Amended January 30, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-007400 - PINHEIRO, MARIE vs CITY OF TURLOCK - Defendant Children’s Crisis Center’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Issues - HEARING REQUIRED.

 

The Court is unconvinced Civil Code section 1714 bars the sort of legislation that is the subject of this motion, even by a general law city. It would be inequitable not to hear any additional argument by Defendant given the additional time granted Plaintiff to correct prior deficiencies.

 

The Court is likely to take the matter under submission and rule early next week.

CV-24-003698 - MCKEE, KONI vs DICKEYS BBQ PIT - Defendant’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court needs to hear from the proprietors and Plaintiff as to this request to determine whether the motion should be granted with a near trial date. (See: Manfredi and Levine v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App. 4th 1128.)

CV-24-006292 - RICHARDSON, CHELSEY vs TELECARE CORPORATION - Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement - GRANTED.

Tentative Ruling: This is a wage and hours case in which it appears to the Court that the parties engaged in arm’s-length negotiation to reach a settlement. The Court finds the proposed settlement is within the range of reasonableness and is deemed to be presumptively valid, subject to any objections that may be heard at the final fairness hearing and subject to final approval by this Court. 

 

Settlement Structure and Key Terms:

The Settlement Agreement (which is attached as Ex. 1 to the Declaration of William C. Sung) provides a Gross Settlement Amount (GSA) of $2,025,000.00, non-reversionary, to resolve class and PAGA claims for a Class Period and PAGA Period of March 16, 2023, to September 1, 2025.

Proposed Deductions:

Attorneys’ fees not to exceed 35% ($708,750);

Up to $35,000 in litigation costs;

Service awards of up to $10,000 per Class Representative (total $30,000);

Administration costs estimated not to exceed $39,950;

PAGA penalties of $100,000, allocated 75% ($75,000) to the LWDA and 25% ($25,000) to the Aggrieved Employees.

Distribution Methodology:

The Net Settlement Amount (NSA = GSA less court-approved fees, costs, service awards, PAGA penalties, administration expenses, and employer payroll taxes) will be distributed to Participating Class Members based on pro rata workweeks.  For tax purposes, the payment allocation is 20% wages (W-2, with withholdings from the GSA for employer payroll taxes) and 80% interest/penalties (1099). Aggrieved Employees will receive Individual PAGA Payments, pro rata by pay periods, regardless of opt-out.

Escalator Clause:

The Agreement includes an escalator tied to total workweeks between March 16, 2023, and May 8, 2025, with a per-workweek value of $6.63; the GSA increases proportionately if workweeks exceed 305,278 by more than 5%, and Defendant may cap at 305,278 by closing the Class Period when reached.

 

The Court provisionally certifies the settlement class for settlement purposes only.

 

The Court appoints Plaintiffs Chelsey Richardson, Bethany Jeanne Reinker, and Charmaine Huff as Class Representatives.

 

The Court appoints Larry W. Lee and Max Gavron of Diversity Law Group, P.C., William L. Marder of Polaris Law Group, William C. Sung, Tiffany L. Luu, and Joseph C. Ramli of Justice for Workers, PC, and Blake R. Jones of Blake Jones Law, PC as Class Counsel.

 

The Court appoints Phoenix Settlement Administrators as Settlement Administrator.

 

The Court preliminarily approves the proposed settlement, including the allocation of PAGA penalties, subject to final approval.

 

The Court approves the form and manner of the proposed Class Notice and directs the Settlement Administrator to mail notice consistent with the schedule set forth in the proposed order.

 

Defendant shall provide class data to the Settlement Administrator within 30 days of entry of the Preliminary Approval Order.

 

The Settlement Administrator shall mail notice within 15 days of receipt of the class data.

 

Class Members shall have 45 days from the initial mailing to submit requests for exclusion, objections, or challenges, with a 14-day extension for re-mailed notices.

 

The Court sets the Final Approval Hearing on May 29, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 21. Plaintiffs shall file moving papers in support of final approval no later than 16 court days before the hearing.

 

Proceedings are stayed pending the Final Approval Hearing, except as necessary to implement the settlement and this order.

CV-25-005913 - JRP REALTY GROUP vs GARCHA, HARINDER SINGH - a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel - GRANTED;  b) Defendant Harinder Singh Garcha’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint - STRICKEN without prejudice.

a) Based on the testimony by the witnesses, including the statements by Mr. Gill, the Court finds factually that the meeting was designed to effectuate a resolution of the matter via “informal means.” At the time of the meeting, JRP Realty Group was represented and Mr. Pannu was either empowered to negotiate or would have contact with decision-makers for Plaintiff.

The Court is unconvinced that privileged information was shared; the testimony was non-specific and unhelpful on that matter. But while Mr. Gill now contends that he had no intention to negotiate, the idea that the meeting might lead to a resolution is definitionally negotiating.

 

The Court must consider the interests of parties to have counsel of their choice against the need to maintain ethical standards. (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135.) Either the meeting was pointless, or the meeting was intended to assist in reaching a resolution. The Court finds the latter. That’s a negotiation.

 

This is consistent with Mr. Gill’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing.

 

Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 forbids such contact. Mr. Gill’s preliminary statements of who he represented and what the limitations of his participation were further indicate that the conversation was about the subject case and was intended to be conveyed to the corporate party. 

 

The Court orders Mr. Gill to notify his former client of this ruling within three days of this ruling, and sets the matter for a Case Status Review on April 2, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 21.

b) As the demurrer was authored by an attorney who was disqualified by his prior actions, it must be stricken.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-001197 - BELL, WILLIAM vs BENHAM, CHRISTOPHER - Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment to Add Primetime Event Medical LLC and Jesse Medlock as Alter Ego Judgment Debtors - DENIED.

By way of this motion, Plaintiff seeks to amend the judgment to add Primetime Event Medical LLC and Jesse Medlock as alter ego debtors.

The motion is procedurally defective. There is no notice of motion and no separate, supporting memorandum. There is no supporting declaration. There is no proof of service showing service on Defendant Christopher Benham as an individual or Jesse Medlock as an individual.

Furthermore, Primetime Event Medical LLC is not simply a dba (meaning a trade name or fictitious business name). According to the Secretary of State’s website, it is a registered limited liability company with several corporate agents (none of which are named Christopher Benham or Jesse Medlock), with a service address that is different from the addresses listed on the proofs of service. (See Search | California Secretary of State, https://bizfileonline.sos.ca.gov/search/business.)

Moreover, regarding Jesse Medlock, the Court is unaware of any California case holding that one natural individual can be the alter ego of another natural individual. The doctrine of alter ego requires a fictional legal entity whose separateness is being disregarded. Real individuals are not fictional legal entities, so there is no “veil” to pierce.

In any case, alter ego liability requires proving two elements: (1) such unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that their separate personalities do not in reality exist, and (2) an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone. (See Angel Lynn Realty, Inc. v. George (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 655, 663.) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing both requirements. (See id., at p. 665.) The instant motion fails to satisfy that burden.

CV-24-005247 - HOLLANDS, CORY vs ENVIRO TECH CHEMICAL SERVICES INC - Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and Class Representative Service Payment - HEARING REQUIRED.

Based on the moving papers and supporting evidence, the Court will GRANT the motion with modification absent any objections. It appears that proper notice to the settlement class has been given in compliance with the law and as required by the Court’s order granting preliminary approval. Having considered the unopposed motion herein and the supporting declarations and evidence, the Court finds that the settlement was entered into good faith, is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and satisfies the standards for final approval under California law. (Civil Code § 1781; Code Civ. Proc. § 382; Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.769.) Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the proposed settlement and the associated fees and costs are approved as set forth in the motions and supporting papers, as follows:

        Gross Settlement Amount: $915,000

        Fees and costs of Settlement Administrator: $5,550;

        Payment to Class Representative: $10,000;

        PAGA allocation to LWDA (65%) and class members (35%): $60,000;

        Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees: $320,250; and

        Class Counsel’s costs: $19,312.99.

The Court notes that Class Counsel requested $20,366.48 in costs, but the Court disallows the following: the LexisNexis legal research fee of $900.00, the in-house photocopying charge of $87.90, and postage of $65.59 (total of $1,053.49). These costs should be part of overhead, especially in a case where Class Counsel is receiving 35% of the gross settlement amount for attorneys’ fees.

In accordance with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 384 and pursuant to the suggestion in the proposed order, the Court sets a compliance hearing for October 2, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22, to confirm full administration of the settlement. The Settlement Administrator shall submit a compliance report no later than five court days before the date of the hearing, which shall include the total amount that was actually paid to the class members pursuant to the subject settlement. In addition, at the time of the compliance hearing, the Court shall amend the judgment to direct that the sum of the unpaid funds be distributed to the State Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. To that end, Class Counsel shall submit a proposed amended judgment at least five court days before the compliance hearing.

The Court orders that Notice of the Court’s Order Granting Final Approval and Judgment be posted on the Settlement Administrator’s website for a period of at least 90 days. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.771(b).)

Class Counsel is ordered to submit a new proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling.

CV-25-001300 - JONSON, AMANDA vs AMAN, MUAZZUM, MD - Plaintiff's Application of Gregg A Hubley, Esq. for Leave to Appear as Counsel Pro Hac Vice - GRANTED, and unopposed.

As the application of Attorney Gregg A. Hubley to appear pro hac vice substantially complies with the requirements of rule 9.40 of the California Rules of Court and is unopposed, the application is GRANTED. The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the application. 

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Marie Silveria sitting on assignment in Department 23:

CV-24-000134 - ZAMORA, EBERARDO vs LAZCANO, MANUEL - Defendant's Motion to Tax Costs, Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(B) and Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1032 and 1033.5 - GRANTED, and unopposed.

 

Based on the papers submitted, and in view of Plaintiff’s stated non-opposition, the Court finds that Defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that the challenged cost item is not recoverable under Code Civ. Proc. §1033.5. Therefore, the Court orders that Plaintiff’s claimed costs should be taxed in the amount of $3,750, representing voluntary mediation fees. As a result, the amount claimed in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs shall be reduced by $3,750, for a total cost award of $7,018.65.

CV-24-009549 - PERRY, SARAH RACHEL vs MYERS TOWING INC - Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - HEARING REQUIRED.

Counsel shall appear to provide the Court with further information regarding the grounds for the motion, including the failure to demonstrate attempts to obtain the client’s consent to substitution of attorneys. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1362(c).)

The Court further notes that the proposed order fails to include the client’s telephone number as required in Item 6, and it reflects an outdated CMC date. In the event the Court determines to grant the motion, counsel will be required to submit a revised form of order correcting these items. In addition, effectiveness will be delayed until counsel submits proof of service of the signed order on the client. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1362(e).)

CV-25-006984 - BOUTELLE, DEREK vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA - Defendant's Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration - GRANTED.

The Court finds that the parties entered an enforceable agreement to arbitrate in connection with the warranty claims asserted in this action. Specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint expressly acknowledges the existence of an express warranty agreement between the parties and also admits that he availed himself of its benefits in presenting his vehicle for repairs under the subject warranty.  Therefore, Plaintiff is equitably estopped from claiming the benefits of that agreement while simultaneously attempting to avoid the burdens it imposes.

With regard to Plaintiff’s claims of unconscionability , the Court finds several elements of procedural unconscionability are present in the agreement within the warranty documents. However, the Court finds no indication of substantive unconscionability therein. Therefore, the agreement is not rendered unenforceable on that ground.

Moreover, even if the Court were persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments against the arbitration agreement contained within the warranty documents, the Court finds that the parties entered into a second agreement to arbitrate in connection with the Connected Services Agreement relative to Plaintiff’s vehicle, and that such agreement encompasses the claims at issue in this action. The Connected Services Agreement expressly delegates issues of enforceability, such as unconscionability, to the exclusive determination of the arbitrator; therefore, the Court makes no findings as to Plaintiff’s argument in that regard.

All further proceedings in the instant action are stayed pending completion of the arbitration.  (9 U.S.C. § 3.)

UD-25-001397 - MA, HAIN Y vs DOUANGKAM, ALLEN - Defendant Alexandria Nevarez’s Demurrer to Unlawful Detainer Complaint - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court is inclined to OVERRULE the demurrer, finding the 3-Day Notice was sufficient.

However, the Court intends to hear from the parties on the issue at the time of the hearing.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-20-004732 - WILLIAMS, R MICHAEL, MD vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO INC - a) Defendants Hospitalists of Modesto Medical Group, Inc., Arun Manoharan, M.D., and Li Huang, M.D.’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint and to Dismiss the Action -  DENIED; b) Defendants Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc.; Tenet Healthcare Corporation; Warren Kirkk; Mark Fahlen, MD; Marny Fern; and Cheryl Harless's Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint - SUSTAINED, with leave to amend in part; c) Defendants Hospitalists of Modesto Medical Group, Inc.; Arun Manoharan, M.D.; and Li Huang, M.D.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint - SUSTAINED, with leave to amend in part.

a) Given that Plaintiff originally presented their Third Amended Complaint in a timely manner for filing, the court elects to exercise its discretion to decline to strike Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 201(i) (1997), Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 201(i) (1997); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct., (2006)144 Cal. App. 4^th 19; Carlson v. State of California Dep't of Fish & Game, (1998) 68 Cal. App. 4th 1268).

b) The Court finds that the individual Defendants could not have restricted Plaintiff’s physician privileges as said restrictions may only be issued by the Executive Medical Committee of a hospital for a medical or disciplinary cause or reason” after the requisite peer review proceeding. Further, Defendant DMC did not take any adverse action against Plaintiff’s physician privileges. (Bus. and Prof. Code §§ 805, 809; Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees of Saint Agnes Medical Center (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 607, rehearing denied, as modified, review denied; Sahlolbei v. Providence Healthcare, Inc., (2003) 112 Cal. App. 4th 1137, review denied, on remand 2004 WL 5608010; Econ. v. Sutter E. Bay Hosps., (2019) 31 Cal. App. 5th 1147; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Sacramento County Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, rehearing denied, review denied). 

The Court notes that in Economy v Sutter East Bay Hospital the Court attributed the Plaintiff’s Medical Groups’ removal of the Plaintiff from the anesthesia schedule at the request/ direction of the hospital, to the hospital, finding that the hospital’s “request was the functional equivalent of a decision to suspend and later revoke plaintiff's clinical privileges.” (Econ. v. Sutter E. Bay Hosps., (2019) 31 Cal. App. 5th 1147).

The Court also notes Plaintiff’s heavy reliance on Westlake but also notes that though the revocation there was not based on a quasi-judicial proceeding, said revocation was still the decision of the hospital though arguably outside the peer review context. (Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, (1976))17 Cal.3d 465). No such decision by the hospital was made here.

The Court also notes that in Payne, also relied on by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’ Payne’s claims did not involve a cause of action for restriction or revocation of privileges.  (Payne v. Anaheim Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., (2005)130 Cal. App. 4th 729).

Given that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to assert a cause of action for restriction of privileges, the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable. Assuming that the actions challenged by Plaintiff were those of the hospital, the general rule however is that a party must exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking relief in the courts has no application in a situation where an administrative remedy is unavailable or inadequate. (Payne v. Anaheim Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., (2005)130 Cal. App. 4th 729).

According to DMC’s Bylaws, Art. VIII. Section 1, 2 and 3, the administrative remedies/procedures therein outlined relate only to decisions regarding a physician’s privileges made by the Medical Executive Committee for a medical disciplinary cause or reason preceded by a Notice and Hearing which did not occur here. In the absence of an adequate remedy, Plaintiff could not have been required to exhaust the stated administrative remedies.  (Payne v. Anaheim Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., (2005)130 Cal. App. 4th 729).

Plaintiff’s Second, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action have overlapping requirements. As to the Second Cause of Action for Interference With the Right to Provide Medical Care, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state the improper or unjustified nature of the alleged interference.

As to the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action, Plaintiff filed to allege facts stating the independently wrongful nature of the alleged conduct. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134; Roth v. Rhodes, (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530).

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s First and Third Causes of Action is sustained without leave to amend. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 430.10 (e), 430.30(a)).

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action is also sustained with leave to amend. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 430.10 (e), 430.30(a)).

Defendants request for Judicial Notice is granted.

Plaintiff shall file their Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order.

c) The Court finds that the Defendant Hospitalists could not have restricted Plaintiff’s physician privileges as said restrictions may only be issued by the Executive Medical Committee of a hospital for a medical or disciplinary cause or reason” after the requisite peer review proceeding. (Bus. and Prof. Code §§ 805, 809; Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees of Saint Agnes Medical Center (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 607, rehearing denied, as modified, review denied; Sahlolbei v. Providence Healthcare, Inc., (2003) 112 Cal. App. 4th 1137, review denied, on remand 2004 WL 5608010; Econ. v. Sutter E. Bay Hosps., (2019) 31 Cal. App. 5th 1147; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Sacramento County Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, rehearing denied, review denied). 

The Court notes that in Economy v Sutter East Bay Hospital the Court attributed the Plaintiff’s Medical Groups’ removal of the Plaintiff from the anesthesia schedule at the request/ direction of the hospital, to the hospital, finding that the hospital’s “request was the functional equivalent of a decision to suspend and later revoke plaintiff's clinical privileges.” (Econ. v. Sutter E. Bay Hosps., (2019) 31 Cal. App. 5th 1147).

The Court also notes Plaintiff’s heavy reliance on Westlake but also notes that though the revocation there was not based on a quasi-judicial proceeding, said revocation was still the decision of the hospital though arguably outside the peer review context. (Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, (1976))17 Cal.3d 465). No such decision by the hospital was made here.

The Court also notes that in Payne, also relied on by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’ Payne’s claims did not involve a cause of action for restriction or revocation of privileges.  (Payne v. Anaheim Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., (2005)130 Cal. App. 4th 729).

Given that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to assert a cause of action for restriction of privileges, the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable. Assuming that the actions challenged by Plaintiff were those of the hospital, the general rule however is that a party must exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking relief in the courts has no application in a situation where an administrative remedy is unavailable or inadequate. (Payne v. Anaheim Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., (2005)130 Cal. App. 4th 729).

According to DMC’s Bylaws, Art. VIII. Section 1, 2 and 3, the administrative remedies/procedures therein outlined relate only to decisions regarding a physician’s privileges made by the Medical Executive Committee for a medical disciplinary cause or reason preceded by a Notice and Hearing which did not occur here. In the absence of an adequate remedy, Plaintiff could not have been required to exhaust the stated administrative remedies.  (Payne v. Anaheim Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., (2005)130 Cal. App. 4th 729).

Plaintiff’s Second, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action have overlapping requirements. As to the Second Cause of Action for Interference With the Right to Provide Medical Care, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state the improper or unjustified nature of the alleged interference.

As to the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action, Plaintiff filed to allege facts stating the independently wrongful nature of the alleged conduct. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134; Roth v. Rhodes, (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530).

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s First and Third Causes of Action is sustained without leave to amend. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 430.10 (e), 430.30(a)).

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action is also sustained with leave to amend. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 430.10 (e), 430.30(a)).

Defendants request for Judicial Notice is granted.

Plaintiff shall file their Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order.

CV-22-004051 - KING, THOMAS vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO INC - Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto Inc's Motion to Dismiss Unserved Defendants Pursuant to CCP 583.210 - 583.250 - GRANTED, unopposed.

Good cause existing unserved Defendants Warren Kirk  and Cheryl Harless are hereby dismissed from this action with prejudice. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 583.210 and 583.250; Slaybaugh v. Superior Court in and for Santa Clara County (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 216).

CV-25-004683 - SALVATIERRA, LUIS vs FREEWAY INSURANCE SERVICES AMERICA LLC - Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request for Stay - DROPPED at moving party’s request.

CV-25-005200 - DUNHAM, DAVID vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC - Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.’s Motion for Protective Order re: Excessive Discovery Propounded by Plaintiff - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

A preliminary review of Defendant’s motion indicates that Defendant’s claims potentially have merit.

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Counsel failed to engage in good faith meet and confer despite Defendant’s Counsel’s two attempts in that regard. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.020, 2016.040). Accordingly, this matter is continued to March 11, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court. In the interim, the  parties shall  engage in the required meet and confer, which will also serve to reduce the burden of the court and promote judicial efficiency.

The parties shall file a Joint Status Statement regarding the outcome of the meet and confer no later than five (5) court days prior to the next hearing.

Both parties are reminded that a reasonable good faith meet and confer towards informal  resolution “means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent to persuade the objector of the error of his ways” and “ something more than bickering with opposing counsel; rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.”  (Clement v. Alegre, (2009)177 Cal. App. 4th 1277, 1294).

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no tentative rulings for Department 19***