Civil Tentative Rulings

AMENDED July 29, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

310102 - THE PEOPLE vs SONORA MINING CORP - Defendant’s Motion to Reopen and Amend Judgment - GRANTED.

The Court has reviewed the moving papers, the Declaration of Anya Kwan, the original Stipulated Judgment entered June 5, 2006, and the proposed Amended Stipulated Judgment. No opposition has been filed.

The original Stipulated Judgment expressly provides that it may be amended or modified by a writing signed by the settling parties and approved by order of the Court.

The proposed Amended Stipulated Judgment satisfies the amendment procedure established by Paragraph 22 of the original judgment.

The original Stipulated Judgment expressly retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the settlement terms.

The remediation framework established by the original judgment had not terminated when the amendment process was commenced, that ongoing remediation obligations remained in existence, and that the Court's retained jurisdiction had not expired when the proposed amendment was submitted for approval.

The amendment appears consistent with and furthers the objectives of the original judgment by maintaining environmental oversight, clarifying successor-owner obligations, updating property descriptions, and continuing funding for remediation activities.

The original judgment expressly contemplated successor ownership, covenants running with the land, and future ownership changes. Because all current landowners have been noticed and affirmatively consented to the change, no prejudice against other parties is apparent.

 

The approval of the amendment will not prejudice the public interest and will facilitate continued implementation of the remediation program established by the original judgment.

The Court approves the Amended Stipulated Judgment submitted with the moving papers and orders it entered as the judgment of the Court. The Court's retained jurisdiction under the original Stipulated Judgment shall continue as necessary to ensure compliance with the Amended Stipulated Judgment and its terms.

The clerk is directed to reopen the matter for the limited purpose of entering this order and thereafter return the case to inactive status

CV-22-001871 - STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY vs PETERS, DARRIN KEITH - Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's Motion to Vacate the Dismissal and Enforce a Settlement Agreement and Enter Judgment - GRANTED, unopposed.

Pursuant to the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement between the parties of September,  2024, and Defendant’s failure to pay the sums due under said Agreement, the Court finds that Defendant is currently in default of said agreement entitling Plaintiff to all outstanding sums under said agreement in addition to interest, costs of suit and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff’s motion is granted.

Including prejudgment interest, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, judgment is entered for Plaintiff against Defendant for $15,728.48   (Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6; Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel, (1999) 74 Cal. App. 4th 299).

CV-25-003433 - TORRES, CANDIDO RODRIGUEZ vs STANISLAUS COUNTY - Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court is strongly inclined to grant the motion. However, because its logic is in part based on legal authority and analysis not offered by the parties, further briefing will be granted if requested; that is both mandatory and best practice in determining if I am correct.  

This is a straightforward question: Does a risk management firm’s otherwise statutorily compliant denial letter of a claim trigger the six-month statute of limitations, or is it insufficient to do so? This does not appear to have a straightforward answer either in the statutes or the case law, but the County appears to have the better argument.

All objections are OVERRULED. The Court does not consider any legal conclusions reached by the declarants and bases any conclusions on the documents themselves and not on declarants’ interpretations of them.

The Request for Judicial Notice is denied as moot, as I believe it is unnecessary in the instant case. (See Bienville Water Supply Co. v. City of Mobile (1902) 186 U.S. 212, 217.)

In this case, Plaintiff Rodriguez Torres crashed on April 11, 2023, and he and his wife Plaintiff Rodriguez presented a claim to the County on October 6, 2023. Notices of rejection were mailed on April 3, 2024. Plaintiff filed suit on April 11, 2025.

Government Code section 945.6 provides for a six-month statute of limitations after receiving a denial, but a two -year statute from the date of the event if no denial is sent.

Government code section 912.4 holds that the claim was deemed to have been rejected 45 days after its submission when no action was taken. In this case, the original denial occurred by operation of law on November 20, 2023, well before the rejection letters were sent.

While the county was well past the 45-day limit for their rejection, Katelaris v. County of Orange (2001) 92 Cal.App.4^th 1211 shortens the filing time to six months from the time of rejection even under these circumstances. If no notice is ever sent, the two-year limit applies. Tardy notice of rejection only delays the start of the six-month clock.

Plaintiffs argue that because the board or an authorized employee did not send the rejection letter, it is of no import. But in fact the rejection letter appears to comply with statutory notice; even though the outside contractor apparently believed it was rejecting the claim at that point, the claim had already been rejected by operation of law. No evaluation of the claim was necessary to make that determination, and the statutory scheme for enforcing the 45-day rule controls.

Given that, the issue here is whether the contractor’s notice is sufficient. Even assuming the County did no investigation and did nothing, the notice requirement is designed to provide Plaintiffs with the specific information on when the time for filing the suit would expire. This notice did so, and the contractor had both apparent and actual authority to send the letter. Plaintiffs were on notice of the requirements to sue within six months of the rejection, and did not do so. Such a failure is jurisdictional and the motion is therefore likely to be granted.

If the Court reached the argument that the parties made, the motion would likely be granted. The County has provided uncontradicted evidence that it was involved in the determination of liability prior to the sending of the rejection letters, and the letters were sent at the request of the County.  

CV-25-004154 - GARRETTSTEINMAN, DANIEL PAUL vs SIERRA CLUB - a) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Form Interrogatories – GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. b) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Request for Production – GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. c) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Special Interrogatories – GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

OVERVIEW: Under these somewhat unusual circumstances, the information provided as to work-product objections is sufficient. No work product objections are available between Mr. Garrett-Steinman and his former clients (Evidence Code section 958). Attorney-client privilege is limited.

The Court is sympathetic to the desire not to provide contact information to Plaintiff, but does not believe it appropriate to deny that witness information. Plaintiff is cautioned that whatever the cause of disruptive behavior toward witnesses, the likely sanction for the sorts of communications that have occurred in the past is to terminate the case in Defendants’ favor. Plaintiff is ordered to send no more than one email and make no more than one phone call within any three-day period without prior approval of the Court.

The Court declines to issue sanctions under these circumstances.

The issue of verifications has appeared to have been remedied.

1. Form Interrogatories.

1.0: GRANTED as to Sean Wirth and Jim Pachl.

1.1: GRANTED as to contact information.

15.1: DENIED as moot given order in 1.1.

17.1, RFA 30: DENIED.

17.1 RFA 31: DENIED.

17.1 RFA 41: DENIED.

17.1 RFA 42: DENIED.

17.1 RFA 43: DENIED.

17.1 RFA 44: GRANTED as to the identity and contact information of the attendee.

17.1 RFA 47: DENIED. The original RFA is not clear.

17.1 RFA 48: DENIED. As with others, the factual basis for the assertions is articulated.

17.1 RFA 50: GRANTED.

17.1 RFA 56: GRANTED.

17.1 RFA document authentication: DENIED. The Court takes these as sufficient admissions; if Defendant believes that these are not enforceable admissions, they should assert that now.

17.1 RFA 45 on: DENIED. See above.

b) Documents

1.  DENIED.
   1. GRANTED, for any outstanding documents.
   2. GRANTED, for any outstanding documents. (Phrasing here and in other locations does not disclaim the existence of other responsive documents.)
   3. GRANTED, for any outstanding documents.
   4. GRANTED for any outstanding documents other than Plaintiff’s own emails. It appears it would be unduly burdensome to provide those.

9. GRANTED. Given the response to 25, there seems to be a contradiction.

10. DENIED.

11. DENIED.

12. DENIED.

c) Special Interrogatory

1: GRANTED in part, as to any non-privileged conversations and including any non-privileged conversations regarding Plaintiff’s ability to proceed. This use of definitions is perhaps not ideal, but also a permissible question in and of itself.

2. GRANTED as to the identity of the discussors.

3. GRANTED as to any discussion of Plaintiff’s ability to proceed as lead counsel.

4. GRANTED as to any discussion of Plaintiff’s ability to proceed as lead counsel.

7. DENIED. Dissatisfaction with the answer is insufficient to require further answer.

9. GRANTED as to any discussion of Plaintiff’s ability to proceed as lead counsel.

10. GRANTED as to any discussion of Plaintiff’s ability to proceed as lead counsel.

11. GRANTED as to any discussion of Plaintiff’s ability to proceed as lead counsel. The remaining answers are encompassed by the prior answers and existing answers are sufficient as far as they go.

12. GRANTED as to any discussion of Plaintiff’s ability to proceed as lead counsel. The remaining answers are encompassed by the prior answers and existing answers are sufficient as far as they go. Providing the information from the thousands of emails Plaintiff sent is overly burdensome and Plaintiff has equivalent access.  

13. GRANTED as to any discussion of Plaintiff’s ability to proceed as lead counsel.

16. DENIED.

21. DENIED.

22-24. GRANTED in part. Any unprivileged documents must be provided, given the answer to Special Interrogatory 25.

25. DENIED.

26. DENIED.

27. DENIED.

29. DENIED.

30. DENIED.

31. DENIED.

33. DENIED.

35. DENIED.

CV-25-008157 - MADRIGAL, ROSEMARIE vs SANDHU BROS INC - Defendant’s Motion to Amend Answer - GRANTED, unopposed.

Good cause existing, Defendant is hereby granted leave to amend its Answer to correctly caption same,  and to amend Page 2, line 1 of the Answer to amend “SANDHU BROS, INC.” to SANDHU BROS GROWERS DBA YAM to accurately reflect Defendant’s true and correct name. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 473(a) W&W El Camino Real, LLC v. Fowler (2014) 226 Cal.App 4^th 263).

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-23-007620 - WRIGHT, ERIKA vs VALLEY INDUSTRIAL PARK LP - Defendant Valley Industrial Park LP's Motion for Summary Adjudication - HEARING REQUIRED.

This matter was continued from July 24, 2026 to July 29, 2026 for oral argument. As a reminder to the parties, below is the tentative ruling that the Court previously posted.

GRANTED - Cross-Complainant, as the moving party, has met the burden of demonstrating entitlement to adjudication of the issues presented herein in its favor. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).) Based on the declaration of William Pinkley and the evidence presented thereby, Cross-Complainant has demonstrated that Cross-Defendant owes a contractual duty to defend and indemnify in connection with Plaintiff’s claims against Cross-Complainant herein. Specifically, the undisputed evidence establishes that the subject incident arose out of, involved, or occurred in connection with Cross-Defendant’s use and/or occupancy of the premises, as provided in the parties’ lease. (See, e.g., UMFs 2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 22, 23, 26, 27, 35, 36, 39, 40.) 

The burden then shifts to Cross-Defendant to submit admissible evidence establishing the existence of material factual disputes preventing adjudication of the issues presented herein. The Court finds that Cross-Defendant has failed to meet that burden.

In that regard, the Court notes that the essence of Cross-Defendant’s purported dispute concerns the legal significance of the evidence as it relates to the application of the subject indemnity clause in the lease. However, the Court finds that Cross-Defendant’s primary cited authority, Morlin Asset Management LP v. Murachanian (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 184 is inapposite on these facts. In addition, while Cross-Defendant suggests the application of the exception for the lessor’s gross negligence or willful misconduct, the evidence presented on those issues consists primarily of speculation and is insufficient to create a material factual dispute on that claim. (See, e.g., Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162–163.)

Cross-Defendant’s objections to evidence are OVERRULED.

CV-26-004533 - GARCIA, FRANCESCA vs AAA INSURANCE - Respondent AAA Insurance's Motion to Compel the Appointment of a Neutral Arbitrator in an Underinsured Motorist Action (CCP 1281.6, Insurance Code 11580.2) - GRANTED, and unopposed.

On April 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.6. There is no opposition on file. Plaintiff seeks the Court’s assistance in selecting a neutral arbitrator.

The unopposed motion is GRANTED. Parties are directed to submit a joint list of proposed neutral arbitrators to the Court by August 29, 2026. Moving party to submit a proposed order within five court days.

PR-25-000754 - IN THE MATTER OF THE GEORGE GARY VENIOT LIVING TRUST - Petitioner Tawna Veniot's Motion to Appoint Receiver - GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

The Court finds that the parties' filings establish a substantial dispute concerning control and administration of the trust's principal asset, the real property located at 1921 Santina Court, Modesto, California. The Court further finds that the evidence regarding pending loss of homeowner's insurance coverage creates a sufficient showing that the property may suffer loss or injury absent court intervention.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 564 and Probate Code section 15642, the Court appoints a receiver over the property.

The receiver shall have authority to:

        1. Take control of and preserve the property;

        2. Obtain access to the property;

        3. Arrange for reasonable maintenance, repairs, and insurance;

        4. Collect information concerning the property's condition and value;

        5. Report to the court regarding the status of the property and any actions reasonably necessary to preserve it.
 

The Court declines at this time to authorize marketing or sale of the property. Any request to sell the property shall be made by noticed motion or application supported by evidence demonstrating that a sale is necessary and in the best interests of the trust and interested persons.

The proposed receiver, Laurie Jamison, is approved subject to the filing of any required oath and bond.

The Court reserves allocation of receivership fees and costs until further order.

Petitioner to prepare and submit within five court days a proposed order that is consistent with this ruling.

PR-25-001101 - IN THE MATTER OF EOFF, MATTHEW - Petitioner's Motion to Compel Initial Responses and Production to Requests for Production, Set Two; Request for Monetary Sanctions - CONTINUED to July 30, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

This matter is CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to July 30, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 22, to be heard with the related discovery motions on calendar that day.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-25-007643 - PITRE, TERENCE vs TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY - Defendant's Board of Trustees of California State University, Alfred Petrosky and Jarrett Kotrozo's Motion for Protective Order - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to July 30, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23, to be heard concurrently with Plaintiff’s related motion to compel.

CV-25-010420 - WELLS FARGO BANK vs KAUR, NAVNEET - Plaintiff's Motion for Writ of Attachment - HEARING REQUIRED (Code Civ. Proc. § 484.040).

CV-25-011861 - YARBROUGH, VANCE vs COELHO, KELLEY - Defendant's Motion for Leave to File an Anti-Slapp Motion - GRANTED.

The Court exercises its discretion to allow Defendant’s pursuit of anti-SLAPP relief despite her failure to meet the 60-day filing deadline provided in Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(f). In this instance, the Court finds that the subject delay was not excessive and the timing of the motion is still consistent with the statute's purpose of examining the merits of covered lawsuits in the early stages of proceedings.

Defendant shall submit her motion for filing within 10 days.

CV-26-001740 - ESPINOZA, FELIX ANTONIO SIFONTES vs NORCAL CHICKEN INC - Defendant Nor-Cal Chicken, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Strike Class Claims - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to September 1, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated the existence of an agreement to arbitrate which encompasses the claims at issue herein. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) 

However, the Court also notes that the arbitration agreement contains a delegation clause, which appears to assign the determination of enforcement issues, such as the unconscionability arguments raised by Plaintiff herein, exclusively to the arbitrator. As neither party’s papers has addressed the significance of the delegation clause here, the Court has determined to continue the matter, as above, and offer the parties the opportunity to address this issue via supplemental briefing.

Therefore, each party may submit a supplemental brief, no longer than 5 pages in length and limited to a discussion of the subject delegation clause, no later than August 21, 2026.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David Hood in Department 24:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 24***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-25-001028 -US BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION vs BOWERS, LATONA R - Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication - HEARING REQUIRED.