options may occur during the first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose.” (Civ. Code, § 2923.5.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead this cause of action because the Notice of Default contains a California Declaration of Compliance certifying that Rushmore contacted the borrower to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. According to Defendants, the declaration creates a rebuttable presumption that can only be refuted by facts. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead this cause of action because Plaintiff does not allege that she did not receive any contact but merely alleges that Defendants failed to provide written notice, and because borrower-initiated contact can remedy any violation and Plaintiff submitted a loan modification.

Plaintiff responds that no contact was made. The First Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Rushmore failed to discuss the loan and Plaintiff’s alternatives at any point in time. (FAC, ¶ 26.)

Questions of fact are not appropriately decided on a demurrer. The question presented on demurrer is whether the Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Here, the First Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Rushmore failed to discuss the loan and Plaintiff’s alternatives at any point in time. (FAC, ¶ 26.) The First Amended Complaint also alleges that Defendant Rushmore submitted a false declaration. The facts supporting compliance are uniquely in Defendant’s control and Plaintiff cannot be expected to prove an absence of evidence.

The demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

Second Cause of Action – Civil Code § 2923.7 (Single Point of Contact)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to allege a material violation by failing to allege any facts to show how any alleged failure to provide a Single Point of Contact (“SPOC”) prevented her from submitting documents. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to allege how she was damaged by Defendants alleged failure to assign a SPOC. Plaintiff responds that Rushmore’s failure to assign a SPOC prevented Plaintiff from assessing her review situation and speeding up the review process. Plaintiff argues it was a material violation because Plaintiff could not obtain status of her review.

Here, the First Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was not appointed a SPOC, different representatives would tell Plaintiff that they did not have the exact reasons for denial of the loan modification, and that the violation was material because it prevented Plaintiff from successfully submitting a loan medication package.

While Plaintiff is bound by the allegations in the original Complaint, she has still alleged some harm.

The demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.

Third Cause of Action – Civil Code § 2924.9

“[W]ithin five business days after recording a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924, a mortgage servicer that offers one or more foreclosure prevention alternatives shall send a written communication to the borrower . . . [.]” (Civ. Code, § 2924.9.)

A “ mortgage servicer is liable only for “a material violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by that mortgage servicer . . . where the violation was not corrected and remedied prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale.” (Civ. Code, § 2924.12.) “Courts who have weighed materiality at this juncture have considered a violation ‘material’ if it affected the plaintiff's loan obligations, disrupted her loan modification process, or caused her to suffer harm.” (Warren v. PNC Bank National Association (N.D. Cal. 2023) 671 F.Supp.3d 1035, 1043.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to plead a material violation as Plaintiff concedes she was reviewed for a loan modification. Plaintiff responds that Rushmore did not contact Plaintiff with any foreclosure alternatives. The First Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to notify Plaintiff as required by Section 2924.9, that Plaintiff did not receive any pieces of mail, and that Defendants’ failure to communicate caused harm by preventing her from qualifying for a repayment plan or forbearance and that she would have taken action to avoid foreclosure with other lending sources.

Although injunctive relief is not available, “[i]f part of a cause of action is good, a general demurrer to that portion of the pleading must be overruled.” (See Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047; PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682.)

The demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

Fourth Cause of Action – Civil Code § 2923.6(c)

“If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower's mortgage servicer at least five business days before a scheduled foreclosure sale, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of sale, or conduct a trustee's sale, while the complete first lien loan modification application is pending.” (Civ. Code, § 2923.6(c).)

Defendants argue that this cause of action is not adequately pleaded because the Notice of Default was recorded on June 11, 2025 and Plaintiff did not submit a completed loan modification until three months later, on September 1, 2025. Thus, Defendants could not be prevented from recording the Notice of Default because Plaintiff’s application was submitted after the Notice of Default was already recorded.

Here, the foreclosure sale date was scheduled for October 17, 2025. The First Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff submitted a complete loan modification application on September 1, 2025, which is at least five days before the scheduled foreclosure sale. Yet, Defendants recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale on September 10, 2025 and the property sold on October 17, 2025. These facts, taken as true, state a dual-tracking claim under § 2923.6.

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Fifth Cause of Action – Business and Professions Code § 17200

Defendants argue that a plaintiff who has defaulted on the loan prior to any alleged unfair business practice lacks standing to bring a UCL cause of action.

Pre-default status does not foreclose causation in HBOR cases where statutory violations are alleged. (Valbuena v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1267.)

Because the demurrer to the first four causes of action is overruled, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is also overruled.

Sixth Cause of Action – Wrongful Foreclosure

Defendants argue that this cause of action fails because Plaintiff failed to allege tender.

A wrongful foreclosure cause of action based on HBOR violations may not require a tender. (See Majd v. Bank of America, N.A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1307 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 151, 162], as modified (Jan. 14, 2016) [“[P]laintiff alleged the foreclosure was in breach of Bank of America's legal obligations and that his modification was denied on a false claim that he failed to produce all required documentation. As we explained above, plaintiff alleged prejudice in that he may have been able to avoid the foreclosure had Bank of America completed the modification review process in good faith. Plaintiff was excused from tendering.

And, under the facts as alleged, foreclosure was not authorized.”].) Because Plaintiff has successfully alleged a violation of the HBOR statutes, the claim is sufficiently stated at this stage.

The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Leave to Amend

Because the demurrer is overruled as to all causes of action, leave to amend is not reached. Defendants to answer within 20 days.

CV-25-012142 – STANISLAUS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS vs GONSALVES, JOSEPH A – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order for Prejudgment Possession – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court would like clarification as to the question of service of the Writ of Summons and Complaint on all unknown persons.

UD-25-001322 – LAZCANO, MANUEL vs ZAMORA, EBERARDO – Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record - GRANTED.

The effectiveness of the order will be delayed until counsel submits proof of electronic service of the signed order on the client.  (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1362(e).)

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-25-010287 – MCDONALD, VENUS vs CITY OF MODESTO CITY COUNCIL – a) Petitioner’s Petition of Writ of Administrative Mandate – CONTINUED to June 18, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22; b) Petitioner’s Motion to Augment Administrative Record and for Sanctions for Respondent’s Material Omissions – GRANTED as to augmentation and DENIED as to sanctions.

a-b) On January 28, 2026, Petitioners submitted the instant Motion to Augment Administrative Record and for Sanctions. Respondent City of Modesto (“City”) submitted an Opposition supported by two declarations. Petitioner submitted a Reply.

Petitioners’ nonexistent authority

In its Opposition, City argues that several cases cited by Petitioners do not exist, that quoted materials Petitioners’ attribute to existing cases cannot be found anywhere in the case, and/or that Petitioners’ memorandum includes propositions that incorrectly attributed to a case.

In Reply, Petitioner McDonald acknowledges that certain citations were inaccurate and withdraws reliance on those authorities.

At the hearing, the Court may set an order to show cause for why Petitioners should not be monetarily sanctioned in the amount of $1000 per fictitious quotation, payable to the clerk of the court, and why Petitioner McDonald should not be directed to serve a copy of the ruling on Modesto Smoke Shop if the order to show cause is not discharged.

Petitioner’s Motion to Augment Administrative Record

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Augment Administrative Record is GRANTED and the request for sanctions is DENIED. The hearing on the Petition of Writ of Administrative Mandate is CONTINUED to June 18, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

The following items shall be included in the certified administrative record: (i) all video files that were displayed to the hearing officer during the August 19, 2025 hearing, including but not limited to the phone video shown by Petitioner and the City’s video played at the hearing, and (ii) any documents or exhibits that were presented to the hearing officer during the August 19, 2025 hearing.

Within seven days, the City shall file a notice identifying the precise citation(s) and item(s) at issue in the administrative decision with citations to the existing record (e.g., the citation document, hearing officer decision pages) to clarify whether or not the CBD gummies were part of the citation.

Within seven days, the parties shall meet and confer and file a joint declaration identifying each document, exhibit, or video (by filename, source device, and brief description each video) that was presented during the August 19, 2025 hearing, which party or parties has possession of each item, and whether or not each item can be reproduced. If any item cannot be reproduced, the parties shall so state in the joint declaration and describe with specificity the item, how it was displayed or reviewed, and why it cannot be reproduced, and shall provide the transcript page/line or timestamp where it was presented.

Within 14 days each party shall lodge the documents and videos (on a CD) in each party’s possession with the Court accompanied by a supplemental exhibit index.

Within 21 days, the City shall file a supplemental certification of the administrative record appending the identified materials and updating the index accordingly.

Moving party to submit a proposed order that conforms to this ruling.

Whether Petitioners lack standing

The issue of standing goes to the merits of the Petition. As the Court previously noted in its February 11, 2026 Minute Order, the Motion to Augment Administrative Record should be heard before the Court considers the merits of the Petition. As the Court also previously noted in the same Civil Minute Order, the citation in question was issued to the smoke shop, not to Ms. McDonald; and because Ms. McDonald does not indicate that she is a California-licensed attorney, she cannot represent the smoke shop. The Court again encourages Petitioners to promptly seek legal advice from a California-licensed attorney regarding this matter.

Whether the Court should order augmentation

“Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) “All or part of the record of the proceedings before the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer . . . may be ordered to be filed by the court.” (Ibid.)
 

Respondent acknowledges that videos were presented at the hearing. There was at least a video played from Ms. McDonald’s phone and also a video from the City’s files. Respondent next acknowledges that correspondence was presented at the hearing, but that it was in the form a question seeking legal guidance. City argues the videos and correspondence are irrelevant but cites no authority that they should not be included in the certified administrative record.

Next, City argues that a partial record is acceptable. But in the case City cited, the court noted that “we are of the opinion that litigants should not participate in ‘gamesmanship’ that deprives a trial court of the opportunity to properly review claims of error in administrative proceedings.” (Elizabeth D. v. Zolin (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 347, 355.) The Court in that case “f[ound] that . . . the trial court was not provided with either the administrative record or a sufficient portion of that record to review” and thus, “reverse[d] and remand[ed] to the trial court with directions to remand the cause to the DMV with instructions to conduct a new hearing.” (Ibid.)

There is also a dispute regarding whether Modesto Smoke Shop was cited for CBD gummies. Petitioners state that Modesto Smoke Shop was cited for CBD gummies. City states in its Opposition that Modesto Smoke Shop was not cited for the CBD gummies and the CBD gummies were not at issue in Petitioners administrative appeal to the City. However, the Modesto Police Department Incident report attached as Exhibit C to City’s Opposition references CBD gummies and states that they were seized and booked into Modesto Property and Evidence, which is also reflected in the evidence/property record. In addition, the administrative hearing transcript makes numerous references to a citation for CBD gummies.

Clarification is necessary and a full record is necessary here to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.

Whether the Court should issue sanctions

City argues that Petitioners’ request for sanctions pursuant to 128.7 is procedurally defective because Section 128.7(c) contains a safe harbor procedure that has not been followed and also states that sanctions are unfounded.

The Court declines to issue sanctions at this time.

PR-23-000289 – IN THE MATTER OF THE MACHADO FAMILY CREDIT BYPASS TRUST – Petitioner’s Motion for Consolidation of Trials of Related Actions - DENIED without prejudice.

The motion is DENIED without prejudice for failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.350(a)(1)(C), as the Court was unable to locate a copy of the notice of motion filed into the civil action.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 23***

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-25-012513 – CARILLO, HECTOR vs STANISLAUS COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE – Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate Order and Reset Hearing (CIV. Proc., 473(b); Cal. Rules of Court) - DENIED, without prejudice.

Civil Proc. Code § 473 permits the Court to “relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Emphasis added).

To the extent that the Court’s prior ruling was based on the merits of Petitioner’s Petition and Defendant’s Response thereto and was not as a result of Petitioner’s failure to properly request a hearing on the Court’s Tentative Ruling, the Court finds, notwithstanding the liberal application of this provision, that no basis exists in light of said provision to grant Petitioner’s request. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion is hereby denied without prejudice.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-24-000340 – NEVITT, BRIAN vs ELLIOT, SHAWNAR – Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default – HEARING REQUIRED.

UD-26-000278 – WTJ PROPERTIES LLC vs VILLA, EDYGAR – Plaintiff’s Motion too Strike Claim of Possession and Answer – HEARING REQUIRED.