Civil Tentative Rulings

July 08, 2026

The following are the tentative ruling for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-001951 – HERNANDEZ, KEIRA vs VALLEY HOME JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – DROPPED at the request for moving party Oakdale Irrigation District, who was dismissed from the lawsuit on June 30, 2026.

CV-25-003678 – JOSEPH, BRADLEY BRICK vs SANDHU, NARENDER KAUR – Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint – GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to pay all fees for any person who needs to be redeposed and Defendant may seek attorney fees for additional time spent due to the lateness of the amendment.

California maintains a strong policy favoring amendment of pleadings and leave to amend should be liberally granted absent a showing of substantial prejudice, unreasonable delay causing prejudice, or clear futility. Plaintiff seeks to add employment-related causes of action arising from the same employment relationship, workplace injury, and post-injury events that form the basis of the existing action. Plaintiff contends that additional discovery obtained during the litigation revealed facts supporting FEHA and Labor Code claims not asserted in the original complaint.

Plaintiff's showing regarding diligence is weak. Many of the facts supporting the proposed employment claims - including the alleged misclassification, wage practices, accommodation requests, and termination - were known to Plaintiff before the motion was filed. Further, Plaintiff relies heavily on an assertion that discovery responses received on April 6, 2026, established Defendants employed five or more employees, yet the referenced discovery responses were not submitted with the motion.

Nevertheless, delay alone is generally insufficient to justify denial of leave to amend. P&D Consultants Inc. v. City of Carlsbad (2010) 190 Cal.App.4^th 1332 does not lead to a different conclusion; in that case the request was made after the trial readiness conference.

The relevant inquiry is whether Defendants have demonstrated substantial prejudice Most of the prejudice cited is to the substantial expansion and recharacterizing of the case, but this is the nature of the allegations rather than through delay.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff has substantially complied with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324 by submitting a proposed amended pleading and a supporting declaration addressing the effect of the amendment, the reasons amendment is sought, when the allegedly supporting facts were discovered, and why amendment was not sought earlier.

The Court expressly does not determine the legal sufficiency of the proposed causes of action. Defendant cites to rules regarding futility, but does not argue them with any specificity. Those issues may be addressed through demurrer, motion to strike, or other responsive pleadings. The Court's ruling is limited to whether Plaintiff should be permitted to file the proposed amended pleading.

Considering the policy favoring amendment and the absence of a sufficient showing of prejudice, the motion is GRANTED. Whether this is a good policy or not is a matter left to the legislature.

Plaintiff shall file and serve the First Amended Complaint within 10 days of service of the order. Defendants shall respond within the time permitted by law. Under section 473, the Court can make equitable orders, and does so, ordering Plaintiff to pay all deposition fees for any person who must be redeposed based on the change in circumstances, and permitting Defendant to seek attorney fees from this Court for additional time spent due to the delay. (This does not include all work on the new causes of action, but rather the amount caused by the delay.)

CV-26-000086 – BRADFORD, PATTI vs KELLERMEYER BERGENSONS SERVICES LLC – a) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings –GRANTED. b) Defendant Amazon.com Services LLC’s Joinder to Kellermeyer Bergensons Services LLC’s and Chio Saechao’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings - GRANTED.  c) Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Decision on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings –GRANTED

a) GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s objections:

To Amick Declaration:

1. 1. 1. 1. OVERRULED
         2. OVERRULED.
         3. SUSTAINED
         4. OVERRULED
         5. OVERRULED.

To Bradford Declaration:

All OVERRULED.

Defendants have met their burden of establishing the existence of a written arbitration agreement executed by Plaintiff on October 12, 2021. Plaintiff does not dispute that she electronically signed the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate as part of the onboarding process. Accordingly, the Court finds a valid arbitration agreement was formed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

The Court further finds that Plaintiff's claims fall within the broad scope of the agreement. The agreement expressly encompasses employment-related disputes, including claims for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, wage-and-hour violations, wrongful termination, and related statutory causes of action. The claims alleged in the Complaint arise from Plaintiff's employment relationship and are therefore subject to the arbitration provision.

The agreement also contains a delegation clause providing that the arbitrator shall have exclusive authority to resolve disputes concerning the interpretation, applicability, validity, and enforceability of the arbitration agreement. The Court finds the delegation language is sufficiently clear and unmistakable to satisfy the standards set forth in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, and Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231.

The Court therefore does not reach the merits of the unconscionability argument.

b) GRANTED.

Although Amazon is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement, the Court finds Amazon has established two independent grounds permitting enforcement of the agreement. First, the arbitration agreement expressly provides that KBS customers at whose facilities employees perform work are intended third-party beneficiaries of the agreement. The evidence establishes Plaintiff worked at an Amazon facility pursuant to KBS's contractual relationship with Amazon. The Court therefore finds Amazon qualifies as an intended third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement. (Ronay Family Limited Partnership v. Tweed (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 830, 838-839.)

Second, Plaintiff's claims against Amazon are predicated upon allegations that Amazon and KBS jointly employed Plaintiff and jointly participated in the acts giving rise to liability. The Complaint repeatedly alleges Amazon and KBS exercised shared authority over Plaintiff's employment and acted collectively with respect to the conduct challenged in this action.

Under these circumstances, equitable estoppel principles permit Amazon to enforce the arbitration agreement. (Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, 786-788; Goldman v. KPMG LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 219-221.)

The Court therefore finds Plaintiff's claims against Amazon are subject to the same arbitration agreement governing Plaintiff's claims against KBS and Saechao.

Amazon's Joinder is GRANTED.

c) GRANTED.

Because the Court is granting the Motion to Compel Arbitration, a stay of this action is required pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4.

Section 1281.4 provides that when a court orders arbitration of a controversy that is an issue involved in a pending action, the court shall stay the action until arbitration is completed. The stay is mandatory. (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 188, 192.)

The Court finds that all claims asserted in the Complaint are subject to arbitration and that no useful purpose would be served by permitting the litigation to proceed simultaneously with arbitration.

Accordingly, the action is stayed in its entirety pending completion of arbitration and issuance of an arbitration award. The August 3, 2026 Case Management Conference is vacated and a Case Status Review is set for December 3, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. The Court expects progress to be made by that time.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-23-005137 – UPPER QUINTO LAND & CATTLE COMPANY LLC vs ROMERO RANCH LLC – Defendant’s Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction – DENIED.

On June 11, 2026, Defendant submitted a motion to dissolve preliminary injunction. Plaintiff opposed and Defendant replied.

Plaintiff is a hunting and fishing organization comprised of individual members. At least three of Plaintiff’s properties are surrounded by Defendant’s property and thus Plaintiff’s members must travel across Defendant’s property to reach Plaintiff’s properties. Previously, Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendant from blocking Plaintiff and its members from traveling over Defendant’s property to access Plaintiff’s properties. The Court granted the injunction with conditions.

Now, Defendant moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction based on two alleged incidents. First, an individual who is also a member of Plaintiff’s organization traveled over Defendant’s property to reach his own private real property. Second, unidentified individuals trespassed and allegedly committed acts of vandalism.

“In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 533.)

Here, Defendant has not satisfied any of the requirements for dissolving the preliminary injunction. Defendant seeks to prevent a private individual from accessing his own private land. Even though such individual also happens to be a member of Plaintiff’s hunting and fishing organization, such an act does not amount to a material change in fact or law. Nor does it establish that the ends of justice would be served by dissolving the injunction because the alleged incidents are divorced from the purpose of the injunction. The requested relief does not flow from the alleged incidents.

Defendant’s cursory request for contempt in reply is not properly before the Court. In any event, the Court is unconvinced a motion for contempt would be successful on the facts presented to date.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dissolve preliminary injunction is DENIED.

CV-25-009644 – WELLS FARGO BANK NA vs VASQUEZ, JUAN P – Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions Admitted and of Nonappearance – GRANTED, and unopposed.

On May 28, 2026, Plaintiff submitted a motion to deem requests for admissions admitted and for nonappearance. Plaintiff’s notice of motion states that Plaintiff submits the motion on the moving papers pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1304(c) and will not appear at the hearing in open court. The motion is unopposed.

“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response . . . [t]he requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) “The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(c).)

Plaintiff’s declaration states that Plaintiff propounded requests for admissions on Defendant and received no response. Plaintiff requests that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified be deemed admitted.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280, Plaintiff’s unopposed motion is GRANTED. The Court intends to sign the proposed order Plaintiff submitted in connection with its motion.

PR-25-000754 – IN THE MATTER OF THE GEORGE GARY VENIOT LIVING TRUST – Petitioner Tawna Veniot’s Motion to Appoint Receiver - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court intends to DENY Petitioner Tawna Veniot’s unopposed Motion to Appoint Receiver WITHOUT PREJUDICE at this time.

Petitioner Tawna Veniot moves for appointment of a receiver to take possession of the real property located at 1921 Santina Court, Modesto, California, evict occupants, prepare the property for sale, market the property, and sell the property pending resolution of the parties' competing claims concerning trusteeship and ownership.

The motion was properly served on respondents Dana Garth and Richard Pomares.  They have not filed any opposition.

The Court recognizes that it possesses authority to appoint a receiver in an appropriate trust proceeding pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 564 and Probate Code section 15642(e). However, receivership is an extraordinary remedy and should be employed only where necessary to preserve property and where less drastic remedies are inadequate.

The present record reflects a genuine dispute concerning the identity of the lawful successor trustee and the parties' respective rights regarding the subject property. The record further contains evidence suggesting the property may require maintenance and repairs. Petitioner relies in substantial part upon allegations contained in respondents' filings concerning termite damage, HVAC issues, and other deferred maintenance concerns.

At present, however, petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence establishing imminent irreparable injury, active dissipation of the property, or circumstances requiring the immediate displacement of occupants and sale of the residence. The Court is also concerned that the requested receivership would grant relief extending well beyond preservation of the asset and could effectively alter possession and control of the property before resolution of the underlying trust dispute.

Additionally, the record suggests the trust may lack liquid assets. The Court notes that appointment of a receiver, standing alone, does not solve an insolvency problem. A receiver is not a source of funding and may instead create additional administrative expenses payable from the disputed asset.

Accordingly, the Court is inclined to deny the motion without prejudice and instead consider issuance of narrowly tailored preservation orders designed to maintain the status quo and protect the property pending adjudication of the underlying petitions.

The Court wishes to hear from the parties regarding the propriety and scope of the following proposed preservation orders:

1. No party shall sell, transfer, encumber, lease, refinance, or otherwise dispose of the property without further court order.

2. The current occupants shall maintain existing utility services reasonably necessary to preserve the property.

3. The current occupants shall maintain existing homeowner's insurance coverage and provide proof of coverage upon request.

4. All parties shall refrain from committing waste or permitting avoidable deterioration of the property.

5. A neutral inspection of the property shall be conducted to assess structural conditions, termite issues, HVAC condition, and other material maintenance concerns.

6. The parties shall cooperate with reasonable inspection requests and provide access to the property upon reasonable notice.

The Court will hear argument regarding whether such preservation measures are appropriate and whether any additional or modified protective orders are necessary pending final resolution of the trust dispute.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-19-006268 – AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK vs MARTINEZ, STEVE – Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate the Conditional Dismissal and for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6 – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to judgment pursuant to the terms of the stipulation entered between the parties in October 2020, by which they agreed to the Court’s retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement herein. Therefore, the motion is granted, the dismissal entered on 10-27-29 is set aside, and judgment shall be entered in Plaintiff’s favor for the total amount of $4,739.00, which represents the principal amount of $10,622.50, less $6,373.50 in payments credited to the account, plus total court costs of $490.00.

The Court will sign the proposed order and judgment submitted by Plaintiff.

CV-23-001773 – TRAVIS, TYEISHA vs COMMUNITY HOSPICE INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement and Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Service Awards – HEARING REQUIRED.

Based on the moving papers and supporting evidence, the Court is inclined to GRANT the motion. It appears that proper notice to the settlement class has been given in compliance with the law and as required by the Court’s order granting preliminary approval.  Having considered the unopposed motion herein and the supporting declarations and evidence, the Court finds that the settlement was entered into good faith, is fair, reasonable and adequate, and satisfies the standards for final approval under California law.  (Civil Code §1781; Code Civ. Proc. §382; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.769.)  Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the proposed settlement and the associated fees and costs are approved as set forth in the motion and supporting papers, as follows:

Fees and costs of Settlement Administrator: $8,750

Payment to Class Representatives: $20,000

PAGA allocation to LWDA (75%) and class members (25%):  $50,000

Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees:  $350,500

Class Counsel’s costs:  $44,304.85

In accordance with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 384, the Court sets a compliance hearing for April 15, 2027 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23 to confirm full administration of the settlement.  Class counsel shall submit a compliance report no later than 5 court days before the date of the hearing, which shall include the total amount that was actually paid to the class members pursuant to the subject settlement.  At the time of the compliance hearing, the Court shall amend the judgment to direct that the sum of the unpaid funds, plus interest as required by the statute, be distributed as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

Class Counsel shall submit a revised proposed order incorporating the above revisions for the Court’s signature.

CV-24-002665 – GERGEES, DORIS vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Pursuant to Civil Code Section 1794(D) – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to September 9, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

The Court notes that counsel herein has substantial experience with these types of matters and is presumably well-acquainted with the law governing the determination of reasonable fees and expenses pursuant to the statute.  Nevertheless, these types of fee disputes are commonplace and appear to reflect a default pattern of refusing to compromise in favor of “trying their luck” before the court, thus wasting judicial resources in the hopes of obtaining a ruling favoring their side.

The Court believes that the potential exists for the parties to informally resolve the issues presented herein if genuine efforts to meet and confer as to such issues are undertaken in good faith. Therefore, the hearing is continued, as above, for that purpose, and the parties are ordered to meet and confer in person or by online video conference to discuss the issues herein. The parties are further ordered to submit a Joint Status Statement by August 28, 2026, describing their efforts to meet-and-confer and any resolution or narrowing of the issues they were able to achieve.

The Court strongly encourages the parties to make genuine efforts to informally resolve their differences with due civility to one another. Should counsel for the parties be unable to reach a reasonable compromise of any of the issues presented by the instant motion, the Court may require personal appearances at the time of the continued hearing to further address the issues herein.

CV-25-004501 – MARTINEZ, ARMANDO ISRAEL vs NEAL, JENNIFER K – Motion to Continue Trial - HEARING REQUIRED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David Hood in Department 24:

CV-26-002843 – HECHT FAMILY THREE LLC vs VOP 21 LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Responses of Defendant VOP 2.1, LLC – DENIED.

A motion to strike is not the appropriate mechanism herein as motions to strike are only available to attack pleadings such as an Answer, Complaint, or Cross Complaint. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 435, 436. The filing at issue is a declaration. 

The Court does, however, GRANT Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice and notes Defendant’s suspension status per Plaintiff’s Exhibit A.  A corporation suspended for failure to file a required statement under the Corporations Code is, like a corporation suspended for failure to pay taxes under the Revenue and Taxation Code, disabled from participating in any litigation activities.  Palm Valley Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Design MTC (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 553, 559; Corp. Code § 2205, Revenue and Taxation Code § 23301. 

Defendant is hereby admonished to refrain from submitting filings to the court regarding this action while in suspended status. Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order within five court days that complies with this ruling.

CV-26-004163 – BENCH, ONEIDA vs CENTRAL VALLEY POST ACUTE – Defendant’s Petition to Compel Arbitration - GRANTED. 

The Court finds that Defendants have discharged their burden of demonstrating the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the decedent Sandra Conforti and the Defendants.  Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 233, 244; Martinez v. BaronHR, Inc. (2020) 51 Cal.App. 5th 962, 967; Gamboa v. NorthEast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App. 5th 15; Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 394, 413.

The Court further finds that said agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and its procedural rules.  9 U.S.C §§ 2-4; Aviation Data, Inc. v. American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. (2007) 152 Cal.App. 4th 1522; Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. (1989) 489 U.S. 468; Tuufuli v. W. Coast Dental Admin. Servs. LLC (2026) 117 Cal.App. 5th 1048.

The Court further finds that the delegation clause in the parties’ arbitration agreement, which delegates to the arbitrator the authority to resolve a wide range of disputes -including those relating to the scope of the arbitration agreement and the arbitrability of the present dispute - clearly and unmistakably delegates the stated authority to the arbitrator.  Nickson v. Shemran, Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App. 5th 121; Jack v. Ring LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App. 5th 1186, review denied; Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63, 67-69; Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2019) 561 U.S. 63, 70; and First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944-45. 

However, to the extent that the parties presented to the court issues exceeding the determination of the validity of the arbitration agreement, the court proceeds to address those issues.

The Court finds that the causes of action for General Negligence, Survival Claim and Elder Abuse and Neglect are survivor actions:  decedent’s own claims she could have brought had she not died, which are premised on professional negligence and are therefore, pursuant to Article I of the parties’ arbitration agreement, subject to binding arbitration.  San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App. 4th 1545, modified on denial of rehearing, review denied; Civ. Proc. Code §§ 377.30,1295; Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp. (2016) 63 Cal. 4th 75.

As to Plaintiffs’ wrongful death cause of action, the Court finds that this cause of action belongs to the heirs of the decedent. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (supra); Adams v. Superior Ct. (2011) 196 Cal.App. 4th 71; and Monschke v. Timber Ridge Assisted Living, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App. 4th 583. 

As a general rule, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute that he or she has not agreed to resolve by arbitration. Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App. 4th 674; and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 219–220. However, a patient's arbitration agreement may bind their heirs in a wrongful death action where: (1) the arbitration agreement expressly manifests an intent to bind heirs or wrongful death claimants; and (2) the wrongful death claim itself is premised on professional negligence within the scope of § 1295, not merely on custodial or non-medical care.  Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 838; and Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. (2025) 18 Cal. 5th 364. The Court finds that these requirements are met here.

Accordingly, Defendants Petition to Compel Arbitration of the claims herein is GRANTED, and this action shall be STAYED pending completion of the arbitration required by the agreement. 9 U.S.C. §3; Civ. Proc. Code §§’s 1281.2,1281.4.

Defendant shall submit a Proposed Order within five court days that complies with this ruling.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 19***